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FRANCE   AND   THE   ALLIANCES 


WORKS  BY   THE   SAME  AUTHOR 


Diplomatic  Questions  of  the  Year  1904 

(^French  policy  —  Eastern  qtustion  —  Russo-Japanese 
war)  Paris,  1905.  Published  by  Felix  Alcan  (jvork 
to  which  a  prize  was  awarded  by  the  French  Academy) . 

The  Conference  of  Algeciras 

(^Diplomatic  history  of  the  Moroccan  crisis)  Second 
Edition,  revised.  Paris,  1907.  Published  by  Felix 
Alcan. 

Notes  on  the  United  States 

{Society  —  Politics  —  Diplomacy)  Third  Edition. 
Paris,  1908.     Published  by  Calmann-Levy. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 


THE  STEUGGLE  FOE  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER 


BY 

ANDRE   TARDIEU 


HONORARY   FIRST   SECRETARY   IN   THE   FRENCH 
DIPLOMATIC    SERVICE 


THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

1908 

All  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1908, 
By  the  MACMILLAN   COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  October,  1908. 
HiLHRV  MORSE  STEPHEfclS 


Nortoooti  33re08 

J.  S.  Cashing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

Having  been  requested,  in  1908,  to  deliver,  under 
the  auspices  of  the  French  Circle  of  Harvard  Univer- 
sity, the  annual  course  of  lectures  there,  founded  by 
Mr.  James  H.  Hyde  a  dozen  years  ago,  I  explained  in 
my  eight  lessons  the  subject  treated  of  in  this  book. 
Although  to-day,  in  its  published  form,  my  subject 
contains  developments  which  would  not  have  been 
possible  in  a  three  weeks'  series  of  lectures,  I  have 
modified  neither  its  spirit,  nor  its  plan,  nor  its  conclu- 
sions. 

Its  spirit  first.  Cultivated  Americans,  who  have 
in  their  universities  such  an  admirable  instrument  of 
work,  are  all  acquainted  with  France  of  the  past ;  her 
history,  her  literature,  and  her  art.  To  show  them 
France  of  to-day,  in  presence  of  Europe  and  the  world, 
such  as  she  has  been  shaped,  after  painful  experiences, 
by  thirty-eight  years  of  sustained  effort  and  diplomatic 
action,  is  the  aim  that  I  have  proposed  to  myself. 

The  plan  resulted  from  the  subject  itself.  It  was 
through  the  Russian  Alliance  that  France  issued  from 
the  isolation  in  which  she  had  been  placed  by  defeat. 
It  was  by  her  understandings  with  Great  Britain,  Italy, 
and  Spain  that  she  subsequently  pursued  the  satisfac- 
tion of  her  interests.  It  is  in  presence  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  dominated  by  Germany,  that  she  has  raised 
the  edifice  of  her  agreements.  It  is  against  Germany 
that  she  has  been  compelled  to  defend  and  complete  it. 
Such  is  the  woof  of  this  book  of  contemporary  history, 
which  is  supplemented  by  a  necessary  study  of  Franco- 
American  relations. 


5^9709 


vi  PREFACE 

My  conclusions  come  out  on  each  page  from  the  nar- 
ration of  events.  In  this  diplomatic  drama,  the  unity 
of  which  is  equal  to  that  of  the  antique  tragedies, 
France  has  fought  for  the  balance  of  power.  Both 
militarily  and  politically  destroyed  in  1871  by  Ger- 
many's triumph,  this  equilibrium  has  been  gradually 
reconstituted.  It  exists  to-day.  But  it  is  unstable. 
The  heirs  of  Bismarck  have  not  yet  resigned  themselves 
to  the  loss  of  the  hegemony  which  —  though  it  could 
be  only  temporary  —  he  had  secured  for  his  country. 
Will  they  accept  the  new  order  of  things  which,  through 
symmetric  groupings  of  Powers,  expresses  the  necessity 
for  stability  in  the  various  international  elements  ? 
This  is  a  question  that,  in  the  near  future,  will  be  set- 
tled either  by  peace  or  war. 

A  Frenchman  could  not  treat  such  a  subject  other- 
wise than  from  a  French  point  of  view.  But  to  try 
to  understand  one's  adversaries  is  already  to  do  them 
justice.  With  this  spirit  of  justice  I  have  endeavoured 
to  inspire  myself,  yet  not  seeking  to  hide  errors,  which 
indeed  do  not  fundamentally  affect  the  whole  of  the 
French  achievement. 

If  Americans  should  see  in  this  book,  which  has  been 
written  in  good  faith,  fresh  reasons  for  loving  and 
esteeming  France,  then  I  shall  have  attained  my  object. 
The  historic  souvenirs  which  unite  the  two  Republics 
have  created  imperishable  ties  between  them.  Being 
convinced  that  they  may  find  in  the  study  of  the  present 
time  a  positive  justification  for  their  old  sympathies, 
I  have  striven  to  the  best  of  my  ability  to  make  this 
justification  clear,  by  telling,  in  the  field  of  diplomatic 
action,  the  struggles  of  France  for  peace  through  the 
balance  of  power. 

Paris,  September  1, 1908. 


CONTENTS 

PA6B 

Preface        v 

CHAPTER   I 

France  and  the  Russian  Alliance 1 

I.  Geographical  necessity  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alli- 
ance —  Hindrances  —  Mistakes  of  the  Second  Empire  —  In- 
stitutions —  Men —  Rapprochement  —  European  equilibrium 

—  Scare  of  1875  —  Bulgarian  incident  of  1887  —  Russian  loans 

—  Nihilists  —  Weapons  and  arms  ordered  —  Cronstadt  — 
Protocols  of  1891  and  1892. 

II.  Franco-Russian  Alliance  judged  by  contemporary 
opinion  —  Speeches  of  the  Baron  de  Mohrenheira,  Mr.  de 
Freycinet,  and  Mr.  Ribot  —  Practice  of  the  Alliance  — 
Franco-Russian  fetes  —  Their  exaggeration  —  Subaltern  posi- 
tion of  France. 

III.  Deviation  of  the  Alliance  —  Trans-Siberian  Railway 

—  Chinese  question  between  1895  and  1902  —  Franco-Rus- 
sian note  of  March  19,  1902  —  Mr.  Delcass^  and  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war  —  French  disappointment  —  Mr.  Combes' 
mistakes  in  tact  —  Manchuria  and  Morocco  —  Franco-Rus- 
sian set-back. 

IV.  Future  of  the  Alliance  —  Veering  of  French  opinion 
in  favour  of  Russia  —  Mr.  Isvolsky  and  the  return  to  Europe 

—  Mr.  Isvolsky  and  the  Alliance  of  the  Three  Emperors  — 
Mr.  Bompard  superseded  —  Financial  and  economic  rela- 
tions —  Russian  Army  and  the  reforms  necessary  —  Lasting 
necessity  of  the  Alliance. 

CHAPTER   II 

France  and  the  English  "Entente" 35 

I.  Franco-English  rivalry  —  Three  centuries  of  war  — 
Attempts  at  an  understanding,  and  their  failure  —  Algeria 

—  Tunis  —  The  Niger  —  The  Congo  —  The  Upper  Nile  and 
Egypt  —  Fashoda. 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

II.  Causes  of  the  Franco-English  rapprochement  —  Ger- 
many and  England  —  Bismarck's  policy  —  German  progress 

—  Commercial  competition  —  English  merchants  and  con- 
suls— Political  distrust — British  impeachment  —  France  and 
the  balance  of  power  —  Franco-English  commerce  —  End  of 
the  colonial  quarrel. 

III.  Entente  Cordiale  —  Role  of  Edward  VII  —  Visit  of 
1903  —  Negotiations  —  Agreement  of  the  8th  of  April,  1904 

—  Egypt  —  Morocco  —  Value  of  the  arrangement  —  Franco- 
English  manifestations  —  German  policy  and  the  evolution 
of  the  Entente  Cordiale  —  Anglo-Russian  rapprochement. 

IV.  Entente  or  Alliance  —  Military  problem  —  Weakness 
of  the  English  Army  —  Mr.  Haldane's  reforms  —  Their  in- 
suflBciency  —  State  of  English  opinion  —  French  interests  — 
Policy  of  neutrality  —  Conditions  of  an  Alliance  —  Failing 
these  conditions,  friends,  but  not  allies. 


CHAPTER  III 

France  and  the  Mediterranean  Understandings  .         .       81 

I.  Franco-Italian  understanding  —  France  and  the  Medi- 
terranean—  Italy  and  the  Mediterranean  —  Franco-Italian 
hostility  —  Tunis  and  the  Triple  Alliance  —  Crispinism  — 
Causes  of  the  Franco-Italian  rapprochement  —  Tunisian 
treaties  —  Treaty  of  Commerce  —  Political  agreements  — 
Morocco  and  Tripoli — The  rapprochement  and  the  Triple 
Alliance — England  and  the  rapprochement — The  rapproche- 
ment and  African  problems  —  Conclusion. 

II.  Franco-Spanish  understanding  —  Spain  after  the  war 

—  Economic  situation  —  Moroccan  aspirations — Penal  settle- 
ments—  Spain  and  France  —  Period  of  the  Triple  Alliance 

—  Difficulties  in  coming  to  an  understanding  with  regard  to 
Morocco  —  First  negotiations  —  Spain  and  the  Franco-Eng- 
lish agreement  —  Franco-Spanish  agreement  —  Trans-Pyre- 
nean  railways  —  Alfonso  XIII  and  the  Western  Powers. 

III.  France  and  Morocco  —  Moroccan  exclusiveness  — 
Early  reign  of  Abd  el  Aziz  —  Moroccan  wealth  —  Franco- 
Moroccan  commerce  —  Morocco  and  Algeria  —  Franco-Mo- 
roccan relations  —  R^voil  —  Guebbas  agreements  —  French 
programme  of  reforms  —  Pacific  penetration. 


CONTENTS  ix 

CHAPTER  IV 

PA6B 

France  and  the  Triple  Alliance 123 

I.  Formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance  —  Crisis  of  1875  and 
the  Russian  intervention  —  Bismarck  and  the  ^'■coalition 
nightmare''''  —  Congress  of  Berlin  —  Austro-German  Alli- 
ance—  Italy's  accession  —  Isolation  of  France. 

II.  Hegemony  of  the  Triple  Alliance  —  Kalnoky  and 
Crispi — Bismarck  and  Russia — Triple  "  Counter-assurance" 
of  Skiernevice  —  Double  "Counter-assurance"  of  1887  — 
Bismarck  and  England  —  Bismarck  and  French  colonial 
policy  —  Bismarck's  threats  —  Military  laws  —  Speeches  of 
the  8th  of  January,  1888,  and  the  consequences. 

III.  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  — 
German  anxiety  —  German  attempt  to  capture  the  Dual  Alli- 
ance —  Advances  of  William  II  —  Policy  of  William  II  — 
Cooperation  of  the  two  systems. — Favourable  situation  of 
Germany  —  Mr.  von  Buelow's  mistake. 

IV.  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Western  understandings  — 
Apprehensions  of  William  II  —  Economic  crisis  in  Germany 

—  Germany  and  Italy  —  Italy  and  Austria  —  Speeches  of 
William  II  —  Policy  of  reserve  —  Russian  defeats  —  Conflict 
of  the  Alliances. 

CHAPTER  V 

Conflict  of  the  Alliances 170 

I.  German  offensive  —  Mr.  von  Kuhlmann's  statements 

—  Cause  and  pretext  —  William  II  at  Tangier  —  Mistakes 
of  Mr.  Delcass6  —  Prince  Henckel  of  Donnersmarck  —  Scare 
in  France  —  Mr.  Delcass^'s  resignation. 

II.  German  success  —  Mr.  Rouvier  and  the  conference  — 
Acceptance  of  the  conference  by  France  —  Moroccan  con- 
cessions of  Germany  —  Success  of  the  great  German  design. 

III.  German  discomfiture  —  Situation  just  before  Alge- 
ciras  —  Germany's  error  —  Fluctuations  of  German  policy  — 
Ends  and  means — "European  reprobation"  —  Failure  of 
the  German  attempt  to  restore  the  Bismarckian  hegemony  — 
Russian  Alliance  and  the  Western  understandings  —  Triple 
Alliance  —  Opinion  in  Germany  —  Resignation  of  Prince  von 
Buelow  to  the  inevitable. 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VI 

PAGE 

The  New  Asiatic  and  European  Understandings         .        .     210 

I.  Asia  and  the  German  policy  —  Sino-Japanese  war  — 
Combined  action  of  Germany,  France,  and  Russia  —  The 
"break-up  of  China"  —  Crisis  of  1900  —  Russo-Japanese 
war  —  German  profit  —  Three  risks  of  France. 

II.  Asia  and  the  French  policy  —  Russo-Japanese 
reconciliation  and  the  agreements  of  1907  —  Franco-Japan- 
ese reconciliation  —  Anglo-Russian  reconciliation  —  Persia, 
Afghanistan,  Thibet,  the  Persian  Gulf  —  France  and  the 
Anglo-Russian  agreement  —  French  profit  accruing  from  it. 

III.  European  developments  —  Evolution  of  the  Anglo- 
Russian  understanding —  Germany's  attitude  —  Interview  at 
Revel  —  Anglo-Russian  understanding  in  Macedonia  —  End 
of  the  Austro-Russian  understanding  —  Anglo-Spanish  and 
Franco-Spanish  agreements  —  Tendency  to  an  equilibrium. 

CHAPTER  VII 

France  and  the  United  States 266 

I,  Sentiment  and  business  —  Souvenirs  of  the  Inde- 
pendence struggle  —  Two  Sister  Republics  —  Politics  and 
the  "Imponderable" — Franco- American  manifestations  — 
Words  and  Deeds  —  Franco- American  commerce  —  Com- 
mercial agreements  —  Possible  improvements  —  France  and 
the  American  financial  crisis  of  1907. 

II.  Politics  —  France  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  —  Ameri- 
can affairs  —  France  and  the  "  big  stick  "  —  Asiatic  affairs  — 
United  States  and  the  "  Open  Door"  —  Mr.  Hay  and  Russia 
—  United  States  and  Japan  —  Franco- Japanese  agreement 
and  the  United  States  —  European  affairs  —  United  States 
and  the  Moroccan  crisis  —  Conference  of  Algeciras  —  Reasons 
of  the  American  policy  —  United  States  and  the  Entente 
Cordiale  —  United  States  and  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe. 

CHAPTER   VIII 

France  and  Peace 300 

Conclusion. 

Index  or  Proper  Names 311 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 


CHAPTER  I 

FRANCE    AND   THE    RUSSIAN   ALLIANCE 

I.  Geographic  necessity  of  the  Franco-Russian  AUiance.  —  Hin- 
drances. —  Mistakes  of  the  Second  Empire.  —  Institutions.  — 
Men.  —  Rapprochement.  —  European  equihbrium.  —  Scare 
of  1875.  —  Bulgarian  incident  of  1887.  —  Russian  loans. — 
Nihilists.  —  Weapons  and  arms  ordered.  —  Cronstadt.  — 
Protocols  of  1891  and  1892. 
II,    Franco-Russian  Alliance  judged  by  contemporary  opinion. 

—  Speeches  of  the  Baron  de  Mohrenheim,  Mr.  de  Freycinet, 
and  Mr.  Ribot.  —  Practice  of  the  Alliance.  —  Franco- 
Russian  fetes.  —  Their  exaggeration.  —  Subaltern  position 
of  France. 

III.  Deviation  of  the  AUiance.  —  Trans-Siberian  Railway.  — 
Chinese  question  between  1895  and  1902.  —  Franco-Russian 
note  of  March  19,  1902.  —  Mr.  Delcasse  and  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war.  —  French  disappointment.  —  Mr.  Combes' 
mistakes  in  tact.  —  Manchuria  and  Morocco.  —  Franco- 
Russian  set-back. 

IV.  Future  of  the  AUiance.  —  Veering  of  French  opinion  in 
favour  of  Russia.  —  Mr.  Isvolski  and  the  return  to  Europe. 

—  Mr.  Isvolski  and  the  AUiance  of  the  Three  Emperors.  — 
Mr.  Bompard  superseded.  —  Financial  and  economic  re- 
lations. —  Russian  Army  and  the  reforms  necessary.  — 
Lasting  necessity  of  the  Alliance. 

I 

The  Franco- Russian  Alliance  may  be  considered 
as  a  perfect  type  of  the  "manage  de  raison^^ ;  not 
that  by  this  should  be  understood  a  bond  imposed 


'^?c^s>re,2':  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

upon  the  contracting  parties  through  a  will  foreign 
to  their  own,  but  one  which,  suggested  first  by  a 
correct  appreciation  of  interests,  corresponded,  when 
once  formed,  to  the  sentiments  of  each. 

To  be  convinced  of  this,  one  needs  only  to  ex- 
amine a  map.  From  time  immemorial,  France,  as 
a  continental  power,  badly  protected  on  her  north- 
eastern frontier,  had  found  herself  on  land  in  rivalry, 
if  not  in  open  struggle,  with  her  eastern  neighbour, 
formerly  Austria,  to-day  Germany.  And  always 
also,  in  order  to  keep  this  rival  or  adversary  at 
arm's  length,  she  was  obliged  to  seek  allies  in  the 
east  of  Europe,  —  Turks,  Swedes,  Poles,  these  last 
more  recently  replaced  by  Russians.  In  1717,  Peter 
the  Great,  during  his  travels  in  France,  said  to  the 
Regent  Philippe  d'Orleans,  when  offering  him  his 
alliance,  ^^I  will  stand  to  you  in  the  stead  of 
Poland,  Turkey,  and  Sweden."  ^  A  century  and  a 
half  later,  at  the  close  of  the  Crimean  war,  Bis- 
marck expressed  the  opinion  that  a  ^^Franco-Rus- 
sian Alliance  was  in  the  nature  of  things.''  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Russian  Empire  and  the  French 
Republic  worked  for  the  increase  of  their  own 
security  by  fortifying  the  equilibrium  of  Europe,  on 
the  day  that  they  recorded  in  a  treaty  of  alliance 
the  lasting  community  of  their  essential  interests. 

In  order  to  succeed  in  concluding  this   Alliance, 

both  French  and  Russians  had  a  good  deal  to  undo. 

Of    the   various  regimes  in   power  since   1815,   the 

Government  of  the  Restoration  alone,  and  notably 

*  See  Albert  Vandal  in  his  Louis  XV  and  Elizabeth  of  Russia. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE  3 

that  of  Charles  X,  had  clearly  understood  the  profit 
France  would  derive  from  a  rapj)rochement  with 
Russia.  The  Due  de  Richelieu^  Chateaubriand^  and 
Polignac  were  the  first  partisans  of  the  Russian  Al- 
liance. And  it  was  largely  because  he  was  assured 
of  Russians  support  that^  in  spite  of  England's 
threats,  the  last  mentioned  statesman  undertook  the 
Algerian  expedition.  On  the  other  hand,  the  reign  % 
of  Napoleon  III  had  a  deplorable  influence  on  French  « 
relations  with  Russia.  The  Crimean  campaign  was 
a  mistake ;  and  the  policy  followed  in  the  affairs  of 
Poland  was  another.  When  the  war  of  1870  broke 
out,  Russia  did  nothing  to  defend  us.  During  his 
stay  in  Saint  Petersburg,  Thiers  obtained  neither 
^^understanding  nor  engagement.''  The  Czar  saw 
in  our  disasters  nothing  more  than  an  opportunity 
to  bring  about  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris. 
Gortchakoff  had  full  confidence  in  Prussia;  and  this 
confidence  was  destined  to  last  until  the  Congress 
of  Berlin.  The  diplomatic  combination  known  un- 
der the  name  of  the  Alliance  of  the  Three  Em- 
perors left  France  isolated.  Vanquished  and  alone, 
she  had  only  herself  to  rely  on. 

Many  circumstances,  indeed,  then  prevented  the 
hope  of  her  being  able  to  escape  from  this  isolation 
by  an  alliance  with  Russia.  An  initial  obstacle  ex- 
isted in  the  wide  difference  between  the  two  countries' 
domestic  regimes.  For  the  Republican  form 
government  the  Russian  Court  felt  very  little  sym- 
pathy. And  if  communications  were  set  up  between 
Paris  and  Saint  Petersburg,  it  was  usually  between 


es 


4  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

the  respective  oppositions,  Russians  blaming  the 
Radical  trend  of  French  politics,  Frenchmen  pray- 
ing for  the  success  of  Russian  Liberals.  Already, 
before  the  end  of  the  Franco-Prussian  war,  one  of 
the  members  of  the  Government  of  the  National 
Defence,  put  forward  the  absurd  proposal  of  a  par- 
don for  Berezowski/  Ten  years  later,  the  refusal  to 
extradite  the  nihilist  Hartmann,  who  had  taken 
refuge  in  Paris,  grievously  offended  the  Czar's 
Government.^  A  no  less  unfavourable  impression 
was  produced  by  the  pardon  granted  to  Prince 
Kropotkine.  These  incidents  turned  to  the  advan- 
tage of  Bismarck,  who  openly  declared  himself 
opposed  to  a  Franco-Russian  rapprochement,  ^^I 
won't  live,"  he  said,  ^^ between  two  enemies." 

Personal  reasons  were  added  to  those  arising 
from  circumstances.  In  choosing  diplomatists  to 
represent  France  in  Russia,  the  French  Government 
was  not  always  well-inspired'.  At  Saint  Petersburg 
the  souvenir  still  remains  of  blunders  in  language 
committed  by  Admiral  Jaures.  He  it  was  who, 
seeing  in  the  Palace  the  portraits  of  the  ancient 
Czars  of  Moscow,  asked  a  Master  of  the  Ceremonies : — 

''Who  are  those  ugly  creatures?" 

He  it  was  also,  who,  when  dining  with  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior  and  speaking  of  certain  Nihilist 
outrages,  finished  up  by  sententiously  remarking :  — 


^  Berezowski  had  fired  a  pistol  at  the  Czar  during  his  stay  in 
Paris  in  1867. 

2  Hartmann  had  blown  up  a  train  which  he  supposed  to  be  the 
Czar's. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN   ALLIANCE  5 

''You  will  only  get  out  of  the  mess  by  establishing 
a  Republic.'^ 

On  the  contrary,  his  successor,  General  Appert, 
was  quite  in  the  Czar's  good  graces.  But  the  brusk- 
ness  of  his  recall  irritated  Alexander  III,  who,  by 
way  of  protest,  ordered  his  Ambassador  in  France 
to  take  a  long  leave  of  absence  from  the  country. 
Then,  there  was  the  Floquet  question.  Under  the 
Empire,  Mr.  Charles  Floquet,  a  young  barrister  at 
that  time,  had  greeted  the  Czar,  during  his  Imperial 
visit  to  the  Palais  de  Justice,  with,  "  Vive  la  Pologne, 
Monsieur !^^  ^  When  the  fiery  law-student  of  1867, 
became  Chairman  of  the  Lower  Chamber  and  sub- 
sequently Prime  Minister,  a  regular  negotiation  had 
to  be  carried  through  for  relations  to  be  established 
between  him  and  the  Russian  Ambassador.  Mr. 
Grevy,  who  remained  at  the  Elysee  until  1887,  was, 
moreover,  hostile  to  any  diplomatic  action  —  and 
especially  to  the  Russian  Alliance.  To  him  the 
policy  of  absolute  reserve  and  of  isolation  alone 
seemed  reasonable.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  we 
had  nothing  to  expect  from  negotiations  with  auto- 
cratic Russia,  and  that,  in  entering  upon  them,  we 
should  only  alarm  Germany  without  any  positive 
benefit  accruing. 

Interest,  however,  which  was  pushing  France  and 
Russia  nearer  each  other,  was  ultimately  fated  to 
carry  the  day.  As  early  as  1873,  the  Due  de  Broglie, 
uneasy  at  Germany's  attitude,  had  solicited  through 
Comte    de    Chaudordy    an    intervention    of   Prince 

1  "  Hurrah  !  for  Poland,  Sir." 


6  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Gortchakoff;  and  the  Russian  Chancellor,  receiving 
the  French  envoy,  had  said  to  him :  — 

^'We  want  France  as  strong  as  she  was  in  the 
past." 

Two  years  later,  in  1875,  German  threats  were 
more  openly  expressed/  It  was  the  time  when 
Bismarck  thought  of  exhausting  us  by  a  fresh  bleed- 
ing, and  the  Berlin  papers  spoke  without  disguise  of 
another  war.  The  only  thing  left  to  conjecture  was, 
whether  the  war  would  break  out  in  the  spring  or 
the  autumn.  Russia  could  not  overlook  the  fact 
that,  the  issue  of  this  unequal  struggle  would  bring 
with  it  a  definite  rupture  of  the  European  balance 
of  power  to  the  benefit  of  the  German  Empire,  and 
would  mean,  as  the  Due  Decazes  said,  ^Hhe  enslaving 
of  the  Old  World."  Prince  Orloff,  who  was  then 
Ambassador  at  Paris,  encouraged  our  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  not  to  yield  an  inch. 

^'Be  firm,"  he  repeated,  '^be  very  firm." 

The  French  Ambassador  at  Saint  Petersburg  was 
General  Le  Flo,  who,  being  in  possession  of  the 
Czar's  entire  confidence,  pressed  him  to  intervene. 
And,  Alexander  II  inclined  more  every  day  to  the 
idea  of  intervention. 

^^If  you  are  really  menaced,"  he  said,  ^^you shall 
know  it  by  me." 

And,  in  fact,  he  refused  to  meet  the  overtures  that 
Mr.  von  Radowitz,  a  German  diplomatist,  was  at 
this  moment  commissioned  to  make  him;  and  con- 
veyed to  General  le  Flo,  through  Gortchakoff,  that 
^  See  Hanotaux'  History  of  Contemporary  France. 


FRANCE  AND   THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE  7 

France  had  nothing  to  fear.  On  the  10th  of  May, 
he  arrived  in  Berlin,  and,  in  an  interview  with 
Bismarck,  spoke  out  so  plainly  that,  a  few  days 
later,  the  cloud  passed  away/ 

The  Eastern  question  and  the  Congress  of  Berlin 
—  which  Gortchakoff  called  the  darkest  page  of 
his  history  —  completely  loosened  the  ties  of  Russo- 
German  intimacy.  Even  in  the  Conference  of 
Constantinople,  that  is  to  say,  before  the  commence- 
ment of  the  Russo-Turkish  war,  Bismarck  had 
played  a  double  game.  He  continued  doing  so 
during  the  Congress.  On  the  morrow  of  this  Euro- 
pean assize,  Russia  was  as  isolated  in  the  East  as 
France  was  in  the  West.  The  Russian  newspapers, 
the  Moscow  Gazette,  for  instance,  preached  the 
French  Alhance.  On  the  7th  of  October,  1879,  the 
conclusion  of  the  Austro-German  Alliance,  two  years 
subsequently,  transformed  into  a  Triple  Alliance  by 
Italy's  adhesion,  and  directed  even  more  against 
Russia  than  against  France;  brought  an  extra 
argument  to  the  Francophile  campaign.  The  Rus- 
sian Czar  and  the  German  Emperor  continued  their 
reciprocal  assurances  of  ^^ cordial  affection'';  but 
the  old  confidence  was  lacking.  During  his  ephem- 
eral premiership  of  1881,  Gambetta  felt  that  the 
moment  had  arrived  to  profit  by  this  change.  And, 
in  appointing  Comte  de  Chaudordy  Ambassador  at 
Saint  Petersburg,  he  said  to  him :  — 

^  See  Hanotaux'  History,  already  cited.  The  Czar  said  to  Mr. 
de  Gontaut-Biron,  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin:  "I  hope 
our  relations  will  become  increasingly  cordial.  We  have  common 
interests.     We  must  remain  friends." 


8  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

^^ Leaning  on  Russia  and  on  England,  we  shall  be 
unattackable/' 

Another  five  years,  however,  elapsed  without 
any  advantage  being  taken  of  such  favourable 
conditions.  By  another  diplomatic  masterpiece, 
Bismarck  had,  indeed,  contrived,  in  1887  first,  and, 
subsequently  in  1888,  to  form  with  Russia  a  counter- 
assurance  which  warded  off  all  danger  of  a  Franco- 
Russian  alliance.  To  Mr.  Flourens,  who  was  ap- 
pointed Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Goblet 
Cabinet  on  the  13th  of  December,  1886,  the  honour 
belongs  of  having  for  the  first  time  turned  the  sug- 
gestions of  interest  into  acts.  The  Eastern  crisis 
supplied  him  with  an  occasion.  Bulgarian  delegates 
had  come  in  January,  1887,  soliciting  the  support 
of  the  great  Powers  against  Russia.  Mr.  Flourens 
declared  to  them  that  their  first  duty  was  to  reach 
an  understanding  with  the  Saint  Petersburg  Cabinet. 
The  German  campaign  on  behalf  of  the  military 
Septennat,  and  the  warlike  ardour  it  aroused  in  Ber- 
lin, enabled  the  French  Government  to  ascertain 
that  their  attitude  with  regard  to  Bulgaria  had  been 
appreciated  in  Russia.  Important  movements  of 
troops  on  the  Polish  frontier,  showed  that  the  Czar's 
Government,  while  not  yet  making  alliance  with  us, 
yet  intended  to  be  in  a  position  to  have  a  word  to 
say  in  the  matter,  if  France  were  attacked.  A  week 
after,  the  Czar,  in  annotating  a  confidential  report 
of  Mr.  de  Giers,  his  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
wrote  on  the  margin,  '^We  must  not  let  France  be 
diminished.'' 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE     9 

At  this  date,  owing  to  the  clear-sighted  initiative 
of  her  financiers,  France  was  able  to  gain  a  fresh 
hold  on  Russia's  gratitude/  With  a  trend  more 
and  more  directed  towards  an  intensive  policy  of 
economic  development,  the  Russian  Empire  needed 
capital.  In  order  to  procure  it,  she  had,  up  to  then, 
applied  to  bankers  who,  after  subscribing  the  loans, 
sometimes  found,  sometimes  did  not  find,  people  to 
invest  in  these  values,  of  whose  Exchange  rates 
they  thus  remained  masters.  In  reality,  it  was 
especially  on  the  Berlin  market  that  such  operations 
were  effected.  A  group  of  French  financiers,  at  the 
head  of  whom  was  Mr.  Hoskier,  a  banker  of  Danish 
origin,  thought  it  would  be  to  the  interest  both  of 
France  and  of  Russia  to  substitute  for  this  system, 
precarious  in  its  principle  and  limited  in  its  exten- 
sion, that  of  floating  the  Russian  loans  on  the  French 
market  and  among  the  French  public.  In  the  month 
of  June,  1888,  Mr.  Hoskier  opened  negotiations 
for  this  purpose  with  Mr.  Wichnegradski,  the  Rus- 
sian Minister  of  Finance.  In  the  following  December, 
after  the  scheme  had  been  thoroughly  dealt  with,  a 
first  loan  of  500,000,000  francs  was  issued  in  Paris, 
of  the  4  per  cent  type,  at  86  fr.  45  c,  which  was 
subscribed  by  more  than  a  hundred  thousand  per- 
sons. Other  loans  followed:  in  1889  (700,000,000 
and  1,200,000,000  francs),  in  1890  (300  millions  and 
41  millions),  in  1891  (320  millions  and  500  millions), 
in  1893  (178  milHons),  in  1894   (454  milUons,  166 

^  See  Ernest  Daudet's  Diplomatic  History  of  the  Franco-Russian 
Alliance. 


10  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

millions,  400  millions),  in  1896  (400  millions),  in  1901 
(424  millions),  in  1904  (800  millions),  in  1906  (1,200 
millions).  And  France  thus  became  Russia's  credi- 
tor for  a  sum  which  may  be  estimated,  with  municipal 
loans  and  industrial  enterprises,  at  twelve  billions 
of  francs/  It  was  a  new  principle  of  solidarity 
between  the  two  countries,  and,  from  1889,  offered 
to  political  combinations  the  broad,  solid  basis  of 
financial  interests. 

The  French  Government  resolved  to  take  advan- 
tage of  it.  On  his  nomination  to  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  which  he  held  till  the  11th  of  Janu- 
ary, 1893,  Mr.  Ribot  resolutely  lent  his  efforts  to 
the  forming  of  an  alliance  with  Russia.  His  chief 
agent  was  our  Ambassador  at  Saint  Petersburg, 
Mr.  de  Laboulaye,  one  of  the  most  remarkable  of 
our  diplomatists  of  the  Third  Republic,  for  qualities 
of  shrewdness,  firmness,  and  tact.  Moreover,  the 
whole  Cabinet  were  in  agreement  on  the  subject. 
In  1890,  Mr.  Constans,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
placed  a  trump  card  in  the  Ambassador's  hand,  by 
effecting  the  arrest  of  a  band  of  Nihilists  that  were 
manufacturing  in  Paris  bombs  intended  to  serve 
against  the  Czar  and  his  family.  At  the  same  date, 
Mr.  de  Freycinet,  the  Minister  of  War,  rendered 
Russia  a  service  of  another  kind,  no  less  appreciated, 
by  putting  our  Chatellerault  Arms  Factories  at  her 

^  To  the  loans  above  mentioned  must  be  added  the  5  per  cent  loan 
of  1822,  quoted  on  the  Exchange,  on  and  after  February  22,  1890; 
the  Interior  loan,  admitted  on  'Change  June  2,  1894;  and,  last  of 
all,  the  Austrian  portion  of  the  1900  loan,  which  has  remained  on 
the  Paris  market. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         11 

disposal.  Every  day  the  atmosphere  grew  more 
favourable/  With  statesmanlike  perspicacity,  Mr. 
de  Laboulaye  saw  that  the  time  had  come  for  action, 
and  that  only  the  approval  of  the  people  was  required 
to  bring  to  a  successful  issue  these  combinations, 
previously  conceived  in  the  secret  councils  of  the 
two  Chancelleries.  In  the  summer  of  1890,  he  or- 
ganized the  visit  of  the  French  fleet  to  Russia ;  but, 
for  reasons  of  opportuneness,  the  project  was  not 
realized  until  the  next  year.  On  the  25th  of  July, 
1891,  Admiral  Gervais'  squadron  arrived  off  Cron- 
stadt. 

The  memory  of  this  triumphal  visit  is  so  recent 
that  I  need  not  dwell  upon  it.  All  Europe  was 
astounded  at  the  Russian  nation^s  enthusiasm. 
All  at  once,  in  spite  of  distance,  in  spite  of  a  past  of 
mistrust,  in  spite  of  differences  of  every  sort,  political, 
intellectual,  and  moral,  Russian  opinion  and  French 
opinion,  breaking  a  long  silence,  united  in  applaud- 
ing the  act  which  manifested  the  rapprochement. 
Although  the  Alliance  was  not  yet  made,  it  was 
already  looked  upon  as  certain.  A  few  weeks  later, 
in  the  Reichstag,  the  Count  von  Caprivi,  Chancellor 
of  the  German  Empire,  said  in  the  course  of  an 
Army  speech:  ^^ There  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  close 
rapprochement  has  come  about  between  France  and 
Russia.  It  has  been  in  preparation  for  a  long  while. 
But  to-day,  everything,  Cronstadt  included,  seems 
to  indicate  that  an  alliance  is  intended. '^  This 
Alliance  was  signed  on  the  22d  of  August,  1891,  by 
^  See  Ernest  Daudet's  book  already  cited. 


12  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Mr.  Ribot,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  Baron 
de  Mohrenheim,  who  was  the  Russian  Ambassador 
at  Paris.  At  the  end  of  June,  1892,  General  de 
Boisdeffre,  being  at  the  head  of  the  Army  Staff, 
went  to  Saint  Petersburg,  for  the  purpose  of  nego- 
tiating a  miUtary  arrangement  completing  the  initial 
protocol,  and  gave  the  Cabinet's  seal  to  a  defensive 
pact  between  France  and  Russia.^  The  two  coun- 
tries thus  abandoned  their  isolation,  and  thereby 
reestablished  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe. 

II 

During  four  years  longer,  the  signatory  Govern- 
ments forbore  to  render  their  Alliance  public ;  but, 
in  the  meantime,  they  determined  its  character 
more  precisely.  On  the  31st  of  August,  1891,  at  a 
fete  given  in  his  honour  at  Cauterets,  the  Russian 
Ambassador,  Mr.  de  Mohrenheim,  said :  — 

Mr.  Prefect,  you  have  just  alluded  to  the  mutual  current  of 
sympathy  set  up  throughout  Russia  and  France.  .  .  .  There 
are  many  reasons  why  this  should  be  so. 

A  few  days  later  at  Vandeuvre,  Mr.  de  Freycinet, 
who  combined  with  his  Premiership  the  Ministry 
of  War,  held  in  his  turn  the  following  discourse :  — 

Don't  let  us  tire  of  improving  and  strengthening  our  Army. 
It  is  one  of  the  elements,  and  not  the  least,  of  our  influence  in  the 
world.  It  has  its  share  in  the  events  that  are  a  joy  to  our  patri- 
otism. Its  progress,  which  Europe  sees  and  France  applauds, 
inspires  some  with  confidence,  others  with  respect.     Such  prog- 

^  See  Jules  Hansen's  book.  The  Baron  de  Mohrenheim' s  Ambas- 
sadorship at  Paris, 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         13 

ress,  moreover,  proves  that  the  Government  of  the  Republic,  in 
spite  of  superficial  changes,  are  capable  of  long  designs,  and 
that  in  the  accomplishment  of  national  tasks,  they  manifest  a 
consistency  that  is  not  inferior  to  a  Monarchy's.  No  one  to-day 
doubts  our  strength.  Let  us  show  that  we  are  prudent.  We 
shall  know  how  to  maintain,  in  a  new  situation,  the  coolness, 
dignity  and  moderation  which,  during  days  of  misfortune,  pre- 
pared our  recovery. 

Finally,  on  the  29th  of  September  at  Bapaume, 
Mr.  Ribot,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  said :  — 

After  hesitating  for  some  time,  Europe  has,  at  last,  done  us 
justice.  A  Sovereign,  who  is  far-seeing  and  firm  in  his  designs, 
and  pacific  like  ourselves,  has  publicly  demonstrated  the  deep 
sympathies  uniting  hi^country  and  our  own.  (Enthusiastic  ap- 
plause. Cries  of:  'Long  live  the  Czar!  Hurrah  for  France! 
Hurrah  for  Russia ! ') 

The  Russian  nation  have  joined  their  Emperor  in  giving  us 
proofs  of  cordial  friendship.     (Fresh  applause.) 

You  know  how  well  we  reciprocate  these  sentiments.  (Yes ! 
Yes  I) 

The  events  of  Cronstadt  have  had  an  echo  even  in  our  small- 
est hamlets,  our  tiniest  villages.  .  .  . 

From  them  has  resulted,  as  justly  remarked,  a  new  situa- 
tion, which  does  not  mean  that  a  new  policy  needs  to  be  adapted 
to  it.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  Just  at  the  moment  when  we  are  able  to  practice  peace 
with  more  dignity,  we  are  not  likely  to  expose  ourselves  to  its 
being  compromised.  Conscious  of  her  strength  and  confident 
in  her  future,  France  will  continue  to  exhibit  the  qualities  of 
prudence  and  coolness  which  have  gained  her  other  peoples' 
esteem  and  have  helped  to  restore  her  to  the  rank  due  to  her  in 
the  world. 

In  other  words,  to  a  state  of  forced  peace  succeeded 
one  that  was  voluntary.  Doubtless,  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance  was  not  an  alliance  formed  for 
revenge.     Its  object  was  not  to  give  us  back  Alsace- 


14  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Lorraine.  But  it  insured  us  in  Europe  a  moral 
authority  which,  since  our  defeats,  had  been  want- 
ing to  us.  It  augmented  our  diplomatic  value. 
It  opened  to  us  the  field  of  political  combinations, 
from  which  our  isolation  had  excluded  us.  From 
mere  observation,  we  could  pass  to  action,  thanks 
to  the  recovered  balance  of  power. 

To  prove  that  such  was  the  character  of  the 
Franco-Russian  Alliance,  I  cannot  do  better  than 
quote  the  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire.  Re- 
turning from  Saint  Petersburg  to  Paris  early  in 
June,  1902,  I  had  the  honour  of  a  long  interview 
with  Count  von  Buelow  at  Berlin.  After  speaking 
to  me  of  the  journey  Mr.  Loubet  had  just  made,  as 
President  of  the  Republic,  to  Russia,  he  added:  — 

^^The  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Dual  Alliance  are  the 
chief  supports  of  the  European  balance  of  power.'' 

This  was  implicitly  admitting  that,  until  the  latter 
was  an  accomplished  fact,  the  equilibrium  did  not 
exist.  Mr.  Jaures,  in  his  sacrilegious  letter  on  the 
Triplice,  as  being  a  necessary  counterweight  to 
Franco-Russian  jingoism,  stands  alone  in  ignoring, 
despite  history  and  geography,  this  plain  truth. 
By  uniting  their  previously  isolated  forces,  France 
and  Russia  had  made  Europe  stable  again. 

For  some  years,  the  two  Allies  would  seem  to 
have  been  too  exclusively  absorbed  in  contemplat- 
ing the  fact  of  their  union,  and  multiplied  outward 
manifestations  that  might  convince  the  world  at 
large  of  its  reality.  In  June,  1892,  the  Grand  Duke 
Constantine  came  in  the  Czar's  name  to  Nancy,  to 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         15 

pay  his  respects  to  President  Carnot.  In  the  ensu- 
ing September,  Messrs.  Ribot  and  de  Freycinet 
had  a  meeting,  at  Aix-les-Bains,  with  Messrs.  de 
Giers  and  de  Mohrenheim.  In  November,  the 
Grand  Duke  Vladimir  was  Mr.  Carnot's  guest. 
In  October,  1893,  Admiral  Avellan^s  sailors '  were 
boisterously  feted  at  Toulon,  and  afterwards  in 
Paris.  In  September,  1895,  Prince  Lobanoff,  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  General  Dragomiroff 
paid  us  a  visit  in  their  turn.  In  October,  1896,  the 
Czar  and  Czarina,  amidst  extraordinary  ovations, 
made  a  stay  in  France,  which  was  terminated  by 
the  admirable  Chalons  review.  Then  came,  in 
1897,  Count  Mouravieff' s  journey  to  Paris  as  Prince 
Lobanoff's  successor,  and  Mr.  Felix  Faure's  visit 
to  Russia;  in  1899,  Mr.  Delcasse's  journey  to  Rus- 
sia, and  that  of  Count  Mouravieff  to  Paris;  in 
1901,  Admiral  Birilev's  call  at  Villefranche  with 
his  squadron,  Mr.  Delcasse's  second  visit  to  Saint 
Petersburg,  and  the  Czar  and  Czarina's  stay  at 
Compiegne;  lastly,  in  1902,  Mr.  Loubet's  journey 
to  Russia,  that  of  Count  Lamsdorf  to  Paris;  and, 
more  recently  (in  1906  and  1907),  the  two  stays 
in  our  Capital  of  Mr.  Isvolski,  appointed,  on 
Count  Lamsdorf's  retirement.  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 

That  all  these  official  comings  and  goings,  accom- 
panied by  an  abundant  exchange  of  telegrams,  in- 
creased the  practical  value  of  the  Alliance,  is  not  so 
certain  as  some  have  maintained.  At  most,  may  it 
be  said,  that  Mr.  Felix  Faure's  journey  to  Russia,  fur- 


16  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

nished  the  Czar  and  himself  with  an  auspicious  oc- 
casion to  define  publicly  the  ties  subsisting  between 
their  two  ^^ friendly  and  allied '^  countries.  With 
that  exception,  these  frequent  meetings,  amid  much 
ado,  produced  no  result  of  immediate  utility.  A 
policy  of  parade  may  satisfy  vanities;  it  can  also 
offend  them;  rarely  does  it  serve  interests.  And 
I  am  inclined  to  share  the  opinion  expressed  to  me 
by  Count  Witte,  when  he  said  to  me  one  day :  — 

'^For  ten  years  you  have  been  making  Franco- 
Russian  manifestations,  in  season  and  out  of  season.'' 

I  have  seen  the  principal  of  these  manifestations 
close  to.  I  was  at  Compiegne  in  1901,  at  Tsarskoie- 
Selo  in  1902.  And  the  impression  they  have  left 
upon  me  is,  that  it  is  neither  necessary  nor  profitable 
to  celebrate  alliances  with  the  help  of  protocol  and 
ceremonial.  One  is  exposed  in  so  doing  to  incidents 
comical  or  painful.  Was  it  indispensable  to  Franco- 
Russian  politics  for  the  Czarina  Alexandra  to  hear 
at  Compiegne,  —  without  any  pleasure,  —  the  re- 
peated, "Oh!  oh!  c^est  une  imperatrice^^  with  which 
Mr.  Edmond  Rostand  had  thought  fit  to  greet  her? 
Was  it  opportune  to  offer  a  certain  Russian  diplo- 
matist, at  the  time  belonging  to  the  Russian 
Embassy  at  Paris,  the  occasion  to  behave  discour- 
teously towards  the  Republican  Government,  and 
then  to  put  ourselves  forward  in  order  to  secure  him 
a  pardon  that  was  not  justified?  Ought  we  to  have 
given  our  guests  the  spectacle  of  ridiculous  quarrels 
between  the  wives  of  our  Ministers  and  those  of  our 
Ambassadors?     And  later,  could  it  be  thought  an 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         17 

edifying  sight,  when  a  Secretary  of  the  French  Em- 
bassy at  Saint  Petersburg,  —  who  claimed  to  possess 
President  Loubet's  entire  confidence  and  that  of 
Mr.  Delcasse,  —  entered  into  open  conflict  with  his 
hierarchic  superior,  the  Marquis  de  Montebello? 
A  Repubhc  never  finds  it  advantageous  to  measure 
itself  with  a  Monarchy  on  the  ground  of  protocol 
observance.  The  lack  of  habit  therein  leads  to 
errors,  on  this  or  that  side  of  the  mean,  to  omissions 
or  excess-commissions  of  zeal.  Thence  results  for 
the  Democratic  regime,  thus  induced  to  lavish 
complaisances  of  somewhat  servile  character,  an 
embarrassed  and,  as  it  were,  subaltern  situation, 
which  creates  a  factitious  inequality  between  two 
governments  called  upon  to  treat  political  questions 
on  the  same  footing.  Too  many  fetes  —  too  many 
flowers,  might  one  say  —  have  been  loaded  upon 
the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  Neither  on  the  one 
hand  nor  on  the  other  have  they  yielded  matter  for 
congratulation.^ 

^  Between  1893  and  1902,  the  combined  action  of 
the  two  allied  countries  was  wanting  in  intensity  and 
consistency.  Each  of  them  looked  after  their  own 
affairs,  while  profiting  by  the  moral  credit  which  the 
Alliance  brought,  yet  without  developing  the  credit 
by  a  methodical  cooperation.)  Thanks  to  the  assist- 
ance afforded  by  French  capital,  Russia  was  able  to 
carry  out  her  Railway  programme  and  her  conver- 
sions, to  construct  the  Trans-Siberian,  and  to 
devote  herself  more  and  more  exclusively  to  ques- 

^  The  same  thing  may  be  said  of  Franco-English  relations. 
c 


J 


18  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

tions  interesting  her  in  the  Far  East.  France,  after 
giving  herself  up  for  three  years  to  the  Dreyfus 
Affair,  managed  to  paralyze  her  activity  through 
religious  struggles.  A  few  years  later,  Russia  found 
herseff  engaged  with  the  armies  of  Japan;  France 
with  the  diplomacy  of  Germany.  Manchuria  in 
the  one  case,  Morocco  in  the  other;  such  were  the 
assets  of  the  Alliance.  How  had  it  been  possible 
for  such  consequences  to  issue  from  a  right  prin- 
ciple? How  was  it  that  the  pact  of  1891,  instead  of 
protecting  its  signataries  from  reverses  and  humilia- 
tions, had  left  the  way  open  to  this  double  and 
astonishing  set-back? 

Ill 

The  reply  to  this  question  is  easy.  If  the  Alliance 
had  become  sterile,  the  reason  was,  that  Russia's 
wilful  blindness  and  France's  weakness,  had  allowed 
it  to  deviate  from  its  aim.  Instead  of  keeping 
Europe  for  its  sphere  of  action,  it  had  gradually 
drifted  towards  Asia.  So  that,  finally,  instead  of 
reminding  our  Allies,  for  their  good  and  our  own, 
of  the  respect  they  owed  to  the  fundamental  pact  — 
respect  of  the  letter  and  respect  of  the  spirit  —  we 
had,  with  sheeplike  docility,  made  ourselves  the 
accomplices  of  their  imprudence. 

On  the  day  when  Mr.  Witte,  by  modifying  the 
track  of  the  Trans-Siberian,  directed  Russia's  money, 
Army  and  Navy,  towards  the  seas  of  China,  France 
ought  to  have  protested.  And  this  she  did  not  do. 
In  1895,  she  joined  Russia  and  Germany,  in  order 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         19 

to  stop  Japan  on  the  threshold  of  victory,  in  the 
name  of  the  Chinese  Empire's  integrity.  Two  years 
later,  with  singular  incoherence,  she  violated  this 
integrity  —  again  imitating  these  two  powers  — 
by  seizing  Kouang-Tcheou-Ouan,  as  Germany  had 
taken  the  Chantung,  and  Russia,  Port  Arthur/ 
In  1900,  during  the  negotiations  that  followed  the 
Pekin  expedition,  she  passively  accepted  Russia's 
lead.  In  1901,  she  made  no  attempt  to  show  the 
Russians  the  mistake  they  were  committing  in 
neglecting  the  Japanese  Alliance  which  the  Marquis 
Ito  had  come  to  offer  them.  Last  of  all,  in  1902, 
when  Japan  had  turned  to  England  and  had  signed 
the  Treaty  of  the  30th  of  January,  1902,  she  was 
rash  enough  to  reply  to  this  treaty  by  the  declara-' 
tion  of  the  19th  of  March,  which,  if  it  had  any 
meaning,  extended  to  the  Far  East  the  action  of 
the  Dual  Alliance. 

This  declaration  was  thus  conceived :  — 

The  allied  Governments  of  France  and  Russia,  having  re- 
ceived communication  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Convention  of 
the  30th  of  January,  1902,  concluded  with  a  view  to  assuring  the 
status  quo  and  general  peace  in  the  Far  East,  and  to  maintain  the 
independence  of  China  and  Corea,  which  should  remain  open  to 
the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations,  were  fully  satisfied 
to  find  therein  affirmed  the  essential  principles  which  they  them- 
selves have  on  several  occasions  declared  to  constitute  and  to 
remain  the  basis  of  their  policy. 

The  two  Governments  deem  that  the  respecting  of  these 
principles  is  at  the  same  time  a  guarantee  for  their  special  inter- 
ests in  the  Far  East.  However,  being  themselves  obliged  to 
provide  for  the  case  in  which  either  the  aggressive  action  of 

*  See  Rene  Pinon's  book,  The  Struggle  for  the  Pacific. 


20  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

third  Powers,  or  new  troubles  in  China,  raising  the  question  of 
the  integrity  and  free  development  of  this  Power,  should  become 
a  menace  for  their  own  interests,  the  two  aUied  Governments 
reserve  to  themselves  the  right  eventually  to  provide  means  for 
their  preservation. 

A  few  days  afterwards,  Mr.  Delcasse,  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  denied  in  the  Chamber  that,  in 
signing  the  above  text,  he  had  intended  or  accepted 
an  extension  of  the  Alliance  to  Eastern  Asia.  But 
then,  what  was  the  meaning  of  the  declaration? 
Was  it  a  mere  surface  manifestation  for  the  purpose 
of  make-believe?  Such  kinds  of  '^ bluff"  are  re- 
doubtable snares,  in  which  those  who  have  recourse 
to  them  are  usually  caught.  The  joint  note  of  the 
19th  of  March  misled  Russian  opinion  by  allowing 
it  to  count  on  France^s  eventual  aid.  It  irritated 
Japanese  opinion  by  leading  it  to  dread  a  double 
European  hostility.  It  accustomed  everybody  to 
the  idea  of  a  war  by  opposing  to  one  another  the 
two  groups,  Japan  and  England,  Russia  and  France. 
At  the  very  least,  it  was  an  encouragement  to  the 
Russian  colonial  party,  who,  through  greedy  specu- 
lation or  ignorance  of  the  facts,  refused  to  perceive 
the  inevitable  issue  of  the  movement  towards 
Corea.  It  favoured  the  plans  of  men  like  Bezo- 
brazoff  ^  and  other  risk-alls,  who  precipitated  Russia 
into  the  war  of  1904. 

France,  who,  in  1902,  had  not  foreseen  the  danger, 

^  Mr.  BezobrazofI  had  succeeded  in  interesting  a  number  of  big 
manufacturers  in  the  Yalu  Company.  His  intrigues  were  one  of 
the  causes  of  the  war.  See  Kouropatkin's  revelations  (McClure's 
Magazine,  September,  1908). 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         21 

continued  her  scepticism  until  the  day  when  it 
burst.  Three  months  before  the  war,  while  all  our 
agents  in  the  Far  East  were  declaring  it  to  be  un- 
avoidablC;  Mr.  Delcasse  asserted  that  it  was  im- 
possible. Instead  of  listening  to  our  ministers  and 
consuls,  who  said,  ^' Japan  means  war,"  he  paid 
attention  only  to  the  Czar,  whose  language  was,  ^'I 
desire  peace.''  When  it  was  still  time  to  restrain 
our  Allies  on  the  eve  of  a  rupture,  and  to  say  to 
them,  ^^You  are  not  ready,"  he  allowed  himself  to 
be  the  dupe  of  certain  civil  or  military  personages, 
who,  having  staked  their  whole  career  on  the  Alli- 
ance, were  to  him  the  Leboeufs  of  this  second  Sedan, 
and  guaranteed  that  everything  would  be  ready, 
even  to  the  last  gaiter-button.  Instead  of  reminding 
Russia,  that  her  contribution  to  the  Alliance  was  her 
strength  in  Europe,  we  let  her  sacrifice  at  once  her 
pledges  and  her  interests. 

Both  morally  and  materially,  the  Alliance  risked 
wreck  in  this  storm.  The  French  public,  who  for 
twelve  years  had  been  accustomed  to  count  on  Russia, 
were  deeply  disappointed  by  her  repulses  and  were 
not  able  to  hide  their  sentiments.  That  the  war  would 
necessarily  be  long  and  difficult  at  such  a  distance; 
that  there  would  be  huge  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
provisioning  the  army,  which  had  been  transported 
to  the  front  at  a  great  expense ;  that  the  Staff  in 
command  had  not  been  suitably  prepared  for  their 
task,  —  all  this  was  known  and  expected.  What 
was  not  foreseen,  was  the  continued  series  of  re- 
verseS;    the    implacable    development    of    an    irre- 


22  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

mediable  inferiority,  the  demonstration  of  strategic 
incapacity,  surpassed  only  by  administrative  care- 
lessness —  a  misreckoning  cruel  for  the  Russians, 
and  almost  as  cruel  for  the  French,  who  had  put 
their  faith  and  sense  of  security  in  the  Alliance. 

Then  those  who,  from  the  outset,  had  been  op- 
posed to  our  pledging  ourselves  to  Russia,  began  to 
cast  up  accounts  and  strike  the  balance,  with  the 
most  unfavourable  interpretation  possible.  The 
three  loans  of  1890  were  passed  in  review,  the  two 
loans  of  1891,  those  of  1893,  1894,  1896,  1901,  1904. 
To  these  were  added  the  municipal  loans  and 
Finlandese  loans,  the  sums  invested  in  metallurgic 
mining,  manufacturing  or  transport  undertakings, 
the  whole  totalling  nearly  twelve  billions,  that  is 
to  say,  nearly  a  fourth  of  the  French  capital  invested 
abroad;  and,  while  doing  justice  to  the  Czar^s 
Government  for  its  exact  punctuality  in  paying 
dividends  and  coupons,  the  doubt  was  expressed, 
as  to  whether  the  services  rendered  by  Russia  were 
worth  the  price  paid  for  them,  as  to  whether  the 
Alliance,  so  useful  to  Russia  for  her  conversions, 
the  redemption  of  her  railways,  the  equilibrium  of 
her  budget,  and  the  construction  of  the  Trans-Si- 
berian, had  given  France  an  equivalent  in  return, 
especially  after  the  Asiatic  adventure,  which,  on 
the  Manchurian  soil  or  in  the  Chinese  seas,  engulfed 
the  men,  ironclads,  and  millions  intended,  as  we 
hoped,  for  the  safeguarding  of  European  peace. 

This  impression  was  put  into  words  with  some- 
what bad  taste.     Mr.  Combes,  the  Prime  Minister, 


FRANCE  AND  THE   RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         23 

made  blunt  statements  to  journalists^  which  a 
Russian  diplomatist  characterized  in  an  interview 
with  me :  — 

'^It  is  disagreeable/'  he  said^  ^^when  we  ask  you 
for  nothing^  to  hear  your  Premier  proclaim  from  the 
housetops  that  you  don't  intend  to  give  us  any- 
thing." 

I  remember  being  one  evening,  after  a  Russian 
defeat,  at  the  Russian  Embassy,  where  I  met  the 
German  Ambassador,  who,  prompter  or  shrewder 
than  the  French  Government,  had  come  to  convey 
to  his  colleague  the  expression  of  his  sympathy. 
Such  things  as  these  were  only  failures  in  tact; 
but,  under  the  circumstances,  they  were  deeply 
felt  by  Russia.  They  were  all  the  more  regrettable, 
as  they  caused  us  to  lose  the  benefit  of  our  alto- 
gether correct  attitude  in  the  question  of  neutrality. 
Not  only  were  we  assuring  to  our  allies  our  financial 
help,  as  in  the  past ;  but,  immediately  after  the  North 
Sea  or  Dogger  Bank  incident,  Mr.  Delcasse  success- 
fully intervened  to  prevent  the  conflict  that  threat- 
ened to  embroil  them  with  England.  A  few  weeks 
later,  through  the  facilities  —  legitimate  indeed  in 
French  Law  —  which  we  afforded  Admiral  Rodjest- 
vensky's  squadron  at  Madagascar  and  in  Indo- 
China,  we  exposed  ourselves  to  the  gravest  diffi- 
culties with  Japan.  None  the  less,  there  was  a 
general  impression  —  and  against  impressions  dis- 
cussion is  useless  —  that  the  Alliance  was  growing 
cooler,  that  its  bonds  were  loosening  and  coming 
undone.     The  moral  impetus  which  had  animated 


24  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

its  first  years  of  existence;  seemed  to  be  checked  for 
long  to  come. 

Materially,  the  detriment  was  still  more  severely 
felt.  For  Russia,  there  was  not  only  the  disastrous 
end  to  her  dream  in  Asia;  there  was  her  military 
disorganization    besides,    coinciding    with    domestic 

(troubles.  For  France,  there  was  the  annihilation 
\of  the  guarantee  that  had  been  gained  in  1891. 
In  September,  1904,  the  Russian  forces  succumbed 
at  Liao-Yang.  In  March,  1905,  they  were  crushed 
at  Mukden.  It  was  in  the  same  month  of  March 
that  the  Emperor  William,  disembarking  at  Tan- 
gier, played  check  to  the  mission  of  Mr.  Saint-Rene 
Taillandier  at  Fez ;  check  also  to  Mr.  Delcasse^s 
policy.  If,  to  make  use  of  the  Chancellor's  ex- 
pression, German  diplomacy  had  been  a  deductive 
one,  it  was  in  1904  that  the  objections  raised  in 
1905  to  our  treaty  with  England  and  our  Moroc- 
can projects  would  have  been  put  forward.  But 
being,  and  flattering  itself  on  being,  an  opportunist 
one,  it  had  waited  until  the  war  in  Manchuria  and 
the  paralysis  of  the  Alliance,  should  place  France 
within  reach  of  its  attack.^ 

For  having  allowed  their  Alliance  to  be  turned 
aside   from  its   proper   object,    both   Russians   and 

I  French    suffered    jointly    for    their    joint    mistake. 

i  Military  defeats  on  the  one  side,  diplomatic  defeats 

I  on  the  other,  demonstrated  a  contrario  the  necessity 
of  a  pact  which  had  become  useless  only  by  reason 
of    its    having    been    tampered    with.     Would    the 
^  See  Andre  Tardieu's  Conference  of  Algeciras. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         25 

lesson  be  profitable  to  those  who  had  just  felt  its 
weight  so  severely? 

IV 

On  the  French  side  first,  wise  reflections  took  the 
place  of  earlier  disappointment.  Among  the  Radi- 
cals, Radical-Socialists,  and  Socialists  even,  who, 
only  a  little  while  before,  were  criticizing  the  barren- 
ness of  the  Russian  Alliance,  hesitation  was  visible. 
From  the  comparison  of  dates,  the  truth  was  per- 
ceived. And  when  it  was  realized  how  closely 
Germany^s  rough  manifestation  had  followed  the 
weakening  of  Russia's  strength,  it  was  better  under- 
stood what  force  and  security  France  had  derived 
for  thirteen  years  from  the  many-times  depreciated 
Alliance. 

It  was  thought  that,  if  Russia  had  remained  pacific 
and  preserved  her  position  of  advantage  in  Europe, 
William  II,  other  things  being  equal,  would  have 
put  less  vehemence  and  brutality  into  his  action  at 
Tangier;  that,  even  if  uneasy,  as  he  pretended  to 
be,  at  Mr.  Delcasse's  tendencies,  he  would  have 
found  a  discreeter  way  of  expressing  his  uneasiness, 
either  to  the  head  of  the  State  or  to  the  head  of  the 
Ministry.  Lulled  with  pacific  songs,  the  Parliament 
had  given  itself  up  to  the  illusion  that  the  war  in 
Manchuria  was  none  of  its  concern.  Being  sharply 
awakened,  it  saw  that,  from  Mukden  to  Fez,  the 
way  was  not  so  long  as  it  had  believed,  and  that  the 
road  between  the  two  places  passed  through  Paris. 

Undoubtedly,    the    domestic    history    of    Russia 


26  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

during  the  last  few  years  has  added  a  fresh  diffi- 
culty to  those  already  existing.  French  opinion  in 
the  majority  has,  more  often  than  not,  disapproved 
the  somewhat  arbitrary  police  operations  of  the 
Czar's  Government.  Without  always  taking  suffi- 
ciently into  account  the  circumstances  surrounding 
each  case,  people  have  found  that  the  Autocracy, 
in  its  halting  evolution  towards  liberty,  was  for- 
getting the  juridical  maxim  that  '^Donner  et  retenir 
ne  vaut.^^  ^  The  seriousness  of  this  incongruity, 
however,  ought  not  to  be  exaggerated.  The  treaties 
binding  nations,  in  view  of  their  foreign  relations 
and  action,  by  their  very  essence  make  abstraction 
of  domestic  policy.  The  similarity  of  regimes  and 
institutions  has  but  little  importance,  if  international 
interests  do  not  agree.  On  the  contrary,  the  con- 
cordance of  these  interests  suffices  to  justify  a  con- 
tract of  alliance.  Francis  I  had  no  objection  to 
ally  himself  with  the  Grand  Turk.  Richelieu  treated 
with  the  Protestants,  and  Mazarin  with  Cromwell. 
Even  Mr.  Jaures,  who,  it  is  true,  has  since  changed 
his  mind,  declared  on  the  23d  of  January,  1903,  that 
he  had  no  fundamental  objection  to  the  Russian 
Alliance,  and  added:  ^^ There  was  a  time  when  the 
Republican  party  wondered  whether  it  would  be 
possible  to  establish  solidarity  of  foreign  policy 
between  two  countries  so  dissimilar  in  their  political 
and  social  conditions.  This  is  a  preoccupation  that 
we  have  no  right  to  entertain.  ...     It  is  the  duty 

*  Compare  the  English  proverb,   Give  a  thing,   take  a  thing, 
Naughty  man^s  plaything. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         27 

of  all  Frenchmen  to  do  nothing  which  can  shake 
and  destroy  the  Franco- Russian  understanding.'^ 

On  the  Russian  side,  fidelity  to  the  French  Alli- 
ance was  evinced  in  the  most  energetic  way  during 
the  Conference  at  Algeciras.  And  the  appointment 
of  Mr.  Isvolski  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Office,  was 
followed  by  his  country's  becoming  once  more  a 
factor  in  Europe,  which  return  to  the  normal  state 
of  things  is  a  matter  for  congratulation  to  France. 
The  agreements  with  Japan  in  1907,  consolidating 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  in  1905,  have  checked  the 
reappearance  of  the  Asiatic  mirage.^  The  signing 
of  an  agreement  with  Great  Britain  in  the  same  year, 
has  accentuated  the  evolution  and  freed  French 
policy  from  the  awkwardness  of  having  to  keep  up 
at  once,  between  a  divided  Russia  and  England, 
the  Russian  Alliance  and  English  friendship.^  At 
the  time  of  his  first  journey  to  Paris  in  1906,  Mr. 
Isvolski,  indeed,  had  an  opportunity  of  testifying 
to  the  sincerity  of  his  sentiments  towards  France. 
He  had  been  in  the  Capital  for  a  few  days  when  he 
received  the  unexpected  visit  of  Prince  Ouroussov, 
the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna.  The  Prince 
came  to  inform  him  that  it  would  be  appreciated  in 
Austria  and  Germany  if,  after  his  call  at  Paris  and 
Berlin,  he  were  to  return  to  Saint  Petersburg  through 
Vienna.     Mr.  Isvolski  replied :  — 

^^I  shall  not  do  what  you  propose.  I  have  come 
to  Paris,  because  France  is  Russia's  ally.  I  shall 
call  at  Berlin,  because,  having  to  pass  through  this 

1  See  below,  Chapter  VII.  ^  gg^  below,  Chapter  VII. 


28  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

city,  I  owe  it  to  our  friendly  relations  with  Germany 
to  stop  there.  But  I  shall  not  go  to  Vienna,  because 
I  have  no  reasons  for  going  there,  and  because,  by 
going,  I  should  alter  the  significance  of  my  journey, 
especially  as  I  have  not  been  to  London/^ 

The  Russian  Minister  thus  affirmed  his  resolution 
not  to  modify  the  character  of  the  Franco-Russian 
Alliance,  by  superimposing  on  it  more  or  less  de- 
terminately  a  kind  of  resuscitation  of  the  ^^  Alliance 
of  the  Three  Emperors. '^  Since  then,  his  policy, 
made  increasingly  precise  by  the  rapprochement 
with  England,  has  preserved  the  same  character. 
The  replacement,  long  desired  by  him,  of  the  French 
Ambassador  at  Saint  Petersburg,  Mr.  Bompard, 
by  Admiral  Touchard,  has  tended  to  confirm  him 
in  these  intentions. 

Brought  back  to  its  original  scope,  the  Alliance 
seems,  therefore,  destined  to  regain  its  full  value  in 
Europe.  The  mistakes  committed  have  been  taken 
to  heart  on  both  sides ;  and,  on  both  sides  also,  their 
logical  conclusion  has  been  drawn.  In  spite  of 
press  polemics  which  break  out  from  time  to  time, 
a  close  understanding  remains  the  norm  of  the  rela- 
tions of  the  two  countries  with  each  other.  Whether 
the  newspapers  discuss  military  questions  or  deal 
with  financial  questions,  their  arguments  are  usually 
frivolous.  When  the  Novoie  Vremia  attacks  the 
French  Army,  it  wilfully  exaggerates  defects  that 
are  easy  to  correct,  and  deliberately  leaves  out  of 
count  merits  of  the  highest  order.  When  French 
newspapers  criticise  the   Russian  army  and  claim 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE        29 

that  the  war  in  Manchuria,  carried  on  for  two  years 
by  this  army  at  thousands  of  kilometres  from  its 
base,  has  pronounced  against  it  a  verdict  from 
which  there  is  no  appeal,  they  are  no  less  completely 
deceived.  As  for  the  financial  question,  and  the 
puerile  bickering  that  makes  the  Russians  say, 
'^You  were  only  too  happy  to  lend  us  your  money," 
while  the  French  retort,  ^^And  you  were  only  too 
glad  to  keep  it,"  there  is  no  need  to  dwell  on  it. 
The  essential  quality  of  financial  operations  is  to 
serve  the  interests  of  both  borrowers  and  lenders. 
If  Russia  has  borrowed  our  money,  she  required  it, 
and,  therefore,  has  nothing  to  reproach  us  with  on 
this  score.  If  we  have  lent  it  to  her,  we  did  so  be- 
cause it  suited  us,  and  we  have  no  reproaches  to 
make  either. 

Economic  relations  between  the  countries,  more- 
over, are  susceptible  of  being  developed.  It  has 
been  seen  above  what  a  formidable  sum  of  money 
France  has  invested  in  Russia.  The  amount  of 
our  loans,  quite  as  much  as  the  interests  of  the 
Alliance,  would  have  justified  on  her  part  a  less 
subaltern  utilization  of  the  pledges  of  1891.  But, 
financially,  French  lenders  have  nothing  to  regret. 
The  financial  situation  of  Russia  is  not  bad.  The 
ordinary  budgets  —  deduction  made  of  the  expenses 
incurred  during  the  war  and  by  the  construction  of 
railways  —  are  in  a  condition  of  equilibrium.  The 
difficulties  of  the  last  few  years  are  to  be  explained 
rather  by  Exchequer  reasons  than  budgetary. 
They  have  their  origin,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  either 


30  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

in  expenses  that  are  directly  productive,  or  in 
reimbursements  of  debts,  or  else  in  exceptional 
circumstances.  The  capital  of  the  Russian  debt, 
which  on  the  1st  of  January  amounted  to  327,000,000 
francs,  represents  less  than  200  francs  per  inhabitant, 
—  a  high  figure,  it  is  true,  but  not  excessive.  The 
gross  expenses  of  the  debt  —  comprising  the  amor- 
tizements, that  is  to  say,  the  counterpart  of  the 
loan  resources  —  absorb  17 J  per  cent  of  the  ordinary 
budgetary  receipts,  which  is  a  less  proportion  than 
in  many  other  States.  Without  doubt,  France  has 
the  duty  and  the  right  to  desire  that  a  thorough 
reform  of  the  Russian  bureaucracy,  both  in  financial 
matters  and  in  other  administrations,  shall  insure 
the  regularity,  honesty,  and  competence  which 
have  so  often  been  wanting.  No  less  legitimate  is 
the  desire  to  develop  by  commercial  agreements 
economic  relations,  which,  in  spite  of  a  somewhat 
unfavourable  Customs  legislation,  have  made  appre- 
ciable progress  during  the  last  twenty-five  years. 
But,  without  underestimating  the  importance  of 
the  services  rendered  by  France  to  Russia,  it  is 
altogether  unjust  to  pretend,  as  some  do,  that  the 
Alliance  is  liable  to  have  bankruptcy  as  its  counter- 
part. 

In  military  matters,  it  is  natural  that  the  Russians 
should  wish  to  see  the  French  Army  equal  to  its 
task.  The  development  of  our  strength,  and  the 
compensation  of  the  weakness  resulting  from  our 
two  years^  service  by  a  better  utilization  of  our 
resources,  are  duties  imposed  upon  us  in  our  own 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE        31 

interest,  still  more  than  in  that  of  our  Allies.  On 
her  side,  Russia  must  make  herself  capable  of 
successfully  playing  the  role  incumbent  on  her,  in 
the  event  of  a  European  war.  For  that,  she  has 
still  much  to  do.  The  Russo-Japanese  war  has 
certainly  diminished  her  power  of  attack  for  some 
time  to  come.  It  drew  successively  on  the  military 
formations  belonging  to  the  Far  East,  the  Reserve 
divisions  stationed  in  the  various  central  provinces, 
and,  ultimately,  on  the  several  Army  corps  destined 
to  the  defence  of  the  Western  frontier  and,  more 
peculiarly,  prepared  for  an  intervention  beyond  this 
same  frontier,  on  those  which,  consequently,  have 
an  especial  interest  for  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance. 
Transported  in  detachments  to  the  front,  these  West- 
ern Army  Corps  were  obliged  to  borrow  men,  officers, 
artillery,  and  material  from  those  that  were  not  being 
mobilized.  And  the  latter  thus  became  incapable  of 
immediately  passing  from  a  peace  to  a  war  footing. 
Moreover,  domestic  disturbances  required  their 
employment  against  the  Revolutionaries,  under 
conditions  which  had  nothing  in  common  with  the 
plan  of  mobilization.  In  a  word,  that  which  was 
left  to  Russia  in  the  way  of  military  strength  at 
the  end  of  the  war  no  longer  weighed  in  the  European 
balance  of  power,  and  no  longer  counted  in  the  esti- 
mates of  international  policy. 

In  order  for  this  state  of  things  to  end,  the  drafts 
made  by  the  Far  East  on  European  Russia  had  to 
be  restored.  The  demobilization  commenced  di- 
rectly  after   the   signing   of   the   Treaty   of   Ports- 


32  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

mouth.  A  general  strike  on  the  railways  retarded 
it,  and  caused  the  returning  convoys  to  be  almost 
as  long  on  the  journey  as  the  outgoing  ones  had 
been.  Not  until  within  the  closing  months  of  1906, 
were  the  European  Army  Corps  completely  rein- 
stalled along  the  Western  frontier.  They  had  lost 
in  Manchuria  a  considerable  portion  of  their  units 
and  the  whole  of  their  belongings,  spent  their  war 
provisions,  experienced  the  fatigues  of  a  hard  cam- 
paign, and  suffered  the  demoralization  of  defeat. 
Their  military  capacity  could  only  be  regained 
through  a  twofold  persevering  effort  —  of  recon- 
stitution  and  reorganization.  The  reconstitution 
requires  considerable  expense,  and  is,  therefore, 
subordinated  to  the  state  of  the  finances.  It  implies 
changes  in  weapon  equipment  and  military  accesso- 
ries. Count  Witte  recently  estimated  the  cost  of 
this  necessary  undertaking  at  a  billion  roubles,  or 
nearly  three  billions  of  francs.  Although  these 
figures  are  enormous,  the  Government  and  the  Duma 
owe  it  imperatively,  both  to  Russia  and  to  France, 
to  set  to  work  without  delay. 

As  regards  the  reorganization,  various  measures 
have  been  taken  since  the  conclusion  of  peace. 
The  fundamental  military  law  of  March,  1906,  has 
reduced  the  duration  of  the  service  to  three  years, 
instead  of  the  five  fixed  by  the  old  law,  which  in 
practice  became  four.  The  long  time  passed  by 
soldiers  of  the  active  Army  under  the  flag,  resulted 
in  the  Reserves  being  composed  of  men  compara- 
tively old  and  numerically  weak.     These  two  in- 


FRANCE  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         33 

conveniences  had  been  keenly  felt  in  Manchuria, 
where  the  bad  component  elements  of  the  Reserve 
divisions  first  transported  to  the  front,  were  partly 
the  cause  of  the  defeat  of  Liao-Yang.  With  a 
shorter  service,  it  has  been  found  necessary  to 
increase  numerically  the  annual  contingents,  since 
the  active  Army  will  have  henceforward  to  be  filled 
up  by  means  of,  no  longer  four,  but  three  contingents. 
The  last  three  levies  have  been  fixed  at  about  four 
hundred  and  seventy  thousand  men.  This  change 
will  extend  to  the  Reserve  classes,  which  will  become 
younger,  more  numerous,  and  more  capable  of 
homogeneity.  Its  tendency  will  be  also  to  bring 
about  a  modification  in  the  recruiting  regulations, 
which  date  back  to  1874,  and  to  diminish  the  exemp- 
tions. In  fine,  three  years  being  just  sufficient  to 
form  a  non-commissioned  officer  in  Russia,  service 
re  enlistments  will  have  to  be  made  use  of.  Although 
certain  measures  have  already  been  taken,  the  lack 
of  a  well-coordinated  plan  is  keenly  felt.  It  is 
indispensable  for  Russia's  security,  for  her  pledges 
exchanged  with  France,  and  for  the  balance  of  power 
in  Europe,  that  this  plan  should  be  clearly  defined 
and  energetically  carried  out  through  a  cordial 
understanding  between  the  ancient  bureaucracy  and 
the  young  Duma. 

On  these  conditions,  the  Franco- Russian  Alliance 
will  have  its  full  practical  effect.  To-day,  as  yester- 
day, and  to-morrow,  as  to-day,  this  Alliance,  if 
sincerely  executed,  both  is  and  will  be  equally 
necessary  to  the  two  contracting  parties.     Let  us 


34  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

once  again  repeat  that  one  has  only  to  look  at  a  map 
to  be  convinced  that,  in  a  Continental  war,  Russia 
•  ^  alone  would  be  able  to  immobilize  part  of  our 
adversaries'  forces  —  and  reciprocally.  It  is  by 
coming  back  to  this  principle  that,  the  whole  bearing 
of  the  1891  pact  is  understood.  As  Count  Witte 
said  to  me  in  1905:  ^^The  essence  of  our  Franco- 
Russian  relations  is  not  modified.  The  Alliance 
remains  in  conformity  to  the  interests  of  the  two 
nations.  In  this  Alliance,  there  is  nothing  to  change, 
and  nothing  must  be  changed."  For  such  a  change 
to  be  justified,  Europe  would  have  to  cease  to  be 
Europe. 


CHAPTER  II 

FRANCE   AND  THE   ENGLISH   '' ENTENTE" 

I.   Franco-English  rivalry.  —  Three  centuries  of  war.  —  At- 
tempts at  an  understanding,  and  their  failure.  —  Algeria. 

—  Tunis.  —  The  Niger.  —  The  Congo.  —  The  Upper  Nile 
and  Egypt.  —  Fashoda. 

II.  Causes  of  the  Franco-English  rapprochement. — Germany 
and  England.  —  Bismarck's  policy.  —  German  progress.  — 
Commercial  competition.  —  English  merchants  and  consuls. 

—  Political  distrust.  —  British  impeachment.  —  France 
and  the  balance  of  power.  —  Franco-English  commerce.  — 
End  of  the  colonial  quarrel. 

III.  Entente  Cordiale.  —  Role  of  Edward  VII.  —  Visit  of  1903. 

—  Negotiations.  —  Agreement  of  the  8th  of  April,  1904.  — 
Egypt. — Morocco.  —  Value  of  the  arrangement.  —  Franco- 
English  manifestations. — German  Policy  and  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  Entente  Cordiale.  —  Anglo-Russian  rapproche- 
ment. 

IV.  Entente  or  AlHance.  —  Mihtary  problem.  —  Weakness  of 
the  English  Army.  —  Mr.  Haldane's  reforms.  —  Their  in- 
sufficiency. —  State  of  English  opinion.  —  French  interests. 

—  Policy  of  neutrality.  —  Conditions  of  an  Alliance.  — 
Faihng  these  conditions,  friends,  but  not  allies. 


Never  has  a  reconciliation  been  more  unexpected 
than  the  one  which,  on  the  8th  of  April,  1904,  put 
an  end  to  the  ancient  quarrel  between  England  and 
France;    and  still  more  unexpected  was  the  perma- 

35 


36  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

nent  character  it  has  since  assumed.  Now  and 
again,  during  the  last  hundred  years,  there  were  hints 
of  an  Entente  Cordiale,  but  these  incipient  under- 
standings were  of  short  duration.  In  1801,  the 
inhabitants  of  London  unharnessed  the  horses  of 
the  First  ConsuFs  Aide-de-Camp,  Colonel  de  Lauris- 
ton,  who  had  come  to  ratify  the  terms  of  peace; 
and  yet,  a  few  months  later,  the  war  began  which 
was  to  finish  only  at  Waterloo.  Again,  in  1838, 
when  Marshal  Soult  went  as  Louis-Philippe's  repre- 
sentative to  the  coronation  of  Queen  Victoria,  he 
was  most  enthusiastically  received;  but,  within  a 
couple  of  years  after,  there  was  very  nearly  an 
open  rupture  between  the  two  countries.  Similarly, 
under  Napoleon  III,  both  understanding  and  subse- 
quent alliance  were  ephemeral;  and,  with  the 
advent  of  1860,  Queen  Victoria  counselled  a  ^'regular 
crusade ''  against  France.  The  opinion  of  Albert 
Sorel,  as  expressed  in  his  writings,  was  that  ^'between 
France  and  England  understandings  may  exist, 
as  they  have  existed  in  the  past,  for  the  purpose  of 
preserving  the  statu  quo,  but  that  England  has 
never  been,  and  can  never  be,  an  ally  for  France, 
except  on  condition  of  the  latter's  abandoning  her 
foreign  expansion. ''  ^  The  same  thing  had  been 
said  by  Lord  Chatham  a  century  earlier  in  some- 
what different  words,  ^^  England's  only  fear  here 
below  is  that  France  should  become  a  naval,  com- 
mercial, and  colonial  power.'' 

After  the  fall  of  the  Stuarts,  the  habitual  relations 
1  See  the  Temps  of  December  24,  1903. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  "ENTENTE"   37 

of  France  and  England  were  those  of  war ;  ^  follow- 
ing each  other,  came  the  war  of  the  League  of 
Augsbourg  (1688-1697),  the  war  of  the  Spanish  suc- 
cession (1701-1711),  the  war  of  the  Austrian  suc- 
cession (1742-1748),  the  Seven  Years'  War  (1756- 
1763),  the  American  war  (1778-1783),  the  wars 
of  the  Revolution  and  Empire  (1793-1815) ;  and, 
in  between  these  periods  of  fighting,  there  were 
intervals  of  precarious  peace  overshadowed  by  deep 
reciprocal  mistrust.  Such  is  the  record  of  the  past, 
explained  by  the  fact  that  England  regarded  France 
as  her  most  dreaded  adversary  in  Europe,  and  more 
especially  outside  of  Europe,  and  that  she  was 
defending,  against  contingent  successes  of  our  own 
country,  the  naval  supremacy  which  is  the  sine  qua 
non  of  her  existence.  ^^ Beware,''  said  Mr.  Urquhart, 
a  Member  of  Parliament,  in  1862,  ^Hhe  sea  threatens 
while  it  serves  you;  it  bears  you,  but  it  environs 
you.  The  position  of  this  island  is  such  that,  there 
is  no  via  media  for  her  between  being  all-powerful 
and  being  nothing  at  all.  This  is  why  she  was 
always  conquered  until,  having  subjugated  the  sea, 
she  in  turn  became  mistress  of  the  world.  England 
will  be  the  sea's  victim  on  the  day  she  ceases  to 
be  its  queen."  From  the  conviction  of  such  neces- 
sity arose  the  adoption  of  the  two-poivers  standard, 
^'England's  fleets  must  be  superior  to  those  of  the 
two  strongest  naval  Powers  in  Europe  combined." 
And  from  it  also  was  born  the  Anti-French  policy. 

*  See  Mr.  Jean  Darcy's  excellent  volume,  A  Hundred  Years  of 
Colonial  Rivalry. 


38  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  without  in- 
terruption and  without  hesitancy,  England  opposed 
the  expansion  of  France.  She  began  with  disputing, 
step  by  step,  the  execution  of  the  treaties  of  1815, 
which  restored  to  us  Saint-Pierre  and  Miquelon, 
Guadeloupe,  Martinique,  Guyana,  our  factories  in 
Senegal  and  Guinea,  the  isle  of  Bourbon  and  the 
five  towns  in  India.  In  1830,  for  months,  she 
threatened  us  with  war,  at  the  time  when  we  were 
installing  ourselves  in  Algeria.  In  the  preceding 
years,  she  had  boldly  supported  the  Barbary  pirates 
against  France;  and,  when  Prince  de  Polignac 
decided  on  a  military  expedition,  she  brought  to 
bear  on  him  a  pressure  which  can  only  be  compared 
to  that  exercised  by  Germany  in  1905  with  regard 
to  Morocco.  At  Algiers,  Tunis,  Tripoli,  her  consuls 
set  the  Mussulmans  against  us:  ^^The  French  are 
mad,"  cried  Wellington,  ''a,  terrible  reverse  awaits 
them  on  the  coast  of  Algeria."  A  few  days  later 
Algiers  was  in  our  hands.  Then  all  through  Europe 
and  in  Africa,  English  diplomacy  turned  against 
France.     At  Gibraltar,   the  forces  were  mobilized. 

To  the  Due  de  Laval,  French  Ambassador  at 
London,  Lord  Aberdeen,  the  Prime  Minister,  said :  — 

^'I  wish  you  good-bye,  Monsieur  le  Due,  with  more 
than  ordinary  regret,  since  I  fear  we  shall  not  see 
each  other  again.  Never,  even  in  the  days  of  the 
Republic  and  Empire,  did  France  give  us  such  reason 
to  complain." 

To  which  the  Ambassador  replied :  — 

^'My  Lord,  I  am  unable  either  to  tell  or  to  foresee 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   39 

what  you  may  be  hoping  from  the  moderation  of 
France ;  but  what  I  do  know  is  that  you  will  obtain 
nothing  from  her  by  threats." 

The  conquest  continued ;  and,  as  long  as  it  lasted, 
England^s  attitude  was  violently  hostile.  Mr.  St. 
John,  the  English  consul  at  Algiers,  made  a  number 
of  defamatory  accusations  against  our  troops; 
nor  was  it  until  1851,  when  applying  for  the  exe- 
quatur of  this  official's  successor,  that  the  English 
Cabinet  reluctantly  acknowledged  the  fait  accompli. 
For  no  direct  cause  of  local  enmity,  through  simple 
hatred  of  French  expansion,  ^^  without  any  fixed 
plan  other  than  that  of  acting  everywhere  and,  on 
all  occasions,  in  an  interest  opposed  to  that  of 
France,''  England  had  thwarted  our  policy  and 
weakened  our  influence. 

In  the  Tunis  affair,  she  it  was,  on  the  contrary, 
who  at  the  Berlin  Congress  made  us  the  first  advances, 
for  reasons  of  general  policy,  and  in  order  to  render 
her  occupation  of  Cyprus  more  palatable.  However, 
some  years  later,  when  Jules  Ferry  tried  to  realize  the 
profit  which  Lord  Salisbury  had,  of  his  own  accord, 
held  out  as  an  inducement  to  Mr.  Waddington, 
objections  of  various  kinds  were  raised  by  the  British 
Foreign  Office;  and  the  Sultan,  in  particular,  was 
advised  that  carte  hlanche  had  not  been  given  to 
France.  True,  the  English  Government  turned  a 
deaf  ear  to  the  Bey  when  he  begged  aid.  But  regret 
was  publicly  expressed  ^Hhat  France  should  have 
thought  fit  to  open  a  fresh  Eastern  question  to  her 
profit";    and  the  English  press  assumed  a  denun- 


40  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

ciatory  tone  when  the  success  of  the  French  arms 
was  decisive.  On  the  14th  of  May,  1881,  Lord 
Lyons,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  handed  a 
note  to  Mr.  Barthelemy  Saint-Hilaire,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  protesting  in  advance  against  Bizerta 
being  made  into  a  fortified  town ;  and,  a  few  weeks 
later.  Lord  Granville  said  to  our  Ambassador,  Mr. 
Challemel-Lacour,  ^'I  should  lack  frankness  if  I 
were  to  leave  you  under  the  impression  that  the 
action  of  France  in  Tunis  has  produced  a  favourable 
impression  here.''  Indeed,  England  emphasized 
her  opinion  by  abstaining  for  sixteen  years  from  any 
revision  of  the  treaties  of  commerce,  which  secured 
her  exorbitant  privileges  in  the  Regency. 

In  West  Africa,  the  question  of  the  Niger  also 
brought  British  interests  and  our  own  into  conflict. 
Our  situation  in  the  basin  of  the  Niger  was,  in  1882, 
if  anything,  superior  to  theirs,  and  at  any  rate  not 
inferior.  Yet,  in  a  few  months,  our  fellow-country- 
men were  ousted  by  the  National  African  Company, 
soon  transformed  into  the  Royal  Niger  Company, 
with  its  charter  and  sovereign  powers,  thoroughly 
supported  by  the  British  Government.  In  spite 
of  the  successes  of  our  explorers,  and  notwithstand- 
ing the  protectorate  treaties  they  signed  with  native 
chiefs,  our  diplomacy,  through  its  shortsightedness 
and  lack  of  energy,  lost  ground  and  was  held  in 
check  under  a  campaign  of  systematic  intimidation. 
The  treaty  of  the  5th  of  August,  1890,  set  the  seal 
to  this  policy;  and,  through  its  defective  drawing 
up,    became   the    cause    of   subsequent   difficulties. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  '^ ENTENTE"   41 

Between  1890  and  1894,  we  made  no  effort  to  react 
against  the  aggressive  behaviour  of  the  Royal  Niger 
Company  towards  our  fellow-countrymen,  and,  in 
particular,  against  Lieutenant  Mizon.  Our  victo- 
ries over  Rabah,  Samory,  and  Behanzin  even  did 
not  suffice  to  give  us  a  due  consciousness  of  our 
strength.  When  these  successes  were  followed  by 
a  more  active  pacific  penetration.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
replied  in  a  tone  of  serious  menace,  which  was  more 
loudly  echoed  in  the  English  press ;  and  we  decided 
to  evacuate  one  of  our  most  important  posts,  the 
Royal  Niger  Company's  troops  at  once  occupying 
it.  Thereupon  negotiations  were  entered  into,  which 
enabled  us  to  gauge  Great  Britain's  intransigence. 
The  Pall  Mall  Gazette  accused  our  officers  of  con- 
ducting themselves  like  ^^ vulgar  brigands";  and, 
in  his  speeches,  Mr.  Chamberlain  announced  that 
he  was  asking  for  military  preparations  to  be  made. 
On  the  14th  of  June,  1898,  a  treaty  was  signed 
which,  in  reality,  favoured  England  by  shutting 
us  out  from  the  Lower  Niger.  Through  a  contin- 
uous forward  policy,  helped  by  the  supineness  of 
our  statesmen,  our  implacable  rival  seized,  in  the 
most  brutal  way,  on  the  great  way  of  penetration 
into  West  Africa. 

In  the  Congo,  Savorgnan  de  Brazza's  successes 
had  provoked  in  London  both  surprise  and  irrita- 
tion. As  early  as  1884,  England  signed  a  treaty 
with  Portugal,  intended  to  cut  off  both  the  French 
and  Belgian  Congo  from  their  outlet  on  the  Atlan- 
tic.    In  presence  of  protests  from  Belgium,  France, 


42  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

and  Germany,  the  Cabinet  of  Saint  James  yielded, 
and  forbore  to  carry  the  treaty  to  its  conclusion. 
On  the  other  hand,  no  recognition  was  forthcoming 
of  the  right  of  preemption  conceded  to  France 
over  the  Belgian  Congo.  At  the  same  date,  as 
our  explorers  were  displaying  their  activity  on  the 
Obanghi,  Great  Britain  determined  to  shut  us  out 
from  the  Nile  route.  She  proceeded  to  negotiate 
an  agreement  with  the  Free  State,  which  '^made, 
as  it  was  said,  the  Congo  the  mandatary  of  British 
policy,  and  introduced  this  State  as  England's  ten- 
ant into  the  Nile  Valley.''  Such  a  treaty  was  mani- 
festly directed  against  France;  and  Mr.  Hanotaux, 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  said  so  in  Parlia- 
ment, adding:  ^'This  agreement  places  the  Inde- 
pendent State  in  a  condition  of  rupture  —  pacific, 
I  am  willing  to  allow,  but  rupture  none  the  less  — 
with  the  signatory  powers  that  gave  their  consent 
to  its  formation;  it  is  in  formal  contradiction  with 
African  international  law."  King  Leopold  gave 
way;  and,  some  weeks  later,  signed  another  treaty 
with  France  which  practically  cancelled  the  pre- 
vious one.  Here  again.  Great  Britain  had  concen- 
trated her  efforts  against  us,  and,  in  her  policy,  set 
our  enfeeblement  as  a  goal  to  be  attained. 

The  acute  stage  of  the  conflict  between  the  two 
countries  was  reached  with  the  affair  of  Egypt. 
Since  the  cutting  of  the  Suez  Canal,  the  importance 
of  the  route  to  India  had  doubled  for  England.  On 
the  9th  of  February,  1877,  Lord  Beaconsfield,  act- 
ing on  his  own  authority,   bought  for  a  hundred 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  "ENTENTE"      43 

million  francs  the  hundred  and  seventy-seven  thou- 
sand shares  held  by  the  Khedive  in  the  canal  prop- 
erty. Four  years  later,  through  an  inconceivable 
error,  the  French  Government  allowed  the  English 
to  install  themselves  alone  in  the  Nile  Valley,  where, 
from  1882  to  1885,  they  carried  on  a  sanguinary 
struggle  against  the  Dervishes,  and  lost  the  Soudan, 
but  strengthened  their  position  on  the  Lower  Nile. 
On  the  14th  of  January,  1883,  profiting  by  the  weak- 
ness of  Mr.  Duclerc,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
they  induced  the  French  Government  to  abandon 
the  condominium,  which,  indeed,  then  had  a  merely 
theoretic  value.  In  1884,  they  announced  their 
intention  of  evacuating  Egypt,  the  date  mentioned 
being  1888 ;  but  this  promise,  as  all  the  others  of 
the  same  reference,  made  diplomatically  or  in  Par- 
liament, remained  unfulfilled.  Between  1891  and 
1894,  they  established  themselves  strongly  on  the 
Upper  Nile  and  over  all  the  plateau  extending  be- 
tween Lake  Albert  Nyanza  and  Lake  Victoria.  At 
the  end  of  1895,  Lord  Salisbury  informed  the  French 
Government  confidentially  that  he  had  decided  to 
crush  the  Mahdi  and  reconquer  the  Soudan.  Eng- 
land's hold  over  Egypt  grew  tighter  every  day. 

Now,  at  the  same  time,  though  with  insufficient 
means  of  execution,  the  lack  of  which  could  not  be 
supplied  by  the  heroism  of  their  agents,  and,  more- 
over, with  deplorable  vacillation  in  their  manner  of 
giving  instructions,  the  French  Government  sent 
out  expeditions  with  a  view  to  reopening  the  Egyp- 
tian   problem    for    European    consideration.     Cap- 


44  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

tain  Marchand^s  force  started  from  the  Ubanghi, 
and  that  of  Mr.  de  Bonchamps  from  Djibouti. 
Unfortunately,  a  French  Deputy,  speaking  in  the 
Chamber  on  the  28th  of  February,  1895,  had  the 
imprudence  to  say:  '^To-day  the  EngUsh  dream  of 
possessing  the  whole  of  the  Nile  is,  I  believe,  once 
for  all  spoiled."  Certain  members  of  the  Govern- 
ment thought  that,  by  anticipating  Great  Britain, 
we  should  be  in  a  position  to  enter  into  negotiations 
with  her  on  the  whole  question  under  favourable 
conditions.  .  .  .  Three  years  after,  Captain  Mar- 
chand  arrived  at  Fashoda;  but,  instead  of  finding 
himself  able  to  communicate  from  there  with  Abys- 
sinia, and  backed  up  by  previous  diplomatic  action, 
he  encountered  Sirdar  Kitchener^s  Anglo-Egyptian 
army  victoriously  camped  on  the  battle-field  of 
Omdurman. 

What  the  morrow  was  is  in  the  memory  of  all: 
a  painful,  breathless,  humiliating  discussion  between 
Mr.  Delcasse,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Sir 
Edmund  Monson,  the  English  Ambassador,  blunt 
demands  from  the  British  Government,  Lord  Salis- 
bury, Sir  Michael  Hicks-Beach,  and  Mr.  Ritchie; 
finally,  on  the  4th  of  November,  1898,  the  evacua- 
tion of  Fashoda  under  the  direct  threat  of  a  war 
for  which  our  Navy  was  unhappily  far  from  being 
prepared.  Between  1894  and  1896,  we  had  lost 
two  years.  In  1896,  we  had  made  up  our  minds 
to  act,  but  had  left  to  a  single  officer  and  two  hun- 
dred men  the  task  of  reopening  the  Egyptian  ques- 
tion.    We  suffered  the  just  penalty  of  so  much  lack 


FRANCE  AND   THE   ENGLISH   ''ENTENTE"      45 

of  foresight.  Strengthened  by  our  mistakes,  Eng- 
land had  pursued  us  without  mercy.  Thencefor- 
ward;  she  was  preponderant  in  Eastern  Africa.  On 
the  21st  of  March,  1899,  we  signed  a  treaty  recog- 
nizing her  hold  over  the  Bahr-el-Gazal  and  Darfour 
regions.  No  special  mention  was  made  of  the  Nile; 
but  what  was  true  of  the  Darfour  region  was  a  for- 
tiori true  of  Egypt.  In  reality,  Great  Britain  re- 
quired us,  by  abandoning  Bahr-el-Gazal,  to  yield  to 
her  a  country  into  which  she  had  never  penetrated, 
and  w^here  we  had  concluded  treaties  with  the 
natives  and  created  some  thirty  posts.  Once  again, 
the  English  had  treated  us  as  enemies ;  and  the  1899 
convention  was  a  suitable  culmination  to  centuries 
of  hatred. 

If,  to  these  grave  motives  of  conflict,  be  added 
secondary  questions  of  dispute  in  Newfoundland, 
Zanzibar,  Madagascar,  Siam,  and  Morocco,  a  fair 
idea  may  be  gained  of  what  Franco-English  rela- 
tions were  up  to  the  day  when  the  Entente  Cordials 
was  concluded.  Now  victorious  over  English  op- 
position in  Algeria,  Tunis,  the  Congo,  now  van- 
quished, on  the  Niger,  in  Egypt,  and  the  Soudan, 
we  might  say  with  Lord  Salisbury:  ^^Not  every 
cause  for  controversy  has  been  removed;  and 
certainly,  in  the  future,  we  shall  have  many  things 
to  discuss.''  Peace  had  been  maintained,  but  an 
armed  peace,  characterized  by  alarms,  distrust, 
rancour,  and  irritation.  How  came  it  that  within 
five  years  a  sincere  understanding  was  established 
between  the  two  hereditary  enemies  ? 


46  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

II 

Neither  in  England  nor  in  France  is  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  understanding  to  be  sought.  Rather 
was  it  the  fear  of  Germany  which  determined 
England  —  not  only  her  King  and  Government, 
but  the  whole  of  her  people  —  to  draw  nearer  to 
France. 

During  the  twenty  years  that  followed  the  foun- 
dation of  the  German  Empire,  Anglo-German  re- 
lations remained  correct.  And  German  diplomacy 
also,  under  Prince  Bismarck's  direction,  made  a 
special  point  of  being  on  good  terms  with  London, 
and  of  pursuing  outside  Europe  no  design  calcu- 
lated to  arouse  anxiety  at  the  British  Foreign  Office : 
^^I  am  an  Englishman  in  Egypt,"  the  Chancel- 
lor once  said;  adding  on  another  occasion:  ^'Eng- 
land is  of  more  importance  to  us  than  Zanzibar  and 
the  whole  eastern  coast  of  Africa."  In  spite  of  po- 
lemics caused  by  the  Germans'  installing  themselves 
on  various  parts  of  the  African  coast,  in  spite  even 
of  the  diplomatic  intervention  which  prevented 
Great  Britain  from  ratifying  her  Congolese  treaty 
with  Portugal,  there  was  a  systematic  effort  of  Wil- 
helmstrasse  to  preserve  cordial  relations  with  Down- 
ing Street.  On  the  14th  of  June,  1890,  an  Anglo- 
German  treaty  was  signed,  acknowledging  Great 
Britain's  supremacy  over  all  the  basin  of  the  Nile. 
A  second  treaty,  on  the  15th  of  November,  1893, 
marked  a  fresh  English  success  by  stipulating  that 
the    German   Cameroons    should   not   extend   east- 


FRANCE  AND   THE  ENGLISH   '^ ENTENTE"      47 

ward  beyond  the  basin  of  the  Chari,  and  that  the 
Darfour,  Kordofan,  and  Bahr-el-Gazal  regions  should 
be  excluded  from  the  German  sphere  of  influence. 
Even  the  Emperor  William's  telegram  to  Mr.  Kru- 
ger  provoked  only  a  temporary  storm,  and  did  not 
hinder  the  conclusion  of  a  secret  treaty  which,  in 
1898,  in  conditions  but  little  known,  disposed  of 
the  future  of  the  Portuguese  colonies.  Whilst  the 
German  press  made  violent  attacks  on  England 
throughout  the  Transvaal  war,  the  Emperor  paid 
a  visit  to  his  grandmother  and  negotiated  an  Anglo- 
German  agreement  relative  to  Samoa.  A  few 
months  later,  there  was  a  further  treaty  between 
the  two  countries  relative  to  China;  and,  at  the 
end  of  1901,  a  triple  naval  demonstration  associated 
together  the  English,  German,  and  Italian  fleets 
against  Venezuela. 

From  this  time,  however,  the  Entente  policy  was 
definitely  abandoned,  the  cause  being,  as  Bismarck 
said,  ^^  cousin  land-rat's  taking  it  into  his  head  to 
turn  water-rat,"  and  obtaining,  within  a  few  years, 
such  prodigious  success  that  England  was  both 
confounded  and  exasperated.  On  the  morrow  of 
the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  no  Englishman  foresaw  this 
lightning  transformation. 

A  soil  with  badly  worked  riches ;  ways  of  communication  still 
incomplete  ;  irregular  shallow  rivers  with  silted-up  harbours  at 
their  estuaries,  and  flowing  into  a  sea  shut  up  between  conti- 
nents, where,  for  eight  months  out  of  the  twelve,  both  climate 
and  fog  interfered  with  navigation  ;  a  defective  economic  organi- 
zation ;  anarchy  in  production  ;  insufficiency  in  capital  ;  in  fine 
and  above  all,  a  population  of  soldiers,  savants  and  peasants  ; 


48  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

everything  seemed  to  forbid  Germany's  aspiring  to  the  brilliant 
destiny  of  the  United  Kingdom.^ 

Freed  from  French  competition,  the  latter  power 
was  incontestably  the  carrier  of  the  seas,  the  neces- 
sary intermediary  between  the  two  worlds.  Her 
security  was  absolute. 

And  yet  the  security  was  deceitful.  Never  was 
economic  progress  more  prompt,  steady,  and  lucky 
than  that  of  the  German  Empire.  Never  was  there 
a  better  exemplification  of  the  proverb  that  ^^Iron 
calls  forth  gold.^'  In  1870,  the  population  of  Ger- 
many was  41,000,000  inhabitants.  Between  this 
date  and  1907,  it  advanced  to  63,000,000.  During 
the  same  period,  the  railways  increased  their  length 
from  20,000  kilometres  to  58,000  kilometres.  Thanks 
to  the  carrying  out  of  a  magnificent  river  improve- 
ment scheme,  the  country's  interior  navigation  has 
gone  beyond  the  watersheds,  and  drained  the  prod- 
ucts of  Central  Europe  towards  her  ports.  These 
latter,  to  which  Belgian  Antwerp  and  Dutch  Rot- 
terdam serve  as  auxiliaries,  are  the  best  fitted  up 
in  the  world.  German  ship-building  yards  have 
a  universal  reputation.  German  docks  monopolize 
the  major  portion  of  Europe's  exportation.  The 
trading  fleet  of  Hamburg  alone  surpasses  in  tonnage 
the  whole  of  that  of  France.  German  commerce 
(importation  and  exportation)  amounted  to  six 
billion  marks  in  1878,  seven  billions  in  1892,  ten 
and  a  half  billions  in  1900,  and  fifteen  billions  in 
1906. 

^  See  Maurice  Lair's  German  Imperialism. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   49 

Parallel  in  its  progress,  Germany's  Navy  has  de- 
veloped in  formidable  proportions.  In  1898,  it 
comprised  only  nine  small  iron-clads.  Under  the 
programmes  of  1898,  1900,  and  1906,  as  finally 
amended,  and  with  the  further  increase  anticipated 
for  1912,  the  Empire  will  possess  in  1918,  according 
to  the  well-known  military  writer.  Colonel  Gaedke's 
computation,  eighty  iron-clads  or  iron-clad  cruisers 
of  20,000  tons,  these  without  counting  a  reserve 
fleet  of  twenty-five  ships  either  of  less  strength  or 
of  less  recent  construction.  She  will  therefore  be 
capable  of  coping  on  sea  with  any  enemy  whatso- 
ever. That  this  adversary  must  be  England,  no  one 
takes  any  trouble  to  hide,  whether  it  be  the  sailors, 
or  the  Navy  League  with  its  nine  hundred  thousand 
members  and  its  annual  budget  of  1,000,000  marks. 
And  a  moral  transformation  has  accompanied  the 
material  one.  To  the  Emperor's  appeal,  saying: 
^'Our  future  is  on  the  sea,"  the  German  people  have 
replied  with  their  usual  discipline.  ^^As  my  grand- 
father worked  for  the  reconstitution  of  this  Army,'' 
added  the  Kaiser,  ^^so  I  will  work,  without  letting 
myself  be  checked,  to  reconstitute  this  Navy,  so  that 
it  may  be  made  comparable  to  our  land  army  and 
permit  the  Empire  to  rise  to  a  greater  degree  of 
power."  While  her  merchants  were  sailing  forth 
to  conquer  fresh  markets,  Germany  began  to  pre- 
pare herself  for  this  new  role.  Read  the  statutes 
of  the  Naval  League :  — 

The  Naval  League  considers  that  Germany  cannot  do  with- 
out a  redoubtable  fleet,  both  for  defending  her  coasts  and  for 


50  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

maintaining  her  rank  among  the  great  World  Powers,  both  for 
protecting  her  general  interests  and  commercial  relations,  and 
for  defending  her  citizens  abroad.  Consequently,  it  proposes  to 
arouse  and  strengthen  throughout  the  country  an  opinion  fa- 
vourable to  the  increase  of  the  fleet ;  and  it  assumes  the  duty  of 
coming  to  the  help  of  sailors  belonging  to  the  fleet  and  colonial 
army  in  case  the  Administration  should  be  unable  to  grant  them 
sufficient  assistance. 

Next,  listen  to  Chancellor  von  Buelow.  You 
will  see  that  both  Government  and  nation  are  in 
perfect  accord.  On  his  speaking  for  the  first  time 
in  the  Reichstag,  he  claims  for  Germany  her  share 
of  room.  Two  months  later,  he  sets  forth  what  is 
required  by  the  economic,  maritime,  and  moral  prog- 
ress of  Germany  ^^as  she  passes  through  the  world 
with  her  sword  in  one  hand  and  her  spade  and 
trowel  in  the  other. ^^  And  his  ensuing  speeches, 
whether  treating  of  Samoa,  East  Africa,  Kiao- 
Tcheou,  or  the  Carolines,  all  assert  the  necessity 
of  the  Empire's  exercising  an  action  outside  of 
Europe.  Each  time,  he  brings  out  the  close  connec- 
tion between  the  successive  steps  of  this  forward 
movement.  Each  time,  he  shows  his  fidelity  and 
zeal  towards  the  colonial  policy  so  often  railed  at 
fifteen  years  previously.  Soon,  indeed,  he  pro- 
nounces the  decisive  words,  ^^Like  the  English, 
French,  and  Russians,  we  claim  the  right  to  a  greater 
Germany. '' 

Then  by  the  despatch  of  numerous  circulars,  the 
Imperial  Chancellery  is  seen  taking  a  preponderant 
part  in  the  negotiations  with  China,  and  assuming, 
during  the  repression  of  the  Pekin  disturbances,  a 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   51 

still  more  important  role  through  the  appointment 
of  Count  Waldersee  to  the  head  command  of  the 
international  troops. 

We  shall  not  let  ourselves  be  thrust  out  from  an  equality 
with  other  Powers.  We  shall  not  suffer  ourselves  to  be  denied 
the  right  to  speak  as  they  do  in  the  world.  There  was  a  time 
when  Germany  was  only  a  geographical  expression,  when  she 
was  denied  the  name  of  a  great  Power.  Since  then,  we  have 
become  a  great  Power ;  and,  with  the  help  of  God,  we  hope  to 
remain  so.  We  shall  not  permit  the  abolition  or  limitation  of 
our  claim  to  a  world  policy  based  on  reflection  and  reason. 

The  expression  was  out  at  last.  Henceforward, 
we  shall  meet  with  it  continually,  and,  on  each 
fresh  occasion,  backed  up  with  greater  precision. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  expansion  phenomenon  is 
one  that  is  general,  so  that  Germany,  as  a  great 
Power  present  and  future,  participates  in  it,  perforce. 
Read  over  the  speech  of  the  3d  of  March,  1902,  the 
Budget  discussions  of  1903,  and  1904;  everywhere 
you  will  find  the  same  affirmation;  everywhere, 
the  German  adaptation  of  this  thought  of  President 
Roosevelt  that  a  nation  cannot  remain  huddled  up 
like  a  petty  tradesman  in  a  narrow  shop. 

So,  imperialist  Germany  aspires  to  fulfil  Treitsch- 
ke's  prophecy :  ^'  When  Germany's  flag  covers 
and  protects  this  huge  empire,  to  whom  will  the 
sceptre  of  the  universe  belong?  Who  will  impose 
her  will  on  other  nations  enfeebled  or  decadent? 
Is  it  not  Germany  who  will  have  the  mission  of 
assuring  peace  to  the  world?  Russia,  a  huge  giant 
in  process  of  formation,  and  with  feet  of  clay,  will 
be  absorbed  by  her  internal  and  economic  difficulties. 


52  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

England,  stronger  in  appearance  than  in  reality, 
will  doubtless  see  her  colonies  separate  from  her, 
and  will  wear  herself  out  in  barren  struggles.  France, 
a  prey  to  her  domestic  strife  and  quarrels,  will  sink 
more  and  more  into  final  ruin.  As  for  Italy,  she 
will  have  enough  to  do,  if  she  wishes  to  bestow 
tranquillity  enough  on  her  children.  The  future, 
therefore,  belongs  to  Germany,  with  whom  Austria 
will  unite,  if  she  has  a  desire  to  live.^' 

The  appearance  of  so  formidable  a  competitor 
could  not  fail  to  disturb  England.  Chatham's 
saying,  ^'Our  first  duty  is  to  see  that  France  does 
not  become  a  naval,  commercial,  and  colonial  Power," 
applied  now  much  more  accurately  to  Germany 
than  to  France.  Thenceforward,  therefore,  Great 
Britain's  efforts  had  to  turn  themselves  against 
Germany.  Long  since,  indeed,  her  merchants,  con- 
suls, and  politicians  had  uttered  a  cry  of  alarm.^ 
In  1886,  at  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  into  the 
decline  of  British  Commerce,  the  Birmingham 
delegates  said :  — 

Germany  has  found  the  way  to  our  markets,  the  addresses 
of  our  customers,  and,  seeing  our  profits,  has  fabricated  our 
trademarks.  She  has  sent  her  cutlery  everywhere;  has  even 
pirated  the  names  of  our  manufacturers.  .  .  .  Sometimes,  she 
has  employed  simple  imitation :  the  Malta  cross  and  the  star, 
with  the  name  Rodgers,  is  one  of  the  favourite  marks  with  our 
customers :  here  are  German  knives  with  two  Malta  crosses  and 
the  name  Rotgens.  .  .  .  The  Germans  of  Westphalia  have  the 
advantage  over  us  of  water-transport  on  the  Rhine  right  down 
to  the  sea.  .  .  .  The  Germans  also  have  the  enormous  advan- 
tage over  us  of  technical  education;   and  are  discreet  into  the 

^  See  Victor  Berard's  English  Imperialism. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE''   53 

bargain.  They  have  spread  over  the  world  and  have  swarmed 
into  our  country,  flooding  it  with  their  imitations.  In  the  City 
of  London  I  know  firms  which,  ten  years  ago,  used  to  supply 
the  colonies  and  foreign  countries  with  English  products,  and 
which,  to-day,  ship  nothing  but  German  inferior  articles.  These 
articles  arrive  with  the  Sheffield  mark;  and,  when  the  consumer 
finds  that  he  has  been  taken  in,  he  accuses  us.  After  two  or 
three  of  such  experiences,  he  refuses  to  deal  further  with  us,  and 
applies  direct  to  the  Germans,  .  .  .  who  then  offer  him  good 
stuff. 

Ten  years  later,  all  the  official  reports  made 
similar  statements  in  more  precise  language. 

Our  market,  wrote  the  English  Consul  at  Cherbourg,  in  1897, 
is  overrun  with  German  hardware  and  toys.  The  region  lives 
mainly  by  its  trade  with  England  ;  and  yet  the  shopkeepers  buy 
nothing  in  England.  At  the  big  bazaar,  where  I  asked  the  reason 
of  this,  the  manager  handed  me  articles  in  wood  and  fayence 
made  in  Germany  from  models  he  had  given,  and  in  sizes  suited 
to  the  taste  of  our  population,  with  views  of  Cherbourg  and 
scenes  from  Norman  history. 

The  same  note  is  struck  in  reports  from  the 
British  consuls  in  Italy,  Sweden,  Norway,  Greece, 
Roumania,  Portugal,  and  Spain.  In  1898,  the  Eng- 
lish consuls  in  Germany  summed  up  their  impres- 
sions thus : — 

The  year  of  1897  has  been  an  admirable  success  for  Germany. 
In  everj^  industry,  progress  has  continued,  and  the  net  result  can 
be  expressed  in  three  words,  "All  fires  alight,"  and  not  only 
those  of  the  manufactory  and  well-to-do  citizen,  but  those,  too, 
of  the  peasant  and  workman.  .  .  .  Everything  evinces  this 
country's  gigantic  effort  to  take  the  lead  of  the  world's  industrial 
development  and  surpass  all  its  rivals. 

If  the  English  ports  were  declining  in  importance, 
this  also  was  Germany^s  fault :  — 


54  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

In  the  last  twenty-six  years  Germany  has  made  enormous 
strides  in  every  direction.  The  establishment  of  productive 
industries  has  given  work  to  an  ever  increasing  population,  which 
between  1872  and  1897  has  gained  thirty  per  cent.  The  creation 
of  a  flourishing  commerce  has  bestowed  on  the  population  a 
growing  proportion  of  the  comforts  of  life  ;  and,  during  the  last 
twenty  years,  this  commerce  has  improved  twenty  per  cent, 
while  the  traffic  in  German  ports  has  gone  up  a  hundred  and 
twenty-four  per  cent. 

When  one  reads  these  reports,  it  is  easy  to  under- 
stand the  fear  felt  by  all  these  English  that  they 
will  be  commercially  ousted  by  Germany,  just  as, 
two  centuries  ago,  they  themselves  ousted  the  Dutch. 
They  are  unanimous  in  acknowledging  the  superiority 
of  German  methods.  Germany  carries  off  the  palm 
by  the  quality  of  her  economic  mobilization.  She 
possesses  a  magnificent  system  of  commercial,  ele- 
mentary, secondary,  and  higher  schools.  Her  clerks 
assimilate  the  habits  and  needs  of  foreign  markets. 
When  serving  their  apprenticeship,  they  prepare, 
at  the  same  time,  the  success  of  the  firms  into  which 
they  will  later  enter.  ''The  Germans  have  conquered 
South  America,^'  writes  the  Consul  at  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
''by  the  peculiar  study  they  have  made  of  its  require- 
ments." And  the  Consul  at  Riga  says  in  his  turn, 
"A  German  seizes  every  opportunity  of  pleasing 
his  customers."    To  this  the  Consul  at  Havre  adds :  — 

The  Germans  have  secured  the  contract  for  supplying  the 
industrial  school  at  Elbeuf  with  all  its  material.  They  have 
laid  down  all  the  machinery  at  a  merely  nominal  price.  .  .  . 
What  was  paid  was  for  the  sake  of  form  only.  .  .  .  They  have 
thus  gained  the  town's  good  graces.  And  this  gift  will  be  amply 
requited  by  their  obtaining  the  future  custom  of  all  the  pupils 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   55 

leaving  this   school,   who   will   have   been   accustomed    to   the 
articles,  methods,  tools,  and  skill  of  the  Germans. 

This  economic  menace  was  bound  to  provoke  a 
chronic  state  of  nervousness,  which  soon  developed 
into  an  obsession.  The  Enghsh  grew  to  think  that 
Germany's  pohcy  was  everywhere  aimed  against 
them.  And  facts  frequently  justified  the  deduction. 
Sometimes,  however,  they  drew  unwarranted  con- 
clusions from  the  course  of  events.  As  an  example, 
may  be  quoted  what  was  written,  in  September, 
1897,  by  an  English  politician  who  has  been  one  of 
the  men  most  intimately  associated  with  the  events 
of  the  last  twenty  years.  It  will  show  the  gradual 
formation  of  England's  impeachment  of  Germany.^ 

Up  to  1895,  he  said,  our  relations  with  France  and  Russia, 
which  left  much  to  be  desired  —  Prince  Bismarck  took  good 
care  of  that !  —  and,  on  the  other  hand,  our  old  ties  of  friend- 
ship with  Austria,  and  especially  with  Italy,  rallied  to  the  Triple 
Alliance,  and  consequently  to  Germany,  not  only  English  poUcy, 
but  English  opinion  in  general.  Already,  however,  before  the 
telegram  to  President  Kruger,  the  Emperor  William's  visit  to 
Cowes,  in  the  previous  summer,  after  the  general  elections  of 
1895,  which  restored  Lord  Salisbury  to  power,  had  produced 
disappointment  in  Government  circles  on  both  sides.  An  al- 
most open  hostility  with  regard  to  South  Africa  was  manifested 
during  Sir  Edward  Malet's  last  interviews  in  Berlin,  before  the 
Ambassador  quitted  his  post;  and  the  Jameson  raid  did  no 
more  than  furnish  German  policy  with  the  pretext  for  a  cowp  de 
theatre  which  was  bound  to  occur  sooner  or  later. 

The  coup  failed  in  its  effect,  first  because  Portugal  refused  to 
lend  herself  to  Germany's  tactics,  and  next  because  greater 
Powers  than  Portugal  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the  proposals  for  a 
European  coalition  against  England  emanating  from  Wilhelm- 

^See  the  Temps  of  September  21,  1907. 


56  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

strasse.  Moreover,  both  the  Government  and  the  English  people 
themselves  had  reacted  with  a  firmness  that  made  Berlin  under- 
stand the  time  was  not  yet  come  to  "administer  a  correction'' 
to  us.  Germany  made  a  volte  face  and,  some  few  months  later, 
countenanced  the  recapture  of  Dongola  by  the  Anglo-Egyptian 
troops. 

But  the  order  to  march  on  Dongola  was  given  at  the  sugges- 
tion of  Italy,  in  order  that  a  diversion  might  be  created  in  her 
favour  and  the  Caliph  and  his  dervishes  be  prevented  from 
threatening  the  Italian  positions  on  the  Red  Sea,  just  at  the 
moment  when  the  Italian  army  in  Africa  had  been  almost 
wiped  out  by  the  disastrous  issue  of  its  Abyssinian  campaign. 
Could  the  Emperor  William  do  otherwise  than  back  the  appeal 
addressed  to  England  by  King  Humbert,  his  ally  as  well  as  our 
friend?  Besides,  he  knew  that  by  urging  England  to  recon- 
quer the  Soudan,  he  would  not  fail,  under  then  existing  circum- 
stances, to  aggravate  the  friction  between  England  and  France. 

It  was  for  the  same  reason  that,  three  years  later,  the  Em- 
peror addressed  his  congratulations  to  the  conquerors  of  Omdur- 
man,  on  the  very  eve  of  Captain  Marchand's  arrival  at  Fashoda. 
If  the  agreement  come  to  between  England  and  Germany  with 
regard  to  certain  colonial  questions  in  Africa  gave  us,  as  has 
been  asserted,  without  its  being  established,  carte  blanche  in  the 
Transvaal,  it  was  only  a  small  instalment  compared  with  the 
price  exacted  at  various  times  by  Germany  for  her  complaisance. 
Kiao-Tcheou,  Samoa,  Salaga  represent  for  us  so  many  bribes 
we  have  had  to  pay  in  order  to  secure  Berlin's  ever  malevolent 
neutrality.  But  we  have  kept  a  remembrance  of  it,  as  well  as 
of  the  tone  of  contempt  assumed  towards  our  army  not  only  by 
the  German  press,  but  by  the  German  Chancellor  himself  in 
the  midst  of  the  Reichstag,  during  the  painful  war  of  the  Trans- 
vaal. Nor  have  we  forgotten  the  discourteous  behaviour  of 
Marshal  von  Waldersee  in  China,  nor  the  way  in  which,  immedi- 
ately after  the  Chinese  agreement  of  September,  1900,  had  been 
signed  between  England  and  Germany,  the  latter  audaciously 
misinterpreted  its  meaning,  so  as  to  exclude  Manchuria  from  its 
scope,  and  to  claim  her  sphere  of  influence  in  the  Yang-Tse 
Valley. 

And  can  it  be  imagined  we  have  forgotten  Germany's  tactics 
during  all  these  years  at  Constantinople,  the  opposition  now 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   57 

underhand,  now  declared,  she  has  always  made  to  our  diplo- 
macy in  the  Armenian  question,  the  Cretan  question,  and  later 
the  Macedonian  question?  Are  we  perchance  so  blind  as,  with- 
out speaking  of  the  Bagdad  railway,  not  to  have  seen  Germany's 
hand  behind  Turkey  both  in  the  region  of  Aden  and  on  the 
Persian  Gulf,  and  also  in  the  construction  of  the  Hedjaz  rail- 
way, which,  last  year,  caused  the  Anglo-Turkish  dispute  with 
regard  to  Tabah?  Have  we  not  heard  the  Emperor  William 
proclaim  aloud  that  Germany's  future  is  on  the  seas.  Have  we 
not  read  the  preamble,  directly  aimed  at  England,  of  the  great 
Parliamentary  bill  for  the  increase  of  the  German  fleet. 

It  was  by  their  cumulative  effect  that  all  these  incidents,  — 
the  agreements  by  which  Germany  has  grudgingly  accorded  us 
her  good  graces  at  a  usurious  price,  as  well  as  the  diplomatic 
shocks,  which  no  agreement  has  attenuated  —  have,  somewhat 
late  alas!  convinced  us  that  it  would  be  much  more  simple 
and  advantageous  for  us  to  come  to  an  understanding,  once  for 
all,  with  France,  and  even  with  Russia,  than  to  remain  indefi- 
nitely under  the  pressure  of  Germany's  exactions.  Lord  Salis- 
bury had  grown  too  old  in  the  ancient  order  of  things  to  take 
the  decisive  step,  although  no  English  statesman  chafed  under 
the  German  curb  with  more  bitterness  than  he,  during  his  last 
years  of  power.  For  the  Anglo-French  Entente,  new  men  were 
needed :  King  Edward  on  the  throne,  and  Lord  Lansdowne  at 
the  Foreign  Office.  Not  that  they  intended  to  make  the  Entente 
against  Germany.  Their  sole  aim  was  to  put  an  end  to  a  situa- 
tion which  Germany  had  exploited  too  long  with  a  view  to  se- 
curing the  predominant  power  in  Europe.  It  was  a  measure 
not  of  aggression  but  defence.  However,  for  Germany,  he  who 
is  not  with  her  is  against  her.^ 

In  London,  therefore,  the  Franco-English  rap- 
prochement appeared  to  be  the  best  means  of  coping 
with  Germany  for  the  joint  good  of  ''Trade''  and 
the  ''Empire."  On  the  French  side,  economic 
interests  counselled  this  rapprochement,  and  political 
interests  were  not  opposed  to  it.  Taking  one  year 
^  See  the  Temps  of  September  21,  1907. 


58  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

with  another,  England  purchases  from  us  a  billion's 
worth  of  merchandise.  On  this  account,  she  is, 
as  was  said  one  day,  ^Hhe  oldest,  nearest,  richest, 
and  most  constant  of  our  colonies/'  All  the  articles 
that  we  chiefly  export  (Paris  articles,  ready-made 
goods,  tissues,  fashion  articles,  worked  leather, 
chemicals,  pottery,  and  metal  goods),  compete  only 
to  an  insignificant  degree  with  articles  of  British 
production.  As,  on  the  other  hand,  England  has 
large  available  capital,  and  is  an  excellent  buyer, 
capable  of  appreciating  an  article  of  luxury  and 
paying  for  it,  French  production  is  to  such  an  extent 
complementary  of  its  neighbour's  that  it  might,  if 
it  tried,  considerably  increase  its  exportation  across 
the  Channel.^  If  it  has  remained  thus  long  station- 
ary, or  nearly  so  (46  millions  in  1875,  35  millions  in 
1885,  47  millions  in  1895),  the  fault  is  rather  that 
of  the  sellers  than  of  the  things  sold.  Our  mer- 
chants persisting  in  a  regrettable  routine,  consider- 
ing that  the  merits  of  their  goods  are  equal,  the 
requirements  of  the  English  market  identical,  too 
often  believe  it  unnecessary  for  them  to  alter  their 
methods  and  to  reckon  with  the  modern,  growing 
intensity  of  competition,  especially  that  of  Germany. 
There  was  consequently  room  for  a  development, 
which  could  not  but  gain  by  the  establishment  of 
friendly  relations.  Such  development  had  been, 
for  several  years,  regarded  with  a  favourable  eye 
by  the  commercial  associations  of  the  two  countries. 

^See  the  reports  of  Mr.  Jean  Perier,  French  Commercial  Attache 
in  London,  published  by  the  National  Office  of  Foreign  Commerce. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  "ENTENTE"   59 

On  the  14th  of  September,  1901,  the  Associated 
Chambers  of  British  commerce  passed  a  resolution 
advocating  a  treaty  of  Franco-English  arbitration, 
basing  their  vote  on  the  ^'immense  advantages  that 
would  accrue  from  it  to  commercial  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries.'^  In  1903,  during  a  visit 
of  some  French  members  of  Parliament  to  London, 
Mr.  Louis  Sinclair,  the  founder  of  the  Commercial 
Committee  of  the  House  of  Commons,  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  rapprochement  might  bring  about  an 
economic  Entente.  Sir  Edward  Sassoon  said  on  the 
same  occasion,  ^^Our  aim  should  be  to  arrive  at 
the  one  Entente  which  is  really  stable,  that  based 
on  material  interests.'^  In  France,  the  various 
Chambers  of  Commerce  had  likewise  rallied  to  the 
same  idea.  All  of  them,  one  after  another,  passed 
resolutions,  to  which  several  Municipal  Councils 
adhered,  calling  for  the  development  of  the  two 
countries'  commercial  relations.  On  this  point, 
there  was  entire  agreement  between  the  traders  on 
both  sides  of  the  Channel.^ 

Politically,  the  repulses  even  which  Great  Britain 
had  inflicted  on  France  in  Africa  —  the  Niger,  the 
Upper  Nile,  and  Egypt  —  had  exhausted  the  ancient 
rivalry.  We  had  nothing  more  to  gain  and  nothing 
more  to  lose.  A  policy  of  reconciliation,  based  on 
the  recognition  of  accomplished  colonial  facts,  was 
therefore  theoretically  possible.  At  this  moment, 
Mr.  Delcasse,  being  resolved  to  seek  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and,  more  especially  in  Morocco,  compensa- 
^  See  Gabriel  Louis  Jaray's  Franco- English  Policy. 


60  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

tions  for  the  set-back  by  which  his  ministry  had 
begun  and  for  which  it  would  be  unjust  to  hold  him 
responsible,  rightly  thought  that  a  Mediterranean 
policy,  already  facilitated  by  the  rapprochement 
with  Italy,  could  only  be  carried  out  in  conjunction 
with  England.  Had  he  then  formed  the  chimerical 
design  since  attributed  to  him  of  isolating  Germany  ? 
This  is  not  probable.  At  any  rate,  it  was  legitimate 
for  him  to  seek  for  further  political  security  on  the 
side  of  England,  and  to  bestow  an  additional  guaran- 
tee on  our  diplomatic  autonomy  and  through  it  on 
the  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  And  the  British 
Government's  inspiring  thought  with  regard  to  the 
balance  of  power  must  necessarily  have  found  its 
echo  in  Paris.  Last  of  all,  the  analogies,  sometimes 
inexact,  which  can  be  discovered  between  French 
and  English  institutions  were,  with  certain  people, 
an  additional  argument  in  favour  of  a  rapprochement. 
^'We  lost  a  great  deal  of  time  with  England  between 
1882  and  1898,''  said  Mr.  Deschanel  in  1903.  In  a 
few  months,  this  lost  time  was  about  to  be  regained, 
and  the  Entente  Cordiale  sealed. 

Ill 

The  English  King  was  the  initiator  of  the  rap- 
prochement. He  it  was  who  both  conceived  and 
facilitated  it,  while  still  many  believed  that  the 
moment  was  premature. 

Edward  VII  has  been  both  praised  and  attacked 
without   stint.     Perhaps   he    deserves    neither    the 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   61 

'^excess  of  honour,  nor  yet  the  excess  of  abuse." 
Among  present  sovereigns,  he  has  one  superiority, 
that  of  having  gained  experience  in  Hfe  before 
reigning.  The  existence  of  leisure  imposed  on  him 
by  the  British  Constitution  during  his  mother's 
life,  a  leisure  which  he  freely  profited  by,  enabled 
him  to  form  his  opinion  of  men  and  things  by  close 
personal  observation.  Madame  de  Genlis  used  to 
say  that  princes  are  the  worst-brought-up  people 
in  the  world.  She  meant  by  this  that  their  educa- 
tion is  Artificial,  and  that  they  grow  up  without 
ever  encountering  contradiction,  which  is  the  leaven 
of  the  critical  mind.  Such  was  not  the  case  with 
Edward  VII.  And,  doubtless,  it  is  for  this  reason 
that  he  possesses  more  consistency  of  thought,  more 
tact,  and  more  shrewdness  than  other  sovereigns. 
He  is  not  afraid  of  taking  the  initiative ;  and  so  far 
his  initiative  has  been  a  success.  The  boldest 
example  of  it  was  his  visit  to  Paris  in  1903.  Putting 
aside  all  objections,  and  being  convinced  of  his 
success,  he  arrived  in  France,  amidst  an  atmosphere 
of  uncertainty.  When  the  first  platoons  of  cuiras- 
siers rode  down  the  Champs  Elysees,  embarrassment 
and  anxiety  weighed  on  the  public.  The  National- 
ists had  declared  their  intention  of  hissing.  What 
would  be  the  result  of  a  hostile  manifestation? 
The  King,  as  far  as  he  was  concerned,  did  not  believe 
in  the  danger,  and  he  was  right.  The  Parisians 
accorded  him  not  an  enthusiastic,  but,  from  the 
first,  a  respectful,  and  soon  a  genial,  reception.  The 
road  was   clear.     Two    months    later,   Mr.   Loubet 


62  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

paid  King  Edward  a  return  visit.  And,  on  welcom- 
ing his  colleague,  Mr.  Delcasse,  to  London,  Lord 
Lansdowne  said  to  him :  — 

^^Now  we  are  going  to  have  some  conversation." 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  conversation  both  in 
Paris  and  in  London.  Lord  Lansdowne,  Mr.  Del- 
casse,  Mr.  Paul  Cambon  —  the  French  Ambassador 
in  London,  —  Sir  Eldon  Gorst,  at  that  time  the 
Egyptian  Government's  financial  adviser,  were  the 
chief  interlocutors  in  this  dialogue  that  lasted  eight 
months.  On  the  English  side  was  shown  a  sincere 
desire  to  come  to  an  understanding,  but  also  in 
details  great  minuteness  and  a  wary  fear  of  yielding 
too  much;  on  the  French  side  an  equal  willingness 
to  come  to  an  arrangement,  the  best  intentions,  in 
fine,  but  too  much  southern  imaginativeness,  and, 
here  and  there,  carelessness  in  practical  precision. 
On  the  8th  of  April,  1904,  the  agreement  was  signed, 
and  its  immediate  publication  produced  a  deep 
impression  in  Europe. 

The  arrangement,  which  comprised  a  convention 
relative  to  Newfoundland  and  Western  Africa,  and  a 
declaration  concerning  Egypt  and  Morocco,  formed 
a  treaty  of  liquidation  and  equilibrium.  The  con- 
vention had  merely  a  local  importance,  and  settled 
ancient  disputes,  somewhat  to  England's  advantage, 
with  the  artificial  adjunction  of  questions  of  very 
different  nature.  On  the  contrary,  the  declaration 
had  a  general  value,  and  mapped  out  the  main  lines 
of  a  future  policy.  As  already  seen,  we  had  lost 
in  Egypt,  from  year  to  year,  the  bigger   share  of 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   63 

our  advantages,  and  our  dispossession  had  been 
practically  effected  by  the  Fashoda  incident  termi- 
nating in  the  treaty  of  March,  1899.  Yet,  theoreti- 
cally, we  preserved  our  liberty  to  profit  by  any 
opportunities  that  might  occur,  and  to  draw  Europe's 
attention  to  a  problem  that  was  not  juridically 
settled.  It  was,  therefore,  an  appreciable  success 
for  England  to  obtain  the  assurance  that  ^Hhe  Gov- 
ernment of  the  French  Republic  would  not  thwart 
her  action  in  Egypt  by  ^asking  that  a  date  should  be 
fixed  for  the  British  occupation  to  cease  or  by  taking 
measures  of  another  Idnd.^^  The  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment, that  is  to  say.  Great  Britain,  regained  the 
liberty,  besides,  to  dispose  of  the  savings  resulting 
from  the  conversion  of  1890.  And  she  was  freed 
from  the  obligation  of  devoting  to  the  Debt  service 
revenues  double  the  sum  annually  required.  Instead 
of  the  Debt  Exchequer  being  compelled,  in  each 
financial  period,  to  make  a  sort  of  seizure  on  the  to- 
tality of  the  Egyptian  revenues,  it  was  the  land  tax 
which  became  the  creditors'  pledge.  In  return,  France 
obtained  certain  guarantees,  in  particular,  that  the 
reimbursement  of  the  Preference  Debt  should  be  ad- 
journed from  1905  to  1910 ;  that  the  1885  Loan,  for 
which  no  limit  of  reimbursement  had  been  specified, 
could  not  be  reimbursed  before  the  same  date ;  that 
the  Consolidated  Debt,  three-fifths  of  which  are  held 
in  France,  could  not  be  either  converted  or  reimbursed 
before  1912.  These  were  wise  precautions,  but  of  very 
secondary  importance  compared  with  the  advantages 
of  the  highest  order  secured  by  Great  Britain. 


64  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

This  being'so,  the  agreement  concerning  Egypt  com- 
prised also  a  reciprocal  liberty  of  action  for  ourselves 
in  Morocco.  One  needs  only  to  consult  a  map  to 
see  that  France,  being  supreme  in  Algeria  and 
Tunis,  cannot  regard  with  indifference  what  takes 
place  in  the  Moorish  Empire.  It  is  a  necessity  for 
her  that  order  shall  reign  there  and  that  no  Power 
shall  acquire  preponderant  influence  over  the  country 
at  her  expense.^  After  being  for  twenty  years  our 
most  redoubtable  adversary  in  Morocco,  England 
now  recognized  that  ^4t  belonged  to  France,  as 
having  territory  contiguous  to  this  country  over  a 
great  distance,  to  have  the  more  exclusive  charge  of 
its  tranquillity  and  to  lend  her  assistance  to  it  in  all 
the  administrative,  economic,  financial,  and  military 
reforms  required. ^^  She  declared  besides,  ^^that 
she  would  do  nothing  to  thwart  French  action  in 
these  matters.'^  A  reciprocal  engagement,  valid 
for  thirty  years,  secured  to  the  two  contracting 
parties  commercial  liberty  and  equality  of  treat- 
ment both  in  Egypt  and  Morocco.  Last  of  all,  it 
was  stipulated  that  the  two  signataries  ^^  should 
lend  each  other  mutual  help  diplomatically  for  the 
execution  of  the  clauses  of  the  present  declaration." 

Is  it  possible  to  estimate  arithmetically  the  re- 
spective advantages  assured  to  the  two  parties  by 
this  double-barrelled  arrangement?  It  is  certain 
that  by  effacing  ourselves  in  Egypt  in  England's 
favour,  we  did  no  more  than  acknowledge  the  force 
of  actual  facts,  whilst  British  diplomacy  abandoned 
^  See  below,  Chapter  HI. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   65 

in  Morocco  designs  to  which  the  future  was  open. 
It  is  no  less  evident  that  our  adhesion  to  Great 
Britain^s  Egyptian  poHcy  confirmed  an  existing 
situation  and  constituted  a  real  profit  for  her, 
whereas  in  Morocco  she  granted  to  us  virtual  ad- 
vantages, prospects,  and  possibilities  only.  France 
paid  cash  down,  England  by  draft;  and  Morocco, 
as  events  proved,  was  not  yet  the  hatched  chicken 
of  which  one  could  freely  dispose.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  what  we  gave 
up  had  a  greater  value  for  England  than  for  our- 
selves, and  reciprocally.  The  balance  of  equity  was 
undeniable ;  and,  on  the,  whole,  its  effect  was  a 
success.  The  drawing  up  of  the  agreement,  how- 
ever, left  more  than  one  thing  to  be  desired.  The 
article  relating  to  Egypt  was  too  vague ;  and  the 
expression,  ^^by  taking  measures  of  another  kind,^' 
was  altogether  wanting  in  precision.  Moreover, 
certain  eventualities  had  been  overlooked,  which 
it  would  have  been  wiser  to  provide  against.  This 
was  discovered  notably  when  Mr.  Lambert,  the 
French  director  of  the  Khedive's  School  of  Law, 
resigned  and  was  replaced  by  a  young  Englishman, 
Mr.  Hill,  who  had  none  of  the  qualifications  requi- 
site for  presiding  over  an  establishment  imbued 
with  our  spirit.  However,  in  a  general  way,  the 
good  was  greater  than  the  bad;  and  Mr.  Delcasse 
deserved  the  praise  that  was  unstintedly  bestowed 
on  him. 

Furthermore,  whatever  might  be  the  value  of  the 
agreement  in  its  reference  to  Africa,   it  drew  the 


66  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

attention  of  the  world  at  large  rather  by  its  general 
significance.  The  colonial  rivalry  between  France 
and  England  had,  for  centuries,  become  a  common 
property.  It  was  the  postulate  of  European  policy, 
the  favourite  instrument  of  the  policy  of  Germany. 
By  putting  an  end  to  this  state  of  things,  the  Cabi- 
nets of  London  and  Paris  introduced  a  new  weight 
into  the  international  balance  of  power.  They  mu- 
tually freed  themselves  from  preoccupations  that 
had  long  been  a  burden ;  and  they  guaranteed  each 
other  a  liberty  of  action  which  was  equally  precious 
to  both.  France,  in  particular,  who  had  not  been 
able  to  hold  Russia  back  from  the  Manchurian  ad- 
venture, found  an  opportune  compensation  for  the 
enfeeblement  she  incurred  through  the  Japanese  vic- 
tories. Preceded  by  the  Franco-Italian  agreement 
and  soon  followed  by  the  Franco-Spanish  one,  the 
Franco-English  arrangement  procured  us,  in  Western 
Europe,  a  moral  authority  which  made  us  a  centre 
of  attraction;  and,  if  it  was  calculated  to  expose  us 
to  certain  difficulties,  it  rendered  us  in  return  capa- 
ble of  solving  them.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  second 
phase  of  the  diplomatic  evolution  which  enabled  us 
to  issue  progressively  from  our  position  of  isolation. 
Of  course,  there  was  the  fear  that  it  would  not  be 
easy,  in  presence  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  to- 
gether with  Anglo-Russian  hostility  and  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war,  to  reconcile  our  necessary  alliance 
with  Saint  Petersburg  and  our  useful  friendship  with 
London.  But,  at  once,  without  noticing  newspaper 
objections,  Russia's  official  representatives  declared 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   67 

that  their  Government  took  no  umbrage  at  the  Anglo- 
French  rapprochement} 

Indeed,  before  long,  facts  occurred  which  most 
happily  justified  the  agreement  thus  concluded. 
And  here  again,  it  was  neither  in  London  nor  in  Paris 
that  the  decisive  events  happened.  The  fear  of  Ger- 
many was  responsible  for  the  Entente  Cordiale;  and 
Germany's  mistakes  transformed  and  strengthened 
it.  Whatever  merit  may  be  assigned  to  the  repeated 
Franco-English  manifestations  of  sympathy,  —  King 
Edward's  visits  to  Paris,  the  English  fleet's  welcome 
at  Brest,  that  of  the  French  fleet  at  Portsmouth,  the 
Paris  Municipal  Council's  stay  in  London,  the 
London  County  Council's  reception  at  our  Hotel  de 
Ville,  and,  last  of  all,  Mr.  Fallieres'  official  visit  to 
London  —  the  strengthening  of  the  Entente  is  not 
due  to  these ;  all  such  fetes  have  been  effects,  not 
causes.  The  cause  must  be  sought  in  Germany. 
On  the  morrow  of  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of 
1904,  Germany  affected  the  most  serene  indiffer- 
ence. A  year  later,  the  Emperor  William's  journey 
to  Tangier,  strikingly  showed  that  his  Government 
had  only  waited  for  the  Russian  defeats  to  manifest 
the  inimical  sentiments  they  had  felt  from  the  very 
first. ^  During  the  Moroccan  crisis,  Franco-English 
solidarity  was  cemented  by  the  common  peril.  The 
identity  of  French  and  British  interests  affirmed  it- 
self by  an  identity  of  policy ;  and,  when  the  Algeci- 
ras  Conference  closed,  no  one  in  Europe  could  fail 

^  See  Andre  Tardieu's  Diplomatic  Questions  of  the  Year  1904. 
^  See  below,  Chapter  V. 


68  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

to  see  that;  for  the  agreement  of  Hquidation  signed 
two  years  previously,  an  Entente  had  been  substi- 
tuted which,  though  not  set  down  in  treaty  form,  no 
less  counted  as  a  diplomatic  security  of  the  highest 
order. 

More  recent  events  have  tended  only  to  increase 
the  value  of  this  security.  The  Russo-Japanese  war, 
which  coincided  with  our  Moroccan  embarrassment 
and  was  partially  the  cause  of  it,  had  made  it  harder 
for  us  to  fit  in  the  Russian  Alliance  with  our  friend- 
ship for  England.  For  a  while,  when  our  neutrality 
dispute  with  Japan  was  in  its  acute  stage,  and  more 
especially  when  the  Dogger  Bank  incident  happened, 
it  seemed  as  though  France  would  have  to  choose 
between  one  of  two  dread  alternatives.  But  Mr. 
Delcasse,  with  infinite  skill,  discovered  a  remedy  in 
the  peril  itself ;  and  the  meeting  in  Paris  of  the  In- 
ternational Commission  of  Inquiry,  intrusted  with 
the  task  of  arbitrating  between  the  English  and  the 
Russians,  was  the  first  step  towards  the  achievement 
of  their  reconciliation.  A  year  later,  negotiations 
were  entered  into  between  London  and  Saint  Peters- 
burg; and,  on  the  31st  of  August,  1907,  an  Asiatic 
agreement,  with  a  wider  bearing  than  its  actual 
clauses,  was  signed  between  those  who  had  been 
adversaries  for  ages  and  who,  in  June,  1908,  at 
Revel,  set  public  seal  to  their  recent  intimacy.^  The 
grand  German  design  of  a  '' Continental  League'' 
against  England  was  definitely  ruined.  Bismarck's 
trick  of  using  Anglo-Russian  hostility  to  press  on 
1  See  below,  Chapter  VI. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  "ENTENTE"   69 

France  with  all  the  weight  of  Central  Europe  was  no 
longer  possible.  A  Triple  Entente  facing  the  Triple 
Alliance,  gave  a  new  foundation  to  Europe's  balance 
of  power. 

IV 

This  internal  evolution  of  the  Entente  Cordiale,  — 
as  also  certain  public  manifestations,  such  as  the 
toasts  in  which,  in  June,  1908,  the  King  of  England 
and  the  President  of  the  French  Republic  spoke  of 
'^ strengthening ''  the  Entente  and  rendering  it  '^per- 
manent," —  have,  in  the  most  natural  manner  possi- 
ble, placed  before  public  opinion  in  Europe  the  ques- 
tion of  an  eventual  transformation  of  the  Entente 
into  an  alliance.  When  political  questions  are  dealt 
with,  the  mind,  as  Talleyrand  used  to  say,  must  take 
in  the  future.  It  is  never  too  early  to  scrutinize  a 
probability  which  unforeseen  circumstances  might 
any.  day  oblige  those  interested  in  it  to  change  into  a 
reality ;  and,  in  so  far  as  opinions  vary,  it  is  impor- 
tant to  express  them. 

If  language  has  a  meaning,  what  is  intended  by 
strengthening  the  Entente  Cordiale  is  the  substitution 
of  a  formal  treaty  for  the  moral  agreement  of  1904. 
At  present,  France  and  England  are  friends,  but  not 
allies.  If  it  be  urged  that  the  distinction  is  a  sec- 
ondary one,  in  presence  of  the  keenness  of  mutual 
sympathy,  we  must  reply  that,  when  the  relations 
of  two  great  Powers  are  concerned,  precision  is  a 
duty,  and  ambiguity  a  danger.  For  the  moment, 
English  policy  and  French  policy  run  parallel;    but 


70  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

they  are  not  bound  to  each  other.  They  joined, 
four  years  ago,  in  negotiating  a  treaty  of  Uquidation ; 
and  this  treaty  has  become  the  basis  of  a  sincere 
reconciliation.  However,  neither  on  one  side  nor  on 
the  other  were  pledges  given.  It  may  be  admitted 
that,  in  a  time  of  crisis,  such  pledges  would  be 
spontaneously  forthcoming  from  an  identity  of  in- 
terests. But,  if  this  is  likely,  why  not  examine  the 
question  thoroughly  in  advance,  weigh  its  pros  and 
cons,  and,  in  fine,  estimate  the  advantages  and  in- 
conveniences attaching  to  such  ^^strengthening," 
which  heads  of  States  and  the  press  speak  of  contin- 
ually without  clearly  defining  it. 

Diplomatically  and  preventively,  the  Entente  Cor- 
diale  has  justified  itself.  When  it  was  concluded,  its 
object  was  negative  and  limited,  and  recorded  merely 
a  colonial  understanding.  Very  quickly,  so  quickly 
indeed  that  some  were  surprised,  this  Entente  as- 
sumed a  positive  value.  Perhaps  there  would  be 
exaggeration  in  saying  that  to  it  was  owing,  in  1905, 
the  preservation  of  peace ;  for  this  peace  —  analo- 
gous to  that  of  Fashoda  and  of  a  kind  such  that  not 
many  would  be  needed  in  a  century  to  deprive  its 
beneficiaries  of  their  right  to  rank  as  a  great  Power — 
we  paid  for,  we  and  we  alone,  with  an  unprecedented 
humiliation,  and  the  sacrifice  of  a  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  under  the  threats  of  a  neighbouring  country. 
On  the  other  hand,  during  the  negotiations  that  fol- 
lowed the  crisis,  before,  at,  and  after  Algeciras,  Great 
Britain  supported  us  with  a  loyal  energy  to  which  the 

1  See  Chapter  V. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  '' ENTENTE"   71 

French  owe  grateful  homage.  The  weight  of  Eng- 
lish approval  which  our  proposals  constantly  met 
with  throughout,  contributed  to  insure  their  suc- 
cess. And  this  visible  unity  has  exercised  an  at- 
traction so  great  that,  in  the  next  year,  following 
the  example  of  France,  Russia  concluded  with  Great 
Britain  a  pact  of  reconciliation  which  opens  to  our 
policy  a  wide  perspective  of  safety. 

Does  this  mean  that  a  Franco-English  alliance 
would  be  justified  de  piano?  It  is  certain  that  one 
of  the  gravest  objections  that  would  have  been  raised 
not  long  ago  against  such  an  alliance  has  disappeared 
since  our  ally,  Russia,  has  become  reconciled  with 
Great  Britain.  France  would  have  been  false  not 
only  to  her  pledges,  but  also  to  her  own  interests,  if 
she  had  allied  herself  with  England  while  the  latter 
Power  was  inimical  to  Russia.  That  is  not,  how- 
ever, the  case  to-day.  And,  as  far  as  this  is  con- 
cerned, the  way  is  open.  For  the  English,  the 
French  Alliance  is  desirable.  England  has  always 
wished  to  have,  in  case  of  difficulties,  a  Continental 
ally.  The  history  of  the  eighteenth  century  proved 
this,  and  that  of  the  nineteenth  likewise.  It  was 
even  possible  to  say  that  she  got  others  to  fight,  and 
herself  entered  the  lists  only  at  the  last.  The  sup- 
port of  the  French  Army  in  a  European  war  in  which 
Great  Britain  should  be  engaged,  would  be  of  ines- 
timable value  to  the  Cabinet  of  Saint  James.  Would 
England's  support,  in  a  European  war  in  which 
France  should  be  engaged,  be  of  equal  value  to  our 
own  country? 


72  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

To  this  question  —  the  gravest  that  our  states- 
men have  conscientiously  to  ask  themselves  —  it  is 
essential  that  a  candid  reply  should  be  given.  In 
the  present  situation,  England's  diplomatic  cooper- 
ation, before  a  war,  would  be  of  infinite  service  to 
us.  When  once  war  were  begun,  this  cooperation 
would  be  but  of  small  avail.  Great  Britain^s  naval 
victories  would  not  hold  off  a  single  cannon  or 
a  single  man  from  our  frontiers.  They  would  ren- 
der us  none  of  the  services  which  Russia,  and 
Russia  alone  at  present,  is  able  to  render  us.  In 
a  word,  a  Franco-English  alliance  would  mean  for 
us,  in  the  military  domain,  a  minimum  of  profit. 
And  for  things  to  be  different,  it  would  be  necessary 
for  the  British  Army,  thoroughly  reformed  not  only 
in  its  organization,  but  in  its  manner  of  recruitment, 
to  become  capable  of  taking  energetic  action  on  the 
Continent,  for  it  to  be  able  to  create  on  land  an 
effective  diversion,  for  it  to  be  ready  to  lessen  the 
shock  our  own  army  would  have  to  support ;  in  fine, 
it  would  be  necessary  for  Great  Britain  to  be,  as  far 
as  France  is  concerned,  a  second  Russia. 

Unfortunately,  the  English  Army  is  far  from  being 
in  a  position  to  play  this  role.  Mr.  Haldane,  the 
Minister  of  War,  has  attempted  to  realize  a  certain 
progress  b}'  means  of  a  reform  which  came  into 
force  on  the  31st  of  March,  1908.  But  his  attempt 
would  seem  to  be  altogether  insufficient.  Under  the 
new  scheme,  the  principle  of  free  enlistment  has  been 
preserved  which  is  the  traditional  basis  of  military 
organization  in  England  for  the  active  army  as  well 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  ''ENTENTE"   73 

as  for  the  Reserve  forces,  including  Yeomen  and  Vol- 
unteers. However,  the  engagement  of  the  Territo- 
rials, that  is  to  say,  of  the  two  latter  categories,  will 
be  of  a  stricter  kind.  The  Volunteers  (infantry)  used 
to  enlist  for  any  period  they  wished,  and  could  cancel 
their  engagement  at  will  on  condition  of  giving  notice 
to  their  colonel  a  fortnight  beforehand.  The  Yeo- 
men (mounted  infantry)  were  bound  for  periods  of 
three  years,  which  conferred  on  their  body  a  relative 
stability.  But  for  both  of  these  classes,  the  period 
of  service  in  times  of  peace  was  only  of  short  dura- 
tion. In  times  of  war,  the  periods  of  forced  service 
remained  variable.  The  law  of  the  2d  of  August, 
1907,  completed  by  ulterior  regulations,  in  particu- 
lar by  the  Special  Navy  orders  of  the  18th  and  20th 
of  March,  1908,  prescribes  for  both  infantry  and  cav- 
alry a  four  years'  period  of  service.  In  order  to  can- 
cel the  engagement,  three  months'  notice  must  be 
given;  and,  in  addition,  the  soldier  that  breaks  his 
bargain  must  pay  a  fine,  and  must  bring  back  his 
arms  and  outfit  to  the  depot  of  the  battalion  or 
squadron.  The  new  system,  therefore,  is  stricter 
than  the  old. 

And  its  stringency  shows  itself  still  more  clearly, 
if  the  provisions  are  considered  that  determine  under 
the  new  law  the  activity  of  the  Territorial  Army. 
This  army  can,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  be  called  out  on 
active  service,  and  the  Territorial  soldier  be  then 
kept  for  a  whole  year  on  duty.  The  object  is  evi- 
dently, not  only  to  amalgamate  the  two  species  of 
auxiliary  forces,  which,  to  use  Mr.  Haldane's  expres- 


74  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

sion,  had  grown  up,  anyhow,  like  mushrooms,  but 
further  to  give  to  this  amalgam  a  military  value  and 
make  out  of  these  incoherent  elements  a  compact, 
organic  whole,  an  army  in  the  modern  sense  of  the 
word.  For  that,  these  battalions  must  be  disci- 
plined, instructed,  and  properly  trained  in  their  re- 
spective regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions;  a  field 
artillery  must  be  given  them  which  the  auxiliary 
forces  did  not  possess;  engineering  troops,  which 
formerly  were  also  lacking;  and  behind  these  must 
be  created  troops  for  foraging  and  revictualling  — 
all  that  provides  for  the  nourishment  of  an  army,  all 
that  constitutes  the  framework  without  which  there 
are  neither  legs  for  marching  nor  arms  for  fighting. 
County  associations,  local  staffs,  are  commissioned 
to  see  to  this  organization. 

Thus  remodelled,  the  new  Territorial  Army  would 
have  the  sole  charge,  in  the  case  of  a  war  with  a 
European  Power,  to  assure  the  defence  of  the  Eng- 
lish metropolis.  For  Mr.  Haldane  has  decided  — 
and  this  is  the  second  characteristic  feature  of  the 
reform  —  that  the  Militia  shall  henceforward  be 
required,  in  time  of  war,  to  join  the  active  line  regi- 
ments and  to  cooperate,  if  need  be,  with  them  in  a 
campaign  abroad.  Then,  it  would  be  the  remod- 
elled Territorial  Army  which  would  take  the  place  of 
the  old  Militia  for  the  defence  of  the  Metropolis,  the 
Militia  becoming  a  ^^ special  reserve  force,''  the  battal- 
ions of  which  will  encircle  the  active  battalions  of 
the  line,  in  order  to  supply  them  with  additional  men 
during  a  war  in  the  enemy's  country.     Thus  they  will 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  "ENTENTE"   75 

become  the  headquarters  of  the  regiments  compos- 
ing the  expeditionary  force.  With  this  end  in  view, 
the  personal  obligations  of  militiamen  are  to  be  ren- 
dered more  rigorous  —  six  months'  effective  services 
in  the  year  following  the  enlistment,  and  longer  in 
each  of  the  other  years,  with  a  fortnight's  training 
and  six  days'  rifle  practice.  The  Militia,  under  its 
new  constitution,  will  yield  a  hundred  and  one  battal- 
ions, seventy-four  of  which  wdll  fill  up  the  gaps  oc- 
curring in  the  active  battalions  serving  abroad,  the 
tw^enty-seven  others  being  employed  as  foraging, 
garrison,  and  auxiliary  service  troops.  Mr.  Hal- 
dane  hopes  to  have  in  this  way  a  body  of  166,000 
men  capable  of  disembarking  on  an  enemy's  shore, 
and  a  home  army  of  315,000. 

All  this  reads  very  well  on  paper;  but  the  ques- 
tion is  how  far  it  is  realizable.  Still  now,  as  in  the 
past,  what  the  English  Army  lacks  is  a  proper  sys- 
tem of  recruitment;  and  recruitment  is  the  muscle 
of  war,  just  as  money  is  its  nerve  strength.  Both 
Yeomen  and  Volunteers  were  given  till  the  15th  of 
June,  1908,  to  accept  or  refuse  the  new  order  of 
things ;  and  it  turns  out  that  enlistments  have  been 
appreciably  fewer  than  was  expected.  On  the  other 
hand,  grave  difficulties  crop  up,  when  the  question 
of  artillery  is  considered.  The  Volunteers  have  in 
the  Yeomen  a  kind  of  Territorial  cavalry.  But  they 
must  have  cannons.  And  Mr.  Haldane  has  asked 
for  the  authorization  to  form  for  this  purpose  a  hun- 
dred and  eighty-two  field  batteries.  In  the  House 
of  Lords,  such  competent  authorities  as  Lord  Rob- 


76  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

erts,  Lord  Denbigh,  and  Lord  Grenfell  have  sharply- 
criticised  the  project,  which  can  only  be  carried  out 
by  dismissing  thirty-three  active  batteries,  that  is  to 
say,  by  bringing  about  an  important  diminution  in 
the  forces  of  first  line.  Writing  on  this  subject,  the 
Army  and  Navy  Gazette  says:  ^'The  active  army  has 
been  reduced  and  is  threatened  with  fresh  reduc- 
tions; and  its  reserve  force  will  itself  decrease, 
through  the  operation  of  the  same  cause.  The  Mili- 
tia has  been  destroyed,  and  no  one  can  say  to  what 
extent  it  will  be  replaced  by  the  special  reserve  force. 
The  Volunteers  have  disappeared  to  the  extent  of 
two-thirds  of  their  numbers,  and  are  replaced  to  the 
extent  of  a  third  only  by  Territorials.  The  Royal 
Artillery  force,  through  the  effect  of  an  innovation 
that  is  nothing  less  than  criminal,  is  about  to  lose  a 
part  of  its  effective  units.  We  regret  to  see  that  the 
Minister  is  refractory  to  every  argument  brought 
forward  by  the  most  enlightened  authorities  in  both 
Army  and  nation."  How  is  it  possible  to  ignore  Mr. 
Haldane's  own  avowal  that  the  English  Army  ought 
to  have  eight  thousand  officers  more  than  it  possesses 
at  the  present  time? 

Such  being  the  state  of  affairs,  it  is  only  prudent 
to  conclude  that,  in  a  Continental  war.  Great  Brit- 
ain's assistance  would  have  but  mediocre  value ; 
prudent  not  to  abandon  one's  self  to  dangerous  illu- 
sions. The  polemics  that  were  carried  on  in  the 
month  of  June,  revealed  that  there  are  two  con- 
tradictory currents  of  opinion  in  England.  One, 
which  was  expressed  in  a  remarkable  article  that 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH  "ENTENTE"   77 

appeared  in  the  National  Review,  is  favourable  to 
an  increase  of  the  British  Army.  ^^An  Anglo- 
French  alUance/'  said  the  writer,  ''would  be  with- 
out profit  for  France  as  long  as  England  cannot 
offer. her  the  assistance  of  a  large  army  in  Lorraine. '^ 
The  other  current,  which  manifestly  represents  the 
majority,  is  opposed  to  an  alliance  and  to  the  thor- 
ough military  reform  which,  from  our  point  of  view, 
would  be  its  sine  qua  non.  Many  English  people, 
it  is  true,  seem  to  think  that,  in  case  of  war,  the 
alliance  would  come  about  of  its  own  accord.  But 
it  is  just  against  such  a  way  that  one  ought  to  pro- 
test. International  improvisations  are  perilous. 
Should  the  day  come  when,  for  Mr.  Haldane's  inade- 
quate scheme,  the  English  authorities  would  decide 
to  substitute  a  more  serious  programme  and  to  pro- 
vide their  country  with  a  modern  army,  should  the 
day  come  when  they  would  recollect  that  Napoleon 
succumbed,  not  at  Trafalgar,  but  at  Waterloo,  then 
clear-sighted  Frenchmen  might  be  partisans  of  an 
alliance  that  would  complete  and  widen  the  system 
of  pacific  defence,  sealed  in  1891,  by  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance,  and  the  political  risks  of  which 
would  be  compensated  for  by  military  advantages. 
Until  then,  on  the  contrary,  there  can  be  no  ques- 
tion between  France  and  England  of  pledges  for  the 
future  and  military  cooperation.  And  if,  while 
things  remain  as  they  are,  an  Anglo-German  war 
should  break  out,  our  country^s  sole  duty  would  be 
to  safeguard,  with  all  her  energy,  her  diplomatic  and 
military  autonomy. 


78  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Here  comes  in,  it  is  true,  the  too  famous  hostage 
theory:  Germany,  while  at  war  with  England,  at- 
tacking France  in  order  to  have  guarantees  on  the 
Continent.  Once  more,  with  regard  to  this,  a  clear 
understanding  is  necessary.  The  hostage  theory 
may  well  have  been  menacing,  at  a  time  when, 
France  being  disorganized  and  Russia  vanquished, 
neither  Power  was  able  to  make  use  of  the  alliance 
between  them.  This  time  has  gone  by.  If  Germany 
were  to  attack  France  now,  she  would  set  in  action 
the  chief  clause  of  the  military  convention  signed 
between  France  and  Russia  in  1892,  and  would 
have  on  her  back  not  only  the  French  but  the  Rus- 
sian Army,  too.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
so-called  guarantee  to  be  taken  against  Great  Brit- 
ain would  risk  being  a  most  unprofitable  one.  The 
hostage  theory  to-day  is  a  mere  scarecrow,  at  which 
we  can  afford  to  smile,  on  condition  of  remaining 
able,  in  accordance  with  Russia,  to  energetically 
enforce  our  armed  neutrality. 

That  which  our  country  needs  to  do  is  to  regard 
the  English  Entente  with  a  matter-of-fact  mind,  and 
while  having  a  practical  regard  for  her  own  interests. 
This  Entente  has  a  great  political  value,  not  a  mili- 
tary one,  and  we  must  act  in  accordance.  Having, 
during  the  last  thirty-eight  years,  made  no  war  on 
account  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  we  must  not  expose 
ourselves  to  make  it  for  others.  In  a  word,  France 
must  be  decided  to  reject  improvised  combinations 
which  would  drag  her  from  peace  into  a  conflict 
wherein  all  the  risks  would  be  for  her.     These  res- 


FRANCE  AND  THE  ENGLISH   ''ENTENTE"       79 

ervations  are  neither  offensive  nor  superfluous, 
since  they  are  inspired  by  care  for  French  interests 
and  by  the  experience  of  the  past.  Already,  when 
the  practical  side  of  the  Russian  Alliance  was  in 
question,  some  of  our  fellow-countrymen  claimed 
that  it  should  be  withheld  from  discussion,  and  dealt 
with  by  an  act  of  faith.  To  regard  the  holy  ark  with 
a  critical,  independent  eye,  was  deemed  sacrilegious 
audacity.  What  did  we  gain  by  such  discretion? 
And  what  did  the  Russians  gain  by  it?  Instead  of 
reminding  our  Allies  of  their  duties  towards  us  — 
which,  in  the  case  at  issue,  were  one  with  their  du- 
ties towards  themselves  —  we  docilely  accepted  the 
deviation  of  the  Alliance ;  we  allowed  the  money. 
Army,  and  Navy  of  Russia  to  desert  Europe  for  Asia. 
Under  our  approval,  the  Saint  Petersburg  Govern- 
ment, between  1895  and  1902,  turned  more  and 
more  in  the  direction  of  the  Far  East.  Continually 
deceived  in  their  hopes,  they  incurred  thus  the  dis- 
asters of  Mukden  and  Tsusima,  without  our  doing 
anything  to  restrain  them.  And,  a  few  weeks  after, 
we  learned  to  our  cost,  both  at  Tangier  and  in  Paris, 
what  these  defeats  meant  to  us. 

These  things  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  our  rela- 
tions with  England.  As  a  Continental  Power, 
France  needs  allies  who,  in  case  of  war,  are  capable 
of  helping  her  on  the  Continent.  Good  business 
makes  good  friends,  and,  still  more,  good  allies.  If, 
in  the  interests  of  the  world's  peace,  the  Anglo- 
French  Entente,  the  foundations  of  which  are  already 
laid,  is  one  day  to  become  permanent  and  ^^ stronger,'' 


80  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

if,  in  other  words,  a  treaty  is  destined  to  confer  on  it 
the  form  of  a  contract,  it  is  only  right  that  this 
treaty,  negotiated  in  a  fair  spirit,  should  impose  on 
each  the  sacrifices  required,  —  on  France  and  Rus- 
sia an  enlightened  attention  to  their  naval  power, 
on  which  Great  Britain  must  be  able  to  count,  and 
on  Great  Britain  a  thorough  reform  of  her  land 
forces,  whose  development  both  France  and  Russia 
are  entitled  to  expect. 

Until  then,  let  us  maintain  a  reserved  attitude. 
Friends,  but  not  allies;  such  is  the  necessary  and 
sufficient  programme,  the  only  one  calculated  to 
ward  off  alike  the  dangers  that  might  come  from 
our  adversaries  and  those  that  would  risk  being 
caused   by   our   friendships. 


CHAPTER  III 

FRANCE    AND   THE   MEDITERRANEAN   UNDERSTAND- 
INGS 

I.  Franco-Italian  understanding.  —  France  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean. —  Italy  and  the  Mediterranean.  —  Franco-Italian 
hostility.  —  Tunis  and  the  Triple  Alliance. — Crispinism. 

—  Causes  of  the  Franco-Italian  rapprochement.  —  Tunis- 
ian treaties.  —  Treaty  of  Commerce.  —  Political  agree- 
ments. —  Morocco  and  Tripoli.  —  The  rapprochement  and 
the  Triple  Alliance.  —  England  and  the  rapprochement. — 
The  rapprochement  and  African  problems.  —  Conclusion. 

II.  Franco-Spanish  understanding.  —  Spain  after  the  war.  — 
Economic  situation.  —  Moroccan  aspirations.  —  Penal  set- 
tlements.—  Spain  and  France.  —  Period  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance. —  Difficulties  in  coming  to  an  understanding  with 
regard  to  Morocco.  —  First  negotiations.  —  Spain  and  the 
Franco-English   agreement.  —  Franco-Spanish   agreement. 

—  Trans-Pyrenean  railways.  —  Alfonso  XIII  and  the 
Western  Powers. 

III.  France  and  Morocco.  —  Moroccan  exclusiveness.  —  Early 
reign  of  Abd  el  Aziz.  —  Moroccan  wealth.  —  Franco- 
Moroccan  commerce.  —  Morocco  and  Algeria.  —  Franco- 
Moroccan  relations.  —  Revoil.  — Guebbas  agreements.  — 
French  programme  of  reforms.  —  Pacific  penetration. 

I 

In  the  thought  of  the  French  Government,  the 
Franco-English  rapprochement  was  not  only  a  use- 
ful measure  of  general  interest.  It  appeared  to 
them,  also,  as  the  necessary  instrument  of  the  Medi- 
terranean policy  dictated  to  them  by  their  tradi- 
tions and  future  interests. 

G  81 


82  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

To  quote  Gambetta's  saying,  the  configuration 
of  our  coasts  and  our  establishment  of  French  rule 
in  Algeria  have  made  the  Mediterranean,  and  the 
Western  Mediterranean  especially,  our  ^^  scene  of 
action/^  Historically,  France  has  had  a  prepon- 
derant role  in  the  three  events  dominating  the 
modern  history  of  the  Mediterranean:  the  unifica- 
tion of  Italy,  the  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal,  and 
the  Europeanization  of  North  Africa.  Geographi- 
cally, she  is  the  only  Power  who,  over  a  long  extent 
of  coast,  borders  on  both  sides  of  the  Latin  Sea. 
Politically,  her  successes  in  Algiers  and  Tunis,  her 
repulses  in  Egypt  and  on  the  Continent,  have  con- 
centrated her  activity  on  the  west  basin  of  the 
Mediterranean,  which  is  peculiarly  accessible  to 
her  commerce  and  her  fleets,  and  is  the  route  to  her 
African  and  Asiatic  colonies.  But  it  places  France 
in  presence  of  three  Powers  with  whom  she  has  to 
count.  One  of  them.  Great  Britain,  through  Gi- 
braltar, Malta,  and  Egypt,  holds  the  two  Gates  of 
the  Central  Sea.  The  two  others,  Italy  and  Spain, 
by  their  situation  itself,  have  interests  of  the  same 
kind  as  France  has;  and,  from  this  fact,  may,  in 
pursuit  of  such  interests,  come  into  conflict  with 
our  own  country.  The  agreement  of  the  8th  of 
April,  1904,  liquidated  the  Anglo-French  quarrel. 
How  did  the  reconciliation  of  France  with  Rome 
and  Madrid  come  about? 

If  nothing  in  the  past  had  given  any  reason  to 
hope  for  a  rapprochement  between  France  and  Eng- 
land, that  between  France  and  Italy  was  no  less 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS       83 

unlikely.  True,  we  had  rendered  the  Italians  sig- 
nal services  at  the  time  when  they  achieved  their 
unity;  but  Napoleon  Ill's  mistakes,  his  pre- 
tension to  check  at  his  will  the  national  move- 
ment that  he  had  let  loose,  Rouher's  '^ Never,"  and, 
last  of  all,  Victor  Emmanuel's  utilitarian  policy  in 
1870,  had  separated  the  two  peoples,  after  their 
bond  of  union  had  apparently  been  sealed  on  the 
battle-fields  of  Magenta  and  Solferino.  Moreover, 
young  Italy  was  indulging  in  dreams  of  grandeur; 
and  it  was  in  the  Mediterranean,  that  is  to  say,  at 
our  expense,  that  she  was  hoping  to  realize  them. 
As  early  as  1838,  Mazzini  had  declared:  ^^ Northern 
Africa  is  Italy's  inheritance.''  And  to  Mazzini  it 
was  that  Bismarck  wrote  in  1866 :  ^' Italy  and  France 
cannot  associate  to  their  mutual  advantage  in  the 
Mediterranean.  This  sea  is  an  inheritance  that 
cannot  be  divided  between  two  kindred  nations. 
The  empire  of  the  Mediterranean  belongs  indis- 
putably to  Italy,  who  possesses  in  this  sea  coasts 
twice  as  extensive  as  those  of  France.  .  .  .  The 
empire  of  the  Mediterranean  must  be  Italy's  con- 
stant thought,  the  aim  of  her  ministers,  the  funda- 
mental policy  of  the  Florence  Cabinet."  In  1870, 
not  content  with  taking  Rome,  many  Italians  had 
the  idea  of  occupying  either  Corsica  or  Tunis.  A 
few  years  later,  Fregosa,  in  his  book  entitled,  II  pri- 
mato  Italiano,  claimed  Egypt,  Tripoli,  Tunis,  and 
Algeria  as  Italy's  natural  colonies.^    The  Policy  of 

^  See,  in  reference  to  this,  Rene  Pinon's  Empire  of  the  Medi- 
terranean. 


84  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

the  Consulta  justified  Thiers^  saying  that  '^Italy's 
gratitude  would  last  just  as  long  as  her  weakness."  ^ 
These  tendencies  Bismarck,  with  his  superior 
skill,  managed  to  excite,  foster,  and  utilize.  The 
clericalism  of  the  National  Assembly,  the  mainte- 
nance of  a  French  guardship  at  Civita  Vecchia,  the 
petition  of  our  bishops  for  the  reestablishment  of 
the  Pope^s  temporal  power,  and  the  Due  de  Bro- 
glie's  ministry,  everything  was  taken  advantage  of 
by  him  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  Italy  in  a  state 
of  alarm.  The  Tunis  affair  served  to  complete  the 
Rome  Cabinet^s  distrust  and  fear  of  us.  To  the 
laurels  which  Signor  Maccio,  the  Italian  Consul, 
hoped  to  gather  in  the  Regency,  the  expedition  of 
General  Forgemol  replied  with  the  consent  of  Eu- 
rope in  1881.  Hatred  of  France  was  rampant. 
Revenge  was  sought  at  any  price.  The  moment 
awaited  by  Bismarck  arrived.  Strengthened  by 
the  alliance  concluded  with  Austria  in  1879,  he  had 
no  need  to  solicit  Italy  to  join  the  coalition.  She 
offered  of  her  own  accord.  She  abandoned  herself. 
The  Triple  Alliance  was  concluded,  and  Italy^s 
armaments  at  once  gave  it  an  aggressive  character. 
Crispinism  was  the  order  of  the  day.     From  1881 

^  It  is  right  to  add  here  that  in  a  speech  pronounced  on 
the  3d  of  May,  1894,  Baron  Blanc,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
attempted  to  clear  his  country  from  this  charge.  According  to 
him,  it  was  out  of  gratitude  towards  France  that  Italy  had  not 
anticipated  her  in  Tunis  and  did  not  join  with  England's  action 
in  Egypt.  This  somewhat  singular  theory,  as  is  remarked  in  the 
book,  France  and  Italy,  written  by  Mr.  Billot,  our  late  Ambassa- 
dor at  Rome,  proves  the  ingeniousness  of  Baron  Blanc's  mind  — 
and  nothing  more. 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS       85 

to  1896,  it  weighed  on  Franco-Italian  relations. 
In  the  Triplice,  Crispi  was  the  instigating  agent 
whom  Bismarck  was  able  to  restrain  or  let  loose, 
just  as  he  pleased.  Franco-Italian  relations  were 
considerably  more  strained  than  those  between 
France  and  Germany.  To  act  against  France 
rather  than  on  behalf  of  Italy,  such  was  the  line  of 
conduct  instinctively  followed  at  Rome,  whether 
in  Europe  or  out  of  Europe ;  but,  as  was  soon  seen, 
at  the  expense  of  Italy's  interests,  both  political 
and  economic. 

During  this  period,  numerous  were  the  disagree- 
able incidents  that  occurred  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. In  the  month  of  December,  1887,  the  Flor- 
ence police,  cynically  backed  up  by  Crispi,  broke 
open  the  archives  of  our  Consulate.  In  the  follow- 
ing year,  the  military  commandant  at  Massowah, 
acting  on  his  own  authority,  abolished  the  capitu- 
lations, under  the  benefit  of  which,  the  French  re- 
siding there  had  lived  for  more  than  twenty  years. 
In  February,  1888,  the  altogether  improbable  re- 
port was  circulated  that  the  French  fleet  was  about 
to  attack  Spezzia.  On  the  2d  of  October,  1891,  a 
French  pilgrim  having  written  Vive  le  Pape  on  the 
register  lying  in  the  Pantheon  near  Victor  Emman- 
uel's tomb,  there  was  a  formidable  outburst  of  anti- 
French  feeling  throughout  the  country.  In  August, 
1893,  the  Prince  of  Naples  was  present  at  the  Ger- 
man military  manoeuvres  in  Lorraine ;  and^  in  the 
same  month,  some  Italians  having  been  killed  at 
Aigues  Mortes  in  a  quarrel  with  French  workmen, 


86  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

the  Palais-Farnese,  which  was  the  residence  of  our 
Embassy,  was  attacked  by  the  mob.  In  Septem- 
ber, 1894,  the  Itahan  authorities  of  the  frontier 
made  several  arrests  of  French  officers,  while  in  the 
December  following,  a  whole  series  of  expulsions 
of  French  journalists  who  had  been  long  established 
in  Rome,  was  carried  out.  Now  and  again,  it  is 
true,  there  were  Franco-Italian  fetes  celebrated 
and  exchanges  of  good- will  in  one  place  or  another: 
the  visit  of  an  Italian  squadron  to  Toulon,  in 
April,  1890;  the  inauguration  at  Nice  of  Garibal- 
di's monument,  in  October,  1891 ;  the  visit  of  a 
French  squadron  to  Genoa,  in  September,  1892 ; 
manifestations  of  sympathy,  when  President  Carnot 
was  assassinated,  in  June,  1894;  the  unveiling  at 
Magenta  of  MacMahon's  statue,  in  June,  1895. 
True,  also,  between  two  armament  projects,  Crispi 
affirmed  his  attachment  to  peace  and  his  senti- 
ments of  friendship  towards  France.  None  the 
less,  the  tension  was  great,  and  Italian  policy  was 
responsible  for  this.  Add  to  these  things  the  clash 
of  interests  embittered  by  our  protectionism  and 
the  rupture  of  commercial  relations  between  the 
two  countries;  and  it  will  be  seen  how  fragile  was 
a  peace  that  was  at  the  mercy  of  every  little  alarm. ^ 
On  the  5th  of  May,  Crispi's  megalomania  exposed 
his  country  to  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  Abyssini- 
ans.  The  morrows  of  defeat  are  favourable  to 
reflection.  Italy  reflected.  Her  grievances  in  the 
Mediterranean  had  induced  her  to  throw  in  her  lot 

^  See  Billot's  France  and  Italy. 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS      87 

with  the  Triple  Alliance.  However,  her  Mediterra- 
nean policy  had  not  secured  by  it  the  guarantees 
sought,  Bismarck,  in  1882,  granting  nothing  to 
Mancini  on  this  score.  In  1886,  Robilant,  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  wrote:  '^I  am  quite 
decided  not  to  take  the  initiative  in  meeting  the 
Chancellor  with  a  view  to  further  negotiations.  In 
1882,  we  seemed  rather  to  be  begging  the  Alliance 
than  to  be  negotiating  it;  and,  in  concluding  it,  we 
exposed  ourselves  to  a  Continental  war  without 
securing  our  guarantees  against  a  Naval  war."  By 
such  a  policy,  what  had  Italy  gained  ?  With  regard 
to  Germany,  a  subaltern  position ;  with  regard  to 
France,  a  precarious  one,  and,  as  a  consequence, 
armaments  that  heavily  burdened  her  budget.  Her 
extraordinary  credits  ran  up :  127  millions  in  1882, 
212  millions  in  1885,  146  millions  in  1886;  and, 
finally,  in  the  budget  of  1894-1895,  a  deficit  of  180 
millions.  The  denunciation  of  the  Commercial 
Treaty  with  France  had  been  ruinous  to  Italian 
agriculture  and  industry.  Within  two  years  Ital- 
ian exports  to  France  had  fallen  61  per  cent. 
More  than  700  million  francs  had  been  withdrawn 
in  one  year  by  French  capitalists  from  Italian 
undertakings  in  which  they  were  invested.  The 
Exchange  rose  to  123.  As  General  Corsi  wrote: 
^^The  economic  consequences  of  the  alliance  with 
Germany  were  disastrous. '^  And  many  people,  con- 
sidering the  state  of  affairs,  began  to  repeat  Robi- 
lant's  words :  ^^  Italy  is  decidedly  tired  of  this  barren 
Alliance ;    and  I  am  loath  to  oblige  her  to  persevere 


88  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

in  it.  For,  I  am  too  deeply  conscious  that,  as  far 
as  we  are  concerned,  it  will  always  be  void  of  results.'' 
At  least,  there  was  good  reason  to  correct  its  exclu- 
sive, onerous,  and  burdensome  character  by  a  return 
to  a  policy  of  equilibrium.^ 

The  logical  issue  from  this  situation  was  through 
a  rapprochement  between  France  and  Italy;  and 
circumstances,  more  than  any  personal  good-will, 
were  the  active  cause  of  the  reconciliation.  On  the 
28th  of  September,  1896,  Italy  gave  us  a  first  pledge 
—  by  accepting  a  revision  of  the  Tunisian  treaties, 
which  implied  an  official  recognition  of  our  situation 
in  the  Regency.  On  the  1st  of  October,  a  Franco- 
Italian  treaty  of  navigation  was  substituted  for  the 
one  which  had  expired  in  1886.  Last  of  all,  on  the 
21st  of  November,  1898,  was  signed  the  Treaty  of 
Commerce  which  had  long  been  desired  in  Rome. 
The  Italian  commercial  balance  sheet  at  once  showed 
an  increase  of  100  millions  in  imports  and  of  200 
millions  in  exports.  Our  French  banks,  the  Paris 
Comptoir  d'Escompte  and  the  Banque  de  Paris,  — 
intervening  just  when  the  German  economic  crisis 
of  1900  put  an  end  to  the  financial  aid  that  had  pre- 
viously been  obtained  at  Berlin,  —  saved  the  Rome 
market  from  a  veritable  disaster.  ''But  for  the  100 
milUons  of  the  Public  Debt  purchased  in  1901  by  the 
Paris  Market,  Italy  would  in  that  year  have  been 
unable  to  obtain  her  economic  equilibrium;  and 
the  exchange  on  foreign  countries,  instead  of  disap- 
pearing gradually,  would  have  advanced  to  pre- 
^  See  Luigi  Chiala's  Pagine  di  Storia  contemporanea. 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS      89 

mium  rates."  ^  At  this  juncture,  Italy  was  induced 
to  draw  nearer  to  France  by  the  tightness  of  her 
economic  situation;  and  the  ItaUans  themselves 
are  the  first  to  acknowledge  it,  as  the  following  quo- 
tation proves :  — 

The  German  economic  crisis  rendered  it  necessary  that  Italy 
should  seek  for  a  political  rapprochement  with  France.  Italy 
would  have  been  forced  (in  any  case)  to  inaugurate  a  policy 
altogether  friendly  to  France.  If,  through  a  political  blunder, 
such  as  the  visit  of  the  Prince  of  Naples  to  Metz,  the  patriotic 
sentiments  of  the  French  had  been  wounded  and  the  Paris 
market  had  again  begun  to  sell  Italian  Consols,  Italy  would  have 
been  obliged  sooner  or  later  to  reimburse  all  the  French  money 
invested  in  them ;  the  exchange  would  again  have  advanced  to 
its  highest  rates;  Consols  would  have  declined  to  their  lowest 
ebb ;  and  Italy  would  have  found  herself  in  presence  of  an  eco- 
nomic crisis  like  the  one  she  had  such  a  terrible  experience  of  in 
1893.  The  powerlessness  shown  by  the  German  money  market 
to  act  as  Italy's  banker,  the  need  of  the  latter  young  country's 
continuing  her  economic  development,  and  having  the  aid  of 
other  nations  richer  than  herself,  together  with  the  fact  that  the 
Paris  money  market  has  once  more  assumed  the  role  of  banker 
to  Italy,  impose  on  the  Government  a  policy  which  shall  be  in 
perfect  accord  with  that  of  France.^ 

It  is  therefore  allowable  to  think  that  commercial 
and  financial  interests  on  Italy's  side  would  have 
sufficed  to  determine  the  rapprochement,  while 
securing  to  France  political  advantages  that  were 
equivalent.  Such  was  not  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Del- 
casse,  who,  when  commercial  relations  were  resumed, 
seized  the  opportunity  in  order  to  enter  into  diplo- 
matic negotiations  with  the  Cabinet  at  Rome.     In 

^  See  G.  M.  Flamingo's  book,  The  Financial  Reasons  for  the 
Franco-Italian  Friendship. 

^  See  G.  M.  Flamingo's  book,  above. 


90  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

the  month  of  April,  1901,  the  Italian  fleet,  under  the 
orders  of  the  Duke  of  Genoa,  came  to  pay  an  official 
visit  to  President  Loubet  at  Toulon.  In  the  same 
year,  in  consequence  of  an  exchange  of  views  with 
Paris,  Signor  Prinetti,  the  Italian  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  announced  that,  to  his  knowledge, 
^^  France  had  no  intention,  in  the  regions  bordering 
on  the  vilayet  of  Tripoli,  to  go  beyond  the  limits 
fixed  by  the  Convention  of  the  21st  of  March,  1899, 
nor  yet  to  interfere  with  the  Caravans.'^  A  few 
days  later,  in  an  interview,  Mr.  Delcasse  stated  that, 
in  return  for  this  assurance,  Italy  had  promised  to 
do  nothing  that  might  hamper  French  policy  in 
Morocco.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  was  the  sub- 
stance of  the  Notes  exchanged,  in  December,  1900, 
between  the  Governments.  In  1902,  on  the  renewal 
of  the  Triple  Alliance,  Mr.  Delcasse  explained  in 
Parliament  ^Hhat  the  legitimate  aspirations  of 
both  nations  clashed  nowhere'' ;  and  he  added,  ^Hhat 
neither  directly  nor  indirectly  was  Italy's  policy 
aimed  against  France  by  reason  of  her  alliances. 
They  could  not,  in  any  case,  imply  a  threat  against 
us  whether  in  diplomatic  forms,  protocols,  or  in- 
ternational military  stipulations.  In  no  case  and 
under  no  form,  could  Italy  become  either  the  instru- 
ment or  the  auxiliary  of  an  aggression  against  our 
country." 

What  was  the  value  of  this  rapprochement  9  What 
was  its  scope  ?  In  a  general  point  of  view,  that  is  to 
say,  the  European,  it  made  no  change  in  the  terms 
of  existing  treaties.     However  closely  Mr.  Delcasse's 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS       91 

declarations  are  examined,  there  is  only  one  affirma- 
tion to  be  extracted  from  them;  to  wit,  that  the 
engagements  imposed  on  Italy  by  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance have  not  an  offensive,  but  a  purely  defensive, 
character,  and  that,  in  the  case  of  an  attack  on 
France,  Italy  would  not  be  associated  with  it.  But 
it  does  not  seem  that  the  constitutive  clauses  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  ever  had  any  stipulation  of  the  kind. 
What  gave  them  their  aggressive  character  was  not 
their  wording,  but  the  bias  exhibited  by  Italy  in 
their  interpretation.  And  it  was  the  alteration  of 
this  bias  which  constituted  an  important /aiY  nouveau 
in  the  international  order.  When  Bismarck  used 
to  speak  of  ^^ exhausting  our  life's  blood,"  Italy  was 
the  Power  he  intended  should  play  the  provocative 
agent's  role.  It  was  through  Italy  that  the  Triplice 
was  able  to  become  offensive  in  its  action.  Without 
modifying  the  text  that  sealed  this  Alliance,  the 
Franco-Italian  rapprochement  modified  therefore 
its  nature.  Since  the  rapprochement,  the  Triple 
Alliance  has  lost  its  edge.  It  is  less  threatening 
militarily,  more  peaceable  politically.  To  Ger- 
many, if  attacked  by  France,  it  leaves  the  support 
of  the  Italian  Army;  but  for  an  attack  on  France 
there  is  no  longer  the  assistance  of  Italian  provoca- 
tions. 

This  evolution  assumes  still  greater  precision,  if, 
instead  of  considering  the  friendly  understanding 
between  Rome  and  Paris  by  itself,  we  place  it  as 
a  function  of  the  Franco-English  rapprochement. 
Between  1882  and  1900,  Italy  was  not  only  Ger- 


92  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

many's  ally.  She  was  also  bound  to  Great  Britain 
by  engagements,  the  nature  of  which  was  not  clearly 
declared,  but  the  existence  of  which  was  not  doubt- 
ful. In  February,  1887,  Depretis  said,  ^^Our  situa- 
tion is  now  secure  both  on  sea  and  on  land.^'  On  the 
29th  of  June,  the  Marquis  di  Rudini,  who  held  the 
double  office  of  Premier  and  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  declared  in  his  turn :  — 

What  Italy  perseveringly  and  tenaciously  wishes  is  peace, 
because  she  believes  it  is  necessary  for  the  development  of  her 
institutions  and  the  improvement  of  her  economic  conditions. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  Italy  also  tenaciously  wishes  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  statu  quo  in  the  Mediterranean  especially. 

With  a  view  to  realizing  these  designs,  the  Government  has 
not  waited  until  to-day,  in  seeking  to  come  to  understandings 
and  to  conclude  agreements  with  the  Powers  that  are  in  the 
same  order  of  ideas  and  whose  interests  are  bound  up  together. 

An  exchange  of  opinions  took  place  only  a  few  years  ago  with 
England,  followed  by  declarations  on  the  part  of  Sir  James  Fer- 
gusson  in  the  English  Parliament ;  and  there  remains  but  little 
for  me  to  add  on  the  subject. 

His  language  was  strictly  conformable  to  the  facts  of  the 
case.  Both  Italy  and  England  purpose  to  maintain  peace  while 
preserving  the  statu  quo.  I  may  say,  moreover,  that  I  perceive 
no  questions,  respecting  which,  the  views  of  Italy  are  not  in 
accordance  with  those  of  England,  seeing  that  their  interests 
are  identical. 

Last  of  all,  on  the  17th  of  March,  1896,  the  Marquis 
di  Rudini  repeated  in  his  ministerial  statement  that 
the  country^s  traditional  friendship  with  England 
completed  Italy's  system  of  alliances.  As  long  as 
England  was  at  loggerheads  with  France,  her  inti- 
mate   relations    with    Rome,  —  ^^her    Alliance    of 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS      93 

Sentiment/'  to  use  the  Duke  of  Sermoneta's  ex- 
pression, —  was  not,  as  may  be  imagined,  of  a  nature 
to  improve  Franco-Italian  relations.  And,  on  the 
contrary,  the  Franco-English  rapprochement,  con- 
cluded in  1894,  at  once  added  value  to  the  Franco- 
Italian  understanding.  It  was,  so  to  speak,  its 
moral  security,  increasing  its  diplomatic  efficacy  in 
the  cause  of  peace. 

As  for  the  agreements  assuring  reciprocal  absten- 
tion in  Morocco  and  the  Tripolitaine  respectively, 
they  were  in  harmony  with  the  interests  of  the  two 
countries.  It  will  be  seen  further  on,  why  France 
was  compelled  to  intervene  in  Morocco.  And,  in 
sooth,  to  quote  a  pertinent  remark,  ^^  the  key  of  the 
Moorish  Empire  was  not  to  be  sought  in  Rome." 
But  still  Italy's  good- will  with  regard  to  projects  as 
yet  ill-defined  might  one  day  be  useful.  On  the  other 
hand,  no  essential  interests  required  the  presence 
of  the  Italians  at  Tripoli.  What  they  desired,  after 
their  Ethiopian  fiasco,  was  more  especially  the 
satisfaction  of  their  amour-propre.  The  Tripoli- 
taine does  not  possess  the  first-class  value  recently 
attributed  to  it  by  Rohlfs  when  he  wrote:  ^^The 
Power  that  holds  Tripoli  will  be  master  of  the 
Sudan :  Tunis  as  an  acquisition  is  not  worth  the 
tenth  of  Tripoli."  Indeed,  no  one,  even  at  Rome, 
nourishes  any  illusions  with  regard  to  the  possi- 
bilities of  profit  in  the  Tripolitan  affair.  The  Sultan 
has  sovereignty  over  the  vilayet,  and  would  only 
abandon  it  in  obedience  to  armed  force.  As  an 
Italian  Minister  once  said:    ^'It  is  proper  that  our 


94  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

designs  on  Tripoli  should  preserve  a  strictly  platonic 
character/'  Even  with  this  character,  certain  per- 
sons in  France  have  expressed  the  opinion  that  it 
was  imprudent  to  admit  the  hypothesis  of  an  Italian 
installation  at  the  gates  of  Tunis.  However,  while 
granting  that  the  rapprochement  with  Rome  might 
have  been  negotiated  on  better  terms,  it  may  be 
reasonably  presumed  that  such  fears  are  purely 
chimerical. 

Being  convenient  in  Africa  and  useful  in  Europe, 
the  Franco-Italian  agreement,  coupled  with  the 
Franco-English  one,  deserves  in  itself  nothing  but 
approbation.  But  the  way  in  which  we  have  made 
use  of  it  is  undoubtedly  less  worthy  of  praise. 
Thus,  for  instance,  it  was  imprudent  to  compromise 
our  relations  with  the  Holy  See  by  President  Loubet's 
visit  to  Rome,  and  thus  to  prepare  the  rupture  of 
the  Concordat.  It  was  for  us  to  understand  our 
interests  better;  and  no  reproach  can  be  made 
against  Italy  by  reason  of  our  mistake.  Similarly, 
Italy  has  certainly  benefited  through  the  weakening 
of  our  situation  in  the  Far  East ;  and  the  agreement 
of  January,  1907,  was  a  seal  set  upon  this  change  to 
her  advantage.  But  here  again,  we  are  alone  to 
blame,  for  not  seeing  that,  by  breaking  with  the 
Vatican,  we  should  sooner  or  later  lose  the  profit 
accruing  to  us  by  the  exercise  of  our  Catholic  pro- 
tectorate in  the  Levant.  The  events  that  have 
occurred  since  1902,  have  allowed  us  to  estimate 
the  price  of  our  good  relations  with  Italy.  What 
would  have  happened  notably  if  the  Italy  of  1905 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS      95 

had  been  in  the  same  frame  of  mind  with  regard  to 
us  as  the  Italy  of  1889?  The  pohcy  which  had 
sought  for  the  rapprochement j  and  reahzed  it,  was 
good  and  wise  in  its  principle.  The  errors  made  in 
applying  it  cannot  induce  us  to  forget  that. 

II 

The  Franco-Spanish  rapprochement  was  the  natural 
complement  of  the  reconciliation  between  France 
and  England  and  of  that  between  France  and  Italy. 
It  was  necessarily  inspired  by  the  same  principle, 
and  necessarily  served  the  same  policy.  But  it 
could  not  assume  the  same  form. 

The  Cuban  war  and  the  loss  of  her  colonies  com- 
pelled Spain  to  fall  back  on  herself.  This  admirable 
country,  which  a  defective  administration,  content 
to  exploit  the  colonial  farm,  had  for  centuries 
permitted  to  lie  fallow,  understood  from  the  lesson 
of  her  defeat  that  her  future  would  depend  on  her 
energy.  To  quote  Mr.  Victor  Berard's  just  expres- 
sion, Spain  is  at  once  a  farm  and  a  workshop.  To 
this  farm  and  to  this  workshop,  what  is  lacking? 
Men,  money,  capital. 

The  peasant  has  no  capital  to  buy  the  machinery  and  tools, 
for  want  of  which,  he  is  unable  to  stand  against  foreign  compe- 
tition. The  husbandman  has  not  the  capital  needed  to  rees- 
tablish the  irrigation  works  which  once  transformed  the  whole 
of  Arabian  Spain  into  a  garden.  The  ironmaster,  the  miner,  the 
manufacturer,  the  tradesman,  the  commission  agent,  have  found 
on  the  spot  a  certain  amount  of  capital  which  had  come  back 
from  Cuba  or  the  PhiUppine  Islands  and  which  has  enabled 
them  to  set  going  a  large  number  of  businesses  that  to-day  are 


96  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

thriving.  .  .  .  But  what  they  want  is  ten  or  twenty  times  as 
much  money.  Spanish  industry  finds  lenders  only  at  seven  or 
eight  per  cent.  And  if,  after  considering  private  individuals, 
you  come  to  look  at  the  State,  what  loans  would  the  latter 
have  to  negotiate  if  it  were  only  to  undertake  the  repair  and 
upkeep  of  what  remains  of  the  national  manufacturing  appli- 
ances and  other  machinery  or  the  development  of  that  part 
which  is  in  process  of  formation!  Castile  and  Aragon  demand 
the  remaking  of  the  canals  given  them  by  Charles  V.  Cadiz, 
Carthagena,  Tarragona,  Vigo,  beg  for  docks  and  dykes.  Spain 
throughout  needs  railways.  .  ,  .  And,  above  all,  the  entire 
country  requires  a  restored  coinage,  finances  that  are  sound. 
.  .  .  Public  finance  must  first  be  placed  on  a  good  footing,  if 
private  finance  is  to  be  improved.^ 

When  once  in  possession  of  herself,  and  turned 
towards  economic  action,  Spain  is  too  proud  not  to 
rely  on  her  future.  This  future  is  no  longer  to  be 
sought  beyond  the  seas.  She  sees  it  quite  near 
to  her,  within  her  reach,  in  the  Morocco  that  she 
herself  resembles  by  the  situation  of  her  mountains 
and  the  aspect  of  her  soil.  As  the  Marquis  de 
Segonzac  ^  has  demonstrated,  Morocco,  more  than 
any  other  portion  of  Africa,  is  like  Spain  in  race, 
history,  and  civilization.  There  is  striking  simi- 
larity between  the  Sierra  Nevada  and  the  Rif 
mountains.  The  Straits  of  Gibraltar  are  a  mere 
accidental  break.  They  do  not  constitute  a  frontier, 
and  have  never  separated  anything,  either  geographi- 
cally or  historically.  The  Moors  still  dream  of  the 
palaces  of  Granada.  And  as  for  the  Spaniards, 
ever  since  Isabella  the  Catholic  assigned  them  in 
her  will  and  testament  the   task   of    pursuing  the 

^  Victor  Berard's  book,  The  Moroccan  Affair. 

2  See  Marquis  de  Segonzac's  book.  Travels  in  Morocco. 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS      97 

Mussulmans-  on  to  the  African  shore,  they  have 
considered  Morocco  as  being  their  pecuhar  prop- 
erty, over  which  they  claim  ^^ historic  rights." 

To  tell  the  truth,  the  realization  of  these  rights 
has  so  far  been  of  a  mediocre  kind.  In  1688,  Spain 
obtained  the  cession  of  Ceuta.  At  the  time  of  the 
1720  expedition,  and  more  especially  on  the  occasion 
of  that  of  1859,  which  ended  in  the  capture  of  Te- 
toan,  together  with  the  payment  of  a  war  indemnity 
and  the  extension  of  the  Ceuta  territory,  she  at- 
tempted to  establish  herself  firmly  on  Moorish  soil; 
but  the  result  was  negative,  or  nearly  so.  What 
Spain  acquired,  to  wit,  her  penal  settlement,  was 
purely  factitious,  a  mere  administrative  abstraction, 
nothing  more.  Ceuta,  which  has  no  commercial 
activity,  occupies  a  position  of  strategic  value,  but 
is  not  seriously  fortified.  Penon  de  Velas,  Alhuce- 
mas,  the  Isle  of  Alboran,  Peregil,  Ifni,  and  the 
Zaffarine  Isles,  serve  as  hulks  —  when  they  serve  for 
anything  at  all.  Melilla  alone,  since  it  has  been  a 
free  port,  has  carried  on  a  certain  trade ;  but  the 
countries  that  chiefly  benefit  by  it  are  France  and 
England.  The  penal  settlement  costs  2,500,000 
pesetas  annually.  The  trade,  which  amounts  to 
about  two  millions,  yields  to  Spain  a  sum  of  about 
400,000  pesetas;  so  that  the  excess  of  expenditure 
over  receipts  is  more  than  two  millions.  Between 
the  Spanish  residents  and  the  native  population 
there  is  no  intermingling.  The  Moors  do  not  allow 
the  Europeans  to  issue  from  their  fortress.  In 
most    of    the    penal    settlements   everything    comes 


98  FRANCE  AND  THE   ALLIANCES 

from  Spain,  even  their  soft  water.  Clinging  for 
centuries  to  a  few  islets  and  peninsulas  of  the  coast, 
the  Spanish  have  drawn  no  profit  from  them,  either 
to  increase  their  territory,  or  even  to  secure  its  being 
respected.  During  this  long  domination,  they  have 
gained  only  the  ineradicable  hate  of  neighbouring 
tribes.  Such  precarious  possession  of  a  few  rocks 
confers  on  them  no  more  rights  over  the  bulk  of  the 
country,  than  sticking  their  nests  in  windows  gives 
to  swallows  the  ownership  of  a  house. 

In  order  to  work  for  their  economic  development, 
as  also  in  order  to  give  effect  to  their  aspirations 
in  Morocco,  the  Spanish  need  help.  And  such  help, 
France,  better  than  any  other  nation,  is  in  a  position 
to  afford  them.  The  support  of  French  capital  can 
be  the  leaven  which  shall  cause  the  unexploited  re- 
sources of  the  peninsula  to  germinate.  As  for 
Morocco,  what  Senor  Silvela  said  in  1901  is  true: 
^'The  present  situation  of  the  country,  closed  to 
commerce,  to  civilization,  to  any  increase  of  popula- 
tion, to  the  working  of  its  mines,  to  the  consumption 
and  exchange  of  productions,  is  not  a  source  of  profit 
or  wealth,  but  rather  of  poverty,  sterility,  and  stag- 
nation for  Spain.  ...  It  is  in  an  understanding 
with  France  that  we  shall  find  the  surest  aid,  not 
indeed  for  making  war  but  for  an  equitable  and 
reasonable  division  of  interests.'^  Although  this 
idea  of  sharing,  which  has  a  very  considerable  number 
of  adherents  in  Spain,  did  not  correspond  with  the 
views  of  French  policy,  Senor  Silvela's  language 
deserved  to  be  taken  note  of,  as  indicating  a  dispo- 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS   99 

sition  that,  one  day  or  another,  we  might  find  it 
advantageous  to  encourage. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  during  the  last  twenty  years 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  Spain  was  far  from 
showing  herself  favourable  to  France.  Rather 
towards  Berlin  than  towards  Paris  it  was  that  her 
sympathies  w^ent.  The  second  marriage  of  Alfonso 
XII  with  an  Austrian  princess  (1879)  harmonized 
with  the  country's  desire  to  enter  into  closer  rela- 
tions with  the  Triple  Alliance.  Four  years  later,  the 
King  paid  a  visit  to  Germany,  where  William  I 
appointed  him  Colonel  in  a  Prussian  regiment 
garrisoned  at  Strasburg.  And,  a  few  days  later, 
on  his  arrival  in  Paris,  Alfonso  XII  was  greeted  in 
the  Rue  de  Rivoli  with  hisses  and  groans.  In  the 
month  of  November  following,  when  the  Crown 
Prince  proceeded  to  Madrid  to  return  the  Spanish 
King's  visit,  all  the  European  press,  whether  rightly 
or  wrongly,  spoke  of  an  alliance  between  Germany 
and  Spain.  True,  in  1885,  the  conflict  which  broke 
out  over  the  Caroline  Islands,  produced  throughout 
Spain  a  strong  feeling  of  irritation ;  but,  at  the  death 
of  Alfonso  XII  in  1886,  calm  was  restored,  and  the 
German  leanings  of  the  Government  in  Madrid 
seemed  less  doubtful.  The  minority  of  Alfonso  XIII 
and  his  mother's  regency  were  a  period  of  quiet 
reflection,  which  was  at  last  disturbed  so  tragically 
by  the  war  with  the  United  States  (1898).  On  that 
occasion,  the  friendliness  towards  Spain  shown  by 
the  French  newspapers,  and  the  clever  mediation 
of    Mr.    Jules     Cambon,    French    Ambassador    at 


100  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

Washington,  during  the  negotiations  for  peace, 
effected  a  rapprochement  between  Madrid  and  Paris. 
Although  an  Austrian,  the  Queen-Mother,  with 
rare  clear-sightedness,  understood  that  Spain  could 
not,  without  peril  to  herself,  adhere  to  a  political 
system  which  would  have  risked  bringing  her  into 
opposition  against  France. 

"No  country  can  do  our  dynasty  as  much  harm 
or  as  much  good  as  France,"  she  said  one  day  to 
Mr.  Loubet. 

Her  prudent  and  circumspect  diplomacy,  admira- 
bly seconded  by  Senor  de  Leon  y  Castillo,  her  Am- 
bassador at  Paris,  succeeded  in  keeping  the  future 
free  for  a  policy  which  her  son,  a  young  man  of  intel- 
ligent, charming,  and  liberal  mind  and  a  friend  to 
our  country,  resolutely  guided,  as  soon  as  he  came 
of  age,  towards  a  friendship  with  France. 

A  Franco-Spanish  understanding  relative  to  Mo- 
rocco encountered,  notwithstanding,  difficulties  that 
were  serious.  Certain  Spaniards,  who  though  not 
numerous,  made  a  great  deal  of  stir,  had  retained  a 
hatred  of  France.  Men  like  Senor  Villanueva,  who, 
when  he  was  at  the  head  of  the  Admiralty  in  1895, 
resigned  rather  than  accept  the  Grand  Officer's  grade 
in  the  Legion  of  Honour,  were  full  of  distrust  and 
prejudice  with  regard  to  us.  As  far  as  Morocco  was 
concerned,  the  very  largeness  of  their  desires  ren- 
dered them  hostile  to  all  precision:  for,  to  define  is 
to  limit.  Obsessed  by  the  hope  of  Moroccan  profits 
that  were  still  undivided,  they  considered  any  other 
foreign   action  than  their   own   as   a   menace,   any 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    101 

agreement  with  a  foreign  Power,  and  especially  with 
France,  as  prejudicial,  France  being  supreme  in  Al- 
geria. This  explains  why,  between  1899  and  1904, 
Spanish  policy  underwent  fluctuations,  the  main 
lines  of  which,  if  not  the  details,  are  sufficiently  well 
known.  There  were  at  first,  in  1902,  preliminary 
negotiations  with  Paris,  which,  while  going  pretty 
far,  did  not  issue  in  the  treaty  of  which  an  apocry- 
phal text  was  published.  What  would  seem  to  have 
been  discussed  was  a  method  of  sharing,  as  to  which 
no  agreement  could  be  reached.  Next  there  was  a 
double  and  parallel  exchange  of  views  with  Great 
Britain  and  Germany,  which  doubtless  took  its  rise 
in  the  sale  to  Germany  of  what  was  left  of  the  Span- 
ish colonies  in  the  Pacific,  —  the  Caroline  and  Ma- 
rianne isles.  Nothing  came  of  this,  either.  Things 
went  on  so  till  1904,  when,  on  the  8th  of  April,  Ma- 
drid learned  that  France  and  England  had  just  come 
to  an  understanding  on  the  question  of  Morocco. 

The  news  of  this  understanding  caused  a  disagree- 
able impression  in  Spain;  and  the  feeling  was  that 
there  had  been  too  much  waiting  on  events.  France, 
it  was  thought,  being  henceforth  in  agreement  with 
England,  would  show  herself  less  conciliatory  than 
in  the  past.  However,  these  two  Powers  had  taken 
the  precaution  to  put  into  the  statement  of  their 
arrangement  a  clause  proving  their  friendly  inten- 
tions with  regard  to  Spain.  ^^The  two  Govern- 
ments," said  Article  8,  ^^ basing  themselves  on  their 
amicable  sentiments  towards  Spain,  take  into  special 
account  the  interests  she  has  acquired  from  her  geo- 


102  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

graphic  position  and  her  territorial  possessions  on  the 
Moroccan  coast  of  the  Mediterranean,  with  respect 
to  which  subject,  the  French  Government  will  ar- 
range with  that  of  Spain/'  In  accordance  with  this 
pledge,  Mr.  Delcasse  at  once  entered  into  negotia- 
tions with  Seiior  de  Leon  y  Castillo,  the  Spanish 
Ambassador,  their  exchange  of  views  continuing 
throughout  the  summer  of  1904.  Now  and  again, 
they  found  it  difficult  to  reconcile  the  claims  of  their 
respective  countries;  but  finally  a  convention  was 
agreed  upon,  and  duly  announced  in  the  press.  Its 
terms  were  as  follows :  — 

The  Government  of  the  French  Republic  and  that  of  his 
Majesty,  the  King  of  Spain. 

Having  agreed  to  determine  the  extent  and  the  guarantee  of 
the  interests  belonging  to  France  by  reason  of  her  Algerian  pos- 
sessions and  to  Spain  by  reason  of  her  possessions  on  the  coasts 
of  Morocco. 

And  the  Government  of  his  Majesty,  the  King  of  Spain,  hav- 
ing in  consequence  given  their  adhesion  to  the  Franco-English 
declaration  of  the  8th  of  April  relative  to  Morocco  and  Egypt, 
communication  of  which  had  been  made  to  them  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  French  Republic. 

Declare  that  they  remain  firmly  attached  to  the  integrity  of 
the  Moroccan  Empire  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan. 

This  document  was  fairly  vague.  On  reading  it 
and  re-reading  it,  one  experienced  a  feeling  that  the 
two  Governments  had  kept  the  essential  part  of  it 
to  themselves.  Undoubtedly,  Spain,  by  adhering 
to  the  Franco-English  declaration,  affirmed,  together 
with  the  two  signataries  of  the  declaration,  her  at- 
tachment to  the  integrity  of  Morocco  and  to  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Sultan.     She  also  recognized  that 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    103 

^4t  belonged  to  France,  more  peculiarly  as  a  border 
Power  having  a  long  contiguous  frontier,  to  see  that 
this  country  remained  tranquil  and  to  lend  her  assist- 
ance, with  a  view  to  all  the  economic  and  financial 
administrative  reforms  required/'  She  also  de- 
clared herself  equally  decided  ^'not  to  hamper  France 
in  what  might  be  done  for  this  purpose,  and  to  af- 
ford her  the  help  of  Spain's  diplomacy  for  the  exe- 
cution of  the  clauses  of  the  present  declaration/' 
But  if  France  obtained  this  precious  adhesion  from 
Spain,  it  was  ^4n  consequence"  of  something  else. 
This  something  was  the  determination  of  ''the  ex- 
tent of  Spain's  rights  and  the  guarantee  of  her  inter- 
ests resulting  from  her  possessing  territory  on  the 
coasts  of  Morocco."  In  other  words,  Spain's  adhe- 
sion corresponded  to  concessions  from  France.  And 
it  was  just  on  the  chapter  of  such  concessions  con- 
taining the  essence  of  the  agreement  that  nothing 
was  openly  said.  What  were  these  secret  clauses? 
What  rights  —  new  ones  evidently  —  had  we  ceded 
to  Spain?  How  and  in  what  measure  had  the  ex- 
tent of  these  rights  been  fixed?  How  and  under 
what  form  had  the  guarantee  of  such  interests  been 
established?  These  questions  were  left  without  an- 
swer. 

In  reality,  the  privileged  political  position  of 
France  with  regard  to  Morocco  was  acknowledged  by 
Spain.  But  France  consented  to  certain  restrictions 
in  the  exercise  of  her  privilege,  and  these  restrictions 
were  in  favour  of  Spain.  She  associated  Spain  with 
herself  in  her  designs  of  peaceful  penetration  within 


104  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

the  part  of  Morocco  where  such  penetration  had  the 
greatest  advantage  for  Spaniards.  However,  in  this 
same  part,  any  action  of  Spain,  during  a  Hmited 
time,  was  subordinated  to  previous  arrangement  with 
France,  whereas,  on  her  own  ground,  France  was 
obUged  only  to  notify  Spain  of  her  initiatives.  There 
was  no  question  of  divided  shares,  but  merely  of  an 
economic  cooperation,  as  also  of  the  contingency  of 
concerted  measures,  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance 
of  order  in  case  of  serious  disturbance  breaking  out. 
It  was  a  complicated  combination,  which,  in  the 
year  following,  had  to  be  rendered  more  precise  in 
certain  of  its  terms  by  a  supplementary  agreement 
(September,  1905).^  Moreover,  it  recorded,  unlike 
the  Franco-English  and  Franco-Italian  arrange- 
ments, a  sort  of  purchase-out  in  favour  of  France; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  coupled  Spanish  projects 
with  French.  It  was  positive  instead  of  being  nega- 
tive. 

A  few  months  earlier,  this  political  agreement  had 
been  preceded  by  an  economic  understanding,  which 
in  the  future  is  destined  to  bear  the  best  fruits,  to 
wit,  the  treaty  relative  to  the  Trans-Pyrenean  rail- 
ways. There  is  no  journey  more  uselessly  long  than 
that  from  Paris  to  Cadiz.  A  plan  for  remedying  this 
state  of  things  had  been  long  under  consideration; 
and  a  Franco-Spanish  convention  on  the  subject  was 
signed  in  1885.  After  a  series  of  preliminary  nego- 
tiations and  preparatory  surveys  superintended  on 
the  French  side  by  Mr.  Mille,  Civil  Engineer-in- 
^  See  our  book,  Diplomatic  Questions  of  the  Year  1904. 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    105 

Chief;  two  lines  were  mapped  out,  one  running  from 
Oloron  to  Jaca  through  the  Canfranc  pass,  the  other 
from  Saint  Girons  to  Lerida  through  the  Salau  pass. 
It  had  been  decided  by  the  two  Commissaries  that 
the  two  lines  should  be  made  on  the  same  level. 
Everything,  therefore,  was  apparently  settled,  when 
an  article  was  published  to  the  effect  that  the  two 
Governments  were  to  come  to  an  understanding  as 
to  the  date  on  which  the  convention  should  be  sub- 
mitted for  Parliamentary  approval.  This  was  equiv- 
alent to  an  indefinite  postponement.  The  conven- 
tion was  never  brought  before  the  Chambers.  The 
ratification  was  never  accorded.  From  that  time 
forward  there  were  frequent  attempts  to  take  up  the 
matter  again,  but  always  without  anything  definite 
being  done.  In  1904,  however,  a  step  forward  was 
taken.  To  the  two  lines  first  planned,  a  third  was 
proposed  from  Ax-les-Thermes  to  Ripoll,  shortening 
the  journey  from  Toulouse  to  Barcelona  by  three 
hours.  A  treaty  embodying  the  new  scheme  was 
signed  on  the  18th  of  August,  1904,  and  was  com- 
pleted by  an  additional  act  in  February,  1905.  This 
was  a  first  definite  effort  towards  economic  coopera- 
tion between  the  two  countries.  It  would  be  ad- 
vantageous to  have  others  following. 

The  thought  may  occur  that  in  the  case  of  the 
Franco-Spanish  rapprochement,  as  in  that  of  the 
Franco-Italian,  less  onerous  conditions  might  have 
been  secured.  However,  Spain,  with  her  haughty 
temperament,  would  not  have  accepted  the  Moroccan 
developments   of  our  Mediterranean  policy,   unless 


106  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

satisfaction  had  been  granted  to  her  historic  claims. 
By  refusing  her  this  satisfaction,  we  should  have 
aroused  her  hostility.  And  either  in  Europe,  in  the 
event  of  a  war,  or  else  in  Morocco  itself,  such  hostil- 
ity might  have  become  dangerous.  On  the  contrary, 
the  agreement  thus  opportunely  concluded  was  a 
guarantee  for  the  future,  which  was  further  strength- 
ened by  Great  Britain's  intervention.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  Franco- 
English  Entente  was  the  determining  cause  of  Spain's 
throwing  in  her  lot  with  Europe's  Western  Powers. 
The  marriage  of  Alfonso  XIII  with  a  princess  of  the 
English  Royal  Family,  his  interviews  with  Edward 
VII,  his  visits  to  London  and  Paris,  confirmed  this 
trend  of  Spanish  policy,  which  indeed  was  in  accord- 
ance with  his  personal  preferences,  since  he  has  no 
leanings  towards  Germany.  From  his  stay  at  Ber- 
lin he  brought  back  a  disagreeable  impression.  It 
seemed  to  him  as  though  attempts  were  being  made 
to  astonish  and  daunt  him ;  and  the  result  was  that 
he  was  annoyed.  His  presence  on  the  throne,  there- 
fore, is  the  pledge  that  a  policy  will  be  followed 
which,  if  partially  caused  by  a  somewhat  naive  Pan- 
Latinism,  none  the  less  corresponds,  in  its  existing 
form,  to  the  practical  interests  of  those  that  it  binds 
together. 

Ill 

On  the  5th  of  November,  1881,  when  explaining 
to  the  Chamber  his  Tunisian  policy,  Jules  Ferry  said : 
''The  Tunisian  question  is  as  old  as  the  Algerian  one. 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    107 

It  is  contemporaneous  with  it.  Can  any  good  French- 
man support  the  idea  of  leaving  to  any  but  a  weak, 
friendly,  or  subordinate  Power  the  possession  of  a 
territory  which,  in  the  full  acceptation  of  the  term, 
is  the  key  of  our  house  ?  ^'  The  necessity  thus  clearly 
recognized  by  the  greatest  statesman  of  the  Third 
Republic,  was  bound  to  become  the  inspiring  princi- 
ple of  our  policy  from  the  moment  when,  after  the 
Algerian  and  Tunisian  questions,  that  of  Morocco 
arose. 

Situated  at  the  extreme  western  end  of  Africa, 
Morocco  has  remained  down  to  our  own  day  as  a 
wreck  of  antiquity.  During  the  past  century,  all 
the  various  Mussulman  countries  have  more  or  less 
adopted  our  European  civilization.  Morocco  alone 
has  continued  a  closed  country,  rigidly  preserving 
her  peculiar  exclusiveness.  In  no  other  spot  is  reli- 
gious life  so  intense  as  in  the  Maghreb  el  Aksa.  In 
no  other  clime  is  the  national  life  feebler.  It  has 
been  truly  said  that  Morocco  is  not  an  empire  falling 
to  decay,  but  an  empire  in  process  of  birth,  an  em- 
pire which  has  not  succeeded  in  imposing  a  State 
unity  on  the  independent  tribes  that  theoretically  it 
governs.  The  nature  of  its  soil  favours  such  inde- 
pendence, which  manifests  itself  more  or  less  strongly 
according  as  the  reigning  Sultan  is  more  or  less  capa- 
ble of  exercising  his  authority,  but  which  so  far  has 
never  been  subdued.  Morocco  is  divided  into  two 
portions,  each  varying  with  the  reach  of  the  central 
Power.  The  Bled  el  Maghzen,  in  a  general  way,  com- 
prises the  populations  of  the  plain,  who  yield  obedi- 


108  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

ence  to  functionaries  appointed  by  the  Sultan  and 
consent  to  pay  a  tax,  which,  however,  is  irregularly 
collected.  The  Bled  es  Siba  acknowledges  the  Sul- 
tan's authority  only  when  imposed  by  means  of  an 
expedition.  However,  what  at  one  moment  be- 
longs to  the  Maghzen  country  may  very  well  belong 
to  the  Siba  country  at  another.  For  the  last  ten 
centuries,  it  has  been  the  lot  of  Moroccan  Sultans  to 
have  continually  to  conquer  their  subjects,  and  the 
special  occupation  of  the  subjects  has  been  that  of 
disobeying  their  sovereigns.  To  tell  the  truth,  the 
notion  of  sovereignty  does  not  exist.  Where  there 
is  no  hierarchy,  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be 
any  moral  notion  attaching  to  revolt.  Morocco  is  a 
country  of  feudal  and  theocratic  anarchy;  and  the 
disturbances  that  have  occurred  there  in  recent 
times  are  merely  a  fresh  manifestation  of  tendencies 
that  have  long  existed.  It  is  Europe  alone  which, 
first  through  mental  assimilation,  and  subsequently 
through  political  interests,  has  created  the  unity  of 
Morocco.  In  such  unity  there  has  never  been  either 
reality  or  totality.  What  does  exist  is  a  Moorish 
Empire,  with  which  other  Powers  treat;  but  inside 
the  empire  one  finds  merely  tribes  who,  in  battles  or 
else  in  incessant  negotiations,  seek  their  personal 
profit  only. 

The  Sultan  Muley  Hassan,  who  reigned  from  1873 
to  1894,  was  an  energetic  man  who  had  strength- 
ened his  power  by  making  war  throughout  his 
reign.  When  he  died,  still  fighting,  in  the  course 
of  an  expedition  in  the  Tedla,  near  the  Oued  el  Abid, 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    109 

he  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Muley  Abd  el  Aziz, 
who,  at  the  time,  was  sixteen  years  of  age.  The 
Chamberlain  of  the  dead  monarch,  Si  Ahmed  Ben 
Mouga,  caused  the  young  man  to  be  proclaimed 
Emii^  el-Muminin,  that  is  to  say.  Commander  of 
the  Faithful.  Then,  thrusting  into  the  background 
the  person  of  him  whom  he  had  just  proclaimed 
Sultan,  he  seized  on  the  Government,  which  he 
exercised  alone.  Between  1894  and  1900,  he  was 
the  sole  ruler  of  the  Empire.  ^'Gifted  with  dauntless 
will,  an  untiring  worker,  eager  for  power  and  wealth,"  ^ 
he  dispensed  the  Sultan  from  exercising  his  king- 
craft, giving  him  people  to  entertain  him  instead  of 
teaching  him  how  to  reign.  Abd  el  Aziz  acquired 
nothing  of  that  virile  teaching  suitable  for  scholars 
destined  to  a  throne.  When  Si  Ahmed  died,  he 
had  completed  his  twenty-second  year;  but  was 
completely  lacking  in  maturity  of  mind,  in  method, 
and  in  consistency.  After  Si  Ahmed's  disappear- 
ance, rival  influences  sought  to  monopolize  the 
Government.  There  was  that  of  the  Sultan's 
mother,  that  of  Si  elHadj  el  Mokhtar  ben  Ahmed, 
who  was  the  secretary  and  successor  of  the  deceased 
vizier,  and,  last  of  all,  that  of  Si  el  Mehdi  el  Menebhi, 
who  was  Minister  of  War.  This  third  influence 
soon  contrived  to  supplant  the  others.  In  the 
month  of  April,  1901,  Si  Fedul  Garnit  was  installed 
as  Grand  Vizier.  But,  under  cover  of  his  name,  it 
was  Menebhi  who  reigned  and  held  the  chief  power 
until  his  disgrace  placed  the  Sultan  in  other  hands. 

^  See  Dr.  F.  Weisgerber's  book,  Three  Months'  Campaigning  in 
Morocco. 


110  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

By  his  qualities  as  by  his  failings,  Abd  el  Aziz  was 
utterly  unfitted  for  the  task  of  consolidating  an 
authority  that  was  tottering  to  its  fall.  This  tall 
young  man,  of  sallow  complexion,  with  straggling 
beard  just  beginning  to  grow,  and  a  tendency  to 
stoutness  and  a  certain  awkwardness  and  timidity, 
remained  until  he  was  thirty  in  this  boyish  stage. 
He  is  good-hearted  and  quick  of  intelligence,  but 
possesses  neither  patience  nor  energy.  His  mind 
is  an  open  one,  and  more  liberally  inclined  than  that 
of  most  of  his  subjects.  He  is  favourable  to  reform 
and  progress,  and  has  a  friendly  feeling  towards 
Europe,  on  occasion  showing  it.  However,  in  all 
this  there  is  no  system  nor  method,  nothing  that 
resembles  a  policy.  What  Abd  el  Aziz  likes  best  in 
European  civilization  are  itr  eccentricities.  Every 
one  has  heard  of  his  useless  acquisitions,  made  at 
the  instigation  of  unscrupulous  advisers,  to  the 
detriment  of  his  budget.  Billiard-tables,  motor-cars, 
cabs,  uniforms,  toy  railways,  balloons,  cinemato- 
graphs, ice  machines,  serving  for  a  day  and  neglected 
on  the  morrow,  have  filled  his  palace  and  emptied 
his  purse.  Such  frivolous  amusements  have  shocked 
native  sentiment.  And  Abd  el  Aziz  has  been,  in  a 
large  measure,  the  destroyer  of  his  own  authority. 
Even  his  good  intentions  have,  by  his  own  fault, 
turned  against  him.  In  1901,  he  tried  to  reform  the 
system  of  taxation,  which,  to  tell  the  truth,  was 
iniquitous.  But  he  suppressed  the  ancient  taxes 
before  settling  what  could  be  put  in  their  place. 
The  Moroccans  have  profited  by  the  change,  but 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    111 

have  obstinately  resisted  the  new  system;  so  that 
since  1901,  the  Moorish  Exchequer  has  had  no 
regular  revenues  to  draw  on  except  the  Customs. 
Similarly,  it  is  the  Sultan's  blunders  which  have 
encouraged  successive  revolts,  first  that  of  the  Roghi 
Bou-Hamara,  then  the  one,  at  present  victorious,  of 
Muley  Hafid/ 

And  yet  Morocco  is  a  rich  country.  ^^Well 
watered  by  the  rains  which  are  attracted  by  its  high 
mountains  from  the  ocean,  irrigated  in  its  driest 
parts  by  the  waters  of  the  ouadi  which  flow  down 
from  the  summits  of  Atlas,  both  its  climate  and  its 
situation  make  it  a  country  more  favoured  by  nature 
than  either  Algeria  or  Tunis.  To  the  east,  the  basin 
of  the  Moulouya  is  barely  more  than  a  continuation 
of  the  Oranie.  At  the  foot  of  the  mountains,  the 
oases  of  the  Tafilat  and  the  Oued  Draa  share  in 
the  geographic  conditions  of  the  Sahara  and  re- 
semble our  finest  oases  of  Southern  Algeria.  But 
to  the  west,  along  the  ocean,  from  Tangier  to  Atlas, 
a  long  strip  of  land  stretches,  between  fifty  and  a 
hundred  kilometres  in  breadth,  composed  of  black 
soil  which,  if  ploughed  by  European  settlers,  and 
if  peace  with  an  equitable  system  of  taxation  were 
assured  by  a  regular  government,  might  become  a 
rich  cereal-growing  country.  Between  this  coast- 
zone  and  the  mountains,  extend  grassy  steppes 
capable  of  supporting  herds  of  cattle  and  horses, 
and  also  of  being  here  and  there  transformed  by 
irrigation.  On  the  mountain  plateaus,  in  the  raised 
^  See  Eugene  Aubin's  book,  The  Morocco  of  To-day. 


112 


FRANCE   AND   THE  ALLIANCES 


valleys,  where  rain  is  abundant,  the  olive,  vine,  and 
other  fruit  trees  of  the  Mediterranean  grow  almost 
without  any  cultivation.  More  towards  the  south, 
between  the  two  terminal  branches  of  Atlas,  the 
Sous  Valley  displays  its  orchards  and  its  fields. 
If  to  this  be  added  that  a  geological  survey  of  the 
Maghreb  region  and  various  traces  found  by  travellers 
encourage  the  belief  that  coal  and  different  metals 
are  hidden  beneath  the  surface  of  the  soil,  .  .  .  one 
has  less  surprise  in  remembering  that,  according  to 
Diodorus,  the  Phoenicians  once  established  on  the 
African  coast,  beyond  the  pillars  of  Hercules,  three 
hundred  factories  from  which  they  derived  wealth 
of  all  kinds.'' 

It  was  only  natural  that  France,  being  supreme 
in  Algeria,  should  bethink  herself  of  the  future 
possibilities  she  saw  offered  to  her  in  Morocco. 
Between  Algeria  and  the  Moorish  Empire,  there 
really  exists  no  natural  boundary.  The  Berber 
countries  form  one  whole.  Mountains  and  valleys 
cross  the  frontier;  and  the  races  are  also  similar, 
while  religious  and  family  organization  is  identical 
throughout.  Moreover,  the  economic  consequences 
of  this  situation  have  been  felt  ever  since  a  remote 
past,  as  the  following  tables  will  show :  — 


1.  PERCENTAGE  OF  FOREIGN  TRADE  WITH  MOROCCO 

1902    1903    1904    1905       1906     1907 


France  and  Algeria 
England  .... 
Germany  .... 
Spain 


31.1 
41.6 
9.01 

8.4 


37.7 

41.1 

9.6 

7.2 


30. 

40.1 

11.1 

7.7 


46.3 
29.5 
9.9 
4.02 


50.42 

28.78 

8.41 

4.:6 


43.34 
33.05 

12.98 
4.10 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS     113 


2.  MOROCCAN  COMMERCE  WITH  OTHER  POWERS. 
(in  millions  of  francs) 

1902        1903       1904      1905      1906     1907 


Aggregate  trade 
France     and 

Algeria  .  . 
England  .  . 
Germany  .  . 
Spain       .     .     . 


103,347 

32,900 

43,011 

9,317 

8,723 


109,493 

34,813 

45,036 

10,522 

7,903 


97,689 

29,413 

39,266 

10,900 

7,602 


78,642 

36,467 

23,240 

7,832 

3,163 


84,526 

42,613 

24,332 

7,114 

3,861 


76,928 

34,883 

25,428 

9,983 

3,116 


In  the  commercial  relations  of  France  and  Morocco, 
there  are  two  characteristic  reciprocal  needs.  France 
in  Africa  requires  Moroccan  labour;  and  Morocco 
requires  French  merchandise.  Our  trade  with  the 
Moorish  Empire  consists  more  and  more  in  sending 
our  products  there.  To  a  greater  extent,  therefore, 
than  any  other  Power,  France  must  desire  to  see 
order  established  over  its  length  and  breadth.  She 
must  desire  this  also  on  behalf  of  her  citizens  who 
are  settled  in  the  country.  The  number  of  French 
firms  that  have  established  themselves  in  Morocco 
is  not  far  short  of  three  hundred.  The  capital  in- 
vested in  trade  there,  exclusive  of  navigation  com- 
panies, is  about  thirty  million  francs.  For  the  most 
part,  the  French  tradespeople  residing  in  the  Em- 
pire are  modest  workers,  small  folk  who  have  emi- 
grated to  get  a  living,  —  market-gardeners,  bakers, 
restaurant-keepers,  grocers,  bricklayers,  mechanics, 
—  who,  by  dint  of  toiling  hard,  earn  on  the  Moroccan 
soil  enough  to  furnish  themselves  with  subsistence. 
The  duty  of  the  French  Government  as  regards 
their  protection  cannot  therefore  be  disputed. 


114  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Moreover^  political  interest,  still  more  imperious 
than  economic  interest,  compels  France  to  occupy 
herself  with  Moroccan  affairs.  Enough  has  already 
been  said  to  show  how  radical  the  anarchy  is  which 
prevails  throughout  the  land.  On  account  of 
Morocco's  proximity  to  Algeria,  and  the  geographic, 
ethnographic,  and  religious  unity  of  the  two  coun- 
tries, such  anarchy  is  a  constant  menace  to  our 
colony's  tranquillity.  All  the  various  Algerian 
agitators,  Abd  el  Kader,  Ulad  Sidi  Cheikh,  Bou 
Amama,  have  used  Morocco  as  an  operating  base 
against  us.  Order  in  Morocco  is  consequently 
necessary  for  order  to  reign  in  Algeria.  A  fortiori, 
we  ought  to  have  the  assurance  that  this  already 
redoubtable  spontaneous  anarchy  shall  not  be 
aggravated  by  European  instigation,  using  it  and 
keeping  it  up  against  us. 

Thus  is  determined  the  necessary  policy  which  is 
imposed  on  the  French  Government.  They  desire 
that  order  shall  reign  in  Morocco.  They  desire 
further  that  no  European  Power  shall  acquire  there 
a  preponderant  influence  which  might  threaten  to 
compromise  our  situation  in  Africa,  and  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and,  as  a  consequence,  our  situation 
in  Europe.  The  defence  of  this  double  interest  — 
with  the  maintenance  of  order  as  its  positive  portion 
and  the  exclusion  of  foreign  influence  as  its  negative 
one  —  such,  with  regard  to  Morocco,  must  be  the 
rule  of  French  action. 

During  many  years,  our  action  in  the  country 
was    uncertain    in   its    aim    and    fluctuating   in   its 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS      115 

methods.  On  the  morrow  of  the  conquest  of  Al- 
giers, the  battle  of  Isly,  the  bombardment  of  Tan- 
gier and  of  Mogador,  demonstrated  our  military 
power  to  the  Moroccans.  But  this  work  of  repres- 
sion was  not  politically  utilized.  The  Treaty  of 
Lalla-Marnia  of  1845,  indeed,  revealed  the  Govern- 
ment's hesitations  by  the  lack  of  precision  in  its 
clauses.  In  proportion  as  Oran  was  more  thickly 
colonized,  the  inconveniences  resulting  were  in- 
creasingly felt.  Continual  aggressions,  which  caused 
long  controversies,  troubled  the  security  of  our 
dependent  population.  And  the  claims  that  our 
Ministers  in  Tangier  were  each  year  called  upon  to 
defend,  produced  no  other  effect  than  that  of  giving 
the  Moorish  Power,  though  without  the  least  prac- 
tical efficacy  on  our  frontiers,  an  artificial  existence. 
By  virtue  of  our  ''right  of  pursuit, '^  inscribed  in  the 
Treaty  of  1845,  and  in  agreement  with  the  Maghzen, 
France  sent  several  punitive  expeditions  into  Moroc- 
can territory,  that  of  General  de  Wimpffen  in  1870, 
those  of  1881  and  1882,  owing  to  the  revolt  of  Bou 
Amama.  For  nearly  half  a  century,  however,  she 
confined  herself  to  isolated  measures  without  seeking 
to  reach  the  evil  in  its  source  and  to  prepare  a  last- 
ing remedy.  Not  until  1900,  and  then  only  after 
successive  rebounds  and  under  the  pressure  of 
circumstances,  did  the  French  Government,  by 
deciding  to  occupy  the  Touat  region,  take  the  pre- 
cautionary measures  requisite  for  the  defence  of  our 
southern  frontier.  A  year  later,  Mr.  Revoil,  the 
Governor-General  of  Algeria,  being  convinced  that 


116  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

this  occupation  would  be  without  lasting  effect,  if 
conquest  were  not  followed  by  organization,  entered 
into  negotiations  with  the  Moroccan  Government 
which  resulted  in  the  Treaty  of  the  20th  of  July, 
1901,  this  latter  becoming  thenceforward  the  basis 
of  our  policy. 

The  agreement  —  which,  as  indicated  in  the  word- 
ing of  its  preamble,  was  intended  to  ^^consolidate 
the  bonds  of  friendship  existing  between  the  two 
Governments  and  to  develop  their  reciprocal  good 
relations  by  establishing  them,  on  the  one  hand,  on 
the  guarantee  of  the  Moorish  Empire's  integrity,  and, 
on  the  other,  on  the  improvement  of  the  frontier 
situation,  in  which  both  were  immediately  interested, 
by  all  such  detailed  arrangements  as  the  said  frontier 
situation  might  necessitate '^  —  instituted  a  veritable 
cooperation  between  the  two  neighbouring  Govern- 
ments. Without  seeking  to  fix  an  absolutely  im- 
movable boundary  line  amidst  limitless  sands  and 
wandering  tribes,  an  exchange  of  good  offices  was 
provided  for,  both  as  regards  police,  and  the  regula- 
tion of  trade  and  Customs.  A  Franco-Moroccan 
Commission  proceeded  to  the  place;  and,  in  order 
to  facilitate  its  labours,  a  second  agreement  was 
signed  at  Algiers  on  the  20th  of  April,  1902,  ^^with  a 
view  to  securing  permanent  peace,  safety,  and 
commercial  progress.''  The  first  article  said:  ^^The 
Moorish  Government  engage,  by  all  possible  means, 
throughout  the  extent  of  their  territory  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Oued  Kiss  to  Figuig,  to  consolidate  the 
authority  of  their  Maghzen  such  as  it  has  been  exer- 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS      117 

cised  over  the  Moroccan  tribes  since  the  Treaty  of 
1815.  The  French  Government,  by  reason  of  their 
frontier  situation,  will  lend  their  aid  to  this  task 
in  any  and  every  case  of  need.  The  French  Govern- 
ment will  establish  their  authority  and  a  condition 
of  peace  throughout  the  Sahara  regions,  and  the 
neighbouring  Moroccan  Government  will  help  in  this 
by  every  means  in  their  power. '^  It  was  further 
stipulated  that  a  triple  line  of  markets,  —  French, 
mixed,  and  Moroccan,  —  with  a  corresponding  col- 
lection of  dues,  should  be  created  between  Morocco 
and  Algeria.  The  French  Government  pledged 
themselves  to  pay  the  Maghzen  each  year  a  sum 
equivalent  to  the  Customs  duties  accruing  from  the 
merchandise  entering  Algeria  from  Morocco  between 
Figuig  and  the  Teniet  es  Sassi.  A  supplementary 
agreement,  dated  the  7th  of  May,  1902,  rendered 
more  precise  certain  of  the  clauses  in  the  previous 
arrangement.  And  the  policy,  as  thus  defined, 
was  fortliAvith  put  into  execution. 

In  carrying  out  this  work,  France  gave  proofs  of 
her  generosity  and  friendliness,  placing  instructors 
at  the  Sultan's  disposal  for  his  troops  at  Figuig, 
Oudjda,  and  x\djeroud  (July,  1902),  enabling  him  to 
negotiate  a  loan  (October,  1902),  not  holding  him 
responsible  for  the  sanguinary  outbreaks  at  Taghit 
(August,  1903),  and  at  El  Moungar  (September, 
1903),  nor  yet  for  the  attack  made  at  Zenaga  by  the 
people  of  Figuig  against  Mr.  Jonnart,  the  Governor- 
General  of  Algeria  (June,  1903).  In  spite  of  certain 
fluctuations    due    to    Algerian    influences     and    to 


118  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

General  O'Connor^s  imprudent  language,  the  coopera- 
tion continued.  As  Mr.  Delcasse  wrote:  ^'The  an- 
archy with  which  the  Moorish  Empire  had  to  con- 
tend did  not  allow  us  to  visit  upon  its  monarch  the 
responsibility  for  acts  from  which  we  had  to  suf- 
fer.'' We  therefore  permitted  free  entry,  into  the 
Algerian  territory,  of  the  money,  weapons,  ammuni- 
tion, and  even  troops  which  the  Maghzen  needed  in 
order  to  cope  with  the  Roghi  (June,  1903).  We 
further  placed  at  his  service  a  member  of  our  mili- 
tary mission.  Captain  Larras,  for  the  organizing  of 
the  expedition  against  Oudjda  (July,  1903).  We 
gave  him  two  pieces  of  artillery  with  their  material 
and  men  (August,  1903).  Captain  Martin,  another 
French  officer,  was  commissioned  to  instruct  the  Mo- 
roccan troops  on  the  frontier  (September,  1903). 
The  Algerian  Lieutenant  Ben  Sedira,  with  his  cannon 
^^ carrying  dread  everywhere,''  assured  the  success  of 
the  mahalla  directed  against  Taza  (October-Novem- 
ber, 1903).  Thus,  the  Maghzen  was  able  to  appre- 
ciate at  the  same  time  the  necessity  and  efficacy  of 
our  assistance.  And  under  the  excellent  superin- 
tendence of  General  Lyautey,  who,  in  the  autumn  of 
1903,  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  subdi- 
vision of  Ain-Sefra,  there  was  a  commencement  of 
peace  on  the  frontier,  which  a  few  months  before  had 
been  in  such  a  serious  state  of  disturbance.^ 

Although  this  pacification  was  important,  it  was 
not,  however,  adequate,  considering  the  double  inter- 
est that  inspired  our  Moroccan  policy.     It  was  not 
1  See  the  Yellow  Book  (1901-1905). 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS      119 

only  on  our  borders  but  through  the  whole  of  the 
Moorish  territory  that^  both  commercially  and  politi- 
cally, we  needed  the  restoration  of  order.  Our  pol- 
icy of  reform  and  cooperation  was  intended  to  be 
applied  over  the  entire  length  and  breadth  of  the 
Empire.  In  order  to  prevent  the  establishment  of 
any  influence  hostile  to  ours,  it  was  necessary  for  us 
to  make  our  action  felt  at  Fez.  On  the  8th  of  April, 
1904,  the  Franco-English  agreement  secured  us  the 
renunciation  of  Great  Britain,  up  to  then  our  most 
redoubtable  adversary.  We  had  been  guaranteed  a 
similar  renunciation  of  Italy  several  years  before. 
Spain's  adhesion  was  to  be  secured  six  months  later. 
By  a  grievous  error,  Mr.  Delcasse  lost  a  great  deal  of 
time  before  he  bethought  himself  of  drawing  the 
necessary  conclusions  from  this  new  situation.  Not 
before  the  16th  of  May  did  Mr.  Saint-Rene  Taillan- 
dier,  our  Minister  at  Tangier,  furnish  Ben  Sliman 
with  explanations  concerning  the  Franco-English 
Treaty;  and,  only  in  January,  1905,  when  nine 
months  had  been  lost,  did  he  go  to  see  the  Sultan  at 
Fez.  However,  in  spite  of  this  grave  mistake,  some 
useful  measures  were  taken.  On  the  27th  of  May, 
1904,  Captain  Fournier,  a  Frenchman,  was  intrusted 
by  the  Sultan  with  the  organization  of  the  police  at 
Tangier.  On  the  12th  of  June,  an  association  of 
French  Banks  granted  the  Sultan  a  loan  of  sixty-two 
and  a  half  millions,  guaranteed  by  the  Customs 
duties,  the  lenders  having  the  option  of  checking 
the  receipts  in  the  eight  ports  open  to  commerce, 
and  furthermore  a  previous  deduction  and  prefer- 


120  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

ence  rights  on  future  loans.  The  creation  of  a  State 
Bank  through  our  agency  was  also  planned.  In 
May,  1904,  at  the  Maghzen's  request,  we  lent  our 
diplomatic  assistance  for  the  purpose  of  delivering, 
from  the  hands  of  the  brigand  Raisuli,  Mr.  Perdic- 
caris,  an  American,  and  Mr.  Varley,  an  Englishman, 
who  had  been  captured  and  detained  by  him.  Not- 
withstanding the  reservations  formulated  by  Ben 
Sliman  as  to  the  Franco-English  agreement,  espe- 
cially respecting  its  '^difficult  points,"  and  those  of 
its  terms  that  ''might  offer  ambiguities  and  lead  to 
something  contrary  to  what  was  aimed  at"  we  were, 
therefore,  justified  in  believing  that  the  programme 
of  reforms  elaborated  —  too  slowly  —  by  the  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Tangier  Legation, 
would  be  considered  at  Fez  as  the  logical  develop- 
ment of  the  amicable  policy  which  Ben  Sliman  him- 
self, in  July,  1904,  had  defined  when  saying:  ''His 
Majesty  knows  that  the  most  powerful  motive  of 
yoiir  insistence  is  the  community  of  interests  pos- 
sessed by  the  Governments  of  the  two  neighbouring 
countries  and  also  the  community  of  harm  that  they 
are  exposed  to  suffer." 

There  was  nothing  extraordinary  about  the  pro- 
gramme of  reforms.  It  was  based  on  three  guiding 
principles:  Morocco^s  integrity,  the  Sultan's  sov- 
ereignty, commercial  liberty.  It  continued  the 
work  that  had  been  begun,  —  police,  trade,  civili- 
zation. There  was  no  design  of  conquest,  or  of  pro- 
tectorate, or  of  monopoly.  Conquest  would  have 
cost  too  dear.     A  protectorate  would  have  served  no 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS      121 

purpose  in  face  of  the  exclusiveness  of  the  tribes. 
Monopolization  would  have  been  contrary  to  inter- 
national treaties.  To  create  police  forces  with  Mo- 
roccan natives  and  Algerian  instructors  in  all  the 
principal  towns ;  to  restore  finances  by  means  of  a 
more  honest  collection  of  taxes,  a  genuine  checking 
of  expenses,  and  the  repression  of  smuggling ;  to  in- 
crease the  carrying  trade  by  public  works  wisely 
planned  and  the  construction  of  ports,  bridges,  and 
roads  —  all  this  by  contract  law ;  to  multiply  hospi- 
tals, schools,  educational  and  charitable  institutions, 
—  such  was  the  tenor  of  the  programme,  which,  if 
realized  with  the  unique  means  of  action  conferred 
on  us  by  Algeria,  and  with  the  clear-sighted  sym- 
pathy of  Europe,  herself  destined  to  benefit  by  it, 
would,  within  a  short  time,  have  been  able  to  change 
the  face  of  the  Moorish  Empire.  As  Mr.  Delcasse 
wrote:  ^'Far  from  diminishing  the  Sultanas  author- 
ity, we  were  peculiarly  anxious  to  enhance  his  pres- 
tige.'' And  with  reason,  the  Foreign  Minister  added : 
^^It  will  be  in  his  name  that  the  agents  we  may  have 
to  place  at  his  disposal  will  exercise  their  functions, 
carefully  applying  themselves,  in  accordance  with 
our  wishes,  to  ingratiate  themselves  with  the  popu- 
lation, not  to  offend  their  feelings,  but  to  respect 
their  beliefs,  their  customs,  and  their  organization. 
In  return,  we  expect  the  Makhzen,  while  appreciat- 
ing our  efforts,  to  do  his  best  sincerely  to  second 
them.  And,  thus,  an  era  of  peace  and  prosperity 
will  soon  dawn  upon  Morocco.'' 

A  few  weeks  later,  all  this  appearance  of  promise 


122  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

had  vanished.  At  the  instigation  of  Germany,  the 
Maghzen  and  the  Sultan  separated  themselves 
bruskly  from  the  policy  of  cooperation.  The  Mo- 
roccan problem  passed  from  the  African  into  the 
European  domain.  The  solution,  which  had  been 
rendered  possible  through  the  development  of  our 
alliances  and  friendships,  was  handed  over  to  a 
diplomatic  melee  —  a  veritable  conflict  of  alliances, 
the  consequences  of  which  were  to  weigh  heavily  on 
the  world,  while  the  causes  leading  up  to  them  must 
be  sought  in  the  history  of  the  past  twenty  years. 


tj 


CHAPTER  IV 

FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE 

I.  Formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  —  Crisis  of  1875  and  the 
Russian  intervention.  —  Bismarck  and  the  ^'coalition  night- 
mare." —  Congress  of  Berlin.  —  Austro-German  Alliance. 

—  Italy's  accession.  —  Isolation  of  France. 

II.   Hegemony  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  —  Kalnoky  and  Crispi. 

—  Bismarck  and  Russia.  —  Triple  "counter-assurance"  of 
Skiernevice.  —  Double  "counter-assurance"  of  1887. — 
Bismarck  and  England.  —  Bismarck  and  French  colonial 
policy.  —  Bismarck's  threats.  —  Military  laws.  —  Speeches 
of  the  8th  of  January,  1888,  and  the  consequences. 

III.  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  —  Ger- 
man anxiety.  —  German  attempt  to  capture  the  Dual  Alli- 
ance. —  Advances  of  William  II.  —  Pohcy  of  William  II.  — 
Cooperation  of  the  two  systems.  —  Favourable  situation  of 
Germany.  —  Mr.  von  Buelow's  mistake. 

IV.  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Western  understandings.  —  Ap- 
prehensions of  William  II.  —  Economic  crisis  in  Germany. 

—  Germany  and  Italy.  —  Italy  and  Austria.  —  Speeches 
of  William  II.  —  Policy  of  reserve.  —  Russian  defeats.  — 
Conflict  of  the  Alliances. 

I 

France  has  not  developed  her  alliances  and  friend- 
ships with  nothing  in  the  way  of  opposition  to  face 
her.  When  our  diplomacy  began  to  incline  towards 
Russia,  about  the  year  1889,  the  Triple  Alliance,  initi- 
ated in  1879  by  the  bond  between  Austria  and 
Germany,  and  completed  by  Italy's  joining  the  com- 
bination, in  1882,  dominated  Europe  without  any- 

123 


124  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

thing  to  counterbalance  it.  Fifteen  years  later,  this 
same  Triple  Alliance  subsisted  over  against  the  har- 
monious edifice  of  agreements,  the  completion  of 
which  once  more  enabled  us  to  make  our  diplomacy 
actively  felt.  A  study,  therefore,  of  the  relations 
between  France  and  the  Triple  Alliance  is  necessary 
for  the  right  comprehension  of  our  conduct  and  our 
interests. 

On  the  10th  of  May,  1875,  the  Czar,  Alexander  II, 
arrived  in  Berlin.  For  several  weeks,  Europe  had 
been  living  in  the  dread  of  a  crisis.  A  sensational 
article  published  by  Mr.  de  Blowitz  in  the  Times  on 
the  6th  of  the  same  month,  and  giving  a  summary 
of  what  had  recently  appeared  in  the  German  press, 
predicted  that  a  war  was  on  the  point  of  breaking 
out.  What  the  German  writers  said  was  in  sub- 
stance this:  ^^To  finish  once  for  all  with  France  is 
not  merely  opportune.  It  is  a  duty  Germany  owes 
to  herself  and  to  humanity.  Europe  will  never  be 
tranquil  as  long  as  a  struggle  is  possible ;  and  there 
will  be  this  possibility  of  a  struggle  as  long  as  the 
blunder  made  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  remains 
unrepaired.  For  it  leaves  France  in  a  position  to 
survive  and  recommence  the  duel.  Germany  is 
troubled  by  the  consciousness  of  having  only  half- 
crushed  her  enemy  and  of  being  able  to  defend 
herself  only  by  sleeping  with  one  eye  open."  This 
accurate  and  striking  recapitulation  of  articles  that 
could  be  read  every  day  in  the  Trans- Rhenish  press, 
aroused,  according  to  Lord  Derby's  expression,  ^^uni- 
versal  indignation.''     Sympathy   for   France,    van- 


FRANCE  AND   THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        125 

quished  but  dignified  in  her  defeat;  and,  what  was 
more,  the  fear  of  a  definitive  rupture  of  the  balance 
of  power  in  Europe,  facilitated  the  task  of  the  Due 
de  Decazes,  who  was  resolved  on  ^^ exciting'^  the 
Powers. 

To  General  Le  Flo,  the  French  Ambassador,  the 
Czar  had  made  a  promise  that  he  would  intervene; 
and  between  the  Czar  and  the  British  Government 
there  was  an  entire  agreement  on  the  subject.  In 
vain  Bismarck  had  the  following  statement  inserted 
in  the  North  German  Gazette:  ^^The  language  of  the 
European  press  is  all  the  more  unintelligible,  as  ab- 
solutely nothing  has  occurred  which  is  of  a  nature 
to  trouble  the  relations  existing  between  the  French 
and  the  German  Government.'^  In  vain,  he  de- 
nounced the  ^^hypocritical  league  composed  of  ultra- 
montane-revenge politicians  and  Exchange  bears.'' 
No  one  believed  him.  On  the  12th  of  May,  Alex- 
ander II  said  to  Viscount  de  Gontaut-Biron,  the 
French  Ambassador,  in  an  interview  he  had  with 
him  while  at  Berlin:  ^^ Peace  is  necessary  to  the 
world.  We  each  have  enough  to  do  at  home.  Rely 
on  me,  and  make  yourself  easy.  Tell  Marshal  Mac- 
Mahon  how  much  I  esteem  him  and  how  sincerely  I 
wish  that  his  Government  may  be  strengthened. 
I  hope  that  our  relations  will  become  more  and 
more  cordial.  We  have  interests  in  common.  We 
must  remain  friends."  On  the  14th  of  May,  Gort- 
chakoff  addressed  a  telegraphic  circular  to  the  vari- 
ous Russian  Ambassadors,  announcing  that  ^Hhe 
maintenance  of  peace  was  assured."     Bismarck,  in 


126  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

his  anger,  overwhelmed  the  Russian  Chancellor  with 
his  sarcasms:  ^^Why  not/^  said  he,  '^coin  five-franc 
pieces  with  this  motto:  ^Gortchakoff  protect 
France/  Or  else,  why  not  organize  at  the  German 
Embassy  in  Paris  a  theatre  where,  with  the  same 
device,  he  might  appear  before  French  society  in 
the  role  of  a  guardian  angel,  in  a  white  robe,  with 
wings,  amidst  a  display  of  Greek  fire."  Whatever 
may  have  been  his  real  intentions,  Bismarck  was 
none  the  less  caught  in  his  own  trap.  Russia  and 
England  spoiled  his  game.  If  he  did  not  desire  war, 
he  had  allowed  or  caused  the  contrary  to  be  believed. 
In  either  case,  the  issue  was  the  same :  a  discomfi- 
ture. ^^  Whether  it  had  been  his  wish  or  not  to  en- 
lighten himself  as  to  the  sentiment  of  the  Powers, 
he  knew  now  what  he  had  to  expect.  The  Franco- 
Russian  rapprochement  had  appeared  as  a  combina- 
tion eventually  realizable,  in  the  course  of  this  press 
campaign  so  brutally  entered  upon,  so  ingeniously 
magnified,  and  so  happily  closed."  ^ 

Thence  was  born  the  Triple  Alliance.  From  the 
moment  of  this  alarm,  which  he  himself  had  been 
responsible  for,  Bismarck  was  obsessed,  as  Count 
Schouvaloff  put  it,  with  the  ^^ coalition  nightmare." 
He  saw  only  one  way  of  warding  off  the  fancied  dan- 
ger; namely,  to  take  the  initiative,  and  on  the  Ger- 
man victories  establish  a  league  so  strong  and  so 
wide-reaching  that  France  would  be  for  a  long  time 
condemned  to  isolation.  The  Alliance  of  the  Three 
Emperors  proposed  in  1872,  which  indeed  was  to 
*  Hanotaux'  History  of  Contemporary  France,  Volume  III. 


FRANCE  AND   THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        127 

have  been  rather  an  understanding  than  an  alliance, 
appeared  to  be  impracticable  on  account  of  Eastern 
difficulties.  At  Germany's  instigation,  Austria  was 
nourishing  hopes  of  revenge  in  the  East.  Russia 
lived  only  for  her  policy  in  the  Balkans.  Between 
Vienna  and  Saint  Petersburg  there  was  bound  to  be 
conflict.  A  choice  had  to  be  made.  Bismarck  did 
not  hesitate ;  and,  in  spite  of  the  Emperor  William, 
he  chose  the  good-will  of  Vienna.  Already,  in  1878, 
he  had  refused  to  give  any  pledges  to  the  Czar 
against  the  hypothesis  of  an  Austro-Russian  war.^ 
His  pretension  to  play  the  role  of  the  ^^  honest  inter- 
mediary" expressed  nothing  more  than  his  deter- 
mination to  remain  neutral.  At  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  his  attitude  was  explicable  only  by  the  choice 
he  had  made  of  Vienna  in  preference  to  Russia 
through  his  hatred  of  Gortchakoff.  Three  months 
later,  the  Russian  Chancellor  quitted  Germany,  say- 
ing that  the  Congress  had  been  ^^the  darkest  episode 
in  his  career.''  Alexander  II  declared  that  ^^ Bis- 
marck had  forgotten  his  promises  in  1870."  The 
Russian  newspapers  raged  against  the  German  pol- 
icy. Troops  were  massed  on  the  frontier  of  Poland. 
Uneasy  at  the  Russian  movements  in  the  East, 
Francis-Joseph  asked  for  protection.  On  the  7th 
of  October,  1879,  the  Austro-German  Treaty  was 
signed,  in  spite  of  the  Emperor  William's  reluctance. 
Austria's  abrogation  of  Article  5  in  the  Treaty  of 
Prague,  and  Bismarck's  assurances  of  political  help 
to  Count  Andrassy,  with  regard  to  the  occupation  of 

*  See  Bismarck's  Thoughts  and  Souvenirs,  Volume  II. 


128  FRANCE  AND   THE   ALLIANCES 

Novi-Bazar,  were  the  first  indications  of  the  rajp- 
prochement.  Within  less  than  a  year,  an  alliance 
was  substituted  for  it.  The  Treaty,  which  was  pub- 
lished by  the  two  signataries  in  1888,  was  drawn  up 
as  follows :  — 

Considering  that  their  Majesties,  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and 
King  of  Hungary  and  the  Emperor  of  Germany  and  King  of 
Prussia  must  esteem  it  to  be  their  unavoidable  duty  as  sover- 
eigns to  watch  under  all  circumstances  over  the  safety  of  their 
Empires  and  the  tranquillity  of  their  peoples ; 

Considering  that  the  two  Monarchs  will  be  able,  by  a  solid 
alliance  of  the  two  Empires,  in  the  kind  of  that  which  previously 
existed,  more  easily  to  accomplish  this  duty,  as  also  more  effica- 
ciously ; 

Considering,  in  fine,  that  an  intimate  agreement  between 
Austro-Hungary  and  Germany  can  threaten  no  one,  but  is 
rather  calculated  to  consolidate  European  peace  as  created  by 
the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin ; 

Their  Majesties,  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  King  of  Hun- 
gary and  the  Emperor  of  Germany  and  King  of  Prussia,  prom- 
ising each  other  solemnly  never  to  give  any  aggressive  tendency 
whatsoever  to  their  purely  defensive  agreement,  have  resolved 
to  conclude  a  reciprocal  alliance  of  peace  and  protection ; 

In  this  aim,  their  Majesties  have  appointed  as  their  plenipo- 
tentiaries : 

For  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  King  of  Hun- 
gary, his  real  Privy  Councillor,  the  Minister  of  the  Imperial 
House,  as  also  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Lieutenant  Julius,  Count 
Andrassy,  etc. ; 

For  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Germany,  his  Ambassador 
and  plenipotentiary  extraordinary,  Lieutenant-General  Prince 
Henry  VII  of  Reuss,  etc. ; 

Who  have  both  entered  into  relations  with  each  other  to-day 
in  Vienna,  and,  after  showing  each  other  their  powers  duly 
recognized  as  good  and  sufficient,  have  settled  what  follows  :  — 

Article  I.  —  If,  contrarily  to  what  may  be  hoped  and  con- 
trarily  to  the  sincere  wishes  of  the  two  high  contracting  parties, 
one  of  the  two  Empires  were  to  be  attacked  by  Russia,  the  two 


FRANCE   AXD   THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        129 

high  contracting  parties  are  bound  to  lend  each  other  reciprocal 
aid  with  the  whole  of  their  imperial  military  power,  and,  sub- 
sequently, to  conclude  no  peace  except  conjointly  and  in  agree- 
ment. 

Article  II.  —  If  one  of  the  two  high  contracting  parties 
were  to  be  attacked  by  another  Power,  the  other  high  contract- 
ing party  binds  itself,  by  the  present  act,  not  only  not  to  up- 
hold the  aggressor  against  its  high  Ally,  but  at  the  least,  to 
observe  a  benevolent  neutrality  with  regard  to  the  contracting 
party  aforesaid. 

If,  however,  in  the  case  previously  mentioned,  the  Power 
attacking  were  to  be  upheld  by  Russia,  whether  by  way  of  ac- 
tive cooperation  or  by  military  measures  that  should  threaten 
the  Power  attacked,  then  the  obligation  of  reciprocal  assistance 
with  entire  mihtary  forces  —  obligation  stipulated  in  Article 
I  of  this  Treaty  —  would  immediately  become  executory, 
and  the  military  operations  of  the  two  high  contracting  parties 
would  also,  in  such  circumstances,  be  conducted  jointly  until 
the  conclusion  of  peace. 

Article  III.  —  This  Treaty,  in  conformity  with  its  pacific 
character  and  to  avoid  all  false  interpretation,  will  be  held 
secret  by  all  the  high  contracting  parties. 

It  may  only  be  communicated  to  a  Third  Power  with  the 
knowledge  of  the  two  parties  and  after  a  special  agreement  be- 
tween them. 

Considering  the  intentions  expressed  by  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander at  the  Alexandrowo  interview,  the  two  contracting  par- 
ties nourish  the  hope  that  Russia's  preparations  will  not,  in 
reality,  become  threatening  to  them;  for  this  reason,  there  is 
at  present  no  motive  for  communication. 

But,  if,  against  all  expectation,  this  hope  should  be  ren- 
dered vain,  the  two  contracting  parties  would  recognize  that  it 
was  a  duty  of  loyalty  to  inform  the  Emperor  Alexander,  at  least 
confidentially,  that  they  must  deem  any  attack  directed  against 
one  of  them  as  being  directed  against  both. 

To  testify  which,  the  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  this 
Treaty  with  their  own  hand  and  have  affixed  their  seals  thereto. 

Made  at  Vienna,  on  the  7th  of  October,  1879. 
Signed :  Andrassy. 

Prince  Henry  VII  of  Reuss. 


130  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

This  defensive  Alliance  was  especially  aimed  at 
Russia^  and,  subsidiarily,  against  France.  Mili- 
tarily, it  constituted  a  guarantee  against  one  or  the 
other  of  these  two  Powers.  Politically,  it  consoli- 
dated the  triumph  of  1871.  But  in  order  to  hold 
Europe  in  check  and  to  impose  on  her,  in  peace, 
the  German  supremacy,  as  also  to  avoid  surprises 
such  as  that  of  1875,  it  was  not  altogether  adequate. 
A  wider  foundation  was  needed  for  the  hegemony 
which  Bismarck  claimed  to  exercise  from  Berlin 
over  the  rest  of  the  world.  With  a  view  to  supply 
this  breadth  of  base,  an  invitation  was  given  to  Italy 
in  1882.  Mention  has  already  been  made  of  the 
grievances  that  irritated  her  against  France.  She 
was  only  too  willing.  Bismarck  had  merely  to 
beckon  to  her.  In  the  autumn  of  1873,  Victor 
Emmanuel  had  paid  a  visit  first  to  Vienna,  then  to 
Berlin;  and,  from  that  date,  journalists  and  other 
political  writers,  such  as  Colonel  Marselli,  had 
preached  the  German  Alliance.  In  1875,  the  Em- 
peror of  Austria  went  to  Venice,  and  the  Emperor 
of  Germany  to  Milan.  And  the  triumphal  reception 
accorded,  at  once  to  William  I  and  to  Marshal  von 
Moltke,  was  rightly  judged  to  foreshadow  a  political 
understanding.  The  Tunis  affair  did  the  rest.  In 
October,  1881,  King  Humbert,  accompanied  by  de 
Depretis  and  Mancini,  made  a  journey  to  Vienna; 
and,  at  the  end  of  December,  his  Ambassadors 
informed  the  Governments  of  Germany  and  Austro- 
Hungary  that  he  was  ready  to  give  his  adhesion 
to  the  defensive   pact   of   1879,  on  the   basis  of  a 


FRANCE  AND   THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        131 

reciprocal  territorial  guarantee.  In  February,  1882, 
negotiations  were  begun  at  Vienna  between 
Count  Kalnoky,  the  Prince  of  Reuss  and  Comte  de 
Robilant.  On  the  20th  of  May,  1882,  the  Triple 
Alliance  w^as  concluded.  Its  text  was  not  published. 
But  the  tenor  may  be  guessed  by  that  of  the 
Austro-German  Treaty,  to  which  Italy  merely 
acceded.  The  pact  w^as  concluded  for  five  years 
and,  failing  a  formal  renewal,  was  to  expire  on  the 
20th  of  May,  1887.  As  every  one  knows,  the  Triple 
Alliance  has  never,  since  then,  ceased  being  in  force. 
Quinquennial  renewals  took  place  in  March,  1887, 
and  June,  1891.  At  the  latter  date,  it  was  stipulated 
that  the  Alliance  should  be  prolonged  for  twelve 
years  with  the  option  of  denunciation  at  the  end  of 
the  first  six  years.  The  three  contracting  parties 
not  having  made  use  of  such  option,  the  third  re- 
newal, for  a  period  of  twelve  or  six  years,  was  signed 
at  Berlin  on  the  28th  of  June,  1902. 

The  conclusion  of  the  Triple  Alliance  corresponded 
to  the  desire  expressed  by  Bismarck  when  he  wrote : 
^'We  had  made  victorious  w^ars  on  two  great  Euro- 
pean Powers.  It  was  essential  that  w^e  should 
remove  one  of  these  two  powerful  adversaries  that 
we  had  vanquished  on  the  battle-field  from  the 
temptation  to  make  alliances  w^ith  others  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  revenge.  We  could  not  address 
ourselves  to  France.  Any  one  acquainted  with  the 
history  and  character  of  the  Gallic  nation  had  no 
difficulty  in  understanding  why."  ^  The  Austrian 
^  Thoughts  and  Souvenirs,  Volume  II. 


132  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Alliance,  which  he  had  always  desired,  gave  him 
satisfaction.  As  for  the  Italians,  of  whom  he  said  in 
1880,  ''The  Italians  are  like  those  crows  that  feed 
on  carrion  and  hover  around  battle-fields  until 
something  is  left  for  them  to  eat,''  ^  he  accepted 
them  with  a  touch  of  disdain,  as  a  sort  of  political 
instrument,  and  still  more  as  affording  by  their 
connection  with  Austria  and  Germany  an  additional 
guarantee  for  Austria.  Germany  thus  found  her- 
self at  the  head  of  a  coalition  disposing  of  more  than 
two  million  men  on  a  war  footing,  and  barring 
Central  Europe  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Medi- 
terranean with  a  line  of  alliances  of  which  she  was 
the  guiding  hand.  She  was  the  dictator  of  peace  — 
a  peace  which  she  both  imposed  and  guaranteed. 
''The  force  of  Germany  was  protected  by  a  belt  of 
two  bulwarks :  against  France,  there  was  the  Italian 
alliance ;  against  Russia,  that  with  Austria.  Within 
this  double  dyke,  where  she  was  invulnerable,  she 
remained  free  for  making  an  attack.  Defensive  in 
its  appearance,  this  grouping  of  forces  allowed 
Germany  to  act  on  the  world  at  will.  This  it  is 
which,  since  that  time,  has  been  called  the  German 
hegemony."  ^ 

In  face  of  such  a  combination,  France,  by  herself, 
was  paralyzed.  True,  the  Republic  had  not  per- 
mitted her  to  sink  "gradually  or  by  sudden  drops"  ^ 
to  the  degree  Bismarck  hoped.     Her  army  was  in 

*  Maurice  Busch's  Memoirs,  Volume  II. 

2  Charles  Andler's  Prince  Bismarck. 

2  Bismarck's  Thoughts  and  Souvenirs,  Volume  II. 


FRANCE  AND   THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        133 

process  of  reorganization.  In  Jules  Ferry  she  pos- 
sessed a  firm^  clear-sighted  statesman.  She  had 
just  proved  in  Tunis  that  she  was  capable  of  willing 
and  executing.  However^  diplomatically,  she  was, 
none  the  less,  reduced  to  impotence.  Russia  was 
not  ready  for  an  action  in  common.  Great  Britain, 
who  had  been  favourable  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin, 
was  already  veering  round.  She  was  displeased 
with  France  on  account  of  the  latter's  hesitating 
attitude  during  the  negotiations  respecting  the 
frontiers  of  Greece.  She  experienced  both  surprise 
and  irritation  on  discovering  what  advantage  had 
been  taken  in  Tunis  of  Lord  Salisbury's  encouraging 
language.  She  foresaw  also  that  her  own  action 
in  Egypt  would,  for  a  long  time  to  come,  place  her 
in  opposition  to  the  Cabinet  of  Paris.  And,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  from  the  month  of  July,  1883,  Anglo- 
French  relations  assumed  that  character  of  unfriendly 
coolness  which  they  were  destined  to  keep  for  the 
next  twenty  years.  Spain,  as  previously  shown, 
inclined  towards  the  Triple  Alliance.^  And  through 
the  medium  of  Italy,  Bismarck  was  able  to  influence 
London.  Nothing,  therefore,  thwarted  German  pre- 
ponderance. In  order  to  maintain  and  strengthen 
it,  there  was  no  need  to  make  war.  A  state  of  peace 
sufficed.  And  to  secure  such  peace,  not  even  the 
adhesion  of  the  nation  vanquished  in  1871  was 
necessary. 

*See  above,  Chapter  III. 


134  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

II 

For  the  purpose  of  maintaining  this  situation, 
Bismarck  could  unreservedly  rely  on  his  Allies. 
Until  his  fall  in  1890,  he  used  them  at  his  will,  with 
perfect  security.  By  the  very  reason  of  her  hostility 
let  loose  against  France,  Italy  was  a  puppet  in  the 
hands  of  Berlin.  Having  to  procure  forgiveness 
for  his  own  "red''  past,  Crispi  displayed  great  zeal. 
As  soon  as  he  came  into  power,  he  hastened  to 
Friedrichsruhe  in  order  to  receive  his  instructions. 
And  a  military  convention  was  the  outcome  of  this 
journey.  Under  Kalnoky,  Austria  was  no  less 
docile.  The  ^^dog  of  the  Empire, ^^  as  Beust  ^ 
called  him,  was  forever  on  the  road  between  Varzin 
and  Friedrichsruhe.  There  were  interviews  in 
abundance,  in  1884,  in  1885,  in  1886,  in  1888. 
The  Emperor  William,  completely  reconciled  to  the 
Austrian  Alliance,  had  no  need  to  stimulate  Francis 
Joseph's  fidelity  in  their  long  chats  at  Gastein  or 
Ischl.  In  March,  1887,  the  Triplice  was  renewed 
on  the  same  terms  as  those  made  five  years  earlier, 
without  Comte  de  Robilant's  obtaining  anything 
else  through  his  velleities  of  independence  besides 
the  Grand  Cross  of  the  Black  Eagle. 

It  was  less  easy  to  deal  with  Russia.  But  Bis- 
marck was  not  a  man  to  be  discouraged  by  diffi- 
culties. He,  therefore,  played  his  game  —  and 
played  it  with  full  success.  The  grievances  of  1878 
had  deeply  affected  the  Czar,  Alexander  III,  who, 

^  See  Count  von  Beust's  Memoirs. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        135 

moreover,  had  a  dread  of  revolution ;  and  Germany 
seemed  to  him  to  be  the  last  rampart  of  the  Mon- 
archy. Granted,  all  the  ^^Slavists/'  including  Igna- 
tieff  and  Skobeleff,  did  not  pardon  the  Germans,  and 
continued  to  preserve  their  antipathy.  Granted, 
there  were  commercial  and  fiscal  difficulties  with 
Germany,  while  the  two  countries'  systematic 
armaments  aroused  on  either  side  an  amount  of 
distrust  and  ill-humour.  Yet,  for  all  this,  Bis- 
marck's will  enabled  him  to  find  instruments,  and 
he  left  nothing  untried  to  ingratiate  himself  with 
Russia.  No  sooner  was  Prince  Orloff  appointed 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  (February,  1884)  than  all 
the  newspapers  of  the  Chancellor  extolled  this 
^^ token  of  rapprochement.^^  Six  days  afterwards, 
the  Grand  Duke  Michael  arrived  for  the  celebration 
of  the  Emperor  William's  seventieth  birthday,  in 
his  quality  of  Knight  of  Saint  George.  On  the  16th 
of  May  following.  Prince  William  went  to  Saint 
Petersburg  to  take  part  in  the  fetes  given  on  the 
occasion  of  the  coming  of  age  of  the  Czarevitch; 
and,  across  the  frontier,  there  was  a  fraternizing 
of  German  and  Russian  officers  (June,  1884).  In 
July,  at  Russia's  request,  Bismarck  expelled  from 
Berlin  all  persons  residing  in  the  German  capital  who 
were  held  to  be  suspects  by  the  Czar's  Government. 
Last  of  all,  on  the  14th  of  September,  the  Three 
Emperors,  of  Germany,  Russia,  and  Austria,  met  at 
Skiernevice  in  a  solemn  interview.  This  interview 
did  no  more  than  reveal  to  the  world  at  large  an 
agreement  that  had  been  made  six  months  previously. 


136  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  on  the  21st  of  March,  Bismarck, 
at  length  attaining  his  desire,  had  completed  the 
Triple  Alliance  by  the  signing  between  two  of  its 
parties  and  the  Russian  Government  of  a  secret 
understanding  which  stipulated  for  a  benevolent 
neutrality  in  case  one  of  the  two  should  be  attacked 
by  another  Power.  The  negotiations  had  not  been 
altogether  easy.  ^^It  was  not  with  much  enthusi- 
asm that  Austria  entered  into  engagements  with  a 
neighbour  who  was  her  most  dreaded  rival;  and 
Russia,  on  her  side,  manifested  some  distrust  towards 
these  friends  who  had  made  their  own  alliance 
against  herself.'^  ^  After  concluding  the  Triple 
Alliance  against  Russia,  Bismarck  had  accomplished 
the  stroke  of  genius  which  consisted  in  getting  Russia 
to  guarantee  it.  Under  pretext  of  defending  the 
'^monarchic  principle,^'  Germany  strengthened  her 
hold  on  Europe.  The  isolation  of  France  was 
absolute.  An  additional  ring  encircled  those  which 
had  already  been  passed  round  her  in  1879  and  1882. 

It  will  be  understood  without  difficulty  that 
Bismarck  was  anxious  to  preserve  this  masterpiece; 
and,  indeed,  whatever  could  be  done  to  make  it 
secure,  he  did.  In  1885,  he  welcomed  Mr.  de  Giers, 
his  Russian  colleague,  to  Friedrichsruhe.  In  1886, 
he  met  him  at  Franzenbad,  and,  with  a  view  to 
conferring  more  importance  on  the  meeting,  five 
Russian  diplomatists  —  Mr.  de  Staal,  Ambassador 
at  London ;  the  Baron  de  Mohrenheim,  Ambassador 
at  Paris;    Prince  Cantacuzene,  Charge  d'Affaires  at 

*  See  Paul  Matter's  Bismarck  and  his  Times,  Volume  III. 


FRANCE  AND   THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        137 

Vienna;  Mr.  de  Toll,  Minister  at  Copenhagen;  and 
Mr.  de  Struwe,  Minister  at  Washington  — were  all 
present  at  it.  In  November,  1887,  the  Czar, 
Alexander  III,  arrived  at  Berlin.  At  this  moment 
(March  21,  1887)  the  Counter-Assurance  of  the 
Three  Emperors  had  been  for  three  months  without 
force,  it  having  expired,  and  Russia  not  having  been 
willing  to  renew  it  on  account  of  her  fears  over  the 
Eastern  question.  On  the  18th  of  November,  while 
the  Czar  was  staying  at  Berlin,  Bismarck  extorted 
a  fresh  treaty  from  him,  similar  to  the  previous  one, 
except  that,  instead  of  binding  three  Powers,  the 
engagement  was  between  Germany  and  Russia 
only.  It  was  a  repetition  of  Skiernevice,  with  two 
signataries.  The  Counter-Assurance  was  resus- 
citated with  an  equal  value  for  Germany.  Sure  of 
the  future,  Bismarck  was  convinced  that  for  long 
to  come  he  had  averted  the  danger  of  a  Franco- 
Russian  coalition. 

At  the  same  time,  he  contrived,  by  his  supple 
diplomacy,  to  keep  England  in  his  game.  To  tell 
the  truth,  it  was  not  so  hard  as  ^^recapturing" 
Russia.  England  had  quitted  the  Congress  of 
Berlin  in  a  satisfied  frame  of  mind.  Egypt  had 
caused  her  to  fall  out  with  France.  She  was  content 
to  remain  in  her  ^^ splendid  isolation,"  and  was 
without  prejudices  against  Germany.  Not  that 
she  had  been  pleased  to  see  her  acquire  the  Marshall 
Isles  in  1878,  Luderitzland,  New  Guinea,  Togo,  and 
the  Cameroons  in  1884,  and  install  herself  in  Eastern 
Africa  in  1886.     But  she  did  not  yet  believe  in  the 


138  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

German  peril  which,  ten  years  later,  was  to  cause 
her  such  anxiety.  At  certain  times,  there  was 
some  tension  between  London  and  Berlin,  for  in- 
stance, when  Germany  and  France  prevented  Great 
Britain  from  ratifying  the  Treaty  with  Portugal 
which  would  in  advance  have  made  her  supreme  in 
the  Congo  (1884).  Now  and  again,  also,  the  North 
German  Gazette  had  disputes  with  the  Times  (1884). 
But  not  much  attention  was  paid  to  this.  In 
1885,  Bismarck  declared  he  was  confident  of  the 
future.  ^^With  England,^'  he  said,  ^^we  are  on  good 
terms.  That  England,  with  her  persuasion  she 
rules  the  seas,  should  feel  some  surprise  on  suddenly 
seeing  her  cousin  land-rats,  as  she  calls  us,  begin 
to  navigate,  is  not  astonishing.  .  .  .  But  we  have 
old  relations  of  friendship  with  England;  and  the 
two  countries  are  anxious  to  preserve  them." 
(January  10.) 

In  the  month  of  February  following.  Lord  Gran- 
ville protested  against  the  idea  of  any  coolness 
having  arisen  between  Downing  Street  and  Wilhelm- 
strasse.  In  his  turn,  Bismarck  disclaimed  ''having 
ever  blamed  the  English  policy  in  Egypt."  (March 
3.)  On  the  4th,  Count  Herbert  von  Bismarck,  who 
was  privy  to  his  father's  intentions,  paid  a  visit 
of  courtesy  to  London.  And,  on  the  22d,  the  Prince 
of  Wales,  in  person,  went  to  Berlin  to  testify  to  the 
cordiality  of  the  two  countries'  relations.  In  1886, 
three  Anglo-German  colonial  agreements  were  signed 
successively,  the  first  relative  to  the  Pacific  (April 
6),  the    second,  to    the  possessions  in   the  Gulf    of 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        139 

Guinea  (August  2),  the  third,  to  Zanzibar  and 
East  Africa  (November  1).  Moreover,  through 
Italy,  Bismarck  did  not  despair  of  sooner  or  later 
entering  into  closer  relations  with  London.  He 
was  aware  of  his  Ally's  exchanges  of  views  with 
Great  Britain.  He  knew  that  if  the  Italians  had 
gone  to  Massowah,  it  was  with  the  consent  of  the 
English  Cabinet.  And,  in  fine,  he  was  not  ignorant 
that  Austria  also,  in  a  large  measure,  could  rely  on 
British  support.  He  was  quite  confident,  therefore, 
and,  as  he  followed  on  a  map  of  the  world  the 
progress  of  our  expansion  outside  Europe,  he  prom- 
ised himself  the  joy  of  witnessing,  —  suave  man 
magno,  —  ^^the  shock  of  the  English  and  French 
locomotives'' ;  a  fresh  opportunity  for  his  acting  the 
part  of  a  kind  and  ^^ honest"  broker. 

On  the  French  side,  he  found  entire  security  in 
the  prodigious  ardour  which  made  us,  in  all  parts 
of  the  world,  rush  after  colonies,  whatever  they 
might  be.  Jules  Ferry  had  said  in  1882:  ^^France 
must  have  colonial  power.  Every  portion  of  her 
colonial  domain,  even  its  least  fragments,  must  be 
held  sacred  by  us.  .  .  .  It  is  not  the  future  of 
to-morrow  that  is  concerned,  but  that  of  fifty  and 
a  hundred  years  hence,  that  of  the  mother-country 
herself."  This  eloquent  appeal  had  been  heard, 
and  even  listened  to  with  too  great  readiness,  so 
that  the  action  of  France  had  been  scattered,  and 
carried  to  spots  in  which  we  had  no  interests.  The 
Tunisian  protectorate  in  1882,  the  annexation  of 
the  towns  of  Mzab,   six  hundred  kilometres  from 


140  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Algiers  (1882) ;  the  Senegal  and  Niger  expeditions 
against  Ahmadou  and  Samory  (1883) ;  the  conquest 
of  Dahomey  (1883-1892);  the  settlement  in  the 
Congo  (1884);  the  Madagascar  war  (1882-1885); 
the  settlement  at  Djibouti  (1882-1885) ;  the  con- 
quest of  Tonkin  and  Annam  (1885-1888) ;  all  these 
proved  our  vitality,  and  rendered  us  inoffensive  in 
Europe.  To  this  French  expansion  Bismarck  was 
favourable.  ^^We  have  every  reason  to  rejoice  at 
it,"  he  said  after  Tunis.  And,  in  his  generosity, 
he  wished  us  to  have  Morocco,  respecting  which, 
in  1880,  he  had  instructed  his  delegates  at  the  Con- 
ference of  Madrid  ^Ho  regulate  their  attitude  by 
that  of  their  French  colleague. '^  In  September, 
1884,  he  placed  himself  in  agreement  with  our 
Ambassador  at  Berlin,  the  Baron  de  Courcel,  on  the 
question  of  opposing  Englai;id.  And  in  agreement 
with  him  also,  he  summoned  the  Congo  Conference. 
On  the  24th  of  December,  1885,  he  signed  a  delimi- 
tation treaty  respecting  the  French  and  German 
colonies  in  West  Africa.  In  October,  1886,  Mr. 
Herbette's  appointment,  in  the  place  of  Mr.  de  Cour- 
cel, furnished  the  Chancellor's  newspapers  with  an 
occasion  to  say  that  Mr.  de  Freycinet  was  coming 
round  to  Jules  Ferry's  policy.  In  reality,  Bismarck 
had  no  anxiety  that  was  caused  by  France ;  and,  for 
this  reason,  he  proclaimed  in  the  Reichstag  ^Hhat 
the  two  Governments  had  full  confidence  in  the 
sincerity  and  loyalty  of  their  mutual  relations." 

This  did  not,   however,   hinder  him  from  some- 
times brandishing  his  big   sabre   with   a  view  to 


FRANCE  AXD   THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        141 

depriving  the  French  neighbour  of  any  inclination 
to  budge,  and  more  especially  for  the  purpose  of 
inculcating  in  the  German  tax-payers  and  their 
Parliamentary  representatives  a  taste  for  military 
expenses.  He  had  not  waited  for  that  till  Boulang- 
ism  arose,  and  had  never  ceased  mingling  threats 
with  his  advances.  In  1883,  the  North  German  Ga- 
zette, speaking  of  the  risks  of  war,  wrote  with  refer- 
ence to  France:  ^^One  may  paint  the  devil  so  often 
on  the  wall  that  at  last  one  sees  him  appear."  On 
the  4th  of  September  in  the  same  year,  the  same 
semi-ofhcial  paper  declared:  ^^ Germany  will  main- 
tain the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  as  long  as  she  is  left 
with  a  man.'^  And  gracefully  the  paper  added: 
''And  now  let  there  be  no  more  said  about  it.'^  Ten 
days  after  at  Skiernevice,  Bismarck  warned  the 
Three  Emperors  of  the  revolutionary  peril,  that  is 
to  say,  of  the  French  peril.  On  the  28th  of  Novem- 
ber, 1885,  he  condescended  to  address  to  the  French 
Government  an  assurance  of  his  confidence ;  but, 
at  the  same  time,  complained  bitterly  of  the  French 
press  and  people.  On  the  26th  of  March,  1886,  he 
seized  the  occasion  of  the  Decazeville  strikes  to 
express  the  opinion  that,  after  all,  the  French  Army^ 
which  was  then  occupied  in  restraining  the  work- 
men on  strike,  might  well  one  day  become  again, 
as  in  1792,  the  army  of  social  subversion.  On  the 
outbreak  of  Boulangism,  his  tone  naturally  rose. 
On  the  31st  of  January,  1887,  there  was  an  article 
in  the  Post,  entitled  ''Under  the  Knife,"  which  vio- 
lently  denounced  French   provocations.     In  April, 


142  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

there  was  the  Schnaebele  incident;  in  September, 
the  Brignon  affair.^  The  North  German  Gazette,  be- 
tween times,  lauded  ^'German  patience"  in  terms 
that  hinted  this  patience  was  at  an  end.  And,  on 
the  19th  of  May,  a  circular,  courteously  conceived, 
it  is  true,  made  public  the  fact  that  Germany  would 
not  take  part  in  the  Universal  Exhibition  of  1889. 

Why  all  this  fuss  and  bluster?  No  doubt,  to 
secure  the  voting  of  the  War  Credits.  The  Seven 
Years'  Period,  adopted  in  1880,  expired  on  the  31st 
of  March,  1888.  At  the  opening  of  the  session  of 
1886-1887,  the  Royal  Speech  had  announced  the  ne- 
cessity of  increasing  the  country's  military  strength. 
^^In  the  Army,"  it  said,  ^4s  the  only  sure  guaran- 
tee for  the  lasting  protection  of  the  blessings  of 
peace ;  and,  although  the  Empire's  policy  contin- 
ues to  be  pacific,  Germany  is  not  able,  in  presence 
of  the  development  of  military  institutions  in  States 
bordering  on  our  own,  to  abstain  longer  from  in- 
creasing her  military  force  and,  in  particular,  its 
present  peace  footing."  The  new  Seven  Years' 
Period,  in  fact,  comprised  an  augmentation  of  61,000 
men  and  increased  credits  of  47  million  marks. 
On  the  11th  of  January,  1887,  Bismarck  made  a 
strong  personal  appeal.^ 

The  question,"  he  said,  '^of  our  future  relations  with  France 
is  one  that  I  am  not  so  sure  about  .  .  .  Between  ourselves  and 
France  the  work  of  maintaining  peace  is  difficult,  since  the  two 
countries  have  long  been  divided  by  a  dispute  that  is  historical, 
to  wit,  the  fixing  of  the  frontier  line,  which  has  been  doubtful 

1  Incidents  on  the  French-German  border. 

2  See  Paul  Matter's  book  already  cited. 


FRANCE  AXD   THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        143 

and  contested  from  the  time  when  France  acquired  her  complete 
unity  and  Royal  Power.  This  dispute  is  not  ended;  and  we 
must  expect  to  see  it  continued  on  the  French  side.  At  present 
it  is  we  who  are  in  possession  of  the  coveted  portion,  if  I  may  so 
speak  of  Alsace.  We  consequently  have  no  motive  ourselves 
for  fighting  about  it.  But  no  one  can  pretend  that  France  does 
not  dream  of  reconquering  it,  no  one  of  those  who  have  any 
real  knowledge  of  what  is  published  in  the  French  press.  They 
who  desire  a  war  with  us  seek  only  in  the  meantime  for  the  pos- 
sibility of  entering  upon  it  with  the  greatest  forces  possible. 
Their  task  is  to  keep  alive  the  sacred  fire  of  revenge.  ...  I 
have  confidence  in  the  pacific  intentions  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment, and  of  the  French  people ;  but  I  cannot  on  this  account 
lull  myself  with  such  assurance  as  to  be  able  to  say :  We  have 
no  fear  of  France  attacking  us !  I  am  convinced  that  an  attack 
by  France  is  to  be  feared.  Whether  it  may  happen  in  ten  days 
or  in  ten  years  is  something  I  cannot  venture  to  settle.  .  .  . 
His  Majesty  cannot  disavow  the  work  to  which  he  has  devoted 
the  last  thirty  years  of  his  life  —  the  creation  of  the  German 
Army,  the  creation  of  the  German  Empire.  ...  If  to  the  Con- 
federate Government's  solicitude  for  the  defensive  strength  of 
Germany  you  do  not  give  satisfaction  by  a  prompt  and  com- 
plete adoption  of  our  project,  we  shall  then  prefer  to  continue 
the  discussion  with  more  chance  of  success  by  resuming  it  in 
another  Reichstag  than  the  one  I  see  before  me. 

Being  beaten,  Bismarck  read  the  decree  dissolv- 
ing the  national  Parliament;  and  at  once  let  loose 
the  official  press,  the  Post  in  particular.  The  elec- 
tions of  the  21st  of  February,  1887,  gave  him  his 
majority.  But  the  military  effort  was  not  yet 
achieved,  whence  the  occurrence  of  fresh  frontier 
incidents,  which  continued  until  the  eve  of  the 
January  discussions  in  1888.  In  December,  there 
was  a  new  project  for  increasing  the  numbers  of  the 
Landwehr  and  Landsturm,  which,  following  on  the 
inauguration    of    the    fresh    Seven    Years'    Period, 


144  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

caused  considerable  anxiety  in  the  Russian  press. 
Deeming  his  situation  impregnable,  since  he  had 
just  concluded  his  second  Treaty  of  Counter-Assur- 
ance with  Russia  (November,  1887)  and  France 
was  in  the  midst  of  her  civil  discord,  Bismarck  now 
resolved  to  strike  a  decisive  blow.  On  the  3d  of 
February,  1888,  he  gave  order  for  the  text  of  the 
Austro-German  Treaty  to  be  published.  Any  one 
who  reads  it  through  again  will  be  able  to  judge 
what  an  effect  was  produced  by  its  becoming  known 
at  Saint  Petersburg.  On  the  8th  of  the  same  month, 
he  made  a  speech  in  the  Reichstag,  using  language 
of  unprecedented  harshness,  aimed  not  only  against 
France,  but  still  more  against  Russia :  — 

The  fears  that  have  arisen  in  the  course  of  the  present  year 
have  been  caused  by  Russia  more  even  than  by  France,  chiefly 
through  an  exchange  of  provocations,  threats,  insults,  and  recip- 
rocal instigations  which  have  occurred  during  the  past  summer 
in  the  Russian  and  French  press. 

He  added,  however,  that  the  pacific  assurances 
which  he  had  received  from  the  Czar  in  1887,  had 
more  weight  with  him  than  newspaper  articles. 
As  to  the  movements  of  Russian  troops  on  the 
frontier  since  1879,  they  had  tended  to  create  the 
impression  of  an  approaching  aggression,  at  some 
unexpected  moment,  against  one  of  the  neighbouring 
countries.  He  declared,  nevertheless,  that  he  did 
not  believe  in  the  existence  of  such  an  intention:  — 

I  am  convinced  that  even  if  some  French  explosion  or  other 
were  to  involve  us  in  a  war  with  France,  it  would  not  immedi- 
ately bring  us  into  immediate  hostilities  with  Russia,  at  any 
rate  not  necessarily.     But,  on  the  other  hand,  should  we  be 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        145 

engaged  in  a  war  with  Russia,  war  with  France  would  be  certain. 
No  French  Government  would  be  strong  enough  to  hinder  it. 

Bismarck  went  on  to  speak  of  the  military  ex- 
penses France  had  made,  of  ^^her  hatred  against  all 
her  neighbours/'   and  said:  — 

Our  geographic  situation  imposes  greater  efforts  upon  us. 
We  have  to  protect  ourselves  on  three  sides.  .  .  .  More  than 
any  other  nation,  we  are  exposed  to  the  dangers  of  a  coalition. 
God  has  given  us  on  our  flank  the  French,  who  are  the  most 
warlike  and  turbulent  nation  that  exists,  and  he  has  permitted 
the  development  in  Russia  of  warlike  propensities  which,  until 
lately,  did  not  manifest  themselves  to  the  same  extent. 

He  then  retraced  the  history  of  Russo-German 
relations,  insisting  more  peculiarly  on  his  own  role 
at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  where,  with  fine  cynicism, 
he  claimed  to  have  behaved  as  if  he  had  been  ^'a. 
fourth  Russian  plenipotentiary."  He  declared  that 
throughout  the  Congress,  no  Russian  wish  had  been 
expressed,  to  his  knowledge,  without  his  immedi- 
ately satisfying  it.  At  the  same  time,  he  over- 
whelmed Gortchakoff  with  his  retrospective  irony: 
^'If  I  had  not  then  been  long  in  possession  of  the 
highest  Russian  Order,  I  should  have  well  earned 
it."  In  fine,  he  accused  Russia  of  having  excited 
him  against  Austria.  Thence  had  been  born  the 
Triple  Alliance.     And  he  concluded :  — 

The  threats  of  the  press  are  nothing  else  than  sheer  folly. 
Can  any  one  believe  that,  by  dint  of  ink  and  words,  it  is  possi- 
ble to  intimidate  a  Power  of  Germany's  pride  and  power  ?  By 
means  of  courtesy  and  kind  methods  we  may  be  easily  —  too 
easily  perhaps  —  influenced,  but  by  means  of  threats,  never. 
We  Germans  fear  God  and  nothing  else  in  the  world.  It  is  fear 
of  God  which  has  caused  us  to  love  and  cultivate  peace.     If  any 


146  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

one  should  break  it,  he  will  soon  be  convinced  that  the  com- 
bative patriotism  which,  in  1813,  called  to  arms  the  entire  peo- 
ple of  Prussia, —  who  were  then  weak  and  vanquished, —  is  to-day 
the  common  property  of  the  whole  German  nation ;  and  he  will 
find  them  animated  by  one  soul,  with  the  strong  belief  existing 
in  each  soldier's  heart  that  God  is  with  us ! 

This  Quos  Ego,  which  was,  as  it  were,  Bismarck's 
political  will  and  testament,  ripened  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance  ten  years  sooner  than  might  have 
otherwise  been  the  case.  Never  had  the  pax  Ger- 
manica  uttered  a  prouder  language.  Never  had  the 
Chancellor  made  Europe  feel,  in  a  harsher  way,  that 
she  had  a  master  and  would  have  to  keep  him. 
Would  she  have  kept  him,  if,  two  years  later,  Will- 
iam II,  in  his  feverish  haste  to  reign  alone,  had  not 
dismissed  this  master  and  freed  Europe  at  the  same 
time  that  he  freed  himself?  We  leave  the  question 
to  be  answered  by  amateurs  of  conjecture.  As  for 
Bismarck,  such  an  hypothesis  never  entered  into  his 
head.  A  few  months  later,  he  made  the  statement 
that  ^^he  was  sure  he  would  remain  Chancellor  till 
he  died.''  The  ordering  of  the  future  was  one  of  his 
favourite  cards.  Yet  it  was  this  card  that  deceived 
him.  After  struggling  in  secret  for  eighteen  months 
with  the  new  Sovereign,  Bismarck  retired  on  the 
8th  of  March,  1890.  Would  his  successors  be  able 
to  play  his  game  and  prolong  his  success? 

Ill 

The  conclusion  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance 
occurred  a  few  months  after  the  accession  of  William 


FRANCE  AND   THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        147 

II  and  Bismarck's  retirement.     As  early  as  1888, 
the  victim  of    1888    had  come    into    unmistakably 
closer  relations  with  the  victim  of  1871.     True,  on 
the  30th  of  June,  1888,  the  Gazette  of  the  Cross  per- 
sisted in  announcing  that  Bismarck  had   definitely 
turned  Russia  from  the  French  Alliance,  and  that, 
in  order  to  confirm  the  Russo-German  understand- 
ing, William  II,  as  soon  as  he  was  crowned,  would 
commence  his  visits  to  the  various  foreign  courts  by 
going  to  see  the  Czar.     The  interview  took  place ; 
but  its  effect  was  not  to  bring  Germany  any  nearer 
to  Alexander  III.     On  the  10th  of  May,  1890,  after 
his  dismissal  of  the  month  of  March,  Bismarck  be- 
gan his  polemical  revelations  against  his  Sovereign 
and  his  successor;    and,  in  a  published  interview, 
declared  that  ^Hhe  existence  of  France  was  necessary 
to  Russia. '^     On  the  14th  of  the  same  month,  when 
defending  a  military  project  in  the  Reichstag,  Moltke 
contrived  to  couple  Paris  and  Saint  Petersburg  in 
his  speech.     He  said:   ^^The  pacific  assurances  given 
to  us  by  our  neighbours  in  the  East  and  in  the  West 
—  assurances  which  do  not  prevent  them  from  con- 
tinuing  their    armaments  —  are    certainly   precious 
to  us.     But  it  is  for  us  to  find  our  security  in  our- 
selves."    A  few  months  later,   himself  intervening 
in  the  debates,  William  II  exclaimed:    ^^The  times 
in  which  we  live  are  serious ;  and,  perhaps  in  coming 
years,  we  shall  have  trouble."     When  it  is  recollected 
that,  only  ten  weeks  afterwards,  the  welcome  ac- 
corded by  the  Russian  people  to  Admiral  Gervais' 
squadron  at  Cronstadt,  manifested  to  the  world  at 


148  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

large,  as  the  Czar  put  it,  'Hhe  deep  bonds  of  sym- 
pathy uniting  France  and  Russia/'  these  words  of 
the  German  Emperor  assume  their  full  significance. 
V^From  that  moment,  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance 
was  made,  if  not  signed;  and  the  coalition  which 
Bismarck,  until  his  death,  boasted  of  having  dreaded 
and  hindered  as  long  as  he  was  in  power,  —  the 
coalition  which,  in  several  speeches,  Caprivi  was 
subsequently  to  declare  inevitable  and,  indeed,  inof- 
fensive, —  was  thenceforth  assured^ 

At  first,  this  political  event  appeared  to  German 
policy  as  a  discomfiture.  When  bringing  in  two 
new  military  bills  on  the  23d  of  November,  1893, 
Caprivi,  in  spite  of  his  habitual  optimism,  did  not 
dissimulate  the  change  in  the  situation.  ^^France,'' 
he  said  in  substance,  ^'has  numerous  and  well- 
organized  army  corps,  fortresses,  and  intrenched 
camps.  And  we  should  no  longer  find  in  Russia  the 
same  forbearance  as  in  the  commencement  of  the 
War  of  1870.  .  .  .  The  Emperor  of  Russia  is  a  pow- 
erful partisan  of  peace.  But  the  sentiments  of  the 
Russian  people  are  against  us.  The  Russian  mo- 
bilization, moreover,  proves  that  Saint  Petersburg 
believes  the  next  war  will  be  in  the  West.  .  .  .  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  a  rapprochement  has  come  about 
between  France  and  Russia.  Its  origins  date  far 
back.  But,  to-day,  everything,  Cronstadt  included, 
leads  us  to  suppose  that  an  alliance  is  meditated. 
We  do  not  mean  to  attack.  But  we  do  mean  to  be 
able  to  hold  our  own  on  both  sides."  This,  it  may 
be  said,  was  an  oratorical  artifice,  calculated  to  ob- 


FRANCE  AND   THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        149 

tain  the  voting  of  the  military  credits;  an  artifice 
perhaps,  but  yet  testifying  to  sincere  anxiety  and 
real  disappointment.  Thanks  to  the  Russian  Alh- 
ance,  France  escaped  from  the  forced  inaction  in 
which  she  had  remained  for  twenty  years.  Count 
Schouvaloff's  expression:  ^^You  are  suffering  from 
a  Coahtion  nightmare/'  took  on  an  appearance 
of  prophecy  in  the  Hght  of  events.  The  '^Western 
neighbour"  passed  from  the  state  of  passive  peace 
to  one  of  voluntary  peace.  Germany,  forsooth,  did 
not  lack  means  to  defend  the  territorial  statu  quo; 
but  the  political  static  quo  was  modified ;  and  the 
European  balance  of  power,  reestablished  to  the 
profit  of  Bismarck's  two  victims,  took  from  the  Ger- 
man Empire  the  dictatorship  which  it  had  held  so 
long.  In  1879,  Bismarck  wrote  to  the  King  of  Ba- 
varia: ^'The  danger  of  war  complications  (with 
Russia)  is,  in  my  opinion,  not  imminent.  It  would 
only  become  serious  if  France  were  ready  to  march 
in  agreement  with  Russia.  Up  to  the  present,  such 
is  not  the  case.'^  After  1891,  ^^such  was  the  case"; 
and  it  is  easy  to  understand  that  the  change  repre- 
sented a  material  and  moral  diminution  for  Ger- 
many. 

A  policy  of  sentiment  and  impressionism  would 
not  have  accepted  this  fait  nouveau  without  anger. 
German  policy,  being  positive  and  realistic,  sought 
to  get  out  of  it  what  was  possible.  Without  much 
trouble,  she  recognized  that  the  conclusion  of  the 
Dual  Alliance  did  not  constitute  an  immediate 
threat.     Granted,  the  inheritors  of  Boulangism  and 


150  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

their  naive  supporters  attributed  to  the  Franco- 
Russian  AUiance  a  revenge  of  counter-value  and 
approaching  reparation.  And  they  reUed  on  it  for 
the  reconquest  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  But,  in  the 
Chancelleries,  and  even  among  the  well-informed 
public,  it  was  understood  that  this  Alliance  was 
purely  defensive  and  that,  if,  in  case  of  aggression, 
it  afforded  France  a  guarantee,  it  did  not  in  any  de- 
gree or  under  any  form  encourage  her  to  undertake 
an  offensive  policy.  What  did  the  Cronstadt  toasts 
say?  That  the  new  Alliance  was  an  element  of 
peace.  What  did  the  Russian  papers  say?  That 
Europe's  tranquillity  gained  additional  security  by 
the  union  of  the  two  peoples.  But  peace  meant  the 
statu  quo;  and  the  statu  quo  was  the  Treaty  of 
Frankfort.  Germany,  therefore,  could  put  up  with 
the  Dual  Alliance,  on  condition  it  did  not  escape  from 
her  control  and  turn  against  her.  Within  a  few 
months,  her  decision  was  made.  She  would  resign 
herself  to  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  first  because 
no  useful  end  would  have  been  served  by  her  not 
resigning  herself,  and  secondly  because  the  Alliance 
might  become,  in  her  hands,  a  fresh  means  of  action. 
Consequently,  there  was  an  end  to  bitter  speeches, 
an  end  to  hints  of  possible  or  likely  war  which  had 
so  recently  been  heard.  Instead,  were  exhibited 
constant  amiability  towards  France,  a  visible  desire 
to  act  in  concert  with  her,  in  concert  with  Russia; 
to  draw,  when  occasion  offered,  the  two  Allies  into 
cooperation  with  Berlin  outside  Europe,  a  coopera- 
tion having  the  double  advantage  of  diverting  France 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        151 

more  and  more  from  Continental  matters,  and  of 
involving  her  more  deeply  in  the  Colonial  policy 
which,  in  1881,  had  caused  her  to  fall  out  with  Italy, 
and  had  always,  especially  since  the  Egyptian  ques- 
tion, brought  her  into  conflict  with  England. 

To  this  policy  of  relaxation  and  advances,  William 
II  contributed  in  person.  When  he  ascended  the 
throne,  just  after  the  Boulangist  agitation  and  the 
Schnaebele  incident,  he  brought  with  him,  rightly 
or  wrongly,  a  reputation  for  rashness,  and  for  being 
ready  to  embark  on  any  wild  enterprise.  Already, 
before  the  death  of  his  grandfather,  William  I,  he 
had  protested  that  this  reputation  was  undeserved. 
At  the  commencement  of  1888,  he  declared:  ^'I  am 
quite  aware  that,  among  people  in  general  and  es- 
pecially abroad,  I  am  accused  of  frivolous  desires  of 
warlike  fame.  God  preserve  me  from  such  cruel 
folly.  I  indignantly  spurn  these  unworthy  impu- 
tations.'' None  the  less,  the  reputation  has  re- 
mained, and  has  served  as  a  foil  to  all  his  pacific 
affirmations.  First,  there  was  the  Workmen's  Con- 
ference at  Berlin  in  1890,  and  the  fascination  he 
exercised  upon  Jules  Simon  —  things  which  marked 
the  dawn  of  a  fresh  point  of  view  in  the  French  press 
with  regard  to  the  German  Emperor.  Jules  Simon, 
who  wrote  a  great  deal,  could  not  say  enough  in 
eulogy  of  the  Imperial  host,  who  entertained  him 
royally.  He  repeated  the  favourable  opinion  held 
by  William  II  respecting  our  Army,  its  progress,  its 
fitness.  And  our  amour-propre  was  flattered  by  this. 
Then,  there  was  a  series  of  courtesies  which,  coming 


152  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

one  after  another^  fell,  like  so  many  germs  of  peace, 
upon  the  ground  that  had  been  so  well  prepared. 
If  there  was  some  anniversary  of  1870  to  be  com- 
memorated, the  Emperor  did  not  fail  to  render 
homage  to  ^'the  chivalrous  enemy''  (December  14, 
1891);  to  ''the  brave  French  soldiers  fighting  with 
the  courage  of  despair  for  their  laurels,  their 
past,  their  Emperor"  (December  2,  1895).  When 
Marshal  MacMahon  died,  he  instructed  Count  Miin- 
ster,  on  the  same  day,  to  convey  to  the  Duchess 
of  Magenta  the  respectful  expression  of  his  sympa- 
thy'' (October  18,  1893).  When  President  Car- 
not  was  assassinated  at  Lyons,  he  once  more  con- 
trived to  say  just  the  right  thing;  and,  first  among 
foreign  monarchs,  expressed  his  sympathy  with  the 
widow  of  the  President  who,  ''worthy  of  his  great 
name,  had  died  on  the  field  of  honour."  On  this 
occasion,  and  in  spite  of  some  resistance  manifested 
by  German  opinion,  he  gave  orders  for  the  liberation 
of  two  French  naval  officers  who  had  been  arrested 
for  espionage.  Afterwards,  there  were  similar  pro- 
ceedings on  the  death  of  General  Canrobert  (Janu- 
ary 29,  1895) ;  of  Jules  Simon  (June  8,  1896) ;  on 
the  morrow  of  the  fire  at  the  Bazar  de  la  Charite 
(May  4,  1897) ;  and  of  the  loss  of  the  Bourgogne 
(July,  1898) ;  and  again,  still  more  recently,  at  the 
funeral  of  Felix  Faure,  where,  by  his  choice,  he  was 
represented  by  one  of  the  German  princes  nearest  to 
France  by  his  family  relations.  Prince  Anthony 
Radzivill  (February,  1899).  On  the  6th  of  July  of 
the  same  year,  being  in  Norwegian  waters,  he  visited 


FRANCE  AND   THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        153 

the  Frencli  training-ship,  Iphigenia,  and  telegraphed 
to  Mr.  Loubet  to  express  his  gratification,  "  both  as 
a  sailor  and  as  a  comrade''  at  the  amiable  reception 
accorded  him.  In  1900,  he  personally  superin- 
tended the  organization  of  the  German  section  of 
the  Exhibition,  with  a  view  to  increasing  its  brill- 
iance and  success.  In  1901,  General  Bonnal  hav- 
ing been  invited  by  him  to  the  German  military 
manoeuvres,  he  received  this  officer  at  Berlin  and 
loaded  him  with  attentions.  And,  not  so  long  ago, 
the  catastrophe  of  Martinique  Island  furnished  him 
with  another  opportunity  to  send  us  one  of  those 
sympathetic  telegrams  in  which  he  excels,  and  to 
foster  a  friendly  atmosphere  which,  while  somewhat 
artificial,  perhaps,  is  none  the  less  useful  by  reason 
of  the  greater  facility  of  relations  that  results  from 
it.  The  extreme  shrewdness  of  Prince  Miinster,  the 
amenity  of  Prince  Radolin,  the  smiling  skill  of  the 
Marquis  de  Noailles,  for  whom  the  Emperor  felt  an 
especial  friendship,  aided  in  the  improvement.  On 
our  part,  we  did  not  cease  to  contribute  what  lay  in 
our  power,  with  the  reserve  imposed  on  our  dignity 
by  souvenirs  ever  present,  but  with  correctness  and 
perfect  grace.  And,  on  each  occasion  that  called  for 
it,  notably  at  the  time  of  the  Kiel  fetes  and  of  the 
inundations  in  Silesia,  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public were  not  backward  in  replying  with  courtesy 
to  the  courteous  advances  made  to  them  by  the 
German  Emperor. 

Politically,  these  advances  bore  their  fruit;    and 
Germany  derived  profit  from  them.     Being  sure,  or 


154  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

at  least  believing  he  was  sure,  of  the  friendship  of 
England,  with  whom  he  had  signed  successive  Colo- 
nial agreements,  William  II  managed  to  find  or  cre- 
ate opportunities  of  exhibiting  his  relations  with  the 
Dual  AlUance.  Already,  in  1891,  Mr.  de  Giers, 
Russia's  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  after  a  journey 
to  Paris,  had  ostentatiously  visited  the  three  Capi- 
tals of  the  Triplice,  Rome,  Vienna,  and  Berlin. 
Four  years  later,  the  war  between  China  and  Japan 
brought  about  the  threefold  action  of  Russia,  France, 
and  Germany,  which  snatched  from  Japan  the  fruit 
of  her  victory  (1895).  In  the  same  year,  the  inaug- 
uration of  the  Kiel  Canal,  which  was  honoured  by 
the  simultaneous  presence  of  a  French  and  a  Russian 
squadron,  was  the  outward  and  visible  sign  of  a  rap- 
prochement that  Saint  Petersburg  would  seem  to  have 
counselled  in  Paris.  On  the  31st  of  May  and  the  10th 
of  June,  Mr.  Hanotaux,  being  challenged  in  Parlia- 
ment, defended  his  policy  and  secured  its  approval. 
To  Mr.  Miller  and,  who  said  to  him:  ^^  France  will 
never  be  false  to  the  fidelity  she  has  vowed  to  the 
provinces  that  have  been  taken  from  her,"  the  Min- 
ister replied :  — 

We  have  done  no  more  than  other  Powers  in  manifesting 
a  behaviour  of  international  politeness  corresponding  to  an  act 
of  international  policy  that  was  addressed  to  all  the  Powers.  .  .  . 

In  open  peace,  the  relations  of  the  various  nations  must  be 
regulated  by  a  sentiment,  at  once  worthy  and  simple,  of  inter- 
national politeness." 

And  further :  — 

Our  sailors  will  go  to  Kiel,  representing,  not  a  resigned  and 
discouraged  France,  but  a  France  free  and  strong,  sure  enough 


FRANCE  AND   THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        155 

of   herself   to  remain  calm,  proud  enough  and  rich  enough  in 
glory  to  fear  no  comparison,  to  disown  no  souvenir. 

In  what  will  this  France  be  diminished  in  her  prestige,  her 
authority,  her  interests,  because  of  her  vessels'  presence  at  an 
international  ceremony  where  they  will  meet,  among  a  hundred 
others,  the  vessels  of  a  nation  that  is  her  friend,  and  that  has 
replied  in  the  same  conditions  as  ourselves  to  the  same  invita- 
tion? 

Now,  by  a  curious  coincidence,  the  sitting  of  Par- 
liament in  which  the  French  Minister  held  this  ex- 
tremely polite  language  with  regard  to  Germany, 
was  just  the  one  in  which,  in  accord  with  the  Prime 
Minister,  he  proclaimed  officially,  for  the  first  time, 
the  existence  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  The 
feeling  of  the  rapprochement  was  thereby  rendered 
more  sensible.  In  1896,  there  was  another  symp- 
tom :  Germany  announced  her  intention  to  partici- 
pate in  our  Universal  Exhibition  of  1900 ;  and,  a 
few  weeks  later,  William  II  made  a  speech  in  hon- 
our of  the  European  solidarity.  In  1897,  Count 
Mouraview,  then  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, came  to  Paris;  but,  with  a  certain  manifesta- 
tion of  intention,  he  stopped  at  Berlin  on  his  way 
back  to  Russia.  On  the  23d  of  July  in  the  same 
year,  a  Franco-German  agreement  was  signed  rela- 
tive to  the  Togo  delimitation.  And,  at  that  mo- 
ment, overtures  were  made  to  us  from  Berlin  with  a 
view  to  an  understanding  between  the  two  countries, 
—  overtures  the  particulars  of  which  were  unknown, 
but  the  reality  of  which  was  undeniable.  More  and 
more  it  would  seem  that  circumstances  were  leading 
us  towards   a  rapprochement  with  Germany  on  the 


156  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

basis  of  the  Continental  statu  quo  and  of  Colonial 
action  in  harmony.  The  Fashoda  alarm,  and  the 
threatening  prospect  of  a  naval  war  for  which  we 
were  not  ready,  disturbed  public  opinion  greatly, 
which  again  turned  to  the  advantage  of  Berlin, 
since  French  Nationalists  both  past  and  future, 
Mr.  Jules  Lemaitre  among  them,  advocated  an 
understanding  with  our  neighbours  on  the  East 
against  Great  Britain.  True,  when  once  the  Eng- 
lish peril  was  averted,  the  Dreyfus  Affair  awoke  the 
old  historic  resentment.  But  the  correct  attitude 
of  the  German  Imperial  Government  removed  all 
risks  of  clashing  and  conflict.  On  several  occasions, 
the  German  Ministers  were  able  to  congratulate 
themselves  that  this  "Affaire  which  raised  so  much 
dust,  had  not  troubled  the  correctness  of  France  and 
Germany's  relations  with  each  other.''  And  when 
the  crisis  was  over,  it  was  once  more  the  Colonial 
understanding  with  France,  which  appeared  to  be 
Germany's  object,  when  Count  von  Buelow,  speak- 
ing in  the  Reichstag  in  December,  1899,  and  defin- 
ing the  world-policy  of  Greater  Germany,  added: 
'^With  France  we  have  always,  so  far,  easily  and 
willingly  come  to  an  arrangement  in  matters  con- 
cerning Colonial  interests."  The  events  that  oc- 
curred in  China  in  1900,  the  appointment  of  General 
von  Waldersee,  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Inter- 
national troops,  the  confraternity  of  arms  instituted 
between  the  adversaries  of  Sedan,  confraternity 
which  William  II  celebrated  in  the  ensuing  year  by 
receiving    General    Bonnal    at    Berlin  —  everything 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        157 

seemed  to  favour  German  plans.  Again  (March  15, 
1901)  the  Chancellor  insisted  on  the  fact  that,  be- 
tween France  and  Germany,  there  was  no  longer  any 
real  conflict  of  interests,  whether  in  the  Far  East  or 
in  the  many  parts  of  the  w^orld.  More  and  more, 
Germany  availed  herself  of  a  diplomatic  combina- 
tion which  increased  the  security  of  her  State-pos- 
session, and  allowed  her,  both  in  Europe  and  out  of 
Europe,  to  use  either  her  own  Allies,  or  ours,  or  our- 
selves. 

The  Triple  Alliance,  moreover,  continued  in  force, 
as  in  the  past.  Austria  remained  constantly  faith- 
ful to  it,  and,  absorbed  by  her  domestic  struggles, 
in  no  way  modified  her  foreign  policy.  Italy  was  no 
less  docile.  She  had  feted  Chancellor  von  Caprivi 
in  November,  1890,  William  II  in  1892  and  in 
1897.  King  Humbert  had  gone  to  Potsdam  in  1892 
and  1897 ;  and  the  Prince  of  Naples,  to  the  Lorraine 
manoeuvres  in  1893.  Her  defeats  in  Ethiopia  and 
her  economic  difficulties,  besides,  dissuaded  Italy 
from  the  fits  of  Gallophobia  that  she  had  indulged  in 
during  the  early  period  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  In 
June,  1091,  this  Treaty  had  been  renewed  for  twelve 
years,  with  the  option  of  denouncing  it  in  1898.  But 
none  of  the  three  Allies  had  made  use  of  the  option. 
Consequently,  the  Bismarckian  system  subsisted, 
without  any  appearance    of    umbrage   or   prejudice 

(being  caused  by  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  Tur- 
key and  Roumania  had  been  drawn  further  and 
further  into  the  German  wake.  The  Empire's  pros- 
perity was  brilliant.     Its  military  strength  was  un- 


158  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

diminished.  The  TripUce  was  no  longer  alone ;  but 
it  was  not  eclipsed.  Never  had  the  international 
situation  appeared  to  be  more  favourable  to  her 
than  it  then  was.  William  II  exercised  a  personal 
ascendency  over  Nicholas  II  which  was  maintained 
by  frequent  interviews  and  regular  correspondence. 
Russians  Asiatic  policy  inclined  her  to  accept  in 
Europe  the  German  lead,  which  she  had  already 
obeyed  in  China,  by  doing  at  Port  Arthur  what  Ger- 
many had  done  at  Kiao-Tcheou.  The  Austro- Rus- 
sian agreement  of  1897,  relative  to  Turkish  affairs 
and  intended  to  preserve  the  statu  quo,  prevented 
risks  arising  from  Eastern  complications ;  and,  if  the 
Bismarckian  Counter-Assurance  of  1884  and  1887 
no  longer  existed,  this  had  happened  through  the 
operation  of  facts,  not  of  engagements.  Strength- 
ened by  her  naval  programme  of  1900,  Germany 
saw  opened  to  her,  by  the  firman  granting  her  the 
Bagdad  Railway,  which  had  been  obtained  from  the 
Sultan  in  January,  1902,  the  fairest  economic  and 
political  prospects  in  Nearer  Asia.  Her  purchase  of 
the  Spanish  colonies  in  the  Pacific  had  also  served 
her  world-policy  (1899).  She  had  made  her  ap- 
pearance at  Pekin,  in  1900,  under  the  auspices  of 
Marshal  Waldersee,  as  Europe's  dictator.  Nothing 
hindered  her  from  wielding  a  discreet  and  profitable 
influence  over  the  Latin  nations  at  the  time  when 
they  manifested  a  tendency  to  come  nearer  together. 
The  abolition  of  the  dictature  paragraph  applying  to 
Lorraine  had  produced  a  good  impression  in  Paris. 
Negotiations  had  been  opened  respecting  the  Bagdad 


FRANCE  AND   THE   TRIPLE  ALLIANCE         159 

Railway,  which,  with  a  little  more  moderation,  Ger- 
many might  have  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion. 
It  depended  on  Berlin,  by  coupling  such  negotiations 
with  African  affairs,  to  preside  at  the  elaboration  of 
the  various  Mediterranean  understandings,  instead 
of  leaving  the  honour  and  benefit  of  them  to  others. 
It  seemed  even  that,  to  the  political  domination 
established  by  Bismarck,  the  Germany  of  William  II 
had  added  an  economic  supremacy.  Allusion  has 
already  been  made  to  the  prodigious  progress  of  her 
commerce  and  industry.  As  ideas  always  run  in  the 
same  mould,  the  Germany  of  trade  had  the  like  con- 
ception of  success  as  the  Germany  of  government. 
Under  colour  of  serving  the  people's  needs  and  Ger- 
man prestige,  the  German  speculators  attempted  to 
impose  their  combinations  on  the  world  without  re- 
specting or  even  recognizing  the  rights  and  prefer- 
ences of  others.  These  economic  conquerors  on 
land  and  sea  contrived  to  bring  the  nation's  force 
and  influence  into  the  service  of  their  unbounded 
appetites.  Germany  had  become  an  ^^ Industrial 
State."  After  supplying  herself  with  the  most  sci- 
entific machinery  and  requisites  that  had  ever  been 
introduced  into  the  economic  struggle  —  canals,  rail- 
ways, harbours,  technical  schools,  manufactories,  and 
banks,  —  she  abandoned  Bismarck's  system  of  pro- 
tection. In  1895,  she  broke  down  the  barriers  which, 
not  so  long  before,  were  a  hindrance  to  her  expan- 
sion, and  started  out  to  conquer  fresh  markets.  She 
began  with  the  countries  of  the  Continent.  But  soon 
Europe   no   longer   sufficed  to   her   progress.     Asia 


160  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Minor,  India,  Siam,  Japan,  China,  Africa,  the  United 
States,  South  America,  were  invaded  by  her  products ; 
her  commercial  travellers,  with  imperial,  dominating 
manners,  never  failing  to  utilize  the  strength  of  the 
Empire  on  behalf  of  their  merchandise.  Thus  un- 
derstood, the  Weltpolitik  was  the  mercantile  continu- 
ation of  the  Bismarckian  policy. 

In  spite  of  the  perils  attaching  to  such  a  system, 
circumstances  at  the  commencement  of  the  twenti- 
eth century  enabled  Germany  to  consolidate  it.  She 
had  it  in  her  power  to  draw  along  her  borders,  for 
her  own  advantage,  the  ^^Continental  line''  which 
seemed  at  certain  moments  to  be  the  Emperor  Will- 
iam's supreme  aim.  For  three  years,  England  had 
been  paralyzed  by  the  Transvaal  war.  The  rest  of 
Europe  was  in  a  hesitating  frame  of  mind,  easy  to  be 
gained  over  and  to  be  guided.  There  was  a  fine  game 
to  be  played,  a  game  not  difficult  to  be  won  by  Mr. 
von  Buelow,  who,  since  1897,  had  been  the  guiding 
hand  of  the  Empire's  diplomacy.  ^^  There  is  but  one 
favourable  moment  in  affairs,"  said  Bismarck,  in 
1878;  ^Hhe  thing  is  to  know  when  to  seize  it.  Mr. 
Von  Buelow  did  not  seize  it.  Led  away,  now  by  the 
''grand  Continental  designs"  of  the  Emperor,  now  by 
the  attraction  of  immediate  profits  at  the  expense  of 
one  and  another,  he  was  unable  to  choose ;  and, 
through  his  contradictions,  inspired  distrust  in  all. 
A  few  months  later,  peace  was  signed  in  the  Trans- 
vaal (June,  1902) ;  and  this,  following  on  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  (January,  1902),  restored  to 
England  a  liberty  of  action  which  new  men,  the  King 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        161 

and  Lord  Lansdowne,  were  ready  to  raake  good  use 
of.  The  opportunity  which  Germany  had  allowed 
to  escape  vanished ;  and  fresh  combinations  arose  in 
the  midst  of  astonished  Europe. 

IV 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  at  this  time,  acting  on  the 
idea  —  a  true  one,  indeed  —  that  the  Russian  Alli- 
ance, which  neither  could  have  nor  should  have  been 
for  us  an  instrument  of  revenge,  yet,  at  least,  could 
and  should  leave  us  free  in  our  movements,  for  the 
settlement  of  our  own  affairs  and  the  pursuit  of  our 
interests,  French  policy,  first  in  the  direction  of  Italy, 
next  in  the  direction  of  England,  and,  last  of  all,  in 
the  direction  of  Spain,  began  a  triple  campaign  of 
rapprochement.  After  playing,  in  Crispi's  time,  the 
offensive  role  of  the  Triple  Alliance  against  us,  Italy 
effected  her  reconciliation  with  us,  first  commer- 
cially and  then  politically  (1898-1902).  Not  many 
months  after,  an  explanation  of  the  same  kind  led 
us  to  liquidate  with  Great  Britain  a  whole  past  of 
colonial  rivalry  and  ancestral  resentment.  And  this 
liquidation,  more  striking  and  more  important  than 
that  of  the  quarrel  between  France  and  Italy,  was 
recorded,  on  the  8th  of  April,  1904,  in  a  public  treaty. 
Finally,  six  months  later,  Spain,  in  her  turn,  gave 
adhesion  to  this  agreement.  The  local  consequence 
of  these  negotiations  was  to  give  us  a  free  hand  in 
Morocco.  That,  however,  was  a  small  thing  com- 
pared  with   the   general   scope   of   the   liquidation, 

M 


162  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

which  extended  the  field  opened  to  our  activity  by 
the  Franco- Russian  Alliance,  guaranteed  us  our  ma- 
terial and  moral  autonomy  in  Western  Europe,  and 
made  us  a  centre  of  attraction. 

This  was  something  new  and  disquieting  to  Ger- 
many, who,  while  it  was  still  time,  had  not  known 
how  to  assume  the  direction  of  the  movement.  The  I 
fresh  Continental  grouping,  added  to  the  Dual  Alii- , 
ance,  was,  in  fact,  calculated  to  substitute  for  the 
German  hegemony  an  equilibrium  independent  of 
her  influence.  Being  deeply  imbued  with  Bis- 
marck's principles,  William  II  had  no  illusions  on 
the  subject.  The  very  system  was  in  danger,  which 
it  was  his  mission  to  safeguard.  If  any  one  will  read 
over  the  seven  hundred  and  some  odd  speeches  pro- 
nounced, since  his  accession,  by  the  voluble  orator 
who  presides  over  the  destinies  of  the  German  Em- 
pire, a  fixed  idea  will  be  found  in  them,  by  the  side 
of  accidental  opinions  and  ephemeral  theories.  This 
idea  is  that  Germany  must  retain  the  position  she 
acquired  through  her  victorious  war  against  France 
—  position  accruing  at  once  from  the  territorial  con- 
quests realized  at  our  expense  and  from  the  passivity 
to  which  our  diplomacy  was  reduced.  At  the  very 
commencement  of  his  reign,  William  II  said  plainly 
what  he  conceived  his  task  to  be,  and  that  he  would 
allow  no  breach  to  be  made  in  the  Imperial  work: 
'^ There  are  people, '^  he  exclaimed,  '^who  do  not  fear 
to  assert  that  my  father  would  have  been  willing  to 
give  up  what  he,  with  my  grandfather,  had  won  by 
the  sword.     We  knew  the  Emperor  Frederick  too 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        163 

well  to  permit,  even  for  an  instant,  such  an  outrage 
on  his  memory.  Like  ourself,  he  was  convinced 
that  nothing  must  be  abandoned  of  the  conquests  of 
the  heroic  epoch.  We  would  sooner  sacrifice  our 
eighteen  Army  Corps  and  our  forty-two  millions  of 
inhabitants  than  let  one  stone  fall  of  the  edifice 
raised  by  William  I.''  The  tenor  of  this  speech, 
which  was  made  on  the  16th  of  August,  1888,  found 
its  echo  in  a  series  of  similar  manifestations  during  a 
period  of  seventeen  years.  And  it  was  always  the 
same  thought  that  recurred:  ^^To  preserve  the  glo- 
rious conquests  with  which  God  has  rewarded  Ger- 
many's struggles  for  independence  and  unity  is  the 
most  sacred  of  duties. ''  For  this  work  of  preserva- 
tion two  conditions  were  required,  —  those  indeed 
which  Bismarck  had  always  known  how  to  realize. 
First,  it  was  necessary  that  the  German  Empire  — 
in  security  with  regard  to  one  of  its  two  vanquished 
rivals,  to  wit,  Austro-Hungary  —  should  be  in  a 
position  to  repel  an  aggression  of  the  other,  to  wit, 
France,  if,  perchance,  the  aggression  occurred.  Next, 
it  was  necessary  that  any  risk  of  it  should  be  averted 
by  the  incapacity  of  France  to  practise  and  even  to 
conceive  a  policy  of  action.  Thus  and  thus  only 
would  the  hegemony  of  Germany  be  maintained. 
Thus  and  thus  only  would  the  ^^  coalition  night- 
mare" be  removed  from  her.  In  1903  and  1904, 
William  II  was  again  seized  by  this  nightmare. 
Europe  was  escaping  from  his  control,  and  he  felt  it. 
Seeing  her  organize  herself  without  him,  and  per- 
haps against  him,  he  was  troubled  and  alarmed. 


164  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Moreover,  at  this  moment,  Germany  was  but  ill- 
prepared  to  look  coolly  at  a  disagreeable  situation, 
finding,  as  she  did,  within  herself  and  near  her,  things  ^ 
that  might  well  make  her  nervous.  The  very  prog- 
ress which  was  her  pride  and  which  aroused  anger 
and  was  prejudicial  to  interests  abroad,  was,  by  its 
rapidity  and  far-reaching  character,  a  source  of  diffi- 
culties at  home.  In  1901,  an  economic  crisis  com- 
menced to  rage,  which  took  more  than  two  years  to 
exhaust  itself.  ^^ Between  1890  and  1895,  seven 
hundred  and  eleven  Joint-stock  Companies  were 
founded,  with  a  nominal  capital  of  755  miUion  francs. 
And  between  1895  and  1900,  fifteen  hundred  and 
fifty-one  were  founded,  with  a  capital  of  2  billions 
800  milHons.  If  to  these  figures  be  added  the  600 
millions  represented  by  the  various  augmentations 
of  capital  belonging  to  older  Companies  and  the  two 
billions  of  bonds  issued  by  them,  it  may  be  said  that 
since  1895  the  sums  invested  in  German  industry 
have  attained  the  enormous  figure  of  six  billions. ''  ^ 
Now  the  German  Empire  does  not  possess  anything 
like  the  capital  of  England  or  France.  Money  fell 
short.  The  banks,  becoming  more  and  more  dar- 
ing, continued  to  go  right  on.  And  the  returns  were 
not  sufficient  to  cover  the  overdraft.  Failures,  bank- 
ruptcies, and  scandals  occurred;  notably  there  was 
the  disaster  of  the  Leipziger  Bank,^  which  in  1904 
was  hardly  liquidated.  Agriculture  was  as  much  in 
debt  as  Industry.     People  began  to  ask  themselves 

^  See  Francis  Delaisy's  book,  German  Force. 
^  See  Victor  Berard's  William  II  and  France. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE         165 

whether  it  was  not  possible  that  the  economic  giant's 
feet  were  made  of  clay.  Certain  persons  even 
thought  that  war  was  still  the  most  profitable  na- 
tional career.  Even  the  more  moderate  lacked  the 
calmness  needed  in  order  properly  to  appreciate  the 
European  events  by  which  the  Continent  was  escap- 
ing from  German  preponderance. 

Did  it  not  seem,  indeed,  that  the  Triple  Alliance 
itself  was  languishing  ?  True,  it  subsisted  still ;  and 
nothing  was  falser  than  to  believe  that  its  real  exist- 
ence had  ever  been  threatened.  Yet,  certain  dis- 
quieting symptoms  were  noticeable.  Italy  showed 
a  somewhat  indiscreet  joy  over  the  balance  of  power 
that  she  had  managed  to  reestablish  to  her  advan- 
tage among  the  nations  of  Central  Europe.  She  con- 
gratulated herself  on  having  added  to  the  prestige 
which  for  the  last  twenty  years  had  accrued  to  her 
from  the  Triplice,  the  political  influence  which,  to 
use  Mr.  von  Buelow's  expression,  results  from  the 
^^play  of  counterweight."  However  anxious  she 
was  to  preserve  her  alliances,  she  was  no  longer,  as 
at  the  beginning,  condemned  to  them  by  her  isola- 
tion. Slight  modifications  of  attitude  rendered  the 
change  perceptible.  Germany  no  longer  exercised 
over  Rome  the  invincible  prestige  of  yore.  Visits 
were  still  paid,  in  which  speeches  were  still  pro- 
nounced in  honour  of  reciprocal  engagements.  But 
the  Italian  speeches  w^ere  colder  than  the  German. 
And  the  reception  accorded  by  Italy  to  William  II, 
when  he  went  there  in  1904,  seemed  less  hearty  than 
the  one  given  simultaneously  to  Mr.  Loubet.     On 


166  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

the  other  hand,  it  was  impossible  not  to  recognize 
that  clouds  were  arising  between  Vienna  and  Rome. 
The  irredentist  incidents  of  Innsbruck,  Trent,  and 
Trieste,  together  with  armaments  that  were  sym- 
metric and  manifestations  that  were  hostile,  had  on 
various  occasions,  in  spite  of  the  two  Governments, 
brought  out  popular  antipathies.  Last  of  all,  Italy's 
Balkan  ambitions,  the  well-known  theory  of  'Hhe 
Adriatic  equilibrium,''  which  practically  amounted 
to  claiming  for  the  Italians  alone  the  supremacy  of 
these  seas,  could  not  fail  to  give  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment serious  food  for  thought.  With  the  lauda- 
ble desire  of  coming  to  an  understanding,  Rome  and 
Vienna  had  elaborated  agreements  in  view  of  the 
statu  quo  —  promesse  di  non  fare,  as  Signor  Ugo 
Ojetti  one  day  said.  But  such  expedients  were  pre- 
carious. And  the  awakening  of  the  Balkan  prob- 
lem might,  whether  Germany  willed  it  or  not,  put 
her  Italian  Allies  and  her  Austrian  Allies  at  logger- 
heads. 

The  Emperor  William's  uneasiness  was  not  long 
in  showing  itself.  On  the  8th  of  April,  1904,  the 
Franco-English  arrangement  was  signed.  On  the 
28th  of  the  same  month,  he  spoke  at  Carlsruhe,  and 
this  is  what  he  said:  ^^Let  us  think  of  the  great 
epoch  when  the  German  unity  was  created,  of  the 
battles  of  Woerth,  Weissembourg,  and  Sedan.  Pres- 
ent events  invite  us  to  forget  our  domestic  discords. 
Let  us  be  united  in  preparation  for  the  occasion 
when  we  may  be  compelled  to  intervene  in  the  policy 
of  the  world."     On  the  1st  of    May,  when  inaugu- 


FRANCE  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE         167 

rating  a  bridge  at  Mainz,  he  spoke  again  and  still 
more  clearly:  ^'This  work,  which  is  intended  to  de- 
velop the  pacific  relations  of  our  country,  may  have 
to  be  used  for  purposes  that  are  more  serious. '^  Fi- 
nally, on  the  14th  of  May,  the  same  tone  might  be 
remarked  at  Saarbriick.  And,  after  congratulating 
himself  on  the  fact  that  the  town  in  which  he  was 
speaking  had  ceased,  thanks  to  the  German  victo- 
ries, being  a  frontier  town,  he  unnecessarily  boasted, 
in  the  course  of  his  peregrinations,  of  having  visited 
Metz,  ^Hhe  bulwark  of  Germany, '^  which  ^^  sought  no 
quarrel  with  any  one,  but  was  ready  to  defend  itself 
against  all  the  world."  It  is  true  that,  for  another 
ten  months,  no  act  followed  these  words.  The  Chan- 
cellor of  the  Empire,  who  had  made  the  Franco- 
Italian  tour  de  valse  a  subject  for  his  jesting,  who, 
in  1902,  had  declared  that  the  ^^Franco-Italian  agree- 
ments respecting  certain  Mediterranean  questions 
were  not  directed  against  the  Triple  Alliance,  and 
did  not,  in  fine,  encroach  on  its  scope,  who,  three 
months  later,  had  added:  ^' We  have  no  gable  front 
on  the  Mediterranean;  we  are  pleased  to  see  that 
France  and  Italy,  who  each  have  great,  important 
interests  there,  have  come  to  an  understanding  on 
the  question,"  —  the  Chancellor  himself  appeared 
also  to  be  as  little  disturbed  by  the  Franco-English 
agreement  as  he  had  been  by  that  between  France 
and  Italy.  On  the  12th  of  April,  1904,  he  said,  when 
commenting  on  the  Treaty  of  the  8th  of  April :  ^^  We 
have  nothing  to  object  to  in  it  from  the  point  of  view 
of  German  interests."     On  the  14th,  he  advocated  a 


168  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 


'^policy  of  calm  reflection,  and  even  of  reserve/'  as- 
serting his  determination  ^^not  to  embark  the  coun- 
try on  any  adventurous  scheme''  —  the  reference 
being  to  Morocco.  From  that  moment,  however, 
the  Emperor  and  Mr.  von  Buelow  —  the  Emperor's 
alter  ego  —  were  conscious  that  the  hour  was  ap- 
proaching for  them  to  enter,  at  least  on  the  diplo- 
matic if  not  on  the  military  course  which  should 
decide  about  the  future.  They  felt  that  an  era  of 
equilibrium  was  succeeding  in  Europe  to  the  period 
of  Germany's  hegemony.  About  Morocco  they 
cared  but  little.  It  was  merely  a  pretext.  Their 
preoccupation  was  '^Germany's  situation  in  the 
world,"  and  by  this  they  meant  German  preponder- 
ance based  on  the  isolation  of  France.  The  pre- 
ponderance, as  they  thought,  was  in  peril.  If  they 
waited,  it  was  because  they  hoped  thereby  to  obtain 
circumstances  more  favourable.  Since  the  month 
of  February,  1904,  Russia  had  been  monopolized  by 
the  war  in  Manchuria.  How  would  this  war  turn 
out?     Before  acting,  they  must  know. 

In  the  month  of  September,  General  Kouropatkin 
suffered  a  first  disaster  at  Liao-Yang.  In  the  month 
of  February,  1905,  that  of  Mukden  was  worse.  The 
moment  had  arrived ;  the  moment  to  defend,  against 
European  claims,  ^'the  edifice  raised  by  the  Emper- 
or's grandfather,"  the  moment  to  destroy  coalitions 
that  were  forming,  the  moment  to  put  in  check  the 
vanquished  of  the  past  or  the  aggressors  of  the  fu- 
ture. On  the  31st  of  March,  1905,  WilHam  II,  by 
disembarking  at  Tangier,    proclaimed  his   hostility 


FRANCE  AND   THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE         169 

towards  France.  In  reality,  it  was  one  system  of 
Alliances  which  opposed  itself  to  another.  It  was 
the  Triple  Alliance  which  was  trying  its  strength 
against  the  Dual,  the  latter  backed  up  by  the  Entente 
Cordiale.  The  diplomatic  shock,  which  had  been 
preparing  since  1875,  was  about  to  take  place.  His- 
tory would  pursue  its  way  with  relentless  logic. 


GHAPT^^  y 

CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES 

I.  German  Offensive.  —  Mr.  von  Kuhlmann's  statements.  — 
Cause  and  pretext.  —  William  II  at  Tangier.  —  Mistakes 
of  Mr.  Delcasse.  —  Prince  Henckel  of  Donnersmarck.  — 
Scare  in  France.  —  Mr.  Delcasse's  resignation. 
II.  German  success.  —  Mr.  Rouvier  and  the  Conference.  — 
Acceptance  of  the  Conference  by  France.  —  French-German 
agreements.  —  Moroccan  concessions  of  Germany.  —  Suc- 
cess of  the  great  German  design. 
III.   German   discomfiture.  —  Situation  just  before  Algeciras. 

—  Germany's  error.  —  Fluctuations  of  German  policy.  — 
Ends  and  means.  —  "European  reprobation."  —  Failure  of 
the  German  attempt  to  restore  the  Bismarckian  hegem- 
ony.—  Russian  Alliance  and  the  Western  understandings. 

—  Triple  Alliance.  —  Opinion  in  Germany.  —  Resignation 
of  Prince  von  Buelow  to  the  inevitable. 


It  is  impossible  to  justify,  and  difficult  even  to 
understand,  Germany's  Moroccan  policy  during  the 
crisis  of  1905-1906,  if  its  manifestations  only  are 
considered.  If,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  regarded  as  a 
functional  part  of  her  European  policy,  everything 
becomes  clear;  and  it  is  seen  to  be  an  attempt  to 
prove  the  value  of  the  several  international  combi- 
nations made  between  1902  and  1904,  an  effort  to 
demolish  these  combinations  by  menace,  if  not  by 

170 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  171 

violence,  a  Bismarckian  operation  carried  out  by 
men  who  had  neither  enough  of  Bismarck's  prestige 
nor  enough  of  his  genius  to  succeed. 

On  the  11th  of  February,  1905,  while  Mr.  Saint- 
Rene  Taillandier,  our  Minister  in  Morocco,  was 
engaged  in  explaining  to  the  Sultan  the  plan  of  re- 
forms that  he  had  drawn  up,  Mr.  von  Kuhlmann, 
Germany's  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Tangier,  said  to 
Comte  de  Cherisey,  his  French  colleague :  — 

After  the  Franco-English  agreement,  we  supposed  the 
French  Government  would  wait,  to  put  us  into  possession  of 
the  facts  concerning  this  new  situation,  until  the  Franco-Span- 
ish understanding  was  effected,  which  was  foreshadowed  in  the 
arrangement  of  the  8th  of  April.  But,  to-day,  everything  be- 
ing definitely  concluded,  and  the  requisite  Parliamentary  ratifi- 
cations having  been  obtained,  we  find  that  we  have  been 
systematically  kept  ignorant  of  what  was  going  on. 

We  have  therefore  regulated  our  attitude  in  accordance. 

Do  not  imagine  that  I  have  laid  down  my  line  of  conduct 
on  my  own  initiative.  In  presence  of  the  contradictory  inter- 
pretations of  our  newspapers,  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  ask  my 
Government  for  formal  instructions.  Count  von  Buelow  there- 
upon informed  me  that  the  Imperial  Government  had  no 
knowledge  of  the  different  agreements  that  had  been  made  with 
reference  to  Morocco,  and  did  not  recognize  that  he  was  in  any 
way  bound  as  regards  the  question.^ 

These  statements  were  calculated  to  surprise  us. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  false  that  Germany  had 
been  kept  in  '^systematic  ignorance."  On  the  23d 
of  March,  1904,  before  the  Franco-English  agree- 
ment was  signed,  Mr.  Delcasse  informed  Prince 
von  Radolin  of  its  tenor.  The  Ambassador  re- 
plied that  he  found  the  arrangement  ''very  natural 

1  See  Yellow  Book,  1901-t1905. 


172  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

and  perfectly  justified."  On  the  25th  of  March,  fol- 
lowing on  these  verbal  explanations,  the  North  Ger- 
man Gazette  wrote :  — 

As  far  as  can  be  at  present  judged,  German  interests  cannot 
be  affected  by  the  various  exchanges  of  views  concerning  Mo- 
rocco. 

By  reason  of  the  reiterated  assurance  officially  given  on  the 
French  side  that  France  has  no  conquest,  no  occupation  in  view, 
but  is  pursuing  rather  the  opening  of  the  Sultan's  dominions  in 
North  West  Africa  to  European  civilization,  there  is  ground  for 
believing  that  Germany's  commercial  interests  in  Morocco  have 
nothing  to  be  afraid  of. 

With  regard  to  this  problem,  therefore,  there  is  no  need,  as 
far  as  the  Germans  are  concerned,  to  take  umbrage  at  the  Franco- 
English  understanding  which  is  at  present  in  force.^ 

A  fortnight  later,  the  text  of  the  Agreement 
was  published  in  London.  On  the  12th  of  April, 
Count  von  Buelow,  Chancellor  of  the  Empire,  said 
in  the  Reichstag :  — 

We  know  of  nothing  that  should  lead  us  to  think  that  this 
agreement  is  directed  against  any  Power  whatsoever.  What  it 
seems  to  indicate  is  an  attempt  to  settle  a  series  of  disputes  be- 
tween France  and  England  by  means  of  an  amicable  under- 
standing. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  German  interests,  we  have  no  ob- 
jection to  make  against  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  cannot  be 
desirous  of  a  tension  between  France  and  England  which  would 
be  a  danger  for  the  peace  of  the  world,  whereas  we  are  sincerely 
anxious  that  peace  should  be  maintained. 

To  speak  more  especially  of  Morocco,  which  constitutes  the 
essential  part  of  this  agreement,  we  are  interested  in  this  coun- 
try, as  indeed  in  the  rest  of  the  Mediterranean,  chiefly  from  an 
economic  point  of  view. 

Our  interests  there  are,  first  and  foremost,  commercial.     So 

1  See  Yellow  Book,  1901-1905. 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  173 

we  have  important  reasons  for  wishing  tranquillity  and  order 
to  reign  in  Morocco. 

We  owe  it  to  ourselves  to  protect  our  commercial  interests 
in  Morocco,  and  we  shall  protect  them.  Nor  is  there  anything 
to  make  us  fear  that  they  can  be  overlooked  or  injured  by  one 
Power  or  another.^ 

On  the  14th  of  April,  returning  to  the  subject,  the 
Chancellor  expressed  himself  as  follows :  — 

Count  Reventlow  pretends  that  the  Anglo-French  agreement, 
and  especially  the  fundamental  part  of  it  referring  to  Morocco, 
called  forth  in  Germany  sentiments  of  dismay  and  discourage- 
ment. 

He  deems  that  we  ought  not  to  have  suffered  other  Powers 
to  acquire  in  Morocco  a  greater  influence  than  ourselves. 

That  can  only  signify  this :  namely,  that  we  ourselves  ought 
to  claim  a  part  of  Morocco.  I  should  like  to  ask  Count  Revent- 
low one  question,  which  is  very  simple. 

Count  Reventlow  will  certainly  agree  with  me  that,  if  a  great 
Empire,  like  that  of  Germany,  formulates  such  a  claim,  she 
must  pursue  the  realization  of  the  claim,  cost  what  it  may. 

What  now  would  Count  Reventlow  advise  me  to  do,  if  a  claim 
of  this  kind  were  to  be  resisted  ? 

I  do  not  say  it  is  certain  that  such  a  claim  would  meet  with 
resistance ;  I  do  not  say  this  is  likely ;  I  say  only  that,  in  ques- 
tions of  such  gravity,  no  eventuality  should  be  lost  sight  of. 

Would  Count  Reventlow  advise  me  to  unsheath  the  sword? 

Count  Reventlow  does  not  reply,  and  I  understand  his  si- 
lence.    (Laughter.) 

I  think.  Gentlemen,  it  would  be  inconsiderate  on  my  part,  — 
and  I  am  pleased  to  note  that  the  leaders  of  all  parties,  except 
Count  Reventlow,  have  expressed  a  similar  opinion,  —  to  decide 
unnecessarily  on  embarking  the  country  in  such  an  adventurous 
enterprise. 

I  think,  too.  Gentlemen,  that,  were  I  so  to  act.  Count  Revent- 
low, in  whom  the  critical  faculty  seems  to  me  to  be  strongly 
developed,  would  reproach  me  with  my  exaggerated  ardour  for 
action  as  keenly  as  he  has  blamed  my  so-called  fear  of  action. 

1  See  Yellow  Book,  1901-1905. 


174  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

On  the  20th  of  April,  Mr.  Bihourd,  French  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin,  saw  Baron  von  Richthofen,  then 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  said  to  him :  — 

"  I  much  appreciated  the  Chancellor's  language, 
when  he  acknowledged  in  the  Reichstag  that  the 
Franco-English  understanding  was  not  directed 
against  any  Power  and  in  no  wise  threatened  Ger- 
man commercial  interests/' 

In  reply,  Mr.  von  Richthofen  expressed  no  ob- 
jection, made  no  reservation. 

On  the  7th  of  October,  after  the  signature  of  the 
Franco-Spanish  agreement,  Mr.  Bihourd  informed 
Baron  von  Richthofen  of  the  fact. 

^^Are  you  able,''  the  Baron  said  to  him,  'Ho  fore- 
cast the  scope  of  the  agreement  with  regard  to  Ger- 
many's commercial  interests,  which  are  what  I  have 
especially  to  think  of?" 

''The  Franco-English  declaration  of  the  8th  of 
April  last,"  replied  Mr.  Bihourd,  ''offers  every  guar- 
antee on  this  point,  nor  can  Spain's  adhesion  modify 
anything  in  the  promises  then  made." 

Finally,  on  the  13th  of  October,  the  French  Am- 
bassador communicated  to  Mr.  von  Richthofen  the 
text  of  the  Franco-Spanish  declaration.  Once  more 
the  Minister  spoke  to  him  of  the  exclusively  eco- 
nomic interest  that  Germany  took  in  Moroccan  af- 
fairs. The  Ambassador  immediately  answered,  — 
renewing  his  assurances  in  Mr.  Delcasse's  name,  — 
that  "the  Franco-English  declaration  of  the  8th  of 
April  expressly  guaranteed  commercial  liberty  and 
that  the  Franco-Spanish  declaration  could  not,  in 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  175 

his  opinion,  affect  the  securities  already  offered  to 
international  commerce." 

Consequently,  Mr.  von  Kuhlmann^s  assertion  was 
entirely  unwarranted.  It  constituted  a  "bait^^  — 
founded  on  a  pretext  —  in  view  of  diplomatic  action 
dictated  by  reasons  of  a  general  and  not  a  local  na- 
ture. The  reasons  were  likewise  general,  not  local, 
which  guided  the  development  of  this  action.  On 
the  15th  of  February,  Mr.  von  Muhlberg,  Under- 
Secretary  for  State  Affairs,  when  questioned  by  Mr. 
Bihourd  about  Mr.  von  Kuhlmann's  statements,  re- 
plied that  he  had  no  cognizance  of  them.  A  fort- 
night later,  the  Russian  Army  suffered  its  decisive 
defeat  at  Mukden,  a  defeat  which  was  destined  to 
render  the  Saint  Petersburg  Cabinet  powerless  for 
some  time  to  come.  Straightway,  Germany's  real 
policy  revealed  itself.  On  the  21st  of  February,  the 
German  Consul  at  Fez  reported  to  headquarters  that 
Mr.  Saint- Rene  Taillandier,  in  order  to  back  up  his 
plan  of  reforms,  had  claimed  that  he  held  a  ^^  man- 
date from  Europe."  This  assertion  was  false.  On 
the  7th  of  March,  the  same  official  denounced  the 
^^  aggressive  Colonial  tendencies  of  France."  On  the 
12th  of  March,  it  was  announced  that  William  II 
would  call  at  Tangier  in  the  course  of  his  cruise  in 
the  Mediterranean.  On  the  16th  of  March,  Mr.  von 
Bullow,  speaking  ambiguously  in  the  Reichstag, 
said :  — 

Herr  von  Reventlow  touches  on  the  question  whether 
fresh  agreements  between  third  parties  can  affect  our  relations 
with  Morocco. 


176  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Herr  von  Reventlow  seems  to  find  that  our  policy  is  too 
inactive  on  this  point,  and  that  we  are  allowing  ourselves  to  be 
guilty  of  negligence. 

I  quite  understand  the  attention  paid  here  to  the  events 
now  taking  place  in  Morocco  and  to  their  significance. 

I  consider  it  to  be  the  duty  of  the  German  Government  to 
see  that,  in  the  future,  our  economic  interests  in  this  country 
are  not  injured. 

The  moment  is  inopportune  to  make  more  particular  state- 
ments. 

I  defer  these  till  later. 

On  the  29th  of  March,  the  Chancellor  said :  — 

The  Emperor  some  time  ago  told  the  King  of  Spain  that  Ger- 
many seeks  in  Morocco  no  territorial  advantage. 

After  a  declaration  so  categoric,  it  is  absurd  to  try  to  explain 
the  Emperor's  visit  to  Tangier  by  intentions  directed  against 
the  integrity  or  independence  of  Morocco. 

From  this  visit  of  the  Emperor  to  Tangier,  nothing  can  be 
deduced,  as  to  its  motive,  that  is  of  a  nature  to  render  any  one 
uneasy  who  himself  has  no  aggressive  intentions  there. 

Herr  Bebel  has  hinted  that  our  policy  with  regard  to  Mo- 
rocco has  changed  in  the  last  year. 

I  must  remind  him  that  the  language  and  attitude  of  diplo- 
matists and  politicians  are  regulated  by  circumstances. 

The  moment  that  I  judge  to  be  favourable  for  setting  forth 
German  interests,  I  choose  according  to  my  own  estimation. 

With  this  understood,  nothing  has  changed  in  the  tendencies 
of  German  policy  on  the  point  in  question. 

Whoever  seeks  anything  new  will  not  find  it  in  German 
policy. 

But  if  any  attempt  should  be  made  to  modify  the  interna- 
tional situation  of  Morocco  or  to  establish  any  check  on  the 
open  door  in  the  country's  economic  development,  we  must  see 
more  than  ever  that  our  economic  interests  are  not  endangered. 

We  should  first  put  ourselves  into  relations  with  the  Sultan 
on  the  subject. 

The  threat;  therefore,  was  rendered  more  precise. 
On  the  31st  of  March,  it  was  repeated  with  circum- 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  177 

stance.  Disembarking  at  Tangier,  William  II 
spoke  to  the  representative  of  Abd  el  Aziz  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

To-day,  I  pay  my  visit  to  the  Sultan  in  his  character  of  in- 
dependent sovereign. 

I  hope  that,  under  the  Sultan's  sovereignty,  a  free  Morocco 
will  remain  open  to  the  pacific  competition  of  all  nations,  without 
monopoly  and  without  annexation,  on  a  footing  of  absolute  equal- 
ity. 

My  visit  to  Tangier  is  intended  to  make  known  the  fact 
that  I  am  resolved  to  do  all  that  is  in  my  power  properly  to  safe- 
guard the  interests  of  Germany,  since  I  consider  the  Sultan  as 
being  an  absolutely  free  sovereign. 

It  is  with  him  that  I  mean  to  come  to  an  understanding 
respecting  the  best  way  of  safeguarding  such  interests. 

As  regards  the  reforms  which  the  Sultan  is  intending  to 
make,  it  seems  to  me  that  any  action  in  this  direction  should  be 
taken  with  great  precaution,  respect  being  had  for  the  religious 
sentiments  of  the  population  in  order  that  there  may  be  no 
disturbance  of  public  tranquillity. 

By  a  circular  addressed  to  the  various  German 
Ambassadors  on  the  12th  of  April,  the  Chancellor 
appealed  to  Europe.  The  die  was  cast.  The  sub- 
stance of  his  communication  was  a  reiteration  of  the 
imaginary  grievances  already  invoked  by  Mr.  von 
Kuhlmann,  together  with  proposals  for  remedying 
what  was  amiss.  Relying  on  her  rights  and  the 
agreements  she  had  made,  France  had  endeavoured 
to  act  alone.  Mr.  von  Biinlow  demanded  that  an 
International  Conference  should  be  summoned,  com- 
posed of  the  signataries  of  the  1880  Convention  of 
Madrid.^     This   Convention,    it   was   manifest,    had 

1  See  White  Book  for  1906. 

N 


178  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

nothing  to  do  with  the  subject  now  raised,  —  and 
German  jurisconsults  themselves  acknowledged  this, 
—  since  it  had  merely  settled  the  altogether  special 
question  of  the  protection  to  be  granted  to  Moroc- 
cans by  the  several  Foreign  Legations.  But,  by 
forcing  France  to  accept  it,  Europe  was  to  be  shown 
that,  in  spite  of  the  agreements  recently  concluded, 
there  was  nothing  changed  in  the  world,  and  that 
Germany  had  only  to  oppose  a  certain  policy  for  it 
to  be  altered  in  accordance  with  her  wishes.  On 
the  27th  of  May,  the  Moroccan  ''Notables,"  being 
assembled  to  hear  what  Mr.  Saint-Rene  Taillandier 
had  to  say,  took  up  on  their  own  account  the  Ger- 
man idea  of  a  Conference.  On  the  30th,  the  Sultan 
made  the  proposal  his  own,  and  Abd  el  Aziz  thus 
became  the  instrument  of  the  European  scheme 
which  recent  Western  agreements  had  tempted  Ger- 
many to  try  to  carry  out,  which  the  Russian  defeats 
had  allowed  her  to  initiate. 

Considered  by  itself,  the  game  was  a  magnificent 
one  for  the  French  Government  to  play.     Thirty- 
four  years  had    passed    since    the  signing    of    the 
Treaty  of  Frankfort.     After  being  vanquished,  dis-\ 
membered,  threatened  afresh  in  1875,  isolated  until    | 
1891,  our  country  had,  through  the  Russian  Alliance,    / 
been  restored  to  the  possibility  of  diplomatic  action^ 
In  spite  of  errors,  she  had  pursued  her  way  towards 
the  attainment  of  an  increasingly  stable  equilibrium, 
towards  an  autonomy  more  safely  guarded  on  the 
outside.     She  had  successively  drawn  nearer  to  Italy 
England,  and  Spain;    and  had  utilized  these  rap- 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  179 

prochements  for  the  service  of  her  most  essential  in- 
terests —  her  Mediterranean  interests.  The  weight 
had  grown  lighter  with  which  triumphant  Germany 
pressed  upon  her;  and  it  was  in  the  plenitude  of 
her  good  right  that  she  had  acquired  such  guarantees. 
After  his  installation  at  the  Foreign  Office  in  1898, 
Mr.  Delcasse  had  done  more  than  any  other  Minister 
preceding  him  towards  obtaining  this  result.  For- 
tified by  his  patriotism,  by  Mr.  Waldeck-Rousseau's 
confidence  (1899-1902),  by  Mr.  Combes'  indiffer- 
ence respecting  questions  of  foreign  policy  (1902- 
1905),  he  had  methodically  applied  the  plan  that  he 
had  laid  down  for  himself,  probably  without  under- 
estimating the  risks  attending  it. 

Unfortunately,  when  these  risks  revealed  them- 
selves, Mr.  Delcasse  had  as  yet  done  nothing  to  ward 
them  off.  Absorbed  by  his  contemplation  of  the 
goal,  with  his  eyes  raised  aloft,  he  no  longer  saw  the 
snares  that  lay  in  his  path.  After  the  signing 
of  the  Franco-English  agreement,  he  allowed  ten 
months  to  go  by  without  taking  any  action  in  Mo- 
rocco, just  as  if  he  had  been  in  sovereign  disposal  of 
a  serene  future.  He  had  waited  to  act  until  the 
rout  of  the  Russians  at  Liao-Yang,  with  those  at 
Mukden  and  Tsusima,  which  were  worse,  deprived 
us  of  our  best  trump  card,  of  our  sole  Alliance,  of 
our  only  support  on  the  Continent.  Nor  had  he 
taken  any  measures  to  provide  for  the  consequences 
of  such  conduct.  Being  split  up  into  two  parties  by 
the  Dreyfus  Affair,  and  subsequently  by  the  religious 
quarrel,  France  had  lost  her  inclination  for  action 


180  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

abroad.  Disheartened  by  the  system  of  delation 
that  prevailed,  our  Army  and  Navy  had  no  leaders, 
no  organization,  no  ammunition,  no  provisions  ade- 
quate to  the  role  they  should  have  been  ready  at 
any  minute  to  play.  For  some  idea  to  be  gained  of 
their  weakness  at  this  time,  it  suffices  to  mention 
that  the  extraordinary  credits,  hastily  spent  in  order 
to  remedy  the  worst  deficiencies,  amounted,  in  1905, 
to  225  millions;  and  this,  ^Ho  execute  in  a  few 
months  what  should  have  been  spread  over  years, 
this,  to  fill  up  enormous  shortage  in  the  stock  of 
ammunition,  to  place  our  four  great  fortresses  in  a 
proper  state  of  defence,  to  complete  the  weapons 
and  equipment  of  our  armies,  to  construct  the  rail- 
ways that  were  absolutely  indispensable  for  oper- 
ating the  concentration  set  down  in  our  plans  of 
mobilization."  ^  For  months  past  and  years  past,  the 
nation's  ^^expenditure''  had  been  cheese-pared  to  the 
profit  of  ^'Social"  laws.  For  months  past  and  years 
past,  the  Government  had  been  living  in  a  deceitful 
security,  hiding  from  the  country  the  consequences 
accruing  from  the  policy  —  in  itself  excellent  enough 
—  which  they  were  being  compelled  to  carry  out. 
And  when  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  anx- 
iously asked  for  information  respecting  our  military 
preparedness,  he  replied:  — 

''You  are  asking  me  too  much.  I  do  my  own  duty 
and  presume  that  my  colleagues  do  theirs." 

It  is  not  with  ''suppositions"  that  nations  are  led 
to  victory.  When  Bismarck  founded  Germany,  he 
^  See  Pierre  Baudin's  book,  The  Alarm. 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  181 

first  consulted  Moltke.  Mr.  Delcasse  had  questioned 
neither  General  Andre,  nor  yet  Mr.  Camille  Pellet  an, 
whose  bad  administration,  however,  he  had  no  right 
to  ignore.  Being  the  dupe  of  a  strange  illusion,  he 
believed  that  a  diplomatic  operation  was  self-suf- 
ficing. He  forgot  that  the  basis  of  a  diplomatic  oper- 
ation is  formed  out  of  the  military  cash-in-hand  of  a 
nation,  that,  when  one  Power  intends  to  uphold  her 
rights  and  her  designs,  she  prevails  only  by  the  con- 
sideration in  which  her  strength  is  held,  that,  in 
order  to  be  able  to  resist  pressure  in  a  state  of  peace, 
what  is  needed  is  the  capacity  for  repelling  an  ag- 
gression through  war.  Being  aware  that  German 
opposition  would  be  made,  sooner  or  later,  not  to  his 
Moroccan  but  to  his  general  policy,  he,  however,  did 
not  perceive  that  a  France  half-disarmed  both  mate- 
rially and  morally  was  fatally  condemned  to  yield. 
He  willed  the  end  without  willing  the  means.  It 
was  a  ruinous  aberration  of  mind  in  a  good  French- 
man who,  by  dint  of  regarding  that  which  was  de- 
sirable, had  lost  all  notion  of  the  real,  and  the  senti- 
ment of  what  was  possible. 

It  was  not  long  before  the  consequence  of  this  mis- 
take overwhelmed  us.  On  the  31st  of  March  and  the 
7th  of  April,  Mr.  Delcasse  made  two  useless  speeches, 
one  in  the  Senate  and  one  in  the  Chamber,  in  which 
he  feigned  not  to  understand  the  meaning  of  the  dis- 
cussion. On  the  13th  of  April,  he  had  a  personal 
interview  with  Prince  von  Radolin,  and  on  the  18th 
he  caused  a  communication  to  be  made  to  Mr.  von 
Muhlberg,  for  the   purpose  of  '^removing  the  mis- 


182  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

understanding.'^  But  neither  in  Paris  nor  in  Berlin 
did  he  receive  a  reply.  On  the  19th  of  April,  a  pain- 
ful, alarming,  humiliating  discussion  occurred  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs was  not  in  his  usual  form.  Mr.  Rouvier,  the 
Prime  Minister,  raised  a  corner  of  the  veil  when  he 
exclaimed :  — 

What  is  it  that  we  are  reproached  with? 

With  not  informing  Germany  of  the  Franco-English  agree- 
ment on  the  morrow  of  its  being  signed. 

Rather  should  it  be  said  "with  not  informing  other  nations''; 
since  no  notification  was  made  of  the  agreement  which  the  Cham- 
ber had  approved. 

Had  not  the  Chancellor's  speech  the  value  of  an  acquiescence  ? 

Did  not  the  Chancellor  declare  himself  satisfied  on  condi- 
tion Germany's  commercial  interests  were  not  threatened  ? 

What  has  taken  place  since  then  ? 

Certain  military  happenings  have  weakened  our  Ally. 

Perhaps,  then,  the  neighbours  with  whom  we  wish  to  live  in 
harmony  thought  that,  by  raising  a  debate,  they  might  open  a 
question  which  we  were  justified  in  deeming  closed  by  reason 
even  of  the  language  held  on  the  other  side  of  the  Vosges,  and 
might  thus  obtain  some  commercial  advantages. 

This  was  the  truth ;  but  it  was  rather  late  in  the 
day  to  utter  it.  After  resigning  for  a  first  time,  and 
then  withdrawing  his  resignation  on  the  20th  of 
April,  Mr.  Delcasse  resumed  the  direction  of  his  De- 
partment, but  with  diminished  authority.  It  was 
just  at  this  moment  that  Germany  and  Morocco  de- 
manded the  assembling  of  a  Conference.  Mr.  Del- 
casse attempted  to  reply  by  a  refusal;  as,  however, 
he  had  neither  previously  arranged  for  the  conditions 
of  his  refusal  nor  yet  prepared  them,  his  thesis  was 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  183 

untenable.  One  needs  trump  cards  in  order  to  be 
able  to  resist  a  '^  bluff/'  And  we  had  none.  Every- 
day, German  pressure  became  increasingly  insolent. 
Prince  Henckel  of  Donnersmarck,  whose  colossal 
fortune  assured  him  at  the  Court  of  Berlin  a  situa- 
tion which  he  had  not  merited  by  his  career,  came 
to  Paris  as  a  bearer  of  comminatory  language.  After 
going  over  certain  petty  grievances,  he  came  straight 
to  the  point,  and  said :  — 

We  have,  moreover,  to  complain  of  more  serious  grievances 
and  grave  lack  of  customary  courtesy.  You  have  endeavoured 
to  detach  from  us  the  Power  that  was  our  ally  and  this  on  the 
advice  of  another  Power  with  whom  you  have  established  a  cor- 
dial understanding.  You  certainly  have  the  right  to  choose 
your  friends  and  your  allies  as  you  like ;  but  we  owe  it  to  our- 
selves to  protect  ourselves  against  the  consequences  that  may 
be  involved  for  Germany  by  the  agreements  that  you  contract. 

If  your  arrangements  with  England  aimed  only  at  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  in  Europe,  we  should  have  sincerely  applauded 
them.  Unfortunately,  the  appreciations  of  newspapers  that  are 
supposed  to  reflect  Government  opinion,  certain  conversations 
having  all  the  importance  of  official  declarations,  the  speech 
made  by  King  Edward  VII  in  Paris,  have  convinced  us  that 
the  chief  object  of  the  Entente  Cordiale  was  to  secure  the 
isolation  of  Germany,  preceding  and  preparing  an  aggression  in 
the  near  future.  Last  of  all,  by  disposing,  without  warning  us 
or  consulting  us,  of  the  Empire  of  Morocco,  you  have  wounded 
the  German  Emperor  and  the  German  people  to  the  quick. 

Is  this  policy  that  of  France,  or  must  we  consider  it  as  being 
merely  personal  to  Monsieur  Delcasse  ? 

If  you  are  of  opinion  that  your  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
has  engaged  your  country  in  too  adventurous  a  course,  acknowl- 
edge it  by  dispensing  with  his  services,  and  especially  by  giving 
a  new  direction  to  your  foreign  policy. 

We  are  not  concerned  with  Monsieur  Delcasse's  person ;  but 
his  policy  is  a  threat  to  Germany;  and  you  may  rest  assured 
that  we  shall  not  wait  for  it  to  be  realized.     The  Emperor  does 


184  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

not  desire  war.  His  chief  care  is  to  favour  the  development  and 
expansion  of  German  commerce.  The  German  navy,  which  he 
means  shall  be  large  and  powerful,  is  only  a  means  for  carrying 
out  his  exclusively  pacific  designs. 

On  this  ground,  the  Emperor  naturally  finds  himself  in  rivalry 
with  England,  who,  by  tradition,  is  bent  on  destroying  the  fleets 
of  her  neighbours,  or  rather  on  preventing  their  creation.  It  is 
for  you  to  decide  whether  you  prefer  to  serve  England's  inter- 
ests, after  taking  into  account  the  perils  to  which  you  expose 
yourselves  by  a  verbal  understanding  which  you  are  thinking  of 
transforming  into  a  written  alliance. 

The  Emperor  respects  your  Army,  the  high  value  of  which  he 
is  far  from  underestimating.  He  is,  however,  warned,  and  it  is 
better  you  yourselves  should  be  so  too,  of  the  causes  that  may 
weaken  it  and  of  the  germs  of  dissolution  that  have  been  sown 
throughout  it. 

In  a  war  against  Germany,  you  may  possibly  be  victorious,  since 
in  her  most  tragic  crises  France  has  always  found  extraordinary 
resources  in  herself ;  but,  if  you  are  vanquished,  —  and  my  first 
hypothesis  deprives  my  second  of  all  offensive  character,  —  if 
you  are  vanquished,  as  you  probably  will  be,  it  is  in  Paris  that 
peace  will  have  to  be  signed. 

Are  you  hoping  that,  faithful  throughout  to  the  friendship 
uniting  you,  England  will  make  common  cause  with  you,  and 
attempt  —  on  the  German  coast  —  a  diversion  from  which  you 
might  derive  advantage  ?  That  is  possible.  Let  us  assume  the 
most  favourable  case  for  you.  She  bombards  our  ports,  she 
destroys  our  fleets,  she  ruins  our  Colonies.  With  your  billions, 
we  shall  repair  the  damage  of  all  kinds  that  she  may  have  caused 
us.  She  may  deem  herself  impregnable  at  home;  but,  if  we 
occupy  your  territory,  she  will  be  powerless  to  drive  us  away. 

And  now  let  us  examine  what  I  will  call  the  other  picture. 

France  does  not  threaten  Germany.  According  to  the  desire 
of  my  friend  Gambetta,  she  still  thinks  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine ; 
but  she  never  talks  about  them.  Other  questions  of  more  im- 
mediate importance  solicit  her  attention;  since  the  world  is 
wide  enough  for  a  great  nation  like  yours  to  be  able  to  find  the 
wherewith  to  satisfy  her  present  ambitions,  while  adjourning 
hopes  that  are  for  the  moment  irrealizable. 

Your  country  would  assuredly  have  the  finest  and  most  glori- 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  185 

ous  role  that  a  civilized  nation  can  desire.  Placed  as  an  umpire 
between  friendly  England  and  Germany,  then,  not  hostile,  she 
might,  by  arbitrating  in  their  eventual  quarrel,  spare  the  world 
the  horror  of  a  general  conflagration. 

Believe  the  word  of  a  German  who  has  always  had  great 
sympathies  with  you.  Give  up  the  Minister  whose  only  aspira- 
tion is  to  trouble  the  peace  of  Europe;  and  adopt  with  regard 
to  Germany  a  loyal  and  open  policy,  the  only  one  which  is  worthy 
of  a  great  nation  like  yours,  if  you  wish  to  preserve  the  peace  of 
the  world. ^ 

A  few  days  later,  the  inevitable  occurred.  Con- 
scious of  our  military  weakness  and  Russians  power- 
lessness,  Mr.  Rouvier  decided  to  yield.  In  opposi- 
tion to  Mr.  Delcasse,  who  declined  negotiations  in 
view  of  a  Conference,  he  advocated  the  acceptance 
of  preliminary  pourparlers.  Being  supported  by  the 
majority  of  the  Cabinet,  he  did  not  refuse  the  resig- 
nation of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  when  it 
was  handed  in  to  him  the  second  time.  And  by  a 
regrettable  error,  the  disgrace  of  this  retreat  under 
the  enemy's  fire  was  not  even  masked  by  a  collective 
resignation  of  the  Ministry,  which  might  have  been 
reconstituted  on  the  morrow.  Germany  demolished 
the  Minister  who  had  vaunted  of  holding  his  own 
against  her — without,  indeed,  his  doing  anything  to 
render  himself  capable  of  such  action.  She  gained 
the  first  bout.  France  was  obliged,  notwithstand- 
ing her  alliances  and  friendships,  to  gainsay  and 
humble  herself.  And  to  enforce  this  success  William 
II  bestowed  on  Count  von  Buelow  the  title  of  Prince. 
^  Conversation  published  by  the  Gaulois  (June,  1905). 


186  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

II 

After  this  grave  set-back,  Mr.  Rouvier  found  him- 
self in  a  disadvantageous  situation  to  negotiate.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  two  agreements  which  he  con- 
cluded with  Germany,  on  the  10th  of  July  and  the 
10th  of  September,  conceded  Germany's  claims. 

If  the  Prime  Minister  hoped  that,  in  the  course  of 
fresh  pourparlers,  the  German  Chancellor's  exigencies 
would  be  lessened  by  Mr.  Delcasse's  retirement,  he 
was  soon  obliged  to  undeceive  himself.  Since  the 
immediate  occasion  of  their  dispute  was  not  the 
fundamental  cause  of  these  exigencies,  —  no  more 
in  the  second  phase  than  it  had  been  in  the  first,  — 
any  one  would  have  been  foolish  to  imagine  that  Mr. 
Rouvier's  arguments  on  the  subject  of  Morocco,  how- 
ever reasonable  they  might  be,  would  have  a  deter- 
mining influence  at  Wilhelmstrasse.  In  vain  the 
Prime  Minister  remarked  that  projects  were  attrib- 
uted to  us  which  had  not  entered  into  our 
thoughts;  that  we  had  solicited  the  Sultan  for  no 
concession  that  could  diminish  his  authority  or 
hamper  the  freedom  of  trade  within  the  boundaries 
of  his  Empire ;  that  we  had  neither  done  nor  dreamt 
of  doing  the  same  in  Morocco  as  we  had  done  in 
Tunis.  In  vain  he  added  that  a  Conference  would 
be  ^^ rather  a  complication  than  a  solution";  that,  if 
it  assembled  without  a  previous  understanding  being 
arrived  at,  it  would  turn  out  to  be  prejudicial;  that, 
if  it  assembled  after  an  understanding  had  been 
reached,  it  would  be  entirely  useless.     Prince  von 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  187 

Radolin,  acting  on  the  Chancellor's  orders,  contin- 
ued obstinately  to  demand  that  the  Conference 
should  be  summoned,  adding  (on  the  10th  of  June, 
1905) :  ^'  We  insist  on  the  Conference.  If  it  is  not 
held,  then  the  statu  quo  will  remain  in  force.  And 
you  must  know  that  we  will  back  up  Morocco  with 
our  entire  strength."  ^ 

If  the  matter,  thus  put,  had  referred  to  Africa,  and 
Africa  only;  if  Germany  had  merely  desired  to  ob- 
tain especial  advantages  in  the  Moorish  Empire  or 
elsewhere,  such  an  attitude  would  have  been  inex- 
plicable. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  understandable, 
if  the  Assembling  of  the  Conference  is  regarded  as  a 
proof  that  the  German  Government  was  attempting 
to  impose  her  hegemony  on  the  world ;  if  there  is  a 
consensus  of  opinion  to  the  effect  that  the  Moroccan 
dispute  was  the  ^^ occasion"  only  and  that  the  object 
to  be  attained  was  something  higher  —  and  else- 
where. In  this  month  of  June,  1905,  the  Germans 
knew  that  Mr.  Rouvier  was  willing  to  do  more  than 
pay  the  price  of  their  good-will  in  Morocco.  The 
financial  help  of  France  for  their  railways  in  Asia 
Minor  might  have  been  had  by  simply  asking.  They 
might  even  have  obtained  more,  —  perhaps  the  quot- 
ing of  their  public  and  private  securities  on  the  Paris 
Bourse.  These  advantages,  although  great,  did  not 
suffice  to  alter  their  attitude,  since  they  were  antici- 
pating larger  profit  from  the  satisfaction  being  ac- 

1  See  Yellow  Book  (1901-1905).  The  Yellow  Book  does  not 
say  "  with  our  entire  strength."  But  I  am  informed  by  Mr.  Rou- 
vier  that  this  was  the  Ambassador's  expression. 


188  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

corded  them  that  would  publicly  demonstrate  the 
continued  existence  of  their  preponderance. 

Indeed,  one  has  only  to  glance  at  the  two  agree- 
ments in  virtue  of  which,  during  July  and  Septem- 
ber, Mr.  Rouvier  prepared  with  Germany  the  meet- 
ing of  the  Conference.  From  the  Moroccan  point  of 
view,  these  agreements  were  not  disadvantageous  to 
France,  and  procured  her  stronger  guarantees  than 
those  we  had  first  hoped  for.  By  the  terms  of  the 
former  one,  Germany  declared  that  ^^she  pursued  no 
object  at  the  Conference  that  might  compromise  the 
legitimate  interests  of  France  in  Morocco  or  that  was 
contrary  to  the  rights  of  France  accruing  from  her 
treaties  or  arrangements."  She  placed  herself  in 
accordance  with  us  respecting  the  principles  them- 
selves which  had  never  ceased  to  inspire  our  policy, 
—  ^'the  sovereignty  and  independence  of  the  Sultan; 
the  integrity  of  his  Empire ;  economic  liberty  with- 
out any  inequality ;  the  utility  of  police  and  financial 
reforms,  the  introduction  of  which  would  be  regu- 
lated for  a  short  period  through  an  international 
agreement."  Last  of  all,  she  acknowledged  ^Hhe 
situation  enjoyed  by  France  in  Morocco  by  reason 
of  Algeria's  contiguity  to  the  Moorish  Empire  along 
a  vast  extent  of  frontier,  and  of  the  particular  rela- 
tions that  arise  between  two  bordering  countries, 
there  being  also  special  reasons  why  France  should 
desire  the  reign  of  order  throughout  the  Sultan's 
dominions."  The  second  agreement,  which  was  the 
consequence  of  the  first,  laid  equal  stress  on  our  privi- 
leges.    It  provided  for  ^Hhe  organization  of  a  police 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  189 

system  by  way  of  international  arrangement^^;  but 
^^  outside  of  the  frontier  region/'  there  being  an  un- 
derstanding to  the  effect  that,  in  this  region,  poHce 
questions  should  continue  to  be  settled  directly 
and  exclusively  between  France  and  the  Sultan,  and 
should  remain  outside  of  the  Conference  programme. '^ 
There  was  a  similar  understanding  with  regard  to 
the  repression  of  the  smuggling  of  arms  over  the 
area  of  the  same  region.  The  upshot  of  all  this  was 
that  Germany  did  not  dispute  our  ^^  peculiar  inter- 
ests." She  admitted  that  we  had  in  Morocco  an 
exceptional  situation.  She  placed  in  our  hands  cer- 
tain means  of  action,  the  value  of  which  was  incon- 
testable, since,  owing  to  them,  we  were  able  to  obtain 
at  Algeciras  the  recognition  of  our  rights  and  the 
guarantee  of  our  Moroccan  interests. 

But,  if  these  various  points  were  gained,  if  Germany 
made  us  concessions  which,  though  accorded  reluc- 
tantly, were  none  the  less  precious,  it  was  because, 
by  obtaining  our  adhesion  to  the  Conference  princi- 
ple, she  had  secured  that  which  she  most  desired.  In 
the  German  press  her  conduct  was  characterized  even 
as  a  policy  of  amour-propre  and  show-off.  We  will 
be  more  equitable  towards  the  Chancellor.  If  he  in- 
sisted so  strongly  on  the  Conference  being  held,  it 
was  because  alone  the  assembling  of  it  would  per- 
emptorily establish  that  French  understandings  were 
not  self-sufficing  when  Germany  was  pleased  to  in- 
terfere; it  was  because  this  meeting,  before  which 
would  be  heard  the  appeal  of  the  policy  that  Ger- 
many had  prevented  us  from  carrying  out  at  Fez, 


190  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

would  be  a  monument  raised  to  German  puissance, 
a  warning  for  the  future,  a  threat  against  whoever 
should  bethink  himself  to  aspire  to  political  inde- 
pendence. On  the  11th  of  April,  the  Chancellor 
wrote  to  Count  Wolff  Metternich,  the  German 
Ambassador  in  London :  — 

We  are  acting  with  a  view  to  our  interests,  which  apparently 
there  seems  to  be  an  intention  to  dispose  of  without  our  assent. 
The  importance  of  these  interests  is  a  secondary  thing  here.  .  .  . 
If  we,  however,  abandon  them  by  our  silence,  we  shall  thus  en- 
courage the  world,  seeing  us  act  so,  to  commit  similar  breaches 
of  courtesy,  to  our  prejudice  in  other  questions  perhaps  more 
considerable.^ 

On  the  4th  of  October,  Prince  von  Buelow,  re- 
ceiving the  author  of  this  book  at  Baden-Baden, 
said  to  him :  — 

In  the  incidents  which  have  arisen  during  the  past  six  months 
or  so,  there  are  two  distinct  things  to  consider. 

Morocco  is  the  first ;  general  policy  is  the  second. 

In  Morocco  we  have  important  commercial  interests :  we  in- 
tended and  we  still  intend  to  safeguard  them. 

In  a  more  general  way,  we  were  obliged  to  reply  to  a  policy 
which  threatened  to  isolate  us  and  which,  in  consequence  of 
this  avowed  aim,  assumed  a  distinctly  hostile  character  with 
regard  to  us. 

The  Moroccan  affair  was  the  most  recent  and  most  clearly 
manifested  example  of  such  policy.  It  furnished  us  with  an 
opportunity  to  make  a  necessary  retort.^ 

What  should  be  thought  of  this  pretended  ^^iso- 
lation,'' the  Chancellor  had  previously  stated  on 
the  14th  of  April  1904,  when  he  said: — 

»  See  White  Book  (1906). 

'  See  Le  Temps  of  the  5th  of  October,  1905. 


CONFLICT   OF  THE  ALLIANCES  191 

The  member,  Mr.  Bebel,  has  also  spoken  of  an  isolation  of 
Germany.  He  seems  to  fear  that  we  are  drifting  into  complete 
solitude. 

I  answer  him  that  we  find  ourselves  at  present  in  solid  bonds 
of  alliance  with  two  great  Powers,  in  amicable  relations  with  the 
five  others,  that  our  relations  with  France  are  calm  and  pacific, 
and,  as  far  as  depends  on  us,  will  remain  so. 

I  believe,  moreover,  that  we  shall  not  have  much  isolation  to 
fear,  as  long  as  we  continue  to  keep  our  swords  well-whetted. 

Germany  is  too  powerful  not  to  be  capable  of  alliances. 

There  are  many  combinations  possible  for  us;  and,  even  if 
we  had  to  remain  alone,  this  would  not  be  very  terrible  either. 

Consequently,  there  is  no  need  for  anxiety. 

Nothing  had  happened  since  this  date,  with  regard 
to  the  distribution  of  alliances,  that  could  justify 
the  altogether  different  language  which  the  Chan- 
cellor used  to  me  in  October.  Germany  had  still 
her  ^Hwo  solid  Alliances";  and  was  the  only  Power 
in  Europe  enjoying  this  situation.  The  isolation 
spoken  of  by  Prince  von  Buelow  was  therefore 
imaginary.  The  truth  was  that  the  effect  of  the 
change  he  dreaded,  the  effect  of  the  change  which 
had  induced  him  to  employ  the  Moroccan  question 
in  order  to  make  a  ^^ necessary  return- thrust,"  the 
effect  of  the  change  which  had  caused  him  to  pass 
from  the  policy  of  reserve  to  a  policy  of  action  and 
which  he  characterized  as  ^^solation"  by  a  con- 
versational euphemism,  this  effect  had  been,  not  to 
reduce  Germany  to  solitude,  but  to  restore  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe.  It  had  achieved,  not 
the  encircling  of  Germany,  but  the  affranchisement 
of  France.  Throughout  the  dispute,  the  stake  at 
issue  for  Germany  was  not  the  preserving  of  alii- 


192  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

ances,  which  there  was  no  likelihood  of  her  losing, 
but  the  safeguard  of  the  diplomatic  hegemony 
secured  by  Bismarck  as  the  outcome  of  the  Congress 
of  Berlin.  The  stake  was  an  important  one,  and, 
far  more  than  Morocco,  warranted  the  efforts  made 
to  win  it. 

At  the  end  of  1905,  Germany  had  grounds  for 
believing  that  she  was  nearing  the  desired  goal.  In 
the  conflict  of  Alliances  that  had  just  been  fought 
out,  her  triumph  had  been  complete.  She  had 
merely  had  to  intervene  at  Fez  for  the  policy  to 
crumble  that  had  been  established  by  the  Franco- 
English  agreement  of  1904.  She  had  merely  had 
to  threaten  for  France  to  sacrifice  a  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  whom  the  Parliament  had  during 
seven  years  supported  by  its  confidence.  Nothing 
had  been  able  to  stand  against  her  interference. 
The  paralysis  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  was 
not  astonishing,  considering  the  difficulties  both 
exterior  and  interior  in  which  our  Allies  were  in- 
volved. But  at  its  outset  the  Entente  Cordiale 
had  shown  itself  no  better,  since  it  had  not  spared 
France  either  discomfiture  or  humiliation.  Indeed, 
the  military  aid  that  England  could  have  offered 
would  have  done  but  little  to  make  up  for  our  own 
weakness.  The  Franco-Italian  and  Franco-Spanish 
agreements  had  not  even  been  invoked  against  the 
German  pretensions.  The  Chancellor  deemed  him- 
self sure  of  the  morrow  and  spoke  somewhat  ironically 
of  English  policy  in  its  relations  with  ours. 

In  the  conversation  with  me  mentioned  above, 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  193 

the  text  of  which  was  corrected  by  him  before  its 
publication,  he  said :  — • 

Your  country  has  a  useful  role  to  play  in  tranquillizing  minds 
instead  of  exciting  them. 

In  such  a  case  as  the  present,  the  suave  mart  magno  is  not 
applicable.  International  solidarity  is  too  deep  for  any  one  to 
be  able  to  flatter  himself  on  being  the  tertius  gaudens  —  if  I 
may  again  use  a  Latin  expression  —  in  a  quarrel,  whatever  its 
nature  may  be. 

If,  between  Germans  and  Englishmen,  there  are  prejudices 
which  will  vanish  sooner  or  later,  France  can  help  in  removing 
them. 

Allow  me  to  add  that  she  has  set  an  example  which  proves 
that  it  is  always  possible  to  become  reconciled  with  England. 

The  Prince  then  wxnt  on  to  express  his  conviction 
that  the  Conference  would  draw  us  nearer  rather 
than  separate  us.     And  he  added  in  conclusion :  — 

One  condition,  however,  is  essential  for  the  rapprochement, 
namely,  that  the  French  public  should  quite  understand  that  the 
policy  tending  to  isolate  Germany  is  a  thing  of  the  past,  and  that 
the  course  of  conduct  lately  pursued  is  to-day  definitely  aban- 
doned. 

In  spite  of  the  courteous  language  that  was  subse- 
quently employed  in  speaking  of  the  Franco-English 
and  Franco-Italian  rapprocheme7its,  Germany,  not 
without  some  curtness,  expressed  the  wish  that 
nothing  more  should  be  said  about  the  policy  which 
these  rapprochements  had  emphasized.  The  meet- 
ing of  the  Conference  appeared  to  sanction  the 
deference  of  France  to  this  request.  The  debates 
of  this  same  Conference  were  about  to  prove  to  the 
Chancellor  that  the  "eviV^  was  deeper  seated  than 
he  had  imagined,  and  that  Europe,  after  once  shak- 


194  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

ing  off  Germany's  diplomatic  yoke,  did  not  intend 
to  submit  to  it  again. 

ni 

The  Conference  of  1906  was  a  disappointment  to 
Germany.  The  fact  was  that,  owing  to  the  ease 
with  which  she  had  triumphed  in  the  preceding 
year,  she  had  neglected  to  take  into  consideration 
the  durable  realities  underlying  ephemeral  appear- 
ances. 

When,  on  the  15th  of  January,  1906,  the  delegates 
of  the  Powers  met  at  Algeciras,  the  situation  in 
Europe  was  no  longer  what  it  had  been  six  months 
earlier.  First  of  all,  in  France,  a  material  and  moral 
change  had  occurred.  A  reflecting  uneasiness  had 
succeeded  the  scare.  Military  measures  had  been 
taken,  and  this  was  known.  Ninety-four  million 
francs  had  been  spent  on  ammunition,  thirty  mill- 
ions on  equipment,  twenty-six  millions  on  railways. 
The  press,  which  in  the  beginning  had  been  divided 
and  hesitating,  had  now  recovered  itself,  and  had 
rallied  the  minds  of  the  public  to  the  idea  of  resistance 
being  necessary,  after  so  many  concessions.  On 
the  other  hand,  in  August,  1905,  Russia  had  signed 
peace  with  Japan.  And,  in  spite  of  the  disorganiza- 
tion inevitably  caused  by  an  unsuccessful  war,  she 
had  resumed  her  place  in  Europe.  England,  who, 
if  France  had  been  willing,  would  have  made  war 
in  1905,  had  seen  in  Germany's  success  a  fresh 
motive  for  acting  in  conjunction  with  us  for  the 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  195 

purpose  of  establishing  the  European  balance  of 
power.  On  the  1st  of  September,  1905;  in  view  of 
the  Conference,  Spain  had  strengthened  the  ties 
that  bound  our  two  countries  together.  Last  of  all, 
and  above  all,  the  circumstances  of  an  International 
Conference  were  less  favourable  than  a  tete-a-tete 
to  the  game  of  menace  and  ^^ bluff"  practised  by 
Germany  in  the  previous  year.  If  a  rupture  were 
aimed  at,  it  would  be  less  easy  to  realize  amidst  the 
cumbersome  machinery  of  an  international  gather- 
ing; and,  by  reason  of  the  time  lost,  would  appear 
less  specious.  If  intimidation  and  moral  pressure 
were  the  object,  Europe^s  presence  at  the  debates 
would  allow  us  to  find  support  and  to  create  majori- 
ties. It  was  not  so  difficult  for  us  to  remain  cool. 
Our  risks  were  not  so  great. 

This  was  not  suspected  at  Berlin.  There  they 
relied  on  the  docile  aid  of  the  two  Powers  of  the 
Triplice.  William  II  reserved  to  himself  the  task 
of  personally  influencing  the  Czar  so  as  to  get  him 
to  adopt  a  neutral  attitude.  From  England  and 
Spain  an  adhesion  was  reckoned  on,  which  France 
alone  would  have  paid  for.  What  was  simpler 
than  to  say  to  them:  ^'You  have  treated  with 
France  about  Morocco.  You,  EngHsh,  have  with- 
drawn in  her  favour ;  you,  Spaniards,  have  pledged 
yourselves  to  her.  Now,  recover  your  liberty.  You, 
English,  have  secured  in  Egypt  the  advantages 
promised  you  by  the  Franco-English  agreement. 
You,  Spaniards,  have  been  obliged  to  give  up,  in 
favour    of   France,    a    considerable    portion    of   the 


196  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

profits  you  were  hoping  for  in  Morocco.  Come,  let 
us  talk,  and  talk  about  Morocco.  Let  us  draw  up  a 
scheme  by  which  you  will  each  get  your  share,  and 
we,  ours.  As  to  the  solution,  you  will  find  us  accom- 
modating, since  we  have  no  fixed  intention,  or  rather 
we  have  only  one,  namely,  to  oust  France,  and  to 
publish  her  discomfiture  to  the  world.''  This, 
you  may  say,  is  hypothesis.  No  !  not  if  the  history 
itself  of  the  Conference  demonstrates  that  such 
was  the  policy  of  Germany;  if  it  makes  plain  that, 
while  ready  to  accept  all  sorts  of  combinations  which 
France  refused,  she  pursued  one  design  only:  to 
wit,  that  of  breaking  down  the  diplomatic  system 
which  Prince  von  Buelow,  three  months  previously, 
had  said  was  a  thing  of  the  past,  a  thing  that  must 
be  abandoned  forever. 

The  initial  stage  of  the  negotiations  ^  lasted  from 
the  15th  of  January  to  the  19th  of  February  and  was 
taken  up  with  private  conversations.  On  the  25th 
of  January,  Mr.  von  Radowitz,  the  premier  German 
plenipotentiary,  entered  into  pourparlers  with  his 
French  colleague,  Mr.  Revoil,  yet  without  formulat- 
ing any  precise  proposals  concerning  essential  ques- 
tions, such,  for  instance,  as  the  police  organization, 
which  France  asked  might  be  placed  under  her 
control.  At  the  same  time,  in  order  to  entice  Spain 
away  from  us,  Germany  offered  her  the  police  of  all 
the  ports,  renewing  the  offer  at  Algeciras  after 
making  it  at  Madrid.  Through  a  semi-official 
agency,  the  South  German  Imperial  Correspondence^ 

^  See  our  book  on  the  Algeciras  Conference,  2d  edition  (1907). 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  197 

Italy  received  a  similar  offer.  Finally,  on  the  3d 
of  February,  Count  von  Tattenbach,  who  was 
the  second  German  plenipotentiary,  suggested  to 
England's  representative  the  idea  of  separating 
from  France.  In  the  same  week,  four  solutions, 
each  differing  from  the  others  and  from  those  that 
had  been  previously  put  forward,  were  proposed 
by  Germany's  representatives  in  interviews  with 
the  governmental  delegates  or  communications  to 
the  Governments  themselves  of  Spain,  the  United 
States,  Russia,  and  Italy.  There  was  thus  a  clear 
manifestation  of  attempts  to  dissociate  these  Powers 
from  France,  the  sole,  visible,  and  avowed  aim  being 
to  isolate  her,  no  respect  being  paid  to  the  question 
at  issue.  On  the  9th  of  February,  one  of  the  Wolff 
agency's  telegrams  announced  that  Germany  had 
rejected  the  French  proposals.  This  rejection,  which 
was  irregular  in  its  form,  occurred  after  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Russia,  Italy,  and  the  United  States 
had  informed  Mr.  von  Radowitz  that  these  pro- 
posals had  their  approbation.  On  the  19th  of  Febru- 
ary, the  Germans  again  rejected  what  was  proposed 
both  concerning  the  police  and  the  question  of 
finances;  and,  simultaneously,  strong  pressure  was 
brought  to  bear  on  the  Duke  of  Almodovar,  Spain's 
plenipotentiary,  with  a  view  to  securing  his  detach- 
ment from  our  side.  Meanwhile,  in  Saint  Peters- 
burg, the  German  Ambassador,  Mr.  von  Schoen, 
was  trying  to  shake  Count  Lamsdorff  in  his 
fidelity  to  our  cause.  And  in  Rome,  Count  von 
Monts  was  advising  Italy  to  ^'resume  her  liberty  of 


198  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

action. '^  At  Madrid,  Mr.  von  Stumm  declared  that, 
in  case  Spain  behaved  badly,  the  Emperor  William 
would  not  be  able  to  return  the  visit  which  he  had 
received  from  the  latter  in  1905.  In  Algeciras  every 
one  believed  that  there  would  be  a  rupture.  Every 
one  found  the  French  proposals  reasonable.  Every 
one  was  astonished  at  Germany's  resistance.  The 
astonishment  was  natural  enough,  if  only  the  Moroc- 
can question  was  regarded.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  no  one  had  any  need  to  wonder,  who  placed 
himself  so  as  to  see  that  the  Chancellor's  sole  aim 
was  to  affirm  Germany's  supremacy  in  Europe 
through  this  thwarting  of  the  French  projects. 

During  the  second  period  (February  20-March 
14),  the  Conference  held  sittings  for  the  discus- 
sion, first  of  the  Bank  question,  next  that  of  the 
Police.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  debates  on  the 
former  subjects,  German  intransigence  still  con- 
tinued to  show  itself,  notwithstanding  French 
concessions.  In  the  meantime  (February  21), 
Prince  von  Buelow,  availing  himself  of  Baron 
de  Courcel's  presence  in  Berlin,  proposed  a  com- 
promise to  the  eminent  Ambassador  which,  since  it 
went  counter  to  the  principles  we  had  invoked  from 
the  beginning,  would  have  certainly  caused  us  to 
fall  out  with  England  and  with  Spain.  On  the  1st 
of  March,  William  II  replied  to  a  communication 
of  the  Russian  Prime  Minister,  Count  Witte,  by 
recommending  the  same  compromise  to  him.  To 
two  telegrams  of  Mr.  Roosevelt  advocating  the 
creation  of  a  Franco-Spanish  police  checked  by  re- 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  199 

ports  of  the  Italian  Legation  at  Tangier,  the  Emperor 
replied  by  a  double  refusal.  The  ^'isolating''  action 
therefore  was  being  continued.  The  French  Govern- 
ment was  of  opinion  that  they  could  not,  without 
danger,  allow  it  to  develop  further.  On  the  3d  of 
March,  seeing  that  no  decisions  were  being  reached 
with  reference  to  the  Bank,  Mr.  Revoil  asked  that 
the  Police  question  should  be  brought  up  for  dis- 
cussion. Mr.  von  Radowitz  opposing  this,  a  vote 
was  taken,  with  the  result  that  ten  delegates  sup- 
ported the  French  side,  and  three,  the  German. 
Although  the  point  to  be  settled  was  merely  one 
of  procedure,  it  was  seen  that  Europe  had  cast  the 
die  and  won.  Tired  of  Germany's  injunctions,  she 
had  expressed  her  sentiments.  The  ^^ Guardian'' 
of  European  interests,  as  the  Berlin  papers  called 
her,  was  deserted  by  all  her  wards  except  one ;  and, 
when  the  Conference  had  to  decide  as  to  the  best 
way  of  entering  upon  reforms,  she  was  backed  up 
only  by  Austria  and  by  the  compromising  help  of 
Morocco,  the  latter  being  desirous  of  thwarting,  by 
every  means  possible,  the  Conference's  labours 
tending  to  reform. 

This  warning  was  understood  at  Berlin,  since 
now,  for  the  first  time,  either  in  Paris  through  the 
medium  of  the  Prince  of  Monaco,  or  at  Algeciras 
through  the  voice  of  Count  von  Tattenbach,  the 
Chancellor's  Government  showed  themselves  dis- 
posed to  be  more  conciliatory.  It  is  in  fact  easy 
to  see  that,  by  demonstrating  through  its  debates 
and  votes  the  isolation  of  Germany,  the  Conference 


200  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

was  upsetting  the  whole  design  which  the  Emperor 
had  so  striven  to  realize  in  his  policy.  Unfor- 
tunately, just  at  this  moment,  the  French  Chamber 
placed  the  Rouvier  Cabinet  in  a  minority,  an  act 
of  folly  which  once  more  raised  Germany's  hopes. 
On  the  10th  and  11th  of  March,  Mr.  von  Radowitz 
refused  to  keep  the  promises  of  concessions  that  he 
had  made  during  the  morning  of  the  10th.  On  the 
12th,  the  various  German  Ambassadors  received 
a  circular  telegram  from  their  Government,  asserting 
that  the  majority  of  the  delegates  at  Algeciras  were 
hostile  to  France ;  that  with  a  last  effort  she  would 
be  compelled  to  capitulate.  On  the  same  day.  Prince 
von  Buelow,  through  the  medium  of  a  German 
financier  who  was  at  Saint  Petersburg,  telegraphed  to 
Count  Witte :  ^^  Thanks  to  our  concessions  every- 
thing was  going  on  favourably  at  the  Conference 
when,  suddenly,  Mr.  Revoil  created  fresh  diffi- 
culties, to  the  surprise  of  all  the  other  plenipotentia- 
ries, who  deem  his  pretensions  unwarranted,  and 
who,  with  even  the  English,  incline  in  our  favour. 
We  hope  that  Mr.  Witte  will  make  his  influential 
voice  heard,  if  he  desires  to  avoid  a  final  rupture. '' 
Last  of  all,  on  the  13th,  15th,  and  17th  of  March, 
in  three  personal  telegrams,  addressed  to  Mr.  Roose- 
velt through  the  German  Ambassador  at  Washington, 
William  II  appropriated  the  affirmation  and  declared 
that  all  the  Powers,  except  the  United  States,  had 
abandoned  France,  so  that  he  urged  the  President  to 
prevail  upon  us  to  consent. 

Never  had  Germany's  hold  on  the  world  been 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  201 

asserted  with  such  audacity.  If  France  had  yielded, 
and  if  her  Alhes  and  friends  had  not  supported  her, 
Germany  would  have  won  the  game,  not  merely  the 
Moroccan  game,  which  forsooth  was  a  small  part  of 
the  Chancellor's  great  design,  but  that  of  the  wider 
world,  the  Bismarckian  game  in  favour  of  her 
hegemony  against  European  equilibrium.  Happily, 
France  did  not  give  up ;  and  no  one  abandoned  her. 
On  the  14th  of  March,  Mr.  Leon  Bourgeois,  who 
succeeded  Mr.  Rouvier  at  the  Foreign  office,  declared 
to  the  Ambassadors  that  he  had  maintained  the 
instructions  to  Mr.  Revoil  in  their  entirety.  Be- 
tween the  13th  and  14th,  the  British  Government 
notified  the  Powers  by  a  circular  telegram  that  they 
supported  France  on  all  points  and  without  either 
restriction  or  reserve.  On  the  18th,  Mr.  Roosevelt 
characterized  the  German  proposals  as  being  inac- 
ceptable.  On  the  19th,  by  a  circular  similar  to  the 
English  one,  the  Russian  Government  informed  the 
different  Chancelleries  that  they  unhesitatingly  sup- 
ported the  French  requests.  In  less  than  a  week, 
we  had  recovered  the  advantage.  Since  our  isola- 
tion had  been  asserted,  we  replied  by  a  demonstra- 
tion of  the  help  on  which  we  could  count.  The 
German  manoeuvre  had  failed.  Europe  had  not 
yielded.  In  such  conditions,  the  Algeciras  debates 
had  no  further  interest  for  Germany.  She  had  now 
but  one  desire,  to  finish  them  off  as  quickly  as 
possible,  whatever  the  solution  might  be.  On  the 
20th  of  March,  Mr.  von  Tschirschky,  Secretary  of 
State,  said  to  Mr.  Bihourd :  — 


202  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 


^'I  see  no  further  difficulties,  since  we  accept 
what  you  desire/' 

On  the  28th,  an  agreement  was  estabhshed  on  all 
the  principal  points.  Brutality  of  procedure,  bad 
mental  analysis,  inaccurate  estimation  of  the  forces 
in  presence  —  Germany's  discomfiture  exhibited  all 
these.  Obsessed  with  the  idea  of  triumphing  alone 
and  gloriously,  of  leaving  the  Conference  in  her 
character  of  sovereign  of  the  world,  Germany  had 
rejected  with  disdainful  superciliousness  the  four 
offers  of  arbitration  which  had  been  made  to  her 
during  the  Conference,  to  wit,  the  Italian,  Russian, 
American,  and  Austrian.  To  these  four  Powers, 
who,  with  but  small  difference  of  detail,  were  equally 
desirous  of  arriving  at  an  honourable  compromise, 
she  rendered  their  task  so  difficult  that,  after  being 
at  first  well-disposed  intermediaries,  they  had  be- 
come, with  their  varying  means,  the  auxiliaries  of 
our  policy.  The  attempt  made  to  entice  England 
away  had  produced  the  contrary  effect  and  joined 
London  and  Paris  in  closer  bonds.  Russia,  who  at 
the  beginning  had  flattered  herself  she  would  be 
able  to  bring  about  an  understanding,  had  subse- 
quently been  obliged,  in  presence  of  German  exi- 
gence, to  content  herself  with  fulfilling  her  duty  as 
our  ally,  and  had  fulfilled  it  loyally.  Spain  had  re- 
mained faithful  to  us,  seeing  what  little  sincerity 
there  was  in  advances  that  were  continually  accom- 
panied by  threats.  Italy  would  have  been  only  too 
glad  to  be  spared  the  necessity  of  taking  sides  openly. 
Germany,  however,  forced  her  to  do  so ;   and,  as  she 


CONFLICT   OF  THE  ALLIANCES  203 

had  given  us  positive  pledges,  whilst,  on  the  other 
hand;  through  Germany's  will,  the  Triple  Alliance 
had  always  ignored  the  Mediterranean,  she  was 
bound  to  grant  us  her  vote.  The  United  States 
had  supported  us  for  the  simple  reason  that  our 
proposals  appeared  to  them  to  be  moderate.  As 
for  Austria,  although  devoted  to  Germany,  she 
could  not  go  against  plain  evidence,  and  had  exer- 
cised a  conciliatory  action,  which  now  and  again 
inclined  distinctly  in  favour  of  France.  In  short, 
throughout  the  three  months,  none  of  our  supports 
had  weakened ;  and  some  had  even  become  more 
solid.  It  may  also  be  said  that  fresh  ones  had 
been  created  through  ^^reprobation  of  Germany," 
as  Count  Lamsdorff,  on  one  occasion,  put  the 
matter. 

The  results  of  the  Conference  were  important, 
gauged  by  the  interest  Germany  had  had  in  sum- 
moning it.  The  aim  of  German  policy,  manifest- 
ing, as  it  undoubtedly  did,  indifference  with  regard 
to  Morocco,  was  to  use  the  African  conflict  as  an 
occasion  for  reprisals  in  Europe ;  to  prove  to  France 
that  the  Anglo-French  Entente  was  inefficacious; 
at  the  same  time,  to  fortify  the  Triple  Alliance  by 
detaching  Italy  and  Spain  from  the  Western  powers ; 
in  a  word,  to  restore  the  situation  which  Bismarck 
had  bequeathed  to  William  II.  And  the  undertak- 
ing was  an  utter  failure.  Not  only  had  the  two 
countries,  reconciled  by  the  agreement  of  the  8th 
of  April,  1904,  remained  refractory  to  every  effort 
made  to  disunite  them,  but,  in  the  trial,  their  En- 


204  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

tente  had  changed  its  character;  and,  after  being 
originally  signed  for  the  purpose  of  liquidating  the 
past,  it  had  become  a  principle  of  action.  This 
action  had  influenced  Madrid  and  Rome.  The 
visible  solidarity  of  French  and  English  policy  had 
likewise  made  its  impression  on  the  Italian  and 
Spanish  nations.  It  had  attracted  them  to  the 
extent  of  transforming  the  primitive  tour  de  valse 
into  a  durable  connection.  The  Franco-English 
binomial  had  acquired  weight.  It  had  changed 
from  the  static  to  the  dynamic  condition.  Even 
the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  was  strengthened  by 
the  crisis  through  which  it  had  passed.  On  the 
morrow  of  the  Russian  defeats,  German  threats 
had  shown  to  adversaries,  as  well  as  to  friends, 
of  the  Dual  Alliance,  the  need  there  was  for  its  ex- 
istence. Last  of  all,  for  the  first  time  at  Algeciras 
the  representatives  of  Russia  and  England,  brought 
into  contact  by  their  cooperation  in  a  work  of  gen- 
eral behoof,  had  exchanged  amicable  and  reason- 
able views  respecting  the  situation  of  both  coun- 
tries. The  combinations  in  which  France  had  her 
place  marked  had  lost  nothing  by  this  ^^  experiment 
of  resistance.''  In  accepting  Europe's  intervention 
between  the  Sultan  of  Morocco  and  herself,  our 
country  had  done  nothing  more  than  record  the 
inevitable  consequence  of  her  set-back  in  1905. 
For  the  rest,  her  essential  interests  in  the  Moorish 
Empire  were  safeguarded  by  the  privilege  of  exe- 
cution she  shared  with  Spain,  in  putting  into  force 
the  police  and  finance  reforms  she  had  proposed. 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  205 

In  Europe,  she  maintained  her  rank;  and  her 
diplomatic  resources  were  increased  rather  than 
diminished. 

Germany's  discomfiture  was  proved  by  the  fact 
that  what  she  had  tried  to  demolish  remained  still 
in  existence.  The  odds,  therefore,  turned  against 
her.  After  winning  the  first  two  games,  she  lost 
the  final  one  that  should  have  given  her  complete 
victory.  She  was  not  any  more  isolated  after  Al- 
geciras  than  she  had  been  before,  since  she  kept  her 
two  allies.  But,  if  the  term  ^ isolation''  is  taken 
in  the  sense  given  to  it  by  Prince  von  Buelow  in 
1905,  to  wit,  a  grouping  of  Powers  outside  of  Ger- 
many's dictation,  such  isolation  continued.  Her 
own  allies  had  made  her  understand  that,  while 
correctly  fulfilling  their  obligations  towards  her, 
they  were  not  willing  to  merely  follow  in  her  wake. 
Italy  did  not  give  up  her  Mediterranean  agreements. 
To  the  theory  of  an  autocratic  Triple  Alliance,  she 
had  opposed  the  doctrine  of  a  constitutional  Triplice 
in  which  each  of  the  contracting  parties  propor- 
tioned their  contributions  to  their  profits.  Austria, 
who  was  fulsomely  congratulated  by  William  II, 
had  acted  less  as  a  '^second"  than  as  a  mediatrix; 
she  had  contrived  to  show  that  she  had  her  own 
policy,  a  thing  many  had  doubted;  and  that  she 
did  not  mean  to  accept  peremptory  orders  from  Ber- 
lin. So  far,  therefore,  from  having  widened  her 
field  of  action,  Germany  had,  on  the  contrary,  nar- 
rowed it.  Instead  of  augmenting  her  authority, 
she  had  diminished  it.     Nothing  of  what  was  ma- 


206  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

terial  had  been  lost;   but  she  had  not  obtained  the 
moral  success  on  which  she  had  relied. 

This  judgment  was  that  which,  in  general,  was 
expressed  by  the  German  press.  ^^  Neither  van- 
quisher nor  vanquished/^  said  the  Cologne  Gazette. 
The  pronouncement  would  have  been  true,  if,  at 
Algeciras,  Germany  had  not  been  seeking  victory. 
'^Neither  Bismarck's  genius  nor  Talleyrand's  subt- 
lety could  have  obtained  more,''  was  the  opinion 
of  the  Berliner  Tagehlatt,  which,  however,  added: 
'^But  Bismarck  would  never  have  gone  to  Alge- 
ciras.'' The  TcBgliche  Rundschau  spoke  of  Germany's 
isolation;  and  the  Tageszeitung  summed  up  by  say- 
ing: ^^  After  commencing  with  a  flourish  of  trum- 
pets, our  Moroccan  policy  finishes  by  a  surrender;" 
while  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten  exclaimed:  ^^In 
reality,  France  has  obtained  everything  at  the  Con- 
ference ;  her  concessions  are  purely  those  of  form. 
On  essential  points,  we  have  done  nothing  but 
yield."  A  few  months  later,  the  Hannover sche 
Courrier  added,  ^^Our  diplomacy  has  been  bUnd." 
And  at  the  end  of  1906,  the  Frankfort  Gazette  summed 
up  the  general  impression  by  saying  in  substance: 
'^The  Moroccan  adventure  has  warded  off  none  of 
the  risks  against  which  it  was  pretended  measures 
were  to  be  taken.  .  .  .  Germany's  position  has 
been  aggravated  instead  of  being  improved.  Ger- 
man diplomacy  has  made  itself  disagreeable  to  every- 
body. .  .  .  The  telegram  to  President  Kruger; 
the  propaganda  against  the  Yellow  Race  or  against 
America ;  Pan-Islamic  intrigues  in  Africa,  —  mistakes 


CONFLICT  OF  THE  ALLIANCES  207 

and  nothing  but  mistakes.  .  .  .  And  what  has  it 
all  resulted  in?  We  have  left  the  Boers  to  stew  in 
their  own  juice.  The  Japanese  have  beaten  the 
Russians.  The  Sultan  of  Morocco  has  to  submit 
to  Franco-Spanish  police.  Was  it  worth  while 
raising  such  a  hubbub?^' 

The  official  manifestations  themselves  were  quite 
as  little  disposed  to  exult  as  the  newspapers.  On 
the  14th  of  November,  1906,  Mr.  Bassermann,  one 
of  the  National  Liberals  in  the  Reichstag,  said: — 

We  have  entered  upon  an  era  of  travels,  speeches,  telegrams, 
and  amiable  advances  lavished  on  all  sides. 

To-day,  the  Triplice  has  no  practical  utility. 

The  Italian  press  and  people  incline  more  and  more  towards 
France. 

Austria  has  been  too  much  eulogized  for  playing  the  role  of  a 
"brilliant  second,"  which  she  herself  disclaimed. 

The  Franco-Russian  Alliance  remains  intact;  and  the  atti- 
tude of  France  towards  us  is  not  so  good  as  it  was. 

The  interview  at  Cronberg  between  the  English  and  German 
sovereigns  does  not  prevent  England  from  pursuing  her  ancient 
policy,  which  tends  to  isolate  us. 

We  are  living  in  a  period  of  alliances  between  other  nations. 

The  Anglo-Russian  understanding  is  fraught  with  grave  con- 
sequences for  us,  and  Bismarck  already  had  the  coalition  night- 
mare. 

Our  policy  lacks  calmness  and  consistency;  and  one  sees 
clumsy  hands  upset  plans  that  had  been  well  laid. 

Abroad,  all  this  is  noticed  with  attention  and  distrust.  We 
do  not  see  that  there  is  any  imminent  danger  of  war ;  but  there 
is  the  danger  that  comes  from  a  sudden  relaxation  of  strain. 

The  Chancellor  himself  had  altered  his  tone. 
Speaking  during  the  same  sitting,  after  Mr.  Basser- 
mann, he  used  language  characterized  by  its  ex- 
treme moderation,  indifference,  and  resignation:  — 


208  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

I  may  remark  here  more  especially  that  we  have  no  thoughts 
of  slipping  in  between  France  and  Russia,  or  between  France 
and  England. 

Nor  have  we  any  idea  of  producing  a  rupture  of  the  friend- 
ship between  any  of  the  Western  Powers.  Such  is  not  the  ob- 
ject of  our  efforts  whether  secret  or  avowed. 

The  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  since  its  conclusion,  has  not 
been  a  danger  to  peace ;  on  the  contrary,  it  has  acted  as  a  weight 
contributing  to  the  regular  movement  of  the  world's  clock. 

We  hope  that  the  same  thing  may  be  said  of  the  Anglo- 
French  Entente  Cordiale. 

The  good  relations  between  Germany  and  Russia  have  in  no 
wise  tended  to  break  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance. 

Nor  can  the  good  relations  between  Germany  and  England 
be  in  contradiction  with  the  Entente  Cordiale  either,  if  its  ob- 
ject is  pacific. 

He  thus  appeared  to  recognize  the  fresh  condi- 
tions of  equilibrium  which,  both  before  and  during 
the  Conference,  the  German  semi-official  press  had 
not  ceased  denouncing  as  an  attack  on  Germany's 
rights.  The  dream  he  had  conceived,  that  of  re- 
storing, through  Morocco,  the  threatened  Bis- 
marckian  edifice,  had  not  stood  against  the  reality 
of  things.  In  the  ardour  of  the  struggle,  there  was 
a  good  deal  of  indignation  aroused,  on  this  side  the 
Vosges,  by  the  manner  in  which  Germany  behaved. 
Without  approving  all  that  was  said,  one  may  re- 
call, at  this  distance  from  the  past,  Bismarck's  say- 
ing that  'indignation  is  not  a  political  state  of  mind." 
And  as  one  understands  better,  one  is  less  inclined 
to  grow  angry.  The  prodigious  display  of  effort, 
activity,  and  intrigue  which  distinguished  German 
policy  during  those  three  months  could  not  be  ex- 
plained—  and  would  be  blamable  and  ridiculous  — 


CONFLICT   OF  THE  ALLIANCES  209 

if  Morocco  had  been  the  only  stake  that  was  being 
played  for,  if  the  only  questions  had  been  those  of 
deciding  about  a  few  gendarmes  and  meagre  Cus- 
toms duties.  Let  it  rather  be  supposed  that  this 
effort  and  activity  and  intrigue  were  meant  to  build 
up,  on  the  threshold  of  the  twentieth  century,  the 
most  extraordinary  structure  of  political  power 
that  had  ever  been  raised  since  the  time  of  Napo- 
leon I ;  to  save  Bismarck's  work  from  the  assaults 
of  age ;  to  secure  Germany  in  the  domination  of 
Europe  that  had  belonged  to  her  from  1871  to  1891, 
—  and  even  to  1902 ;  to  oppose  these  new  combina- 
tions by  an  alliance  that  had  gloriously  won  its 
laurels  in  a  series  of  trials,  and  with  it  to  overcome 
them.  Then  one  may  admit  that  the  sometimes 
exaggerated  ardour  of  German  policy  was  not  un- 
justifiable. 

Its  only  crime,  in  the  eyes  of  history,  will  be  that 
of  having  been  useless. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   NEW  ASIATIC   AND  EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS 

I.  Asia  and  the  German  policy.  —  Sino-Japanese  war.  — 
Combined  action  of  Germany,  France,  and  Russia.  —  The 
''break-up  of  China."  —  Crisis  of  1900.  —  Russo-Japanese 
War.  —  German  profit.  —  Three  risks  of  France. 
II.  Asia  and  the  French  policy.  —  Russo-Japanese  reconcilia- 
tion, and  the  agreements  of  1907.  —  Franco-Japanese  rec- 
onciliation. —  Anglo-Russian  reconciliation.  —  Persia,  Af- 
ghanistan, Thibet,  the  Persian  Gulf.  —  France  and  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Agreement.  —  French  profit  accruing  from  it. 
III.  European  developments.  —  Evolution  of  the  Anglo-Rus- 
sian understanding.  —  Germany's  attitude.  —  Interview 
at  Revel.  —  Anglo-Russian  understanding  in  Macedonia. 
—  End  of  the  Austro-Russian  understanding. — Anglo- 
Spanish  and  Franco-Spanish  agreements.  —  Tendency  to 
an  equilibrium. 


During  the  last  ten  years,  Asiatic  policy  has  ex- 
ercised on  European  policy  an  influence  at  once  con- 
stant and  considerable.  Every  Power  that  has 
occupied  the  political  stage  in  Europe  possesses 
territory  in  Asia.  All  the  various  diplomatic  group- 
ings, formed  by  reason  of  Asiatic  interests,  have 
produced  their  counter-effect  in  Europe.  Such 
being  the  case,  alliances  and  understandings  refer- 
ring to  Asia  can  only  be  rightly  comprehended 
when  viewed  in  connection  with  general  policy. 

210 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS     211 

The  real  fait  nouveau  of  this  period  is  Japan's 
entrance  into  the  circle  of  the  great  Powers.  Al- 
ready, for  a  long  time,  the  world  had  followed  with 
sympathetic  and  astonished  curiosity  the  efforts 
made  by  the  Empire  of  the  Rising  Sun  to  super- 
impose, on  its  ancient  and  admirable  civilization, 
the  acquisitions  of  the  West,  which  seemed  to  its 
patriotism  the  assurance  of  strength  and  an  instru- 
ment of  future  greatness.  For  the  first  time,  in 
1894,  Japan,  being  conscious  of  her  power,  put  it  to 
the  test.  Between  herself  and  China,  the  Corean 
question  had  always  been  the  subject  of  disputes, 
which,  at  length,  grew  embittered.  On  the  1st  of 
August,  1894,  the  Mikado's  Government  transported 
the  quarrel  to  the  field  of  battle ;  and,  on  the  17th 
of  April,  1895,  the  Treaty  of  Shimonasaki  recorded 
their  easy  victory.^  China,  once  for  all,  recognized 
Corea's  entire,  complete  independence,  renouncing 
all  tribute  from  her  and  all  ceremony  indicative  of 
vassalage.  She  gave  Japan  the  perpetual  right  of 
possession  over  the  peninsula  of  Leao-Tong,  with 
Port  Arthur,  the  island  of  Formosa,  and  the  Pes- 
cadoras.  Besides,  she  pledged  herself  to  pay  a  war 
indemnity  of  200  millions  of  taels  in  eight  instal- 
ments, the  delay  fixed  being  seven  years  at  the  out- 
side, with  a  5%  interest  on  all  payments  in  arrears; 
to  appoint  plenipotentiaries  for  the  purpose  of  con- 
cluding with  Japanese  plenipotentiaries  treaties  of 
commerce  and  navigation,  and  arrangements  rela- 
tive to  land  communications  and  trade.     She  granted 

^  See  Edouard  Driault's  book,  The  Question  of  the  Far  East. 


212  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Japan,  in  advance,  the  treatment  of  the  most  fa- 
voured nation.  She  opened  to  Japanese  trade  the 
ports  of  Chachi,  Chung-King,  Souchow,  and  Hang- 
Chow.  She  accorded  liberty  of  navigation  on  the 
Yang-tse-kiang,  beyond  I-chang  as  far  as  Chung- 
King,  and  on  the  river  Wusung  as  far  as  Hang-Chow. 
Moreover,  Wei-hai-Wei  was  to  be  occupied  by  a 
Japanese  garrison  until  the  first  two  instalments  of 
the  indemnity  had  been  paid. 

Japan's  joy  of  triumph  did  not  last  long.  On  the 
20th  of  April,  1895,  three  days  after  the  Treaty  of 
Shimonasaki  had  been  signed,  a  group  of  Powers, 
which  seemed  at  this  moment  agreed  to  act  together 
in  Europe  and  out  of  Europe,  to  wit,  Germany, 
Russia,  and  France,  laid  their  embargo  on  Japan's 
victories,  and,  out  of  the  peace  of  the  17th,  made  a 
second  treaty  of  San  Stefano.  In  friendly  yet  im- 
perative language,  the  three  Powers  declared  that 
'^a  Japanese  possession  of  the  peninsula  of  Leao- 
Tong  would  be  a  menace  against  the  Capital  of  China 
and  would  render  Corea's  independence  merely 
nominal."  On  the  5th  of  May,  Japan  yielded.  She 
announced  that  she  accepted  the  advice  of  the  Pow- 
ers, not  wishing  to  raise  other  difficulties.  She 
therefore  contented  herself  with  keeping  the  Pesca- 
doras  and  Formosa,  and  renounced  her  right  to  Leao- 
Tong  and  Port  Arthur.  In  return,  she  obtained  an 
indemnity  of  30  millions  of  taels.  The  Treaty  of 
Pekin,  of  the  21st  of  July,  1895,  set  seal  to  this  sacri- 
fice, which  was  a  painful  one  for  Japanese  pride  to 
make.     Indeed,  the  sacrifice  was  not  definitive,  des- 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    213 

tined,  as  it  was,  to  be  redeemed  by  another  treaty 
which  the  Mikado's  plenipotentiaries  were  to  sign  ten 
years  later  at  Portsmouth  in  the  United  States. 

The  European  intervention,  which  had  just  been 
manifested  so  bluntly,  would  have  been  justifiable, 
if  it  had  been  inspired  by  the  principles  that  it  ap- 
pealed to/  The  Powers  were  quite  warranted  in 
insisting  on  the  respect  of  Chinese  independence, 
which  —  then  as  to-day  —  appeared  to  be  the  best 
pledge  of  peace  in  Asia.  But  throughout  this  inter- 
ference, there  was  much  less  principle  operating 
than  covetousness,  which,  in  Saint  Petersburg  and 
still  more  in  Berlin,  awaited  only  a  more  favourable 
opportunity  to  satisfy  itself.  Since  the  time  of  Bis- 
marck, Germany  has  always  sought  to  tempt  Russia 
Asiawards,  with  a  view  to  '^getting  rid  of  her  influ- 
ence" in  Europe.  The  Chancellor  used  to  say: 
^^  Russia  has  nothing  to  do  in  the  West.  All  that 
she  can  get  there  is  nihilism  and  other  maladies. 
Her  mission  is  in  Asia.  There  she  represents  civ- 
ilization.'^ In  1880,  at  the  time  of  the  Kouldja  in- 
cident, this  policy  had  been  applied.  Just  then,  a 
diplomatist  drew  attention  to  ^Hhe  incomprehen- 
sible intimacy"  of  Russia's  Minister,  Mr.  Koyander, 
and  Mr.  von  Brandt,  who  was  Germany's,  and  to 
their  joint  efforts  to  egg  things  on,  the  former  act- 
ing from  national  ambition,  and  with  an  imprudent 
and  heedless  desire  of  procuring  his  country  fresh 
conquests,  the  latter,  on  the  contrary,  reasonably 
calculating  that  it  was  advantageous  for  Germany 

*  See  Rene  Pinon's  book,  The  Struggle  for  the  Pacific. 


214  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

that  Russia  should  be  involved  in  adventures  which 
he  knew  were  perilous  and  which,  if  entered  upon, 
would  absorb  her  vital  forces  for  long  to  come,  and 
thus  remove  from  Europe  and  the  Vistula,  men  and 
generals  whose  proximity  might  hamper  Germany 
at  a  moment  when  she  wanted  her  hands  free.^  Fif- 
teen years  had  gone  by  since  then.  And  in  their 
adoption  of  the  Weltpolitik,  the  German  Govern- 
ment had  acquired  also  a  taste  for  a  Colonial  Em- 
pire. To  make  in  China  a  conquest  of  this  kind  and 
to  drag  in  Russia  behind  them  was  killing  two  birds 
with  one  stone,  a  coup  of  the  kind  relished  by  Im- 
perial diplomacy.  From  1895,  Germany  had  been 
working  with  this  end  in  view. 

Although  having  obtained  excellent  results  dur- 
ing the  whole  of  the  nineteenth  century  by  a  policy 
of  pacific  penetration,  Russia  was  not  able  to  resist 
the  lure  of  immediate  profits  that  was  held  out  to 
her.  Being  in  the  honeymoon  period  of  the  Alli- 
ance, France  was  hardly  in  a  position  to  restrain 
her  other  half  by  a  show  of  authority.  So  Germany 
had  the  game  all  to  herself.  On  the  1st  of  Novem- 
ber, 1897,  the  murder  of  two  German  missionaries 
at  Chang-Tong  furnished  William  II  with  the  desired 
opportunity  for  making  China  feel  his  ^4ron-sheathed 
fist.''  After  an  expedition  theatrically  organized 
at  Kiel  under  the  command  of  Prince  Henry  of 
Prussia,  China  was  obliged,  on  the  6th  of  March, 
1898,   to   lease   to   Germany  for   ninety-nine   years 

^  See  Andre  Cheradame's  book,  The  World  and  the  Russo-Jap- 
anese War. 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS     215 

the  Bay  of  Kiao-Chow  and  a  zone  of  fifty  kilometres 
round  it  —  an  admirable  footing  on  Chinese  soil 
adapted  to  go  with  various  other  German  vantage 
points  in  the  Pacific,  which  latter  were  increased  in 
the  same  year  by  the  purchase  of  Spain's  colonies 
in  these  seas.  Three  weeks  later,  on  the  27th  of 
March,  without  any  pretext,  and  simply  '^with  a 
view  to  protecting  the  Russian  fleet  and  giving  it 
a  strong  base  on  the  western  coast  of  China," 
Russia  contrived  to  obtain,  under  the  same  condi- 
tions, the  cession  of  Port  Arthur,  Talienwan,  and  a 
contiguous  zone,  as  the  terminus  of  the  Trans- 
Manchurian  Railway,  for  which,  in  August,  1896, 
Count  Cassini  had  obtained  the  Tsong-li-Yamen's 
permission  to  be  cut  through  Chinese  territory. 
On  the  11th  of  April,  1898,  France  exacted,  in  her 
turn,  a  lease  of  the  bay  of  Kwang-Chow-Wan. 
Great  Britain  installed  herself  at  Wei-hai-Wei. 
Even  Italy,  in  1899,  tried,  but  in  vain,  to  claim  the 
Bay  of  San-Mun.  It  was  the  break-up  of  China  of 
which  Lord  Charles  Beresford  had  spoken  some 
months  earlier. 

This  quarry  was  the  starting-point  of  the  events 
which  have  since  marked  the  history  of  Asia;  and 
the  situation  thus  created  determined  the  trend  of 
Far  Eastern  policy  during  the  ensuing  eight  years. 
Though  stripped  of  her  conquests,  Japan  would, 
perhaps,  have  resigned  herself  to  see  them  remain 
Chinese.  What  decided  her  to  seek  revenge  was 
the  substitution  of  the  Russian  for  the  Japanese 
flag  at  Port  Arthur.     With  her  integrity  safeguarded 


216  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

in  1895,  China  might  have  gone  on  in  her  lethargic 
existence.  She  was  roused  and  awakened  by  the 
foreign  invasion  of  her  land.  The  Reform  move- 
ment of  Kang-yu-Wei,  which  failed  in  1900,  was 
followed  by  that  of  the  xenophobe  Boxers.  In  the 
month  of  June,  1900,  the  European  Legations  in 
Pekin  were  attacked  by  the  mob,  with  the  inter- 
mittent complicity  of  the  regular  soldiers  and  of 
the  Chinese  Government.  Baron  von  Ketteler, 
Germany's  Minister,  was  assassinated  whilst  pro- 
ceeding on  horseback  to  the  Tsong-li-Yamen.  On 
the  13th  of  August,  an  international  army,  which 
was  constituted  at  Tien-tsin,  delivered  the  Legations, 
the  command  of  it  being  handed  over,  a  few  days 
later,  to  Field-Marshal  Count  von  Waldersee.  Ger- 
many thus  continued  to  play  the  premier  role,  or 
at  least  the  most  ostentatious  one,  in  Far  Eastern 
affairs.  Assuming  a  high  tone  after  the  murder  of 
his  Minister,  William  II  peremptorily  insisted  on  a 
severe  chastisement.  He  proposed  his  ^^  military 
protection"  to  the  Emperor  of  China  and  refused  to 
evacuate  Pekin.  By  an  arrangement  with  England 
(October  16,  1900),  he  seemed  to  reserve  for  his 
own  field  of  action  the  entire  north  of  China,  his 
navigation  companies,  in  the  meantime,  bidding 
fair  to  destroy  all  competition  in  the  South.  At  the 
same  moment,  a  Russian  Army  was  systematically 
occupying  Manchuria.  The  European  monopoliza- 
tion policy  therefore  still  persisted,  amidst  a  medley 
of  contradictions  due  to  divergences  among  the 
Powers ;  and  it  was  becoming  more  and  more  alarm- 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    217 

ing  to  China,  who  had  to  suffer  by  it,  and  to  England 
and  Japan,  who,  on  different  grounds,  were  forced 
to  remain  spectators  of  it  only. 

For  many  years,  the  progress  of  Russian  influence 
in  China  had  caused  serious  anxiety  to  the  British 
Government,  both  commercially  and  politically. 
In  1900,  their  Consuls  wrote:  "The  frontier  routes 
take  every  year  to  Russian  markets  tea,  either  in 
blocks  or  in  leaves,  the  total  value  of  which  must 
figure  out  in  tens  and  hundreds  of  millions;  and 
important  cargoes  also  arrive  at  Odessa  by  sea. 
Although  statistics  are  not  forthcoming,  there  are  a 
thousand  indications  which  show  from  day  to  day 
the  extent  to  which  Russia  has  got  hold  of  Northern 
China's  trade.  Even  in  the  valley  of  Yang-tse- 
kiang,  a  rich  colony  of  Russian  merchants  and 
commission  agents  has  replaced  the  English  agents 
who  formerly  made  all  Russia's  purchases  at  Han- 
Kow,  the  great  tea-market."  ^  On  the  16th  of 
April,  1899,  the  London  Cabinet,  being  already 
preoccupied  by  the  prospect  of  war  in  South  Africa, 
signed  a  treaty  with  Russia  from  which  good  results 
were  hoped,  for  the  protection  of  British  interests. 
Russia  pledged  herself  to  ask  for  no  railway  con- 
cessions in  the  basin  of  the  Yang-tse-kiang,  whether 
for  herself  or  for  any  of  her  subjects.  England 
made  a  similar  promise  with  regard  to  the  Chinese 
provinces  north  of  the  Great  Wall.  The  two  signa- 
taries,  moreover,  expressed  their  intention  to  commit 
no  act  prejudicial  to  China's  sovereign  rights  or  to 
'  See  Victor  Berard's  book,  The  Revolt  of  Asia. 


218  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

existing  treaties.  These  stipulations,  however,  did 
not  suffice  to  restrain  the  Russian  infiltration. 
England  then  concluded  (October  16,  1900)  an 
agreement  with  Germany,  —  still  with  a  view  to 
^Hhe  preservation  of  her  interests  and  her  rights 
under  the  regime  of  existing  treaties."  But  when 
an  attempt  was  made  by  the  London  Cabinet  to 
use  this  agreement  for  the  purpose  of  protesting 
against  the  continued  occupation  of  Manchuria, 
Berlin  replied  that,  whilst  the  province  in  question 
belonged  to  the  Chinese  Empire,  it  did  not,  for  all 
this,  make  part  of  the  real  "China,"  which  latter 
country  alone  was  the  object  of  the  treaty  signed 
in  October.  Realizing  how  powerless  she  was  to 
defend  her  interests  in  Asia  as  long  as  the  Trans- 
vaal war  occupied  her  military  forces.  Great  Britain 
sought  to  get  an  Ally  who  might  act  in  her  place  and 
stead.     Japan  offered,  and  she  took  Japan. 

In  silence  and  reflection,  the  statesmen  of  Tokio 
had  been  meditating  many  things  during  the  past 
seven  years;  and,  though  they  never  spoke  of  their 
discomfiture  of  1895,  this  was  always  in  their  mind. 
Throughout  the  crisis  of  1900,  forgetting  their  just 
grievances,  they  had  loyally  taken  sides  with  Europe, 
had  defended  the  cause  of  civilization,  and  had  ren- 
dered eminent  service  to  the  international  army,  yet 
without  losing  the  authority  which  they  had  acquired 
over  the  Chinese  not  only  by  their  victories,  but  by 
the  European  spoliations  that  had  followed  them. 
At  times,  the  presence  of  Russian  armies  in  Man- 
churia caused  them  grave  uneasiness.     The  occupa- 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    219 

tion  had  lasted  from  1900 ;  and  might  any  day  be 
extended  to  Corea  —  the  Corea  so  necessary  to 
Japan  economically,  on  account  of  the  rice  it  pro- 
duced, so  necessary  strategically  by  reason  of  the 
Continental  base  which  it  afforded  her  and  which 
she  as  an  island  needed.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan 
wanted  money  in  order  to  go  on  with  her  trans- 
formation and  complete  her  equipment;  and  none 
could  be  found  except  in  Europe.  She  aspired, 
above  all,  in  her  legitimate  pride,  to  be  admitted 
as  an  equal  into  the  company  of  the  Nations,  to 
see  her  efforts,  magnificent  in  their  intensity  and 
discipline,  openly  acknowledged  by  the  world. 
True,  there  were  various  ways  of  realizing  such  a 
design.  And  it  does  not  seem  that  Marquis  Ito, 
the  Japanese  Envoy,  when  he  left  for  Europe  in 
October,  1901,  was  altogether  decided  as  to  the  par- 
ticular solution  he  should  adopt.  He  began  his  calls 
with  Paris,  staying  a  week  in  the  French  capital, 
when  Mr.  Delcasse  would  have  been  able,  had  he 
chosen,  to  conclude  with  him  a  piece  of  business 
advantageous  to  ourselves.  He  next  went  to  Saint 
Petersburg,  where  they  were  no  more  clear-sighted 
than  our  statesmen  had  been  here.  Count  Mourav- 
ieff,  one  of  the  most  mediocre  Ministers  who  have 
ever  directed  Russian  policy,  did  not  understand 
that  despatch  was  necessary  and  that  Japan  would 
not  wait.  He  allowed  Marquis  Ito  to  go  away. 
In  January,  the  latter  arrived  in  London;  and,  on 
the  30th  of  the  same  month,  the  Alliance  was  signed 
and  immediately  published. 


220  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

''Moved  by  the  sole  desire  of  preserving  the 
statu  quo  and  general  peace  in  the  Far  East,  being 
especially  interested  in  guaranteeing  the  indepen- 
dence of  China  and  Corea/'  the  two  Governments 
settled,  for  a  period  of  five  years,  the  following 
agreement :  — 

Article  2.  —  If  Great  Britain  or  Japan,  for  the  defence  of 
their  respective  interests  before  mentioned,  should  be  engaged 
in  a  war  with  another  Power,  the  second  contracting  party  shall 
maintain  strict  neutrality  and  do  her  utmost  to  prevent  other 
Powers  from  entering  upon  hostilities  against  her  Ally. 

Article  3.  —  If,  in  the  case  just  mentioned,  any  other  Power 
or  Powers  should  enter  upon  hostilities  against  the  said  Ally, 
the  other  contracting  party  shall  come  to  her  aid  and  make  war 
in  common  with  her  and  conclude  peace,  with  common  accord. 

This  Treaty,  the  sudden  conclusion  of  which 
astounded  every  one,  had  immediate  consequences 
both  in  Europe  and  Asia.  In  Asia,  Japan  secured 
for  her  policy,  not  a  military  support,  —  since  the 
casus  foederis  was  only  to  be  brought  into  action  in 
the  contingency  of  a  war  with  two  Powers ;  and  such 
a  contingency  was  hardly  probable  —  but  a  moral 
authority  which  was  bound  to  encourage  her  in 
assuming  an  energetic  attitude.  On  her  side,  Eng- 
land secured,  for  the  aggregate  of  her  possessions 
and  the  defence  of  her  interests,  the  help  of  a  Power 
installed  in  the  very  heart  of  the  disputed  country, 
and  well  equipped  and  armed.  To  the  policy  prac- 
tised by  Germany  in  1897  and  pursued  also  by 
Russia  with  increased  vigour  after  1900,  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  gave  a  check,  the  efficacy  of  which 
was  soon  to  make  itself  felt.     In  Europe,   Russia 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    221 

received  a  set-back.  And  by  the  Franco-Russian 
declaration  of  the  19th  of  March,  asserting  the  unity 
of  views  —  a  purely  theoretic  one  —  between  Saint 
Petersburg  and  Paris  as  to  questions  in  the  Far 
East,  France,  without  profit  for  Russia,  took  her 
part  in  this  set-back.^  From  this  moment,  Russian 
policy,  and  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  in  conse- 
quence, showed  a  growing  tendency  to  drift  farther 
East.  Germany  began  to  find  fresh  prospects  of 
security  and  European  preponderance,  which  the 
next  three  years  were  destined  to  develop  to  her 
advantage. 

The  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  came  into  force  on 
the  6th  of  February,  1902.  On  the  12th  of  April 
ensuing,  Russia  signed  a  treaty  with  China,  fixing 
as  successive  dates  for  the  evacuation  of  Manchuria 
the  8th  of  October,  1902,  and  the  8th  of  April  and 
8th  of  October,  1903.  When  the  time  came  for  the 
second  zone  to  be  restored  to  China,  Russia  contrived 
to  maintain  her  troops  in  it,  on  the  ground  that  the 
region  was  in  a  disturbed  condition,  this  being,  in- 
deed, a  fact.  Three  months  later  (August  13, 
1903)  the  creation  of  a  Russian  Vice-Royalty  in  the 
Far  East,  and  Admiral  Alexeieff's  appointment 
to  it,  seemed  to  indicate  that  a  policy  of  expansion 
was  being  planned.  The  intrigues  of  Russian  busi- 
ness men  in  Corea  rendered  Japan  more  and  more 
uneasy.  During  this  same  summer  of  1903,  Mr. 
Kurino,  the  Japanese  Minister  at  Saint  Petersburg, 
informed  Count  Lamsdorff  of   his   desire   to   enter 

^  See  Chapter  I. 


222  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

into  negotiations  with  reference  to  questions  in  the 
Far  East.  Russia  complied,  but  appeared  in  no 
hurry  to  discuss.  On  the  3d  of  October,  it  became 
only  too  evident  that  the  Russian  and  Japanese 
proposals  were  not  in  harmony.  The  crux  of  the 
dispute  lay  in  Russia's  refusal  to  come  to  any  terms 
with  Japan  on  the  subject  of  the  Chinese  province 
of  Manchuria.  Three  months  passed  by;  and,  on 
the  13th  of  January,  1904,  this  difficulty  with  regard 
to  Manchuria  still  blocked  the  way.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  Japan  required  Russia  to  promise  that  she 
would  ^^ respect  the  integrity  of  China  in  Manchuria." 
Russia  kept  putting  off  her  reply,  and  Japan  lost 
patience.  On  the  5th  of  February,  she  broke  off 
diplomatic  relations;  and  on  the  8th,  her  torpedo 
vessels  attacked  the  Russian  iron-clads,  —  Cesarevitch, 
Retvisarij  and  Pallada,  —  which  were  lying  outside 
Port  Arthur. 

The  war  which  thus  commenced  is  too  well  known 
to  require  that  an  account  of  it  in  detail  be  given 
here.  On  the  1st  of  May,  the  Japanese  crossed  the 
Yalu.  On  the  30th,  they  invested  Port  Arthur. 
On  the  15th  of  June,  General  Stackelberg,  who  had 
been  sent  to  relieve  it,  was  defeated  at  Vafangu. 
On  the  8th  of  August,  the  outer  positions  of  Port 
Arthur  all  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Japanese.  On 
the  2d  and  3d  of  September,  Kuropatkin  was  de- 
feated at  Leao-Yang.  On  the  1st  of  January,  Port 
Arthur  capitulated.  Between  the  23d  of  February 
and  the  10th  of  March,  the  Russian  Army  was  again 
beaten  at  Mukden.     On  the  27th  of  May,  Rodjest- 


ASIATIC  AND  EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    223 

vensky^s  fleet  was  annihilated  at  Tsusima.  On  the 
8th  of  June,  President  Roosevelt  induced  the  belliger- 
ents to  negotiate.  On  the  5th  of  August,  the  Russian 
and  Japanese  plenipotentiaries  met  at  Oyster  Bay. 
And,  on  the  29th,  peace  was  signed  at  Portsmouth. 

In  a  previous  chapter  was  shown  the  immediate 
effect  exercised  by  the  Russian  defeats  not  only  on 
Europe  at  large,  but  more  especially  on  France. 
Germany,  being  desirous  of  strengthening  the  he- 
gemony that  she  feared  to  lose,  profited  by  these 
defeats  to  act  with  greater  freedom.  A  month 
after  the  fall  of  Port  Arthur,  Mr.  von  Kuhlmann 
gave  us  a  hint  of  his  approaching  inimical  behaviour. 
Three  weeks  after  Mukden,  William  II  manifested 
a  clearer  hostility  at  Tangier.  A  fortnight  after 
Tsusima,  Mr.  Delcasse's  resignation  was  imposed 
upon  us  by  a  campaign  of  intimidation.  Only  after 
the  opening  of  the  peace  negotiations  did  Germany 
make  the  concessions  which  rendered  the  signing  of 
the  July  and  September  agreements  possible.  With- 
out exaggerating  the  rigour  of  this  synchronism,  it 
may  be  said  that  each  defeat  of  Russia  was  followed 
by  a  set-back  for  France,  and  that  the  detestable 
policy  entered  upon  in  1897,  at  Germany's  instiga- 
tion and  from  her  example,  had  profited  no  one  but 
this  latter  Power.  In  what  position  did  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  leave  us?  What  reasons  did  we 
find  in  it  for  uneasiness  or  for  security? 

If  we  had  learned  to  our  cost  what  an  unsuccessful 
war  waged  in  Asia  by  Russia  meant,  we  were  by  no 
means  sure,  on  the  morrow  of  the  Treaty  of  Ports- 


224  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

mouth,  not  to  see  the  peril  reappear  within  a  brief 
delay.  Both  belligerents  had  been  exhausted  by 
the  war;  and  both — the  vanquishers  perhaps  even 
more  than  the  vanquished  —  felt  the  urgent  neces- 
sity of  laying  down  their  arms.  But  neither  side 
was  content  with  the  terms  of  peace ;  the  Russians 
first,  which  is  easy  to  understand.  On  the  10th 
of  June,  General  Linevitch,  who  had  become 
the  Commander-in-Chief;  Generals  Kuropatkin  and 
Kaulbars,  Chiefs  of  Army  Corps ;  Sakharoff,  Chief  of 
the  Staff ;  Rennenkampf ,  Zarubaieff,  Bilderling,  Lvof, 
Samsonoff,  Daniloff,  and  Korff  had  '^energetically 
and  unanimously  petitioned  the  Czar  to  continue 
the  war.''  In  the  heart  of  many  Russians  the  regret 
remained  that  this  prayer  had  not  been  heard. 
Corea  was  handed  over  to  Japan;  Port  Arthur  was 
lost;  the  railway  had  been  given  up;  half  of 
Saghalien  had  been  ceded ;  a  number  of  grants  had 
been  made,  notably  in  the  way  of  fishing  rights; 
the  Asiatic  dream  was  deprived  of  its  crown;  and 
all  this  was  painful  to  Russian  pride.  The  Japanese 
were  more  irritated  still.  Intoxicated  by  their 
victories,  they  were  indignant  at  a  peace  which  they 
deemed  to  be  shameful.  When,  on  the  7th  of  Sep- 
tember, the  signing  of  the  Treaty  was  known  by 
telegrams  which  the  authorities  had  been  keeping 
back  for  two  days,  there  was  a  formidable  riot. 
The  Ministerial  offices  were  attacked,  and  one  of 
them  was  set  fire  to.  On  the  9th,  the  Progressists 
held  a  meeting  at  which  all  the  members  were 
present;   and  a  vote  of  censure  on  the  Government 


ASIATIC  AXD   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    225 

was  passed.  How  long  would  a  peace  last  which 
was  received  thus  on  either  side? 

In  addition  to  the  indirect  peril  threatening  France 
from  this  situation,  there  was  the  more  direct  risk 
she  ran  of  having  compromised  her  relations  with 
Japan  through  her  friendly  attitude  towards  Russia. 
During  the  war,  on  several  occasions,  the  Japanese 
Government  had  reproached  the  French  Govern- 
ment with  failing  to  preserve  neutrality  out  of 
courtesy  towards  Admiral  Rodjestvensky.  In  the 
month  of  May,  1905,  these  reproaches  assumed  a 
character  of  sharp  remonstrance.  Basing  herself 
on  what  had  occurred  at  Cherbourg,  Dakar,  Algiers, 
Djibouti,  Majunga,  Nossi-Be,  and  in  the  bays  of 
Kam-ranh  and  Port-Dayot,  Japan,  through  the  voice 
of  Mr.  Motono,  her  Minister  in  Paris,  stated :  — 

^^  1°.  That,  without  incriminating  the  French  Gov- 
ernment's good  faith,  she  was  of  opinion  that  the 
latter^s  orders  had  been  insufficiently  executed. 

"2°.  That,  since  her  observations  had  been  acted 
upon,  after  the  things  complained  of  had  occurred, 
it  was  regrettable  no  better  surveillance  had  been 
carried  out  before. 

"3°.  That,  while  not  ignorant  of  the  complexity  of 
maritime  neutrality  questions  and  of  the  reasons 
France  had  for  adhering  to  her  own  special  regula- 
tions, she  —  Japan  —  considered  that  the  aid  given 
to  the  Russian  fleet,  through  no  proper  surveillance 
being  exercised,  had  greatly  facilitated  the  accom- 
plishment of  its  mission  and  had  enabled  it  to 
reach  the  China  seas." 


226  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Mr.  Motono  concluded :  — 

"What  Japan  defends  against  France  is  her  very 
existence. 

"  What  she  invokes  is  the  spirit  of  the  duty  of 
neutrality  against  the  quibbles  of  the  letter. 

"  What  she  affirms  is  that,  on  many  distinct 
and  successive  occasions  Rodjestvensky  has  utilized 
French  waters,  during  his  voyage  on  a  war-expedi- 
tion, either  for  staying  to  revictual  his  ships  or  else 
for  the  purpose  of  awaiting  in  safety  the  arrival  of 
his  reenforcements.^' 

The  French  Government  replied  that  in  law  they 
were  completely  covered  by  their  neutrality  regula- 
tions, drawn  up,  not  on  the  occasion  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war,  but  at  the  beginning  of  that  between 
Spain  and  the  United  States ;  that  they  had  taken, 
in  spite  of  the  letter  of  these  regulations,  all  the  meas- 
ures in  their  power  to  secure  complete  impartiality ; 
that,  except  at  Algiers,  and  there  only  in  very  small 
quantities,  there  had  never  been  any  direct  pur- 
chase of  coal  in  French  ports ;  that  purchases  made 
even  from  French  private  persons,  through  the  me- 
dium of  trading  vessels  accompanying  the  squadron, 
had  been  insignificant;  that  all  the  stock  of  coal 
used  by  these  vessels  had  been  bought  in  England 
and  Germany,  without  Japan's  having  made  any 
protest  on  the  matter ;  that  it  was  impossible  to  ex- 
ercise permanent  surveillance  along  the  whole  of 
the  Indo-Chinese  coasts ;  that,  moreover,  the  Japan- 
ese had  done  in  the  Dutch  Indies  and  the  Philip- 
pines the   same   things  that  they  reproached   the 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    227 

Russians  with  doing  in  French  waters.  This  dis- 
cussion between  the  two  Governments  had  no  defi- 
nite conclusion;  but  it  left  traces.  A  report,  which 
was  false,  was  published  by  some  newspapers  to  the 
effect  that  the  Japanese  military  Staff  had  elabo- 
rated a  plan  of  invasion  against  Indo-China;  and 
this  produced  a  certain  amount  of  sore  feeling  in 
France.  Consequently,  just  after  the  end  of  the 
war,  Franco-Japanese  relations  were  less  cordial 
than  they  had  been  before  it. 

Finally,  if  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  can  be 
considered  as  one  of  the  causes  of  the  war  of  1904, 
this  cause  subsisted  more  than  ever  on  the  morrow 
of  the  conclusion  of  peace.  For  the  Alliance  was 
renewed  in  London  on  the  12th  of  August,  1905, 
while  negotiations  were  in  progress  and  before  they 
had  finished.  The  common  principles  to  which  the 
two  Governments  subscribed  were  :  — 

1°.  The  consolidation  and  preservation  of  general 
peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India. 

2°.  The  upholding  of  the  common  interests  of  all 
the  Powers  in  China,  while  assuring  the  indepen- 
dence and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the 
principle  of  equality  for  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  all  nations,  in  China. 

3°.  The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights  of 
the  high  contracting  parties  in  the  regions  of  East- 
ern Asia  and  India. 

Japan's  political  preponderance  in  Corea  was  rec- 
ognized by  England.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan 
recognized  that  Great  Britain,  by  virtue  of  '^her  es- 


228  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

pecial  interests  along  all  the  Indian  frontier,  had  the 
right  to  take,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  this  frontier, 
such  measures  as  she  judged  necessary  for  the  pro- 
tection of  her  possessions  in  India.''  The  clause 
respecting  military  cooperation  remained  the  same 
as  in  the  first  treaty,  except  that  Article  7,  relative 
to  ^Hhe  means  by  which  help  should  be  rendered 
available,"  allowed  it  to  be  understood  that  such 
military  cooperation  might  be  given  in  Europe  as 
well  as  in  Asia.  The  Alliance  was  concluded  this 
time  for  ten  years,  and  was  consequently  extended 
and  strengthened.  The  article  referring  to  the  Ind- 
ian frontiers  and  their  '^ neighbourhood"  lent  itself 
to  all  sorts  of  interpretations,  even  to  that  of  a  plan 
of  military  action  against  Russia  in  Central  Asia. 
The  Alliance  was  generalized  in  its  object  and  made 
more  precise  in  its  means. 

For  France,  it  brought  out  the  disquieting  possi- 
bility of  a  conflict  no  longer  between  Russia  and 
Japan,  but  between  Russia  and  England.  The 
rivalry  of  the  ^^ elephant"  and  the  ^^ whale"  was  em- 
phasized by  the  very  precautions  taken  in  London 
to  protect  English  possessions  in  Asia.  In  the  course 
of  the  war,  the  Dogger  Bank  incident  had  shown  how 
great  the  tension  of  minds  was  both  in  England  and 
Russia.  The  Saint  Petersburg  papers  openly  ac- 
cused Great  Britain  not  only  of  having  excited  Japan 
and  let  loose  the  war,  but  of  fostering  Russian  revo- 
lution with  her  gold.  The  English  had  not  concealed 
their  sympathies  for  Japan,  and  had  even  given 
them  a  distinctly  aggressive  form  against  the  ^^heredi- 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    229 

tary  enemy,"  saying  as  the  Globe  did :  ^^  We  shall  not 
deviate  from  this  line  of  conduct  through  fear  of  giv- 
ing umbrage  to  Russia's  friends  on  the  Continent  or 
through  complaisance  to  the  sentiments  of  Continen- 
tal Powers."  It  was  Lord  Curzon's  earlier  policy 
which  had  most  efficaciously  contributed  to  prepare 
the  way  for  the  first  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  The 
second  one  had  the  same  character,  in  spite  of  the 
letter  in  which,  on  the  6th  of  September,  Lord  Lans- 
downe  had  announced  it  to  Sir  Charles  Hardinge,  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Saint  Petersburg.  Notwith- 
standing the  euphemisms  in  which  the  English  guar- 
antee was  expressed  when  publicly  spoken  of,  its 
consolidation  of  the  Japanese  victories  caused  the 
Russians  an  anxiety  which  was  quite  legitimate.  The 
situation  of  France  between  Russia,  her  ally  since 
1891,  and  England,  her  friend  since  1904,  was  about 
as  difficult  a  one  as  could  be  conceived.  The  con- 
ciliation of  our  Alliance  and  our  friendship  might 
become  impossible.  And  our  entire  policy  risked, 
being  paralyzed  in  the  attempt. 

Whilst,  through  the  conflict  of  alliances,  which, 
in  the  month  of  September,  1905,  was  developing  in 
Paris  and  Berlin,  Germany  derived  an  immediate  ad- 
vantage from  her  intervention,  as  proved  by  Mr. 
Delcasse's  resignation  and  the  forthcoming  meeting 
of  the  Algeciras  Conference,  she  was,  therefore,  bene- 
fited indirectly,  but  very  appreciably  also,  by  the 
events  that  had  occurred  in  the  Far  East,  although 
taking  no  part  in  them.  The  result  for  France  was 
a  false,  precarious  situation,  perhaps  even  a  danger- 


230  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

ous  one.  Between  an  enfeebled  Alliance  and  a  tri- 
umphant friendship,  our  country  must  expect  any- 
thing. In  the  past  ten  years,  the  intrusion  of  Asiatic 
affairs  into  European  policy  had  always  been 
prejudicial  to  us;  and  when  the  crisis  closed,  Asia 
weighed  upon  us  more  than  ever,  burdening  our  fu- 
ture with  heavy  uncertainty,  all  to  Germany's  profit. 

II 

It  is  to  the  honour  of  France  that  she  succeeded 
in  less  than  two  years  in  warding  off  the  three  dan- 
gers threatening  her  —  a  conflict  between  Russia  and 
Japan,  a  conflict  between  France  and  Japan,  and  a 
conflict  between  England  and  Russia  —  by  means 
of  three  reconciliations,  Russo-Japanese,  Franco- 
Japanese,  and  Anglo-Russian. 

The  Russo-Japanese  was  the  first  one  that  needed 
securing;  and,  consequently,  it  was  the  first  one 
essayed.  Not  to  speak  of  the  resentments  already 
alluded  to,  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  had  left  mate- 
rial incertitudes  subsisting.  Arrangements  it  had 
provided  for  were  still  to  be  negotiated ;  and  certain 
things  remained  to  be  defined  more  clearly,  while 
there  were  also  measures  to  be  taken  for  the  Treaty's 
execution.  Between  the  month  of  December,  1905, 
and  the  end  of  1906,  the  report  was  spread  several 
times  that  these  supplementary  negotiations,  which 
had  commenced  immediately  after  the  signing  of 
the  Treaty,  were  making  no  progress.  On  the  1st 
of  January,   1907,  Mr.  Motono,  the  Japanese  Am- 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    231 

bassador  at  Saint  Petersburg^  protested  publicly 
against  such  rumours,  in  which  the  wish  was  father 
to  the  thought;  being  circulated  both  by  Japanese 
and  Russian  newspapers.  Thanks  to  the  concilia- 
tory spirit  shown  by  the  Ambassador,  as  also  by  Mr. 
Isvolsky,  the  year  1907  witnessed  the  conclusion  of 
the  necessary  agreements.  On  the  13th  of  June,  the 
Convention  relative  to  the  exploitation  of  the  East 
China  and  South  Manchurian  railways  was  signed  at 
Saint  Petersburg;  and  also  the  protocol  relative  to 
the  station  in  common  at  Kwang-Chung-tse. 

On  the  28th  of  July,  1907,  an  arrangement  was 
made  respecting  the  Fisheries  question,  which 
granted  to  Japanese  subjects  the  right  to  fish, 
gather,  and  treat  sea  produce,  seals  and  walruses 
excepted,  in  the  seas  of  Japan,  Okhotsk,  and  Behr- 
ing,  excluding  only  rivers  and  bays.  Portions  of 
land  were  to  be  offered  on  public  lease  to  Japanese 
and  Russian  subjects,  without  distinction,  for  the 
preparation,  etc.,  on  shore  of  the  fish  that  was  caught. 
On  the  same  day,  a  Treaty  of  Commerce  and  Navi- 
gation reciprocally  recognized,  on  behalf  of  the  sub- 
jects of  both  countries,  rights  and  privileges  which 
did  not  normally  accrue  from  the  most-favoured- 
nation clause.  Finally,  on  the  30th  of  July,  Mr. 
Isvolsky  and  Mr.  Motono  signed  an  agreement  of 
more  general  scope.  ^^ Being  desirous,"  it  was  said, 
^'of  fortifying  the  pacific,  amicable,  and  neighbourly 
relations  which  have  been  happily  reestablished  be- 
tween Russia  and  Japan  and  to  do  away  with  the 
possibility  of  future  misunderstanding  between  the 


232  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

two   Empires/'    the   contracting   parties   made   the 
following  stipulations :  — 

Article  1.  —  Each  of  the  high  contracting  parties  promises 
to  respect  the  present  territorial  integrity  of  the  other,  as  also 
all  the  rights  accruing  to  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  high 
contracting  parties  from  the  treaties  in  force,  agreements  or  con- 
ventions in  application  at  present  between  the  high  contracting 
parties  and  China,  the  texts  of  which  have  been  exchanged  be- 
tween the  contracting  Powers,  this  in  the  measure  in  which  such 
rights  are  not  incompatible  with  the  principle  of  equal  treat- 
ment enunciated  in  the  Treaty  signed  at  Portsmouth,  on  the  5th 
of  September,  1905,  and  in  the  special  conventions  concluded 
between  Russia  and  Japan. 

Article  2.  —  The  two  high  contracting  parties  recognize  the 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China, 
as  also  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  with  regard  to  trade 
and  industry  for  all  the  nations  of  the  said  Empire.  They  like- 
wise pledge  themselves  to  uphold  the  statu  quo  and  the  respect 
of  this  principle  by  all  the  pacific  means  at  their  disposal. 

With  praiseworthy  clear-sightedness,  Mr.  Isvolsky 
thus  drew  the  inevitable  consequences  from  a  war 
which  had,  indeed,  cost  Russia  neither  a  kopeck  of 
indemnity  nor  an  inch  of  her  territory,  and  from 
which,  therefore,  resulted  no  imperious  duty  of  re- 
venge. The  Asiatic  policy,  as  it  had  been  practised 
at  Saint  Petersburg  since  1896,  embraced  more  of  a 
chimera  than  a  reality.  It  is  not  in  the  seas  of  China 
that  Russia  has  to  seek  for  the  free  port  promised 
her  by  Peter  the  Great ;  not  at  four  thousand  kilo- 
metres from  her  Capital  that  a  great  Continental 
Power  must  place  the  centre  of  her  action.  The 
agreements  of  1907,  which  recorded  accomplished 
facts  and  substituted  friendship  for  distrust,  were 
consequently  inspired  by  just  views.     Having  played 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    233 

a  discreet  and  friendly  role  in  the  conclusion  of  these 
agreements,  France  saw  the  Russian  Alliance  re- 
placed by  them  on  its  proper  basis,  that  is  to  say,  in 
Europe.  The  more  immediate  peril  existing  for  her 
in  the  Far  East  was  removed  by  the  sincere  recon- 
ciliation of  those  who  so  lately  had  been  adversaries. 
And  the  field  was  thus  opened  for  the  pursuit  of 
other  guarantees. 

If  intellectual  and  moral  ties  have  any  value  in 
the  formation  of  international  combinations,  they 
should  contribute  something  to  the  rapprochement 
of  France  and  Japan.  As  was  well  said  by  the  Jap- 
anese newspaper,  the  Kokumin,  in  the  autumn  of 
1906,  France,  among  the  nations  of  Europe,  was  one 
of  the  most  eager  to  encourage  the  Mikado  and  his 
people  in  the  evolution  which  has  made  Japan  a 
great  Power.  It  was  to  France  that  the  Japanese 
officers  came  who  were  sent  to  acquire  instruction  in 
military  organization.  And  it  was  a  Frenchman, 
Mr.  Bertin,  who  created  the  Japanese  fleet.  The 
Japanese  Code  was  modelled  on  that  of  Napoleon. 
Even  during  the  course  of  the  war,  and  in  spite  of 
the  incidents  mentioned  above,  a  Japanese  states- 
man of  mark.  Baron  Suyematsu,  son-in-law  of  the 
Marquis  Ito,  said  to  me  :  — 

^^No  one  in  Japan  is  surprised  at  your  sympathies 
for  your  allies.  But  we  do  not  forget  either  —  and 
w^e  hope  that  France  does  not  forget  —  the  ancient, 
cordial  relations  uniting  us  to  you,  the  services  you 
have  rendered  us,  the  friendships  you  have  formed 
among  us.     However  ferocious  a  war  may  be,  it  is 


234  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

only  an  incident  in  the  history  of  the  world.  This 
one  has  created  between  France  and  Japan  a  situa- 
tion which  is  false  and  somewhat  embarrassing.  But 
let  us  recollect  two  things  —  first,  that  France  has 
never  been  wronged  by  Japan,  and  secondly,  that 
Japan  has  never  been  wronged  by  France;  and  let 
us  in  confidence  wait  for  better  days.'' 

These  days  arrived.  On  the  5th  of  May,  1907,  the 
Havas  Agency  announced  that  a  Franco-Japanese 
understanding  was  about  to  be  signed.  The  next 
day,  Mr.  Pichon  said:  — 

^^The  object  of  our  negotiations  with  Japan,  which 
indeed  are  not  yet  terminated,  is  the  signing  of  a  con- 
vention which  is  calculated  to  add  fresh  guarantees 
to  those  existing  for  the  preservation  of  peace  in  the 
Far  East.  They  are  the  logical  continuation  of  the 
absolutely  peaceful  policy  of  France,  a  policy  whose 
only  aim  is  to  prevent  all  complications  in  whatso- 
ever parts  of  the  world,  and  more  especially  in  those 
where  we  have  particular  interests.'' 

On  the  7th  of  May,  Baron  Kurino,  Japan's  Am- 
bassador, characterized  the  approaching  agreement 
as  follows :  — 

^^Our  wish  has  been  to  achieve  a  work  of  good 
sense  and  peace.  The  interests  of  France  and  Japan 
are  not  at  all  contradictory.  And  the  agreement  will 
set  seal  to  their  harmony.  This  arrangement  com- 
prises, on  the  one  hand,  a  guarantee  for  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  China,  and,  on  the  other, 
a  security  for  the  possessions  of  the  two  contracting 
Powers.     It  gives  sanction  to  the  territorial  status 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    235 

accruing  to  Japan  from  the  last  war,  and  to  France, 
from  her  situation  in  Indo-China.  It  constitutes  a 
decisive  proof  of  the  moderation  of  our  poHcy.  The 
legend  of  the  Yellow  Peril  and  Japanese  ambitions 
will,  I  hope,  be  definitely  dissipated  by  the  event 
now  preparing.  The  old  relations  of  friendship 
uniting  Japan  and  France  increase  the  value  of  this 
loyal  arrangement,  which  the  two  countries  have 
decided  to  conclude,  by  promising  each  other  mutual 
support  on  the  basis  I  have  indicated  to  you.'' 

The  agreement  was  signed  on  the  10th  of  June 
following.     It  was  conceived  as  hereafter:  — 

Declaration 

The  two  Governments  of  Japan  and  France,  while  reserving 
to  themselves  the  liberty  to  enter  into  pourparlers  with  a  view 
to  the  conclusion  of  a  commercial  convention  in  regard  to  rela- 
tions between  Japan  and  French  Indo-China,  agree  on  the  ensu- 
ing stipulations :  — 

The  most-favoured-nation  treatment  shall  be  accorded  to 
Japan's  subjects  and  functionaries  throughout  French  Indo- 
China  in  all  that  concerns  their  persons  and  the  protection  of 
their  property;  and  this  same  treatment  shall  be  applied  to 
the  subjects  and  proteges  of  French  Indo-China  throughout  the 
Empire  of  Japan,  and  this,  until  the  expiration  of  the  Treaty 
of  Commerce  and  Navigation  signed  between  Japan  and  France 
on  the  4th  of  August,  1896. 

Arrangement 

The  Government  of  the  French  Republic  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  his  Majesty,  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  being  animated  by 
the  desire  to  fortify  the  amicable  relations  existing  between 
them  and  to  remove  for  the  future  all  cause  of  misunderstand- 
ing, have  decided  to  conclude  the  following  arrangement:  — 

The  Governments  of  France  and  Japan,  while  agreeing  to 


236  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

respect  the  independence  and  integrity  of  China,  as  well  as  the 
principle  of  equal  treatment  in  this  country  for  the  commerce 
and  things  touching  the  jurisdiction  of  all  nations,  and  while 
having  a  special  interest  in  securing  order  and  a  state  of  tran- 
quillity, notably  throughout  the  frontier  regions  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  that  are  contiguous  to  territories  over  which  they  have 
rights  of  sovereignty,  promise  to  support  each  other  mutually  in 
assuring  peace  and  safety  in  these  regions,  with  a  view  to  pre- 
serving the  respective  situation  and  territorial  rights  of  the  two 
contracting  parties  on  the  Asiatic  continent. 

One  has  only  to  remember  the  anxiety  experi- 
enced by  France  during  the  Russo-Japanese  war^to 
appreciate  rightly  the  diplomatic  guarantee  thus  ob- 
tained from  Japan  for  the  integrity  of  her  posses- 
sions. True,  this  guarantee  depends  only  on  the 
word  of  the  Tokio  Cabinet ;  and,  whenever  it  might 
please  Japan  to  attack  Cochin-China,  Annam,  or 
Tonkin,  it  would  be  difficult  for  us,  at  so  great  a  dis- 
tance, to  defend  them.  But  to  doubt  of  Japan's 
sincerity  would  be  an  insult.  Her  foreign  policy 
has  always  been  vigorous,  and  at  times  brutal.  It 
has  never  been  disloyal.  It  has  kept  the  engage- 
ments to  which  it  has  given  its  seal.  It  has  consist- 
ently announced  in  advance  any  decisions  it  intended 
to  take.  Moreover,  everything  dictates  to  Japan  the 
advisability  of  maintaining  amicable  relations  with 
France.  The  war  having  terminated  without  Rus- 
sia's paying  an  indemnity,  the  financial  situation  of 
the  Mikado's  Empire  has  been  rendered  somewhat 
difficult.  Japan's  debt,  which,  in  1903,  was  559 
million  yenSj  amounted,  on  the  conclusion  of  peace 
at  Portsmouth,  to  1859  millions,  this  being   an  in- 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    237 

crease  of  1300  millions.  France,  therefore,  being 
an  inexhaustible  reservoir  of  capital,  can  be  to  Japan 
the  most  useful  of  friends.  Two  loans  of  twenty- 
three  millions  sterling  have  already  been  subscribed 
by  the  French  market.  Provided  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment grants  equitable  advantages  to  our  industry 
in  return,  these  operations  are  likely  to  be  renewed. 
The  agreement,  taken  in  itself,  is,  consequently,  a 
profitable  one  for  both  contracting  parties.  And  it 
becomes  more  valuable  still,  when  taken  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  the  Franco- 
English  friendship,  and  the  Russo-Japanese  con- 
ventions. It  makes,  in  fact,  an  integral  part  of  a 
system  of  arrangements,  the  advantage  of  which  for 
France  is  twofold.  In  Asia,  it  eliminates  all  imme- 
diate risk  of  war,  since  three  out  of  the  four  Powers 
that  have  the  greatest  interests  there  have  come  to 
an  understanding  for  the  maintenance  of  the  statu 
quo.  In  Europe,  it  removes  risks  of  complications 
arising  from  an  Asiatic  conflict.  In  order  that  such 
a  conflict,  already  rendered  improbable,  might  be- 
come impossible,  there  remained  one  necessary  con- 
dition to  be  fulfilled,  and  the  one  was  sufficient:  to 
wit,  the  reconciliation  of  London  and  Saint  Peters- 
burg. Within  less  than  three  months  after  the 
signing  of  the  Franco-Japanese  agreement,  this  last 
condition  was  realized  in  its  turn. 

A  few  years  ago,  between  August,  1900,  and  De- 
cember, 1901,  an  English  statesman  published  in  the 
Fortnightly  Review,  under  the  pseudonym  Calchas,  a 
series  of  articles  on  British  policy.     In  opposition  to 


238  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

/eurrent  opinion,  Calchas  maintained  that  Great  Brit- 
ain might  and  should  come  to  an  understanding  with 
Russia.  ^^Why  not  a  treaty  with  Russia?"  he  asked 
in  October,  1900.  And  he  drew  the  conclusion  that, 
whether  on  the  Bosphorus,  or  in  the  Balkans,  or  in 
Asia  Minor,  or  in  the  Far  East,  there  was  room  for 
the  two  countries,  room  also  for  an  agreement  be- 

\^  tween  them.  This  press  campaign,  which  attracted 
great  attention  at  the  time,  may  be  considered  as  the 
origin  of  the  oft-thwarted  movement  which,  after 
seven  years'  waiting,  resulted,  in  1907,  in  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Anglo-Russian  convention.     In  order 

^  to  get  so  far,  many  prejudices  had  to  be  overcome. 
Since  the  mutiny  of  the  Sepoys  and  its  thorough  re- 
pression, the  Russian  invasion  had  appeared  to  Eng- 
land to  be  the  only  peril  with  which  India  was 
threatened;  and  the  history  of  Mediterranean  Asia 
or  Oriental  Asia  had,  during  half  a  century,  been 
nothing  but  the  record  of  Anglo-Russian  disputes.^ 
After  the  Crimean  war,  there  was  the  struggle  against 
Schamyl,  the  Caucasian  Iman ;  that  against  Yacoub, 
the  Sultan  of  Cashgar;  then,  there  were  Tcherna- 
ieff's,  Romanowsky's,  and  Kaufmann's  campaigns, 
the  Turkestan  campaign  in  1870,  that  of  Khiva  in 
1873,  of  Khokand  in  1876,  of  Merv  a  few  years  later, 
and  finally  the  Afghan  war.  Behind  each  of  these 
native  resistances,  Russia  thought  she  saw  England. 
In  1885,  just  after  the  successes  of  General  Komar- 
off,  war  appeared  to  be  inevitable  between  the  two 
Powers.  However,  it  was  avoided  by  the  agree- 
*  See  Rouire's  book,  Anglo-Russian  Rivalry  in  Asia. 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    239 

merits  of  1885,  1887,  1895,  and  1899.  Russian  ex- 
pansion had  slackened,  and  had  to  some  extent 
turned  aside.  Still,  it  had  not  stopped.  And  soon, 
indeed,  it  was  seen  advancing  over  the  plateaus  of 
Mongolia  and  along  the  plains  of  Manchuria,  filtering 
through  into  China  and  as  far  as  Thibet,  troubling 
once  more  the  Hindu  frontier,  the  defence  of  which 
dominates  England's  Asiatic  policy,  and  adding  the 
peril  of  the  North  to  that  of  the  Northwest.  It  was 
the  time  of  the  Transvaal  war.  On  the  30th  of  Jan- 
uary, 1902,  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  was  signed. 
The  policy  advocated  in  the  Fortnightly  Review 
seemed  more  than  ever  impossible.  Anglo-Russian 
antagonism  was  at  this  moment  aggravated  by  the 
rivalry  raging  between  Russia  and  Japan ;  and  a  col- 
lision seemed  to  be  imminent. 

The  very  greatness  of  the  peril  acted  as  a  brake. 
In  spite  of  the  occurrence  of  certain  awkward  inci- 
dents, —  the  Dogger  Bank  cannonade,  for  instance, 
—  Great  Britain  and  Russia  remained  at  peace. 
For  one  thing,  there  was  to  be  considered  the  impor- 
tance of  Anglo-Russian  trade,  which  had  grown 
continually  since  1882.  The  English  had  increased 
their  sales  in  the  Empire  of  the  Czars  from  eight  to 
fourteen  millions  sterling,  and  their  purchases  from 
fifteen  to  twenty-five  millions.  Their  consuls  pointed 
out  that  Russia  was  an  admirable  field  opened  to 
their  commercial  progress,  which  everywhere  else 
was  hampered  by  Germany.  Moreover,  although 
Japan's  Ally,  England  had  no  intention  of  handing 
the  Far  East  over  to  her,  Russia  might  be  a  useful 


240  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

counterweight  against  a  friend  that  was  too  strong, 
while  also  offering  an  outlet  for  English  industry. 
Last  of  all^  the  settlement  of  the  Franco-English 
quarrel,  on  the  8th  of  April,  1904,  gave  a  pertinent 
•example  to  those  partisans  of  a  reconciliation  who, 
though  deeming  it  desirable,  did  not  think  it  possible. 
In  1905,  the  Russian  press,  when  examining  into  the 
causes  of  the  Manchurian  defeat,  opined  in  favour 
of  an  agreement.  The  Novoie  Vremia,  in  the  Sep- 
tember of  this  year,  manifested  a  conciliatory  atti- 
tude, which  the  Times  at  once  took  occasion  to 
praise.  In  1906,  during  the  long  weeks  spent  at 
Algeciras,  the  Russian  Plenipotentiary,  Count  Cassini, 
had  frequent  chats  with  his  English  colleague.  Sir 
Arthur  Nicholson,  and  with  Sir  Donald  Mackenzie 
Wallace,  the  king's  personal  friend,  who  subse- 
quently paid  a  visit  to  Saint  Petersburg.  On  being 
called  to  the  Foreign  Office  in  the  May  of  the  same 
year,  Mr.  Isvolsky,  whose  diplomatic  skill  was  incon- 
testable, showed  his  firm  determination  to  place 
questions  concerning  the  Far  East  in  their  proper 
relation  to  other  Russian  interests,  without  allowing 
them  to  encroach  unduly,  and  his  equally  firm  desire 
to  establish  a  better  understanding  between  Russia 
and  England,  on  the  basis  of  an  equitable  agreement. 
This  desire  was  reciprocated  by  King  Edward  and 
his  Government. 

On  the  23d  of  October,  1905,  two  months  after 
the  peace  of  Portsmouth,  the  Times  correspondent 
at  Saint  Petersburg  telegraphed  to  his  paper :  — 


ASIATIC  AND  EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    241 

Saint  Petersburg,  October  23d.  ...  I  have  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  audience  just  granted  by  the  Czar  to  Sir  Charles 
Hardinge  referred  to  the  understanding  which  is  being  prepared 
between  England  and  Russia.  The  arrangements  to  be  made, 
in  view  of  pourparler's  concerning  this  question,  require  Sir 
Charles  Hardinge's  presence  in  London.  I  learn,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  the  Count  Benckendorff,  Russia's  Ambassador  in 
London,  will  proceed  to  Saint  Petersburg  for  a  similar  purpose. 
The  negotiations  being  intrusted  to  two  Ambassadors  who  have 
already  proved  their  ardent  desire  to  see  an  improvement  in  the 
two  countries'  respective  relations,  the  result  of  these  negotia- 
tions can  hardly  be  doubtful. 

Faint  denials  greeted  this  information,  which  was 
perhaps  premature.  On  the  22d  of  May,  the  Temps 
correspondent  at  BerKn  telegraphed  that  every  one 
in  Germany  was  expecting  the  speedy  conclusion  of 
an  Anglo-Russian  agreement.  Questioned  on  the 
24th,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
said :  — 

I  cannot  make  any  statements  as  to  the  alleged  agreement 
which  has  been  published  in  the  press,  since  this  agreement  does 
not  exist.  But  I  may  add  that  there  is  an  increasing  tendency 
on  the  part  of  England  and  Russia  to  give  an  amicable  consid- 
eration to  questions  which  concern  them  both,  whenever  such 
questions  arise. 

This  tendency  has  lately  led  the  two  Governments  to  coop- 
erate on  more  than  one  occasion. 

It  is  a  tendency  which  we  shall  be  happy  to  encourage,  it  is  a 
tendency  which,  if  continued,  will  naturally  bring  about  the 
progressive  settlement  of  questions  interesting  each  of  the  two 
countries,  and  the  strengthening  of  the  friendly  relations  exist- 
ing between  them. 

In  the  month  of  July,  the  intended  visit  of  an 
English  squadron  to  Cronstadt  was  put  off  on  account 
of  the  domestic  difficulties  with  which  Russia  had 


242  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

to  cope  at  the  time.  However,  in  March,  1790,  the 
Russian  sailors  had  a  cordial  reception  in  England. 
And,  on  this  occasion,  a  semi-official  note,  communi- 
cated to  the  papers,  said :  — 

The  information  published  on  the  Continent,  according  to 
which  the  negotiations  relative  to  an  understanding  between 
England  and  Russia  have  been  broken  off,  is  absolutely  incor- 
rect. On  the  contrary,  these  negotiations  are  being  carried  on 
still  between  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Saint  Petersburg.  It  is  expected  that 
the  agreement  will  be  signed  in  that  Capital  at  no  distant  date, 
unless  something  unexpected  happens.  However,  as  questions 
relative  to  Afghanistan  and  Thibet  are  comprised  in  the  negotia- 
tions, it  is  possible  that  some  delay  may  occur  before  the  agree- 
ment is  concluded.  In  fact,  certain  of  these  questions  have  to 
be  submitted  to  the  Emperor  of  China  and  the  Ameer  of  Afghan- 
istan. 

As  to  the  relations  between  the  two  countries,  it  may  be 
categorically  announced  that,  even  before  the  signing  of  any 
agreement  a  real  and  definite  understanding  exists  which  has 
permitted  the  two  countries  to  act  in  complete  harmony  as 
regards  Persia ;  and,  but  for  this  understanding  it  is  hardly 
doubtful  that  recent  events  in  Teheran  would  have  led  to  grave 
complications. 

It  is  necessary  to  insist  on  this  point  that  the  Anglo-Russian 
agreement  is  by  no  means  a  menace  to  any  other  Power.  It 
does  not  threaten  the  integrity  of  Persia,  and  interferes  with  no 
interests  invested  in  this  country. 

The  existence  of  negotiations  was  therefore  pub- 
licly recognized.  On  the  15th  of  June,  1907,  the 
English  Government  showed  their  determination 
^'not  to  admit  any  mixing  up  of  Russia's  domestic 
concerns  with  discussions  referring  to  the  respective 
frontiers  of  the  two  countries  and  aiming  at  the 
prevention    of    difficulties    that    might     otherwise 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    243 

arise/^  On  the  31st  of  August,  the  agreement  was 
signed  at  Saint  Petersburg.  This  agreement  dealt 
with  Persia,  Afghanistan,  Thibet,  and,  under  the 
form  of  some  correspondence  annexed,  with  the 
Persian  Gulf.  In  Persia,  it  fixed  three  zones  of 
influence,  a  Russian  one  to  the  north,  an  English 
one  to  the  southeast,  and  a  third  one,  mixed  in  its 
character,  between  the  two  others;  the  eventual 
measures  of  financial  control  being  left  to  future 
settlement  by  common  arrangement.  In  Afghanis- 
tan, under  reserve  of  the  maintenance  of  the  political 
statu  quo  and  commercial  liberty,  Russia  recognized 
the  preponderant  influence  of  Great  Britain,  and 
renounced  the  right  to  send  diplomatic  agents  to 
Cabool.  In  Thibet,  the  suzerainty  of  China  was 
recognized,  as  well  as  its  territorial  integrity.  Rus- 
sians and  English  pledged  themselves  to  abstain 
from  all  interference  in  the  domestic  administration 
of  the  country,  and  to  seek  no  concession  there. 
The  letter  relative  to  the  Persian  Gulf  stated  the 
agreement  of  the  two  Powers  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  statu  quo. 

Of  interest  to  England  as  being  one  of  the  routes 
to  India,  Persia  is  of  interest  also  to  Russia,  as  being 
one  of  the  ways  capable  of  conducting  her  to  the 
free  sea.  But  on  this  ground,  the  nineteenth  century 
was  far  from  being  equally  favourable  to  English 
and  to  Russians.  And,  more  especially  in  its  last 
quarter,  Russian  preponderance  extended  itself 
over  the  greater  part.  In  less  than  ten  years, 
between  1890  and  1900,  Russian  importations  into 


244  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Persia  doubled,  increasing  from  ten  millions  of 
roubles  to  twenty-one  millions.  And  exportations 
showed  a  similar  progress.  In  1904,  the  English 
Consuls  at  Bagdad,  Kermanshah,  and  Teheran,  as 
well  as  throughout  the  towns  of  the  Iran,  were 
unanimous  in  acknowledging  the  success  of  Russian 
commerce,  to  the  detriment  of  British.  It  was  not, 
however,  so  much  by  commerce  as  by  banking  that 
Russia  conquered  and  held  Persia  during  the  last 
years  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  Russian  Loan 
Bank,  which  had  existed  for  long  years  at  Teheran, 
acquired  much  more  importance  at  the  accession 
of  Mouzaffer  ed  Dine,  father  of  the  Shah  now  reign- 
ing. With  the  support  of  the  Saint  Petersburg 
State  Bank,  of  which  it  was  a  branch,  it  granted  a 
loan  of  twenty-two  millions  of  roubles  without 
special  guarantee,  and  on  the  sole  condition  that  all 
the  other  creditors  of  Persia  should  be  reimbursed. 
Thus  it  became  the  unique  creditor,  with  all  the 
de  facto,  if  not  de  jure,  advantages  attaching  to- this 
situation.  Since  the  arrival  of  Lord  Curzon  in 
India,  Great  Britain  had  tried  to  react,  not  at 
Teheran  itself,  where  the  English  bank,  which  was 
the  ^'Persian  Imperial  Bank,'^  had  made  so  many 
mistakes  that  its  influence  was  lost,  but  towards  the 
South  and  East,  by  Koweit  and  the  Seistan.  In  the 
Viceroy  of  India's  eyes,  it  was  a  course  necessary  to 
that  defence  of  the  Empire  which,  about  the  same 
time,  induced  him  to  send  Colonel  Younghusband 
to  Thibet.  The  understanding  established  between 
those    who    were    considered,    at    this    moment,    as 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    245 

probable  or  possible  adversaries  marked  a  great 
change,  therefore.  The  two  Governments  had  been 
inspired  by  a  spirit  of  prudence,  moderation,  and 
restraint.  And  it  was  the  same  spirit  which  had 
already  guided  their  financial  arrangement  of  Octo- 
ber, 1906,  by  which  they  pledged  themselves  to  lend 
Persia,  on  joint  and  equal  account,  the  sum  of 
£4,000,000  sterling.  It  may  be  further  remarked 
that  the  convention  provided  for  ulterior  arrange- 
ments, particularly  mth  regard  to  the  eventual 
control  to  be  established  over  the  Persian  revenues. 
The  contracting  Powers  made  a  point  of  not  only 
liquidating  the  past  but  preparing  the  future. 

In  Afghanistan,  Great  Britain's  success  was 
complete.  England's  relations  with  Afghanistan 
had  been  difficult  for  a  long  time  past.  But  the 
Russians  were  not  responsible  for  these  difficulties, 
which  they  had  profited  by,  even  while  they  had 
not  provoked  them.  Lord  Roberts  used  to  say, 
"The  less  the  Afghans  see  of  us,  the  less  they  will 
detest  us."  And,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  each  forward 
movement  of  England,  during  a  whole  century, 
aroused  Afghan  resistance,  generally  followed  by  a 
Russo-Afghan  rapprochement.  The  Burnes  mission 
of  1838  led  to  the  Alliance  between  Russia  and  the 
Ameer  and  the  massacre  of  the  British  garrisons  in 
1841.  In  1875,  things  turned  out  pretty  much  in 
the  same  way;  attempts  on  the  English  side  to 
resume  negotiations  resulting  in  the  massacre  of 
the  Cavagnari  mission.  Afghanistan's  policy, 
therefore,  with  regard  to  England  seemed  to  be  a 


246  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

policy  of  reaction.  Lord  Curzon's  somewhat  rest- 
less activity  had  increased  rather  than  dissipated 
the  distrust  at  Cabool.  On  the  contrary,  since 
1905,  a  real  alteration  for  the  better  had  occurred. 
In  the  course  of  his  mission  to  Afghanistan,  Mr. 
Louis  Dane  obtained  from  the  Ameer  a  confirmation 
of  previous  pledges,  and  notably  of  the  Treaty  of 
1893.  Already,  in  1904,  the  Ameer's  son  had  paid  a 
visit  to  Calcutta,  where  he  was  received  with  the 
most  flattering  attentions.  During  the  winter  of 
1906-1907,  the  Ameer,  Habib  Hulla,  in  his  turn,  was 
entertained  by  Lord  Minto,  who  displayed  in  his 
honour  unprecedented  magnificence.  This  visit  re- 
assured Great  Britain  on  the  Afghan  side.  The 
Convention  of  the  31st  of  August  reassured  her  on 
the  Russian  side. 

To  tell  the  truth,  Russia  had  not  waited  for  this 
agreement  to  declare  that  she  had  no  ambitions 
concerning  Afghanistan.  In  the  month  of  March, 
1869,  Prince  Gortchakoff  wrote  to  the  Russian 
Ambassador  in  London:  ^^You  may  repeat  in  the 
most  positive  terms  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
Affairs  of  her  Britannic  Majesty  that  his  Imperial 
Majesty  considers  Afghanistan  as  being  completely 
outside  the  sphere  in  which  Russia  can  be  called 
upon  to  exercise  her  influence.  Neither  interven- 
tion nor  interference  of  any  kind  detrimental  to 
the  independence  of  this  State  enter  into  his  calcu- 
lations." In  February,  1874,  the  Russian  Chan- 
cellor renewed  the  same  assurance  to  Lord  Augustus 
Loftus.     In  February,  1882,  the  Russian  Ambassador 


ASIATIC  AND  EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    247 

in  London  affirmed  to  Lord  Granville  that  his 
Sovereign's  intentions  had  not  varied.  In  October, 
1883,  Mr.  de  Giers  went  further  still;  and,  as  the 
English  Ambassador  at  Saint  Petersburg  asked  him 
if  it  were  true  that  a  Russian  envoy  was  to  start  for 
Cabool  with  a  letter  from  the  Czar  to  the  Ameer, 
he  replied:  ^^It  is  impossible.  All  measures  are 
taken  in  order  to  avoid  there  being  any  relations 
between  Russia  and  Afghanistan,  that  country 
being  considered  as  belonging  to  the  English  circle 
of  influence."  Certain  apprehensions,  however, 
still  persisted.  And  traces  of  them  may  be  found 
in  the  speech  in  which,  on  the  12th  of  January,  1905, 
Mr.  Balfour  identified  'Hhe  problem  of  the  British 
Army"  with  that  of  the  defence  of  Afghanistan. 
Such  fears  were  destined  to  be  appeased  by  the 
Convention  of  the  31st  of  August,  which  determined 
a  zone  of  English  influence  in  Persia  beyond  the 
Afghan  frontier  and  explicitly  recognized  Great 
Britain's  '^special  situation"  at  Cabool.  It  even 
went  so  far  as  to  admit  the  hypothesis  of  England's 
energetic  action,  in  case  the  Ameer  should  not  keep 
his  engagements  to  her.  It  was  a  sort  of  carte 
hlanche  given  her  by  Russia;  and  was  valuable  to 
England  without  costing  the  Czar's  Government 
much. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Thibet,  Great  Britain  made 
a  halt,  at  any  rate,  with  respect  to  her  policy  of 
preceding  years.  For  rather  more  than  two  cen- 
turies, the  Dalai-Lama,  or  pontiff,  in  whose  person 
are  supposed  to  be  united  the  two  halves  of  God, 


248  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Pope  and  Emperorj  had  been  China^s  vassal.  He  is 
assisted  by  a  Chinese  Resident  Minister ;  and  China 
guarantees  him  the  integrity  of  his  States.  In  spite 
of  this  Chinese  guarantee,  the  British,  in  India, 
have  always  exhibited  an  indiscreet  tendency  to 
approach  the  Thibetan  wall.  They  first  subdued 
half  a  dozen  petty  principalities.  Then,  in  1890, 
they  took  the  valley  of  the  Tista  in  Thibet  itself, 
with  the  consent  of  China.  This  annexation,  which 
was  insupportable  to  the  proud  patriotism  of  the 
Thibetans,  definitely  alienated  from  the  EngHsh 
the  sympathies  they  might  eventually  have  secured 
among  the  people  of  Lhassa.  Russia,  on  her  side, 
all  along  the  Siberian  frontier,  has,  if  not  conven- 
iences, at  least  possibihties  of  approach  as  far  as 
the  *'Roof  of  the  World,"  —  an  approach  long  and 
painful,  but  yet  an  approach  all  the  same.  More- 
over, she  has  numerous  Buddhist  subjects,  who 
belong  to  the  Buriat  church,  and  whose  chief  receives 
a  twofold  investiture :  the  one  temporal,  at  Saint 
Petersburg,  the  other  spiritual,  at  Lhassa.  On 
several  occasions  there  have  been  Thibetan  embassies 
despatched  to  Russia.  In  1900,  there  were  political 
pourparlers,  with  a  view  to  a  sort  of  protectorate. 
True,  there  is  nothing  to  prove  that  these  pourpar- 
lers aimed  ultimately  at  an  attack  on  British  India, 
which,  indeed,  is  practically  impossible  of  realiza- 
tion. But  many  English  people,  especially  those 
in  India,  believed  this  or  affected  to  believe  it. 
Lord  Curzon,  in  particular,  proclaimed  loudly  the 
necessity  of  raising  British  prestige,  and,  in  order  to 


ASIATIC  AND  EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    249 

succeed  in  this,  the  advisability  of  penetrating  into 
Thibet  ^^by  persuasion  or  by  force. '^  It  was  evident 
that  such  a  proceeding  risked  provoking  an  Anglo- 
Russian  conflict  which  in  other  parts  of  Asia  had 
been  prevented. 

In  November,  1903,  overcoming  the  Conservative 
Government's  prudent  reluctance,  Lord  Curzon 
obtained  permission  to  send  Colonel  Younghusband 
to  Thibet,  his  purpose  being,  so  it  was  asserted,  to 
open  up  commercial  negotiations.  However,  he  was 
soon  joined  by  General  MacDonald's  troops.  Russia 
did  not  disguise  her  displeasure.  But  three  months 
later,  the  war  in  Manchuria  drew  her  attention  away 
from  Thibet.  After  encountering  much  opposition, 
and  engaging  in  several  combats.  Colonel  Young- 
husband  reached  Lhassa  (September,  1904).  He 
succeeded  in  getting  —  not  from  the  Grand  Lama, 
since  the  latter  had  fled,  but  from  his  Ministers  —  a 
Treaty  opening  the  Thibetan  markets  to  the  British, 
making  the  promise  of  a  large  indemnity,  and  pledg- 
ing the  Thibetan  Government  to  neither  sell,  lease, 
nor  mortgage  any  portion  of  their  territory  to  a 
foreign  Power  without  the  consent  of  Great  Britain. 
The  occupation  of  the  Chumbi  Valley  was  to  serve 
as  a  guarantee.  This  was  a  success,  which  might, 
however,  not  be  durable,  and  had  been  possible 
only  owing  to  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  Still,  it 
marked  on  Great  Britain's  side  a  determination 
to  play  an  increasingly  active  role  in  Thibet.  In 
the  light  of  what  precedes,  one  is  better  able  to 
understand  the  meaning  of  the  Treaty  of  the  31st  of 


250  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

August.  In  the  matter  of  Thibet,  England  and 
Russia  were  two  adversaries,  both  formidably 
armed  for  a  struggle,  the  prize  of  which  appeared 
to  be  uncertain.  In  such  a  case,  it  was  best  to  treat 
before  measuring  strength.  This  was  what  was  done. 
Great  Britain  abandoned  Lord  Curzon's  grandiose 
projects.  But  the  Standard  was  able  to  write  that 
even  before  the  Treaty,  aU  ulterior  profit  from  the 
Younghusband  Convention  had  been  renounced. 
On  the  other  hand,  Russia  declared  that  she  would 
abstain  from  all  interference  in  the  domestic  ad- 
ministration of  the  country.  Yet  she  retained  many 
discreet  and  powerful  means  of  action  through  her 
Buriat  subjects;  and,  in  addition,  England's  iden- 
tical promise  of  abstention  was  a  precious  security 
to  her.  It  may,  therefore,  be  concluded,  without 
dwelling  on  useless  comparisons,  that  the  Treaty 
of  the  31st  of  August,  in  the  part  relating  to  Thibet, 
was  a  work  of  Russo-English  wisdom,  and  that 
it  was  happily  inspired  by  the  same  conciliatory 
principles  as  those  characterizing  the  whole  agree- 
ment. 

There  was  no  mention  made  in  the  agreement  of 
the  Persian  Gulf  question.  But,  in  a  letter  addressed 
on  the  29th  of  August  to  Sir  Arthur  Nicholson,  the 
English  Ambassador  in  Russia,  and  made  public 
at  the  same  time  as  the  Treaty,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
wrote:  ^^The  arrangement  concerning  Persia  is 
limited  to  the  regions  of  this  country  that  touch  on 
the  respective  frontiers  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia 
in  Asia.     The  Persian  Gulf  is  no  portion  of  these 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    251 

regions,  and  is  only  partly  in  Persian  territory. 
There  seemed  consequently  no  reason  for  introduc- 
ing into  the  Convention  a  positive  declaration  con- 
cerning the  special  interests  possessed  by  Great 
Britain  in  the  Gulf,  —  interests  which  result  from  the 
British  action  which  has  been  exercised  in  these 
waters  during  more  than  a  hundred  years."  Sir 
Edward  Grey  added  that  the  Russian  Government 
had  explicitly  declared,  in  the  course  of  the  negotia- 
tions, that  ^Hhey  did  not  deny  Great  Britain's 
special  interests  in  the  Persian  Gulf."  If  the  agree- 
ment said  nothing  about  them,  the  reason  was  that 
the  Persian  Gulf  question  is  intimately  connected 
with  that  of  the  Bagdad  railway,  and  that,  to  discuss 
the  latter,  there  were  four  Powers  necessary,  instead 
of  two. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  England  had  not  waited  till 
the  year  1907  before  she  asserted  her  particular 
situation  and  her  privileged  influence  in  the  Persian 
Gulf.  For  more  than  a  century,  her  ships  have 
cruised  there.  And  she  claims  the  honour  of  having, 
thanks  to  them,  caused  order  and  peace  to  prevail 
in  its  periphery.  It  is  correct  to  say  that,  during 
the  whole  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  British  flag 
was  almost  the  only  one  that  appeared  in  the  Gulf, 
bound  either  on  voyages  of  scientific  exploration 
or  on  expeditions  of  police  repression.  The  sur- 
rounding country  naturally  underwent  the  action 
of  successive  British  officers  and  consuls.  Indeed, 
it  may  easily  be  seen  that  the  lower  valley  of  the 
Tigris  and  Euphrates  is  attached  to  India  by  eco- 


252  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

nomic  ties  that  are  indissoluble.  In  1901,  during 
the  Koweit  incident,  Lord  Curzon  upheld  its  rights, 
or  rather  its  claims,  against  suzerain  Turkey  and 
Germany,  Turkey's  ally.  And,  in  1903,  Lord 
Lansdowne  did  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  ''the 
creation  of  any  naval  base  or  warlike  stronghold 
on  the  Persian  Gulf  by  any  Power  whatsoever  would 
be  a  direct  menace  to  British  interests,  and  that  the 
Government  would  offer  every  opposition  possible 
to  such  creation.''  This  decided  language  could  not 
be  gone  back  upon.  And,  in  his  letter  of  the  29th 
of  August,  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not  fail  to  write, 
''It  is  desirable  to  draw  attention  to  previous 
declarations  relative  to  the  British  policy,  to  confirm 
afresh,  in  a  general  way,  what  has  already  been  said 
concerning  British  interests  in  the  Persian  Gulf, 
and  to  again  assert  the  importance  of  maintaining 
the  said  interests."  It  is  allowable  to  suppose  that 
the  Cabinet  of  Saint  Petersburg  —  if  one  judges 
by  this  letter  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  also  by  the 
limits  fixed  by  the  zone  of  Russian  influence  in 
Persia  —  had  resigned  itself  to  England's  claims  in 
the  Persian  Gulf,  and  that  the  two  Powers  were 
ready  to  discuss  together  the  negotiations  destined 
to  be  opened,  sooner  or  later,  with  regard  to  the 
Bagdad  railway.  No  doubt  this  hypothesis  was 
looked  at  in  the  course  of  the  pourparlers  between 
Mr.  Isvolsky  and  Sir  Arthur  Nicholson.  The  prob- 
lem of  the  Gulf,  which  in  the  future  is  bound  to 
attract  the  attention  of  the  Chancelleries,  seemed 
therefore    implicitly    settled    between   London    and 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    253 

Saint  Petersburg.  When  the  discussion  comes  on 
about  Bagdad,  it  will  be  taken  into  account.  It  is 
true  that  such  discussion  is  perhaps  remote.  For, 
if  the  Germans  assert  that  they  are  in  no  hurry  to 
enter  upon  it,  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia 
are  still  less  so. 

At  the  close  of  these  laborious  negotiations, 
France  was  able  to  consider  their  product  from  a 
twofold  point  of  view:  that  of  the  genesis,  and  that 
of  the  consequences.  It  is  certain  that  the  recon- 
ciliation of  England  and  Russia  was  willed  both 
on  the  side  of  Saint  Petersburg  and  that  of  London ; 
and  it  would  certainly  have  come  about  even  if  no 
foreign  influence  had  been  brought  to  bear  in  these 
two  Capitals.  But,  for  several  years  past,  our 
country  had  not  ceased  endeavouring  to  effect  a 
rapprochement;  and  the  signing  of  the  Franco- 
English  Treaty  of  the  8th  of  April,  1904,  may  be 
considered  as  marking  the  commencement  of  the 
evolution  which  was  completed  in  1907.  This 
Treaty  was  at  first,  in  general,  badly  received  in 
Russia.  However,  two  days  after  its  conclusion, 
Mr.  Nelidow,  in  an  interview,  expressed  quite 
different  views.  '^We  are  the  allies  and  friends 
of  France,'^  he  said.  ^'As  friends,  we  rejoice  at 
whatever  good  fortune  befalls  you.  As  allies  .  .  . 
we  are  glad  of  an  understanding  that  delivers  you 
from  many  cares  and  frees  you  from  certain  restric- 
tions. .  .  .  And,  besides,  is  there  not  a  proverb 
which  says:  ^The  friends  of  our  friends  are  our  own 
friends.'     Who  knows  if  it  will  not  be  verified  once 


254  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES     * 

again  !"^  More  than  one  Russian  newspaper  re- 
proached the  x'^mbassador  for  having  uttered  this 
language.  And  yet,  three  years  later,  he  was  to  be 
justified  by  events.  In  so  far  as  the  press  can  facili- 
tate a  movement  of  opinion  parallel  to  diplomatic 
negotiations,  our  French  press  had  seconded  the 
efforts  of  our  diplomacy.  During  three  years, 
whether  the  question  was  Afghanistan,  or  Russia's 
domestic  policy,  or  Persia,  or  the  Far  East,  we  had 
affirmed,  in  spite  of  passing  clouds,  the  possibility 
and  desirability  of  the  Anglo-Russian  understanding. 
On  the  other  hand,  at  Algeciras,  during  the  long, 
monotonous  weeks  of  the  Moroccan  debate,  our 
plenipotentiaries  had  not  forborne  to  encourage 
the  general  conversation  engaged  in  by  Count 
Cassini,  Sir  Arthur  Nicholson,  and  Sir  Donald  Mac- 
kenzie Wallace.  Discreetly,  but  yet  most  usefully, 
we  had  avoided  certain  collisions:  first,  the  mili- 
tary collision  that  the  Dogger  Bank  cannonade 
might  have  caused,  by  suggesting  the  meeting  of 
an  International  Commission  of  Inquiry  in  Paris; 
and  next,  diplomatic  friction,  either  at  the  time  of 
the  renewal  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  or 
during  the  negotiations  themselves,  which,  a  year 
before,  had  prepared  the  Convention  of  the  31st  of 
August,  1907.  Our  amicable  intervention  had  been 
vigilant  and  continuous.  Our  interests  justified  it. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement 
completed  the  establishment  of  the  Asiatic  equilib- 
rium upon  a  durable  foundation.  Henceforward, 
^  See  our  book,  Diplomatic  Questions  of  the  Year  1904. 


ASIATIC  AND  EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    255 

five  series  of  agreements,  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alli- 
ance, the  Russo-Japanese,  Franco-Japanese,  and 
Anglo-Russian  agreements,  and  the  Franco-Russian 
Alliance,  converged  towards  the  same  object;  to  wit, 
the  maintenance  of  the  statu  quo,  which  guaranteed 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  China.  The 
disturbed  situation  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  of  which 
France  experienced  the  counter-effect  on  her  Tonkin- 
ese  frontier  in  the  spring  of  1907,  added  fresh  im- 
portance to  the  collective  guarantee  expressed  by 
these  five  agreements.  The  return  to  a  policy  of 
preserving  China's  territorial  integrity,  the  only 
one  calculated  to  avoid  conflicts,  received  its  most 
solemn  sanction.  From  what  precedes  it  plainly 
appears  that  such  return  constituted  in  itself  a 
profit  for  France,  a  profit  which,  indeed,  was  about 
to  be  increased  by  the  European  development  of 
some  of  these  agreements. 

Ill 

During  half  a  century,  the  rivalry  between  England 
and  Russia  had  been  Germany's  favourite  weapon 
against  France.  It  would  be  easy  to  follow,  from 
the  Crimean  War  to  that  of  1870,  Bismarckian  policy 
in  the  web  of  work  of  which  we  were  the  victims. 
If  Thiers'  efforts  to  interest  Europe  in  our  cause 
failed,  it  was  because,  under  the  auspices  of  Bis- 
marck, Russians  and  English  continued  to  pursue 
designs  that  were  opposed.  It  needed  Germany's 
formidable  progress  to  unite  in  our  favour  the  two 


256  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

constant  rivals  during  the  crisis  of  1875.  This 
cooperation  was  merely  ephemeral.  And,  a  few 
years  ago,  in  1904,  Mr.  Theodore  Schiemann,  one 
of  the  fiercest  adversaries  France  has  in  Germany, 
wrote  joyfully  that  the  Anglo-French  understanding 
was  incompatible  with  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance, 
since  a  rapprochement  between  Saint  Petersburg 
and  London  would  never  be  possible.  This  rap- 
prochement was  thereafter  accomplished.  Sup- 
ported by  Russia,  her  Ally,  and  by  Great  Britain, 
her  friend,  and  the  Ally  and  the  friend  being  recon- 
ciled, France  was  possessed  in  Europe  of  peculiar 
moral  authority.  And  the  new  link  that  was  riveted 
in  the  chain  of  understandings  procured  her  —  in 
the  diplomatic  order  of  things  —  the  maximum  of 
securities  it  was  permissible  for  her  to  wish  for. 

Neither  by  its  text  nor  by  its  tendencies  was  the 
Anglo-Russian  agreement  a  menace  to  any  one. 
It  was  aimed  at  no  one,  and  isolated  no  one.  But  it 
added  one  more  element  to  the  combinations  which, 
since  1904,  had  contributed  to  free  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe  from  the  hold  of  Germany.  Coming 
after  the  Franco- Russian  Alliance,  after  the  Franco- 
English,  ,Franco-Italian,  and  Franco-Spanish  under- 
standings, it  fortified  European  liberty  and,  like 
them,  dealt  a  blow  to  the  Bismarckian  system,  to 
the  edifice  of  preponderance  which  William  II  had 
striven  in  1905  to  restore,  and  which  the  Conference 
of  Algeciras  had  shown  to  be  so  fragile.  To  resume, 
officially,  in  September,  1907,  the  attacks  made  two 
years   earlier  against  the   ^ isolators"  of   Germany 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    257 

would  have  been  to  discredit  more  clearly  a 
manoeuvre  already  tried  and  found  wanting.  The 
semi-official  press  of  Berlin  took  care  not  to  at- 
tempt this,  and  Prince  von  Buelow  even  thought  it 
advisable  to  say,  in  a  speech  he  made  during  the 
autumn,  that  neither  the  Empire's  happiness  nor 
its  greatness  were  built  up  from  the  divisions  of 
the  other  Powers.  The  Pan-German  press  was 
less  prudent.  Those  papers  which  had  denounced 
in  the  Franco-Japanese  understanding  a  fresh  essay 
of  ^^encirclement"  did  not  fail  to  discover  another 
in  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement.  The  Deutsche 
Tageszeitung  asserted  that  ^^  Germany  had  no  reason 
to  be  satisfied  on  seeing  certain  difficulties  removed 
between  the  two  nations,  since,  under  given  circum- 
stances, the  continued  existence  of  such  difficulties 
might  have  been  useful  to  her.''  The  Frankfort 
Gazette  itself  wrote:  ^^The  kingdom  of  English  India 
has  not  for  a  long  time  been  so  secure  from  Russia 
as  it  is  now.  If  England,  therefore,  without  there 
being  any  immediate  need  for  it,  is  coming  to  this 
understanding  with  her  ancient  adversary,  the 
motive  of  her  doing  so  must  be  sought  elsewhere. 
Probably  we  are  not  making  a  mistake  in  seeking 
for  it  in  Europe." 

German  recriminations  in  1905  had  sufficed  to 
emphasize  the  character  of  the  Franco-English 
agreement  of  1904.  Those  of  1907  likewise  helped 
to  enlarge  the  scope  of  the  Anglo-Russian  one. 
At  the  outset,  the  negotiators  of  this  agreement 
had    not    been    thinking    of    Germany.     They    had 


258  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

done  their  best  to  liquidate  old  Asiatic  quarrels, 
the  possible  revival  of  which  was  a  source  of  anxiety 
to  them.  Gradually";  under  the  state  of  mind  created 
in  Europe  by  the  persistence  of  German  ill-humour, 
it  occurred  to  the  Cabinets  of  London  and  Saint 
Petersburg  that  their  colonial  agreement  might  serve 
as  the  guiding  principle  of  their  further  cooperation 
in  Europe  for  the  settlement  of  questions  which 
certain  oppositions  rendered  difficult  of  solution. 

In  February,  1908,  during  a  debate  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  Sir  Edward  Grey  gave  a  hint  of  this 
general  value  which  he  attributed  to  the  Anglo- 
Russian  understanding.  In  the  ensuing  month 
of  June,  Edward  VII  went  to  Revel  on  a  visit  to 
Nicholas  II;  and,  in  the  toasts  that  were  proposed 
when  the  Czar  alluded  to  'Hhe  limited  scope  of  the 
1907  agreements,''  Edward  VII  added,  ^^I  believe 
that  the  Convention  recently  made  will  contribute 
to  tighten  the  bonds  uniting  the  people  of  our  two 
countries;  and  I  am  sure  that  it  will  lead  to  a 
satisfactory,  amicable  settlement  of  some  important 
questions  in  the  future."  On  the  same  day,  a 
semi-official  note,  telegraphed  from  Revel,  empha- 
sized the  meaning  of  this  declaration:  ^^The  four- 
parlers,'^  it  said,  ^^ which  have  been  carried  on,  for 
some  time  past,  between  the  two  Governments 
concerning  Macedonian  affairs,  may  be  considered 
as  about  to  result  in  a  complete  understanding. 
Nothing  now  is  wanting  but  a  definite  form  to  be 
given  to  the  agreement,  which,  it  may  be  hoped, 
will  serve  as  a  basis  for  a  general  understanding 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    259 

between  the  Powers  interested  in  the  work  of  reforms 
in  Macedonia.'^  Though  couched  in  the  most 
correct  terms  with  regard  to  the  other  Powers,  this 
note,  in  reaUty,  announced  that  the  Anglo-Russian 
agreement  of  1907  relative  to  the  Far  East  had 
given  birth  to  a  new  one,  relative  to  the  Near  East, 
between  the  two  countries. 

On  the  27th  of  January,  1908,  Baron  von  Aehr- 
enthal.  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government,  announced  to  the  Delega- 
tions that  he  hoped  soon  to  obtain  the  Sultan's 
assent  to  the  proposal  he  had  made  of  prolonging 
the  Austrian  railways  as  far  as  Mitrovitza.  This 
was  an  initiative  allowed  by  the  twenty-fifth  article 
of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  but  one  which  was  calculated 
greatly  to  consolidate  Austria's  situation  in  the 
Balkans.  In  its  spirit,  if  not  in  the  letter,  this 
initiative  was  contrary  to  the  Balkan  agreement 
concluded  in  1897,  and  renewed  in  1903  between 
Austria  and  Russia,  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance 
of  the  statu  quo.  The  almost  exclusive  place  held 
by  Asiatic  questions  in  Russia's  preoccupations 
between  1896  and  1905  had  rendered  the  use  of 
this  agreement  more  profitable  to  Vienna  than  to 
Saint  Petersburg.  Under  the  nominal  direction  of 
the  two  '^ Powers  sharing  in  the  understanding,"  the 
reform  policy  had  been  pursued  but  slackly  under 
the  real  control  of  Austria,  to  whom  Russia  accorded 
in  every  case  a  docile  approbation.  As  a  warrant 
for  their  intervention,  the  other  Powers  retained  the 
rights  bestowed  on  them  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 


260  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

But  their  action;  at  first  intermittent,  remained 
purely  diplomatic.  Russia  and  Austria  alone, 
through  their  ^^ civil  agents/'  acting  in  conjunction 
with  Hilmi  Pacha,  the  Turkish  Inspector-General 
of  Macedonia,  played  a  political  role  on  the  spot. 
It  was  only  reluctantly  that  they  had  consented 
to  the  creation  of  the  ^^ Financial  Comptrollers" 
who  superintended  the  management  of  Macedonian 
finances  in  the  name  of  the  other  Powers.  In  real- 
ity, the  Austro-Russian  Syndicate's  plan  of  reforms 
pledged  no  one  to  anything.  And  Great  Britain's 
efforts  to  obtain  more  serious  guarantees  from  the 
Sultan  were  rewarded  with  but  poor  success.  It 
was  quite  clear  that,  benefiting  by  Russia's  forced 
adhesion,  Austria,  taking  thought  for  her  own 
interests  —  at  which  no  one  need  be  astonished  — 
was  practising  in  the  Balkans  a  policy  that  was  more 
Austrian  than  European. 

The  project  relative  to  the  Mitrovitza  railway 
was  merely  a  fresh  manifestation  of  this  policy. 
But,  at  the  moment  when  it  was  announced  by  the 
Baron  von  Aehrenthal's  speech,  the  situation  was 
no  longer  the  same  as  it  had  been  in  preceding  years. 
After  three  years'  peace,  on  the  morrow  of  the  sign- 
ing of  agreements  with  Japan  and  Great  Britain 
which  liquidated  the  Asiatic  dream,  Russia  made 
'^her  reappearance  in  Europe"  and  Mr.  Isvolsky 
took  no  pains  to  hide  the  fact.  ^^The  Russians 
intended  to  recover  their  prestige,  which  had  been 
diminished.  They  made  it  a  point  of  honour  with 
themselves  to  preserve  the  highest  rank  on  the  his- 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN  UNDERSTANDINGS    261 

toric  field  of  their  military  and  diplomatic  victories, 
on  the  territory  they  had  sprinkled  with  their 
blood.  They  had  renounced  a  direct  domination 
over  the  Balkan  peninsula.  But  they  intended  to 
remain  for  the  people  they  had  freed  old  friends 
and  protectors  for  always."  ^ 

The  Austrian  scheme  seemed  to  them  a  provoca- 
tion. Being  anxious  to  modify  the  policy  of  re- 
nunciation which  had  been  imposed  upon  them  by 
their  understanding  with  Austria,  they  found  in 
Austria's  own  action  a  reason  or  a  pretext  for  such 
modification.  They  seized  the  opportunity  to  free 
themselves,  and,  by  breaking  the  pact  of  1897, 
to  replace  the  Macedonian  question  on  its  historic 
footing,  that  is  to  say,  before  the  six  Powers. 

Such  was  the  object  of  Russian  policy  from  the 
month  of  February,  1908.  And  the  Anglo-Russian 
agreement  acted  as  its  lever.  On  the  3d  of  March, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  had  proposed  to  the  Powers  a 
programme  of  reforms  much  more  radical  than  all 
previous  ones.  On  the  26th  of  the  same  month, 
Russia  addressed  to  all  the  Chancelleries,  and  no 
longer  to  Austria  alone,  a  project  which,  though 
less  '^advanced''  than  the  English  one,  yet  showed 
a  step  forward,  compared  with  previous  proposals 
issuing  from  the  Austro-Russian  understanding. 
This  project,  in  fact,  indicated  the  Saint  Petersburg 
Cabinet's  abandonment  of  the  understanding.  On 
the  4th  of  April,  Great  Britain,  who  had  probably 

^  See  Rene  Pinon's  article,  "  Railways  and  Reforms,"  in  the 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes  for  May  15,  1908. 


262  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

been  advised  beforehand,  signified  her  adherence 
to  it;  and,  by  standing  aside  for  Russia,  allowed 
her  the  honour  of  resuming  the  moral  direction  of 
Macedonian  reforms  in  the  presence  of  all  the  Powers. 
Although  every  Government  assented  in  principle 
to  the  Russian  scheme,  there  were  slight  differences 
in  the  way  in  which  the  assent  was  given. 

Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  were  favourable 
to  the  Russian  proposals  without  restriction.  On 
the  contrary,  Germany  and  Austria  were,  above  all, 
desirous  of  preserving  and,  indeed,  of  improving,  the 
intimate  relations  with  Turkey  by  which  they  had  till 
then  profited.  Consequently,  negotiations,  in  view 
of  a  definitive  understanding,  were  bound  to  be 
long  and  difficult,  when,  in  July,  1908,  the  revolu- 
tion broke  out.  This  event  could  not  but  help, 
as  the  events  of  previous  months,  in  turning  Rus- 
sian policy  more  towards  London  and  Paris  than 
towards  Vienna  and  Berlin.  They,  therefore,  fitted 
in  with  the  general  tendency  manifested  in  Europe 
since  the  Conference  of  Algeciras. 

This  tendency  was  still  further  brought  out  in 
1907  by  the  dual  agreement  signed  by  Spain  in  the 
month  of  May  with  France  and  England.  The 
Franco-Spanish  and  Franco-English  rapprochements 
had,  by  this  time,  entered  into  the  general  course  of 
things.  Spain^s  treaties  with  France  in  1904  and 
1905,  and  the  marriage  of  Alfonso  XIII  to  Princess 
Battenberg  in  1906,  permitted  no  doubt  on  the 
point.  The  agreements  of  1907,  though  not  con- 
stituting an  alliance  or  involving  military  engage- 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    263 

mentS;  marked  progress  in  the  political  intimacy 
of  the  three  nations.  They  were  drawn  up  as 
follows  (the  text  of  the  Anglo-Spanish  agreement 
being  identical  in  its  terms  with  the  Franco-Spanish 
one) :  — 

Animated  by  the  desire  to  contribute  by  all  possible  means 
to  the  preservation  of  peace,  and  convinced  that  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  territorial  statu  quo  and  of  the  rights  of  France  and 
Spain  in  the  Mediterranean  and  in  the  part  of  the  Atlantic  wash- 
ing the  coasts  of  Europe  and  Africa  should  serve  efficaciously  to 
attain  this  object,  while  being  profitable  to  the  two  nations, 
who,  moreover,  are  united  by  ties  of  ancient  friendship  and  com- 
munity of  interests :  — 

The  Government  of  the  French  Republic  desire  to  inform  the 
Government  of  his  Catholic  Majesty  of  the  following  declaration, 
with  the  firm  hope  that  it  will  help  not  only  to  strengthen  the 
good  understanding  so  happily  existing  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments, but  also  to  serve  the  cause  of  peace. 

The  general  policy  of  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic, 
in  the  regions  above  indicated,  aims  at  the  maintenance  of  the 
territorial  statu  quo,  and,  in  conformity  with  this  policy,  the 
Government  are  firmly  resolved  to  preserve  intact  the  rights  of 
the  French  Republic  over  their  insular  possessions  as  well  as 
their  maritime  ones  situated  in  the  said  regions. 

In  case  fresh  circumstances  should  arise,  which,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic,  are  calculated  to 
modify  or  to  contribute  to  modify  the  present  territorial  statu 
quo,  the  Government  will  enter  into  communication  with  the 
Government  of  his  Catholic  Majesty,  in  order  to  enable  the  two 
Governments  to  concert  together,  if  judged  desirable,  as  to  the 
measures  to  be  taken  in  common. 

A  Spanish  note,  expressed  in  similar  language, 
replied  to  the  French  note.  Thus  fresh  precision 
was  added  to  existing  arrangements.  Spain,  France, 
and  Great  Britain  have,  all  three  of  them,  posses- 
sions in  the  Western  Mediterranean  and  in  the  East 


264  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Atlantic.  Some  are  insular,  others  European,  and 
others  again  African.  The  governments  of  Madrid, 
Paris,  and  London,  being  united  by  ties  of  friendship, 
have  an  evident  interest  in  there  being  no  modifica- 
tion, without  their  consent,  of  the  statu  quo  in  these 
regions.  And  still  greater  is  the  interest  they  have 
in  maintaining  constant  communication  with  their 
respective  possessions,  if  complications  should  arise. 
Their  understanding  helped  them  to  procure  this 
twofold  security.  The  necessity  of  Franco-Spanish 
cooperation  in  Morocco,  resulting  not  only  from 
bilateral  treaties,  but  from  the  general  provisions 
of  the  Algeciras  Conference,  was  an  additional 
reason  for  making  an  arrangement  which,  neither 
in  reality  nor  yet  in  its  form,  was  a  threat  or  an 
attack  against  any  one. 

The  German  Press,  none  the  less,  denounced  the 
offensive  intention  of  the  dual  declaration  of  the 
16th  of  May  —  just  as,  in  the  months  to  come,  she 
was  to  denounce  the  aggressive  character  of  the 
Franco-Japanese  agreement,  the  Anglo-Russian  agree- 
ment in  Asia,  and  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  in 
Macedonia.  Thus  was  pursued,  in  the  same  terms, 
and  with  parallel  consequences,  the  diplomatic 
debate  which  we  have  seen  arise  and  develop ; 
on  the  one  hand,  after  twenty-five  years'  diplomatic 
servitude,  Europe  claiming  the  right  to  settle  her 
own  affairs  and  to  guarantee  her  balance  of  power; 
on  the  other,  Germany  seeing  in  this  activity  a 
proof  of  hostile  intention  and  an  effort  to  isolate 
her.     Bismarck  had  disappeared  twenty  years  be- 


ASIATIC  AND   EUROPEAN   UNDERSTANDINGS    265 

fore ;  but  still  round  him,  and  his  work,  his  plans, 
his  dreams,  this  world-game  was  played.  The 
dead  man  continued  "to  speak."  And  doubtless 
for  long  to  come  Europe  will  hear  the  muffled 
echoes  of  this  great  voice  from  beyond  the  tomb. 


CHAPTER  VII 

FRANCE    AND   THE   UNITED   STATES 

I.  Sentiment  and  business.  —  Souvenirs  of  the  Independence 
struggle.  —  Two  Sister  Republics.  —  Politics  and  the 
"  imponderable."  —  Franco- American  manifestations.  — 
Words  and  deeds.  —  Franco-American  commerce.  —  Com- 
mercial agreements.  —  Possible  improvements.  —  France 
and  the  American  financial  crisis  of  1907. 
II.  Politics.  —  France  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  —  American 
affairs.  —  France  and  the  "  big  stick."  —  Asiatic  affairs.  — 
United  States  and  the  "Open  Door."  —  Mr.  Hay  and 
Russia.  —  United  States  and  Japan.  —  Franco-Japanese 
agreement  and  the  United  States.  —  European  affairs.  — 
United  States  and  the  Moroccan  crisis.  —  Conference  of 
Algeciras.  —  Reasons  of  the  American  policy.  —  United 
States  and  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  —  United  States 
and  the  Entente  Cordiale.  —  United  States  and  the  balance 
of  power  in  Europe. 


Between  the  United  States  and  France  there 
exist  no  political  ties  in  the  form  of  an  alliance,  just 
as  there  exists  none  between  the  United  States  and 
any  other  country  in  Europe.  Such  ties  are  forbid- 
den by  the  Monroe  doctrine,  which,  at  the  same  time 
that  it  proclaims  the  moral  control  of  the  Union  over 
the  whole  of  America,  affirms,  by  way  of  counter- 
balance, the  Union's  indifference  to  European  ques- 
tions.    A  similar  prohibition    comes  from   General 

266 


FRANCE  AND   THE  UNITED   STATES  267 

Washington's  political  testament,  which  advised  his 
fellow-countrymen  never  to  contract  alliances.  How- 
ever, a  nation  of  eighty  million  souls,  materially  or 
morally  master  of  a  whole  continent,  mingling  with 
increasing  activity  in  the  economic  life  of  the  world, 
at  present  possessed  of  a  first-class  navy  and  of 
strength  which  is  destined  to  grow  still  more,  a  na- 
tion animated  by  ardent  patriotism  and  a  lofty 
national  pride,  cannot  live  ^^  huddled  up  like  a  petty 
shopkeeper  in  a  tiny  shop."  Whether  they  wish  it 
or  not,  the  United  States  have  a  policy  of  world 
importance.  During  the  last  ten  years,  they  have 
been  seen  participating,  sometimes  in  the  first  rank, 
not  only  in  the  solution  of  American  problems,  but 
in  that  also  of  Asiatic  questions,  and  even  of  Euro- 
pean ones.  It  is  therefore  impossible  to  avoid  giv- 
ing them  a  place,  among  our  allies,  our  friends,  and 
our  rivals,  in  the  aggregate  tableau  of  our  foreign 
action. 

Until  now,  at  the  base  of  relations  established  be- 
tween France  and  abroad,  we  have  found  there  was 
interest.  In  the  case  of  the  United  States  the  basis 
is  in  sentiment.  Franco-American  relations  have 
developed  in  an  atmosphere  of  reciprocal  sympathy. 
And  it  is  such  sympathy  wdiich  confers  on  them,  still 
to-day,  their  best  originality.  To  exaggerate  the 
action  of  this  ^imponderable"  would  be  to  expose 
one's  self  to  errors.  To  deny  it  would  be  to  run  into 
them.  If  certain  events  had  not  occurred,  if  some 
others  had  happened  which  the  march  of  history  has 
thwarted,  perhaps  these  sentiments  would  have  lost 


268  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

a  part  of  their  sincerity  and  ardour.  But,  favoured 
by  circumstances,  they  have  flourished  without  let 
or  hindrance ;  and  the  twentieth  century  American 
not  only  feels  no  embarrassment  in  expressing  them, 
but  feels  none  either  in  inspiring  himself  with  them. 
The  American  gratitude  is  a  fact,  and  as,  in  the  order 
of  facts,  nothing  contradicts  or  hampers  it,  there  is  a 
readiness  to  translate  it  into  deeds.  As  Elihu  Root, 
Secretary  of  State,  lately  said,  it  is  a  reality  with 
which  one  must  count  and  on  which  we  can  rely. 

One  of  the  most  distinguished  historians  of  Amer- 
ica wrote  recently :  — 

On  two  occasions,  the  conduct  of  the  French  Government 
was  decisive  in  affecting  the  future  of  the  Union,  so  much  so 
that  one  may  wonder  what  would  have  been  its  destiny  if  France 
had  acted  otherwise.  Without  the  help  of  France,  the  thirteen 
revolted  colonies  would  not  perhaps  have  succeeded  in  conquer- 
ing their  independence  at  the  time  they  did,  and,  even  if  they 
had,  would  not  perhaps  have  secured  the  boundaries  which,  in 
fact,  were  their  guarantees.  Without  the  purchase  of  Louisiana 
—  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  France  took  the  initiative 
of  the  transaction,  —  the  movement  of  expansion  towards  the 
West,  although  inevitable  in  any  case,  would  have  brought 
about  other  results.  If  France  had  kept  Louisiana  long  enough 
to  settle  there  a  considerable  French  population,  there  might, 
to-day,  have  been  among  the  whites  of  the  Southwest  a  strug- 
gle between  two  rival  nationalities  for  the  supremacy.  Or  else, 
if  England  had  conquered  it  and  added  it  to  her  possessions 
in  Canada,  what  would  have  been  the  future  of  the  United 
States?^ 

It  may  be  said  that  the  American  people,  in  their 
aggregate,  however  much  they  are  modified  every 
year  by  immigration,  have  the  feelings  attributed  to 

^  Archibald  Gary  Coolidge,  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power. 


FRANCE  AND   THE  UNITED   STATES  269 

them  by  their  historians.  The  statues  of  Lafayette 
and  Rochambeau  standing  opposite  the  White  House, 
their  portraits  placed  in  the  Congress  Hall  by  the 
side  of  Washington's,  are  not  the  cold  affirmation  of 
an  official  courtesy,  but  the  living  expression  of  a 
national  friendship.  As  Archbishop  Ireland  said  to 
me:  ^^The  United  States  have  forgotten  nothing. 
An  American  learns  to  love  France  when  learning 
the  history  of  his  country.  The  past  has  not  ceased 
to  act  on  the  present.  American  sentiment  cannot 
detach  itself  from  France.  The  immigrants  that  ar- 
rive on  our  shores  are  numerous,  it  is  true.  But  in 
the  air  we  breathe  there  is  something  that  assimi- 
lates them  in  less  than  a  generation.  And  the  new- 
comers are  like  those  that  have  American  ancestors. 
When  learning  the  history  of  their  new  country,  they 
also  learn  to  love  France,  the  great  benefactress  of 
our  Republic.  During  the  first  fifty  years  of  our 
history,  the  souvenirs  of  French  help  and  friendship 
were  almost  contemporary.  They  have  now  be- 
come definitely  incorporated  in  our  traditions. '' 

To  patriotic  gratitude  Republican  confraternity  is 
added.  In  spite  of  profound  and  numerous  differ- 
ences of  temperament  and  constitution,  the  Ameri- 
cans respect  in  France  the  apostle  of  liberty. 
Thomas  Jefferson  was  the  friend  of  Lafayette,  Bar- 
nave,  the  Lameth  brothers,  and  all  the  chiefs  of  the 
Feuillants  Club.  From  the  very  first  day,  he  was 
in  favour  of  the  French  Revolution;  and  even  the 
counter  sentiments  called  forth  in  the  United  States 
bv  the  excesses  of  our  Convention  were  not  able  to 


270  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

uproot  the  original  sympathy  arising  from  an  iden- 
tity of  principles  if  not  of  actions.  In  spite  of  tempo- 
rary difficulties,  —  the  conflict  of  1799,  the  Mexican 
expedition,  the  Panama  affair,  —  this  sympathy  has 
persisted.  When  the  ^^ citizens''  of  America  look  on 
the  side  of  Europe,  they  feel  themselves  drawn  nat- 
urally towards  the  ^^ citizens"  of  France.  By  its 
duration,  the  Republic  has  borne  witness  in  favour 
of  our  political  stability,  and  her  American  elder, 
while  blaming  certain  of  her  tendencies,  particularly 
in  religious  matters,  has  accorded  her  an  esteem 
which  continues  to  grow  as  time  goes  on.  No  doubt, 
in  the  eyes  of  Americans,  as  of  the  rest  of  the  world, 
we  still  carry  the  weight  of  our  defeats.  But  the 
consistency  of  our  action  abroad,  the  amplitude  of 
our  colonial  expansion,  and  the  diplomatic  combi- 
nations that  we  have  succeeded  in  signing,  have  pro- 
cured us  suffrages  and  assured  us  friendships  which, 
in  any  estimation  of  international  forces,  must  be 
appreciated  at  their  value. 

Never,  indeed,  has  Franco-American  intimacy 
taken  more  trouble  to  manifest  itself  than  in  the 
course  of  the  last  few  years.  Following  on  the 
inauguration  of  the  monument  to  Rochambeau, 
there  was  the  Saint  Louis  Exhibition  in  1904, 
which  supplied  the  manifestation  with  the  most 
magnificent  of  settings.  In  the  month  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1905,  Mr.  Jusserand,  the  French  Am- 
bassador, officially  handed  over  to  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  Washington's  bust  by  David 
d'Angers,  of  which  the  original  had  been  burnt  in 


FRANCE  AND   THE  UNITED   STATES  271 

1851,  and  the  rough  clay  model  had  been  recently 
found  at  Angers.  In  the  ensuing  month  of  July,  an 
American  squadron  came  to  Cherbourg  to  fetch  Ad- 
miral Paul  Jones's  coffin,  which  had  been  discovered 
in  Paris  through  the  investigations  of  the  United 
States  Ambassador;  and  the  sailors  of  the  two  na- 
tions associated  themselves  together  in  brotherly 
homage  paid  to  one  of  the  most  glorious  combatants 
in  the  American  War  of  Independence.  During  the 
same  year,  the  retirement  of  General  Porter  was 
made  the  occasion  of  a  spontaneous  demonstration 
of  affection,  which  contrasted  with  the  official  cere- 
mony usually  accompanying  the  departure  of  a  di- 
plomatist. In  1890,  an  American  squadron  came  to 
pay  a  visit  to  our  French  ports  in  the  Mediterranean. 
In  the  month  of  April  following,  one  of  our  naval 
divisions,  being  invited  to  take  part  in  the  fetes 
given  in  honour  of  Paul  Jones's  memory,  was  tri- 
umphantly received  in  America.  The  second  cen- 
tenary of  Franklin,  both  in  Paris  and  in  the  States, 
was  solemnly  celebrated  with  ceremonies  in  which 
the  two  Governments  were  united.  In  1907,  Admi- 
ral Stockton's  visit  to  Brest,  and  the  Tricentenary 
fetes  of  Jamestown  again  furnished  an  opportunity 
for  publicly  manifesting  the  reciprocal  sympathy 
existing  between  France  and  America. 

The  speeches  made  on  these  various  occasions  de- 
serve to  be  remembered,  since  they  emphasize,  often 
with  happy  stress,  the  special  character  of  intimacy 
and  confidence  in  the  relations  existing  between  the 
two   Republics.     In   1905,   Mr.   MacCormick,   when 


272  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

handing  his  credentials  to  Mr.  Loubet,  said:  '^Dur- 
ing the  century  and  more  that  this  Franco-American 
alHance  has  lasted,  which,  on  account  of  the  souve- 
nirs left  in  our  minds  by  the  services  rendered  to  the 
cause  of  liberty,  has  a  much  greater  solidity  than  if 
it  had  been  inscribed  in  treaties,  no  cloud  has  come 
to  trouble  the  amicable  understanding  subsisting  be- 
tween the  two  nations.'^  A  few  days  later,  in  the 
farewell  dinner  offered  to  him,  General  Porter  ex- 
pressed the  same  sentiments:  ''As  iron  is  welded  in 
the  fire  of  the  forge,  so  friendships,"  he  said,  ''are 
welded  in  the  fire  of  battle.  .  .  .  America  is  still 
too  young  not  to  be  grateful.  .  .  .  She  will  never 
fail  to  remember  that,  when  Washington,  Rocham- 
beau,  and  Lafayette  met  before  the  enemy  at  York- 
town,  the  contact  of  these  great  minds  lighted  the 
electric  spark  which  showed  the  way  to  victory  and 
led  the  new  world  once  for  all  towards  justice  and 
liberty  based  on  legal  order  and  the  rights  of  man.'' 
On  this  same  occasion,  Mr.  Delcasse  spoke,  "of  the 
two  countries  whom  nothing  separates  at  present 
and  whose  legitimate  aspirations,  however  far  one 
may  look  into  the  future,  are  not  perceived  to  run 
any  risk  of  being  ever  opposed  to  each  other."  In 
April,  1906,  at  the  fetes  given  at  Philadelphia  in 
honour  of  Franklin's  memory,  Mr.  Root  added, 
as  he  handed  to  the  French  Ambassador  for  his  Gov- 
ernment a  gold  medal  struck  by  order  of  Congress 
after  a  special  vote:  "What  we  are  offering  is  noth- 
ing compared  with  the  immense  service  rendered  to 
us  by  great  French  hearts.     Yet,  at  least,  it  is  a 


FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  273 

token  that;  amid  changing  conditions  and  the  afflux 
of  citizens  from  all  countries  of  the  world,  Americans 
have  not  forgotten  their  ancestors.  You  will  thus 
know  that;  amongst  Americans,  there  is  a  sentiment 
in  favour  of  France  that  persists,  and  that  such  a 
sentiment,  amongst  such  a  people,  is  a  real  and  great 
fact,  which  must  be  taken  into  account.  As  far  as 
we  are  concerned,  we  remain  true  and  loyal  friends 
to  France."  Then  there  was  Mr.  Roosevelt,  who 
telegraphed  to  Mr.  Fallieres  to  assure  him  of  the 
special  place  occupied  by  France  in  the  heart  of  the 
United  States,  to  w^hom  she  ^^  rendered  invaluable 
services  in  what  was  certainly  the  most  critical  pe- 
riod of  their  history."  Again,  on  the  23d  of  March, 
1907,  Mr.  Henry  White,  the  Union's  new  Ambassa- 
dor, when  entering  on  his  functions,  declared  to  Mr. 
Fallieres  that  the  American  Government  esteemed  it 
an  honour  to  ^^  strengthen  "  the  ties  of  friendship  bind- 
ing them  to  France.  And,  once  more,  he  made  use  of 
the  same  language  when  assisting,  on  the  4th  of  July, 
at  the  celebration  of  the  American  National  Fete. 

These  speeches  define  the  altogether  peculiar  na- 
ture of  the  bonds  created  between  France  and  the 
United  States  by  a  tradition  of  more  than  a  century 
old.  True,  one  may  wish  these  ties  to  become  still 
closer,  through  a  reciprocal,  more  complete,  and  bet- 
ter informed  comprehension  of  the  respective  vir- 
tues of  the  two  nations.  The  wdsh  may  be  expressed 
that  Americans,  instead  of  merely  seeing  in  France 
a  country  of  elegance,  literature,  and  art,  might  have 
a  juster  notion  of  her  resources,  strength,  and  aspira- 


274  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

tions.  This  is  a  progress  to  be  desired  and  one  that 
is  reaUzable.  But,  while  working  with  a  view  to  its 
being  brought  about,  there  should  be  no  under-esti- 
mation  of  what  has  already  been  achieved.  If  the 
French  established  in  the  United  States  are  few  in 
number  and  exercise  but  small  influence ;  if  the  Irish 
immigrants,  not  long  ago  our  warmest  friends,  have 
been  alienated  from  us  by  our  religious  policy,  on 
the  other  hand,  our  ideas  and  our  culture  are  the 
object  of  sympathetic  curiosity  all  over  the  territory 
of  the  Union.  The  efforts  of  the  Alliance  Frangaise, 
which  have  been  crowned  with  success,  the  ex- 
change of  lectures  and  lecturers  between  the  Sor- 
bonne,  for  instance,  and  Harvard  University,  have 
contributed  largely  to  make  us  known  and  appre- 
ciated on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  The  cordial 
welcome  given  to  French  travellers  in  America,  and  to 
the  American  Colony  in  Paris,  has  added  individual 
friendships  to  collective  sympathies.  In  Franco- 
American  relations,  sentiment,  which  usually  occu- 
pies so  small  a  place  in  politics,  plays  an  indispu- 
tably important  role.  It  is  the  most  active  leaven  in 
cooperations  sometimes  imposed  by  circumstances  on 
the  two  peoples.  There  was  no  need  of  the  Arbitration 
Treaty  of  1908  to  guarantee  that  questions  arising 
between  Paris  and  Washington  will  always  be  settled 
in  a  spirit  of  good  faith,  good  grace,  and  good  will. 
However,  commercial  interests,  quite  as  much  as 
ancient  sympathies,  justify  the  maintenance  of  cor- 
dial relations  between  France  and  the  United  States. 
Bismarck  used  to  assert  that  history  and  politics 


FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  275 

have  nothing  to  do  with  trade;  that  tariff  wars 
prevent  neither  alhances  nor  friendships,  and  that, 
conversely,  the  consequence  of  the  latter  is  not  al- 
ways an  increase  of  trade.  The  example  of  France 
and  Italy  has  allowed  it  to  be  seen  that  this  asser- 
tion is  not  strictly  accurate.  And  the  example  of 
France  and  the  United  States  tends  also  to  discredit 
it,  since  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  two  countries' 
intimacy  has  favoured  and  encouraged  the  exchange 
of  merchandise  between  them.  If  the  trouble  is 
taken  to  glance  at  the  sales  made  by  France  to  the 
United  States,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  upward  move- 
ment has  been  almost  constant,  showing  an  increase 
of  about  75  per  cent  in  less  than  forty  years.  In 
reality,  these  sales  have  passed  through  the  follow- 
ing phases  {Special  commerce) :  — 

In  millions  of  francs 

1860 219 

1870  ......        306 

1880 332 

1890 328 

1900 355 

1907 402 

We  sell  to  the  Americans  more  than  we  buy  from 
them.  However,  our  purchases  have  gone  up  in  the 
same  proportion  as  our  sales. 

In  millions  of  francs 

1860 139 

1870 217 

1880 731 

1890 317 

1900 509 

1907 632 


276  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

In  considering  these  figures,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  development  of  such  exchanges  had 
to  contend  against  the  double  obstacle  of  American 
and  French  Protectionism.  France  was  the  first 
nation  to  be  favoured  by  the  United  States  with  a 
reduction  in  the  duties  on  imported  articles.  By  the 
Treaty  of  the  30th  of  April,  1803,  which  settled  the 
terms  of  the  cession  of  Louisiana  to  the  States,  cer- 
tain privileges  were  accorded  to  our  ships  and  our 
products.  In  1831,  a  second  agreement,  which  re- 
stricted in  various  particulars  the  advantages  of  the 
previous  ones,  balanced  the  modification  by  lower- 
ing, during  a  period  of  ten  years,  the  import  duties 
on  our  red  and  white  wines.  After  this,  a  long  time 
passed  without  any  further  negotiations.  When,  in 
the  year  1882,  the  United  States  began,  by  reason  of 
their  commercial  development,  to  feel  the  need  of 
having  recourse  to  commercial  reciprocity,  the  agree- 
ments they  negotiated  were  applied  first  to  the  States 
of  South  America.  The  Dingley  Tariff,  which  be- 
came law  on  the  24th  of  July,  1897,  enlarged  the 
possibility  of  fresh  understandings.  On  the  28th  of 
May,  1898,  the  Paris  and  Washington  Governments, 
^^with  a  view  to  improving  their  respective  countries' 
commercial  relations, ''  concluded  a  first  arrange- 
ment comprising  various  reductions  of  duties.  On 
the  24th  of  July,  1899,  a  Treaty  of  Reciprocity  was 
signed.  But  it  called  forth  keen  opposition  more 
especially  on  the  part  of  the  New  York  and  New 
Jersey  jewellers  and  goldsmiths.  Indeed,  none  of 
the  treaties  negotiated,  in  virtue  of  Section  4  of  the 


FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED   STATES  277 

Dingley  Tariff,  were  ratified  by  Congress.  Conse- 
quently, the  agreement  of  1898  had  to  be  fallen 
back  upon.  On  the  20th  of  August,  1902,  an  addi- 
tional protocol  extended  its  provisions  to  Porto  Rico 
and  Algeria.  Finally,  in  1907,  the  United  States 
having  signed  a  commercial  agreement  with  Ger- 
many which  benefited,  to  the  detriment  of  French 
champagnes,  German  sparkling  wines  arbitrarily 
called  by  the  same  name,  France  expressed  the  de- 
sire, at  once  acceded  to  by  the  Government  of  the 
Union,  to  enter  into  negotiations  calculated  to  rees- 
tablish an  equality  of  treatment.  The  Treaty  of  the 
28th  of  January,  1908,  was  the  result.  By  the  terms 
of  this  Treaty,  which,  as  its  preamble  indicated,  was 
intended  to  ^^ complete  previous  ones,"  French  cham- 
pagne wines  were  to  benefit  by  a  reduction  of  twenty 
per  cent  in  the  import  duty,  France  continuing  to 
apply  her  minimum  tariff  to  Colonial  produce  and 
articles  of  consumption  coming  from  the  United 
States  and  Porto  Rico,  exception  made  for  tobacco, 
sugar,  and  things  manufactured  with  them.  More- 
over, a  technical  commission  of  six  members,  three 
being  Americans  and  three  French,  was  intrusted 
with  the  task  of  studying  certain  modifications  to 
be  introduced  into  the  Customs  regulations  of  the 
two  countries.  This  friendly  cooperation  is  likely 
to  facilitate  and  develop  exchanges  between  them. 
Indeed,  if  the  nature  of  such  exchanges  is  exam- 
ined in  detail,  it  will  be  seen  that  they  are  capable  of 
being  increased  in  the  case  of  numerous  articles.  It 
is  true  that  our  tissues,  which  form  the  most  impor- 


278  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

tant  portion  of  our  sales,  are  threatened  by  the  cre- 
ation of  fresh  manufactures.  But,  as  in  the  case  of 
our  skins,  our  Paris  articles,  our  wines,  our  comes- 
tibles, it  lies  in  our  power,  by  an  improved  organiza- 
tion of  our  sales,  to  secure  them  a  larger  market.  In 
his  excellent  report  on  the  Saint  Louis  Exhibition, 
Mr.  Andre  Lesourd  writes:  ^'The  French  trader  has 
certain  false  ideas  which  are  hard  to  eradicate.  He 
thinks  that  all  rich  Americans  come  every  year  to 
Paris  and  can  consequently  buy  in  Paris.  He  thinks 
that,  as  his  business  house  is  well  known  in  Paris,  it 
is  well  known  all  over  the  world,  and  that  those 
Americans  who  wish  to  give  him  orders  can  do  so 
from  America,  simply  from  seeing  his  catalogues. 
Now,  though  the  rich  Americans  who  visit  Europe 
every  year  are  very  numerous,  still  they  do  not  con- 
stitute more  than  quite  a  small  minority  of  the 
wealthy  class."  In  the  same  order  of  ideas,  Mr. 
Lucien  Bonzom,  our  Deputy  Consul  General  at  New 
York,  proposed  in  his  1906  report  to  create,  in  Fifth 
Avenue,  a  sort  of  maison  d^art,  where  our  artistic  in- 
dustries might  be  all  represented.  He  estimated 
that,  from  the  very  first  day,  ^Hhe  turn-over  would 
be  enormous."  The  equally  enormous  amount  of 
general  expenses  and  the  cost  of  installation  have 
so  far  caused  French  tradespeople  to  hold  back.  But 
there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  hope  that  the  idea 
will  sooner  or  later  be  carried  into  effect. 

The  economic  crisis  which,  between  the  autumn 
of  1907  and  the  spring  of  1908,  raged  in  America 
was  prejudicial  to  Franco- American  commerce.     As 


FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  279 

might  be  expected,  it  diminished  purchases  and  what 
may  be  called  touring  expenses.  Moreover,  it  cre- 
ated some  erroneous  notions  which  needed  expla- 
nation for  them  to  disappear.  In  the  month  of 
November,  1907,  being  in  want  of  specie,  the  Ameri- 
can market  applied  to  the  Bank  of  France.  Acting 
in  accordance  with  its  statutes,  the  latter  had  already 
sent  to  the  Bank  of  England  eighty  millions  of  Amer- 
ican gold  eagles,  which  had  naturally  been  despatched 
to  New  York.  The  direct  operation  which  it  was  now 
asked  to  effect  had  a  precedent.  At  the  time  of  the 
Baring  crisis,  the  Bank  of  France  had  lent  the  Bank 
of  England  seventy-five  millions  in  gold,  against 
which  the  latter,  as  a  guarantee  of  its  indebtedness, 
had  handed  in  a  check,  being  a  British  Treasury 
Bond  payable  at  three  months'  date.  The  Bank  of 
France  replied,  therefore,  that  it  was  ready  to  inter- 
vene on  the  same  terms,  that  is  to  say,  with  the 
guarantee  of  the  American  Treasury.  This  condi- 
tion, as  was  most  justly  remarked,  was  all  the  more 
legitimate,  since  there  exists  no  central  Issue  Bank 
in  the  United  States  similar  to  the  Bank  of  England, 
and  it  is  the  Treasury  which,  in  reality,  acts  as  a 
State  Bank  with  regard  to  the  American  market. 
There  was,  consequently,  a  double  reason  why  its 
intervention  should  be  stipulated.  Having  been  in- 
formed of  this  reply,  the  American  Government,  for 
constitutional  reasons,  did  not  think  fit  to  give  the 
guarantee  requested.  The  Bank  of  France,  there- 
fore, being  no  longer  in  presence  of  a  State  guarantee, 
but  of  a  private  operation,  was  bound  to  obey  its 


280  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

statutes^  which  forbade  such  a  transaction.  Not 
being  correctly  informed,  the  American  press  was 
annoyed  and  took  no  trouble  to  disguise  the  fact. 
^^This  refusal,"  wrote  the  New  York  Herald  on  the 
17th  of  November,  ^4s  a  measure  as  shortsighted  as 
it  is  useless."  And  yet  we  might  say  that  it  was 
somewhat  unwarrantable  to  seek  to  impose  a  re- 
sponsibility on  the  Bank  of  France  which  the  Ameri- 
can Treasury  refused  to  join  in  assuming.  More- 
over, no  one  could  be  ignorant  that  our  Bank  of 
France  has  no  right  to  give  gold  against  credit  paper. 
On  the  other  hand,  how  could  it  be  supposed  that 
the  Bank  would  take  part  in  the  issue  of  the  three 
per  cent  American  Treasury  Bonds,  when  it  is  for- 
bidden to  buy  securities  on  its  own  account  and 
those  that  it  can  accept  in  guarantee  of  its  advances 
are  exclusively  French?  One  ought  here  to  add 
that,  through  the  medium  of  the  Bank  of  England, 
the  Bank  of  France  sent,  during  the  crisis,  more 
than  a  hundred  million  dollars  in  gold  to  America. 
This  appreciable  service  is  sufficient  to  prove  that, 
in  conforming  itself  to  its  regulations,  our  National 
Bank  was  in  no  wise  animated  by  hostile  sentiments 
towards  the  American  market. 

Indeed,  it  is  a  well-known  fact  that,  for  some  years 
past,  a  more  active  share  has  been  taken  in  Ameri- 
can business  by  French  capital  than  in  times  gone 
by.  No  doubt,  the  scare  of  1907  will,  to  some  ex- 
tent, lessen  this  cooperation  for  a  while,  but  it  will 
not  stop  it.  In  spite  of  the  competition  resulting 
from  the  rapid  progress  of  American  industry,  the 


FRANCE  AND   THE   UNITED   STATES  281 

production  of  the  two  countries  remains  commer- 
cially, in  a  large  degree,  complementary.  The  cot- 
ton, cereals,  tobacco,  cotton-seed  and  oils,  fruits, 
meat,  wood,  mineral  oils,  both  natural  and  refined, 
and  the  machines  that  France  buys  each  year,  come 
to  fill  up  the  lack  of  her  soil  or  of  her  industry.  In 
return,  French  industry  is  distinguished  so  sharply 
by  the  finish  of  its  manufacture  from  that  of  the 
United  States  that  it  is  certain  always  to  find  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Atlantic  a  market  which  can  still 
be  extended  in  notable  proportions.  Therefore, 
business  as  well  as  sentiment  justifies  the  intimacy 
of  our  relations  with  America.  How  are  these  rela- 
tions to  stand  the  test  imposed  on  them  by  the  ne- 
cessities of  contemporary  politics  ? 

II 

On  the  2d  of  December,  1823,  President  James 
Monroe  wrote :  — 

Seeing  the  free  and  independent  attitude  assumed  by  the 
American  continents,  they  ought  not  to  be  considered  by  any 
European  Power  as  a  territory  lending  itself  to  more  ample 
colonization.  We  owe  it  to  the  frankness  and  friendly  relations 
that  exist  between  the  United  States  and  the  various  European 
Powers  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  as  being  dangerous 
for  our  peace  and  security  any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend 
their  system  to  whatsoever  portion  of  this  hemisphere. 

We  have  never  mixed  ourselves  up  with  the  wars  that  these 
Powers  have  engaged  in  with  each  other  on  questions  concern- 
ing themselves ;  and  it  is  not  in  our  policy  to  do  so. 

We  have  not  intervened,  and  we  shall  not  intervene,  in  the 
present  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  Power.  But 
in  the  States  which  have  declared  their  independence  and  have 


282  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have  recognized,  after 
mature  reflection  and  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  justice, 
we  can  only  consider  the  intervention  of  any  European  Power 
whatsoever,  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them  or  controlling 
their  destiny  in  any  way,  as  being  a  manifestation  of  hostile 
sentiments  towards  the  United  States. 

These  rules,  which,  in  their  author's  mind,  applied 
only  to  the  special  situation  created  by  the  revolt  of 
the  Spanish  colonies,  have  become  the  guiding  prin- 
ciple of  American  policy.  The  practice  of  non-an- 
nexation and,  before  long,  of  non-intervention  which 
was  thus  opposed  to  the  European  Powers  in  matters 
affecting  the  New  World,  has  assumed  the  value  of  a 
dogma.  And,  by  the  attitude  of  the  Powers  with 
regard  to  it,  Americans  have  judged  what  sentiments 
were  held  respecting  themselves.  With  but  few 
exceptions,  France  has  never  caused  them  any  anx- 
iety. The  deplorable  intervention  of  Napoleon  III 
in  Mexico  was  the  only  occasion  of  a  dispute  that 
risked  bringing  us  into  open  conflict  with  them.  No 
doubt,  this  conflict  would  have  broken  out,  if  the 
war  of  Secession,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Mexican 
adventure,  had  not  monopolized  the  forces  of  the 
Union,  and  if  the  Emperor  Maximilian's  tragic  end 
had  not  closed  the  incident  later.  However,  it  left 
a  certain  coldness  between  Paris  and  Washington, 
which  made  itself  felt  to  our  prejudice  in  1870. 
Since  that  time  no  further  difficulty  has  arisen.  The 
making  of  the  Panama  Canal  by  France  might  have 
been  the  cause  of  some  fresh  unpleasantness,  if  we 
had  carried  it  through.  Being  resolved  on  getting 
the  control  of  the  Canal  into  their  own  hands,  the 


FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED   STATES  283 

United  States  would  not  have  resigned  themselves 
to  see  it  managed  by  a  foreign  company.  The  fail- 
ure of  the  French  enterprise,  painful  as  it  was  to  our 
national  pride,  spared  us  by  its  completeness  any 
danger  of  future  complications  on  this  score.  In  all 
other  circumstances  we  have  contrived,  without 
detriment  to  ourselves,  to  conform  our  action  to  the 
doctrine  of  Monroe.  We  keep  our  colonies  of  Saint- 
Pierre  and  Miquclon,  with  that  of  Guyana  and  what 
else  belongs  to  us  of  the  European  possessions  in  the 
West  Indies.  But  the  United  States  do  not  threaten 
them.  Each  time  that  a  dispute  has  arisen  between 
us  and  a  Latin  RejDublic,  the  loyal  and  moderate 
character  of  our  action  has  always  been  appreciated 
at  Washington.  Our  controversy  with  Brazil  re- 
specting the  frontiers  of  Guyana  was  settled  by  ami- 
cable arrangement.  In  dealing  with  Venezuela  and 
its  dictator  Castro,  we  have  shown  a  patience  that 
has  been  carried  to  excess,  and  has  often  been  spoken 
of  as  inclining  to  weakness  by  the  Americans  them- 
selves. At  any  rate,  they  were  gratified  by  our  not 
joining  in  the  naval  demonstration  against  Venezuela 
undertaken  in  1902  by  the  three  Powers,  Germany, 
Italy,  and  Great  Britain.  And  satisfaction  was  ex- 
pressed likewise  when  the  Franco-English  agree- 
ment relative  to  Newfoundland  settled  a  question 
of  difficulty  in  which  American  fishermen  risked  be- 
ing sooner  or  later  implicated.^ 

In  a  general  way,  France  may  be  said  to  accept 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.     She  accepts,  at  the  outset 

^  See  Coolidge's  book,  already  quoted. 


284  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

of  this  twentieth  century,  even  the  larger  scope  of 
the  doctrine,  known  under  the  nickname  of  the  ^^big 
stick.''  There  is  no  need  to  explain  this  term;  and 
every  one,  to-day,  is  aware  of  the  causes  that  have 
brought  about  the  gradual  development  of  the  orig- 
inal doctrine  and  made  it  what  it  is.  The  imme- 
diate object  of  the  United  States  was  to  prevent  all 
European  military  action  in  the  Latin  Republics, 
and,  what  is  more,  all  European  occupation  of  ter- 
ritory. They  could  not,  however,  claim  to  protect 
these  Republics  against  the  consequences  of  the 
disregard  certain  of  them  only  too  often  manifested 
for  their  international  engagements.  The  United 
States  were,  therefore,  compelled  to  exercise  a  sort 
of  preventive  control  over  them,  to  act  as  an  inter- 
mediary between  them  and  Europe,  and  to  assume 
the  role,  with  regard  to  them,  of  a  benevolent  but 
vigilant  gendarme.  It  was  in  this  character  that 
the  Washington  Government  intervened  in  San  Do- 
mingo ;  and,  similarly,  they  will  probably  be  obliged 
to  intervene  in  Venezuela.  Having  no  desire  to 
acquire  fresh  territory  in  any  part  of  the  New  World, 
France  is,  consequently,  without  any  motive  for 
seeking  to  oppose  a  system  which,  while  it  has  no 
juridical  value,  is  of  vital  necessity  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Union.  She  is,  on  the  contrary,  quite 
disposed  to  acknowledge  the  ^^ special  interests" 
which  the  United  States  claim  in  America,  the  more 
so  as  she  herself  puts  forward  a  like  claim  with  re- 
gard to  Northwest  Africa.  Moreover,  the  United 
States  Government  has  never  called  on  her  to  make 


FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED   STATES  285 

sacrifices  incompatible  with  her  dignity.  And,  when- 
ever she  happens  to  be  at  loggerheads  with  any 
one  of  the  lawless  Republics  of  South  America,  she 
is  accustomed,  of  her  own  accord,  to  acquaint  Wash- 
ington with  her  intentions ;  and  to  have  recourse,  in 
the  largest  degree  possible,  to  the  good  offices  of 
American  diplomacy.  This  attitude  is  so  much 
the  more  agreeable  to  the  Government  of  the  Union, 
as  they  have  not  always  met  with  it,  to  the  same  ex- 
tent, in  the  various  other  Powers.  Bismarck  used 
to  characterize  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  ^inter- 
national impertinence.^'  And,  a  dozen  years  ago. 
Great  Britain,  who  since  then  has  adopted  a  more 
conciliatory  tone,  did  not  seem  far  from  approving 
this  sentiment.  By  repudiating  any  design  in  op- 
position to  the  principles  that  lie  at  the  base  of  the 
doctrine,  France  has  strengthened  the  favourable 
disposition  of  mind  existing  towards  her  in  Wash- 
ington. 

Indeed,  it  is  no  longer  on  the  American  soil  only 
that  the  various  European  Powers  are  to-day  ex- 
posed to  find  themselves  face  to  face  with  the  United 
States.  If  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  evolved  in  its 
reference  to  the  New  World,  it  has  evolved  also  with 
regard  to  the  Old.  What  Boutmy  wrote  is  true : 
'^A  nation  of  eighty  million  souls  that  sells  wheat, 
and  coal,  and  iron,  and  cotton,  to  the  whole  world 
cannot  remain  in  an  isolated  condition.  Her  very 
power  lays  obligations  upon  her.  Her  strength 
confers  on  her  a  right.  The  right  changes  into  a 
claim.     The  claim  resolves  itself  into  the  duty  of 


286  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

pronouncing  on  all  the  divers  questions  formerly 
settled  by  the  agreement  of  European  Powers  alone. 
These  Powers  themselves,  in  critical  moments,  turn 
towards  the  United  States,  being  anxious  to  know 
the  latter^s  opinion.  And  the  Government  of  the 
Union  would  lessen  their  influence  in  the  eyes  of  the 
world,  if  they  shut  themselves  up  in  negative  ab- 
stention. Henceforward,  the  United  States  have  a 
policy  of  world-wide  reference.''  Said  Mr.  Roose- 
velt to  me  one  day :  ^^  What  is  most  lacking  in  our  de- 
mocracy is  the  sense  of  their  larger  responsibility.'' 
This  sense  has  developed  with  singular  rapidity  in 
the  last  ten  years.  In  order  to  be  on  good  terms 
with  Americans,  it  is  no  longer  enough  not  to  inter- 
fere with  them  in  America.  It  is  also  necessary  to 
be  in  agreement  with  them  in  other  parts  of  the 
world.  ^ 

When  they  ceased  limiting  their  policy  to  Amer- 
ica, they  first  extended  their  preoccupations  to  Asia. 
This  was  a  foregone  conclusion.  The  law  of  their 
expansion,  in  fact,  carries  them  from  east  to  west. 
When,  under  cover  of  their  high  tariffs,  their  indus- 
try needed  outlets,  they  were  obliged  to  seek  them 
towards  the  Pacific,  in  Asia.  They  began  by  peo- 
pling California.  Then  they  looked  farther  on. 
They  conceived  the  dream  of  a  Pacific  which  should 
be  '^an  American  Mediterranean."  On  this  ocean 
the  Hawaiian  Islands,  Samoa,  part  of  the  Marianne 
Islands,  the  Philippines,  and,  last  of  all,  the  zone  of 
the  Panama  Canal,  all  these  have  staked  out  for 
*  See  our  book,  Notes  on  the  United  States. 


FRANCE  AND   THE  UNITED   STATES  287 

them  the  routes  of  the  future.  ^^Our  products/' 
Mr.  Shaw,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  exclaimed  one 
day,  ^^will  be  transported  over  all  the  seas,  and  the 
United  States  will  become  in  reality,  as  they  are  des- 
tined by  nature  to  become,  masters  of  the  vast- 
est of  oceans."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  American 
policy  in  the  Pacific  and  in  Asia  has  been,  above 
all,  an  economic  one.  Between  1896  and  1905, 
American  importations  into  China  increased  from 
thirty-five  millions  of  francs  to  two  hundred  and 
sixty-five  millions.  In  Corea,  they  rose,  between 
1903  and  1905,  from  one  million  nine  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  francs  to  no  less  than  ten  millions. 
Within  ten  years,  they  increased  in  Japan  from 
forty  to  two  hundred  and  sixty-five  millions. 
In  these  different  countries,  it  was  commercial  in- 
terests which  held  diplomacy  in  their  leading  strings. 
At  certain  times  these  interests  may  have  seemed 
to  clash  w4th  French  ones.  Not  that  France  had 
intentions  of  annexation  or  monopoly  in  any  region 
of  the  Far  East,  but  because  her  alliance  with  Russia 
necessarily  associated  her  with  the  projects  of  the 
Saint  Petersburg  Cabinet.  These  projects,  which 
aimed  at  a  Russian  annexation  of  Manchuria,  and 
after  that,  of  Corea,  had  for  some  years  past,  caused 
anxiety  in  the  United  States.  The  latter  advocated 
the  ^^Open  Door";  and,  since  Japan  advocated  the 
same  thing,  Americans  espoused  the  cause  of  the 
'^ dear  little  Japs."  As  one  of  them  wrote  :  ^^  Japan 
represents  in  this  conflict  the  civilized  element, 
the   modern,    liberal    principle    of    national  policy, 


288  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

the  promise  of  pacific  development."  This  jparti 
pris  was  further  aggravated  by  the  rancour  existing 
against  Russia  among  the  American,  Polish,  and 
Jewish  immigrants.  And  to  some  extent  the  Gov- 
ernment was  influenced  by  it.  In  the  early  days  of 
the  war  between  Russia  and  Japan,  Mr.  John  Hay, 
the  Secretary  for  State  Affairs,  proposed  to  the  Pow- 
ers measures  for  insuring  that  ^'the  neutrality  of 
China  and  her  administrative  entity  should  be  re- 
spected." Under  an  appearance  of  impartiality, 
this  was  a  precaution  taken  against  Russia.  As  all 
the  Neutral  Powers  were  interested  in  the  neutrality 
and  the  territorial  integrity  of  China,  the  American 
proposal  was  adopted.  In  Saint  Petersburg  it  was 
considered  as  not  being  very  amicable  in  its  inten- 
tion, even  though  it  was  correct  in  its  form.  And 
French  opinion,  which  was  favourable  to  Russia, 
found  itself  on  this  account  in  opposition  with  Amer- 
ican opinion,  which  continued  to  be  on  the  side  of 
Japan. 

Since  then,  the  situation  has  changed.  Most 
prudently,  President  Roosevelt  and  his  Ministers 
had  abstained  from  mixing  themselves  up  in  the 
manifestations  of  public  opinion.  Did  they,  even 
then,  foresee  that  the  success  of  Japan  would  make 
her  the  future  rival  of  the  United  States  in  the  Pa- 
cific? The  war  was  hardly  finished  before  popular 
sentiment  in  both  countries  underwent  a  change. 
The  Japanese  reproached  the  Americans  with  the 
role  played  by  Mr.  Roosevelt  during  the  peace  ne- 
gotiations of   1905.     And  the  Americans  were,   in 


FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED   STATES  289 

return,  astonished  at  the  tone  assumed  towards 
them  by  the  Japanese  newspapers.  A  year  later, 
the  incident  of  the  San  Francisco  schools  called  at- 
tention to  the  immigration  question,  which,  after 
being  the  cause  of  animosity,  twenty  years  previ- 
ous, against  the  Chinese,  now  aroused  similar 
feelings  against  the  Japanese,  who  were  rivals  far 
more  to  be  dreaded.  Between  the  autumn  of  1906 
and  the  spring  of  1908,  the  conflict  went  through 
its  successive  phases  with  alternating  periods  of 
agitation  and  tranquillity,  fears  of  war  and  hopes  of 
appeasement.  The  cruise  of  the  American  fleet 
and  Mr.  Taft's  voyage  to  Japan  were  its  last  inci- 
dents. An  agreement  was  subsequently  established, 
the  text  of  which  was  not  published.  In  it  was 
manifested  the  unanimous  desire  of  the  Americans 
for  their  country  not  to  be  over-run  by  Japanese 
coolies,  and  that  also  of  the  Japanese  to  keep  their 
labour  at  home.  The  agreement  was  a  purely 
opportunist  one,  since  neither  party  abandoned  the 
principles  they  upheld,  —  on  the  one  side,  the  right 
to  enter,  on  the  other,  the  right  to  exclude. 

With  this  conflict  France  had  nothing  to  do. 
However,  she  had  to  suffer  its  counter-effect.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Franco-Japanese  Treaty,  which 
was  justified  by  the  reasons  that  have  been  stated 
in  a  previous  chapter,  was  signed  on  the  16th  of 
May,  1907;  that  is  to  say,  just  when  the  Nippo- 
American  crisis  was  in  its  most  acute  phase.  In 
spite  of  the  restricted  character  of  this  agreement, 
a    disagreeable    impression    was    produced    in    the 


290  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

United  States.  The  financial  help  granted  by 
France  to  Japan,  our  engagement  to  respect  and, 
in  accordance  with  her,  to  see  that  others  respect 
the  territorial  integrity  of  China,  to  join  her  in  as- 
suring the  maintenance  of  order  in  certain  provinces 
of  the  Celestial  Empire,  not  to  speak  of  the  guaran- 
tee we  afforded  to  her  own  territorial  situation  in 
Asia, — all  this  caused  the  Americans  to  feel  uneasy. 
^^Some  among  us,^'  writes  Mr.  Coolidge  (who,  in- 
deed, refuses  to  share  in  these  fears),  ^^may  see  in  the 
Franco-Japanese  Treaty  a  proof  that,  in  the  rivalry 
of  the  United  States  and  Japan  on  the  Pacific, 
France  is  taking  the  side  of  Japan.  If  they  should 
persuade  themselves,  besides,  that,  in  the  event  of 
the  United  States  vanquishing  Japan  in  war  and 
deciding  to  deprive  her  of  Formosa,  France  would 
be  bound  to  intervene  by  the  terms  of  this  Treaty, 
their  irritation  might  be  very  great. '^  Such  irrita- 
tion has  not  yet  been  shown;  but  still  there  is  a 
sort  of  hesitation,  which  France  should  have  no 
difficulty  in  removing.  In  reality,  the  Franco- 
Japanese  Treaty  ought  not  to  be  considered  alone, 
as  we  have  already  seen  above.  It  belongs  to  a 
series  of  understandings  constituted  by  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance,  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance, 
the  Entente  Cordiale  and  the  Russo-Japanese  rap- 
prochement. Even  though  Japan  were  to  form 
aggressive  designs  against  the  United  States,  —  and 
this  is  not  proved  to  be  likely,  as  indeed  for  the 
moment  it  is  impossible,  —  Great  Britain,  Russia, 
and  France,  who  are  all  three  against  such  designs, 


FRANCE  AND   THE  UNITED   STATES  291 

would  have,  by  reason  of  the  ties  that  connect 
them  with  the  Tokio  Cabinet,  much  greater  author- 
ity to  restrain  and  advise  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, with  a  firmness  that  could  scarcely  fail  to 
produce  its  effect  and  to  bring  about  a  peaceful 
solution.  Paris,  London,  and  Saint  Petersburg  are 
equally  concerned  in  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Pacific  remaining  what  it  is  to-day,  and  equally 
concerned  also  in  preserving  the  independence  of 
China.  Far  from  compromising  this  equilibrium,  their 
agreements  with  Tokio  confer  on  it  an  additional 
guarantee.  Consequently,  the  relations  of  France 
with  the  United  States  cannot,  under  present  cir- 
cumstances, suffer  anything  from  our  polic}^  in  Asia. 
This  policy  favours  the  elements  of  stability,  and 
American  efforts  should  tend  to  multiply  them. 

The  identity  of  views  and  interests  existing  be- 
tween the  world-wide  policy  of  the  United  States 
and  the  general  policy  of  France  has  manifested 
itself  in  Europe  even  more  clearly  than  elsewhere. 
On  the  15th  of  January,  1906,  the  representatives 
of  the  various  Powers  met  at  Algeciras,  at  the  re- 
quest of  Germany,  who  wished  this  Assembly  of  the 
Conference  to  confirm  our  country's  discomfiture. 
The  United  States  occupied  at  the  Conference  a 
position  that  was  altogether  unique.  Of  the  eight 
Powers  participating  in  it,  she  alone  was  free  of 
all  pledges  given  to  either  side.  Her  Plenipoten- 
tiary, Mr.  Henry  White,  had  been  instructed  to 
share  in  the  deliberations,  first,  because  the  United 
States  Government  had  signed  the  Madrid  Conven- 


292  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

tion  of  1880,  secondly,  because  it  was  interested 
in  the  maintenance  of  freedom  and  commercial 
equality,  and,  lastly,  because  it  might  be  able  to 
contribute  to  the  adopting  of  conciliatory  solutions. 
Save  for  an  intervention  which  he  had  promised  to 
the  Jewish  Societies  in  behalf  of  the  Moroccan  Jews, 
Mr.  Root  had  not  bound  Mr.  White  to  any  particu- 
lar initiative.  He  left  him  free  to  appreciate  the 
relative  value  of  each  different  proposal  and  to  sign 
the  final  protocol  ad  referendum.  There  is  hardly 
any  need  to  observe  that,  by  the  very  force  of 
things,  this  attitude  of  impartiality  was  destined 
to  lead  to  the  American  Plenipotentiary's  acting 
the  role  of  a  veritable  arbitrator  at  Algeciras.  A 
Power  of  the  United  States'  rank  and  strength  could 
not,  in  fact,  take  part  in  such  a  debate  without  its 
action  making  itself  almost  immediately  felt.  In 
spite  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  apparent  ab- 
stention which  was  its  logical  consequence,  the 
United  States  were  about  to  play  their  part  in  the 
most  important  diplomatic  encounter  of  the  Chan- 
celleries that  had  occurred  since  the  Congress  of 
Berlin. 

It  is  no  more  than  a  just  homage  rendered  to 
American  diplomacy  to  recognize  that,  on  this  oc- 
casion, it  exhibited  quite  as  much  clear-sightedness 
as  loyalty.  We  are  pleased  to  think  that  America's 
sympathies  towards  France  were  not  without  some 
influence  on  her  attitude.  But  it  would  be  wrong- 
ing her  to  ignore  the  fact  that  her  paramount  desire 
was  to  decide  equitably  and  to  work  in  the  cause 


FRANCE  AND   THE  UNITED   STATES  293 

of  peace.  When  the  United  States  are  in  presence  of 
Europe^  they  have  only  one  preoccupation :  to  main- 
tain the  balance  of  power,  while  opposing  any  at- 
tempt at  one-sided  domination.  This  was  their 
first  and  decisive  reason  for  showing  themselves 
favourable  to  France,  who,  in  this  particular  case, 
represented  the  cause  of  European  equilibrium 
against  German  hegemony.  Moreover,  they  were 
in  a  position  better  to  understand  than  any  other 
Power  the  nature  of  the  double  interest  we  claimed 
in  Morocco,  the  negative  one,  that  of  removing  all 
other  European  influence  than  our  own  from  the 
Moorish  Empire,  the  positive  one,  that  of  preparing 
the  reestablishment  of  order.  This  double  interest, 
in  fact,  was  identical  with  that  which  had  created 
the  doctrine  of  Monroe.  What  we  wished  to  do  at 
Fez  and  Tangier,  the  United  States,  for  similar 
reasons,  had  done  in  different  parts  of  the  world, 
notably  in  Cuba.  If,  therefore,  faithful  to  our 
engagements,  we  offered  every  commercial  guaran- 
tee in  proposing  reforms  that  respected  the  integrity 
of  the  Moroccan  Empire,  as  also  the  Sultan's  Sov- 
ereignty, we  were  favourably  situated  for  being  able 
to  rely  on  America's  support.  From  the  first  to  the 
last  day,  this  support  was  granted  us. 

To  tell  the  truth,  it  had  not  waited  for  the  meet- 
ing of  the  Conference  in  order  to  show  itself.  In 
the  month  of  June,  1905,  on  the  morrow  of  Mr. 
Delcasse's  resignation.  President  Roosevelt  had 
personally  asked  William  II  to  make  the  acceptance 
of  the  Conference,  which  at  the  same  time  he  urged 


294  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

upon  MS,  an  occasion  for  assuming  a  conciliatory 
attitude.  When  the  debates  were  entered  upon^ 
Mr.  Henry  White,  with  all  the  frankness  of  his  char- 
acter, expressed  his  opinion  concerning  the  solutions 
proposed  by  Mr.  Revoil  (Franco-Spanish  police). 
On  the  5th  of  February,  he  declared  himself  favour- 
able to  them,  during  a  conversation  he  had  with 
Mr.  von  Radowitz.  When  these  proposals  had 
been  put  aside  by  a  first  German  refusal,  it  was  Mr. 
White,  again,  who,  approving  of  the  further  conces- 
sion made  by  France  (Reports  of  the  Italian  Lega- 
tion concerning  the  Franco-Spanish  police),  under- 
took to  introduce  this  combination,  which  was  a 
sort  of  compromise  (February  15).  After  sup- 
porting the  first  solution,  Mr.  Roosevelt  also  sup- 
ported the  second,  not  because  it  emanated  from 
France,  but  because  it  corresponded  to  the  princi- 
ples proclaimed  at  the  opening  of  the  Conference. 
When,  on  the  3d  of  March,  at  our  request,  a  vote 
was  taken  as  to  the  advisability  of  placing  the  police 
question  on  the  order  for  the  day,  Mr.  White  gave 
us  his  vote,  still  in  the  objective  interests  of  an 
understanding,  against  which  obstacles  were  being 
raised,  not  on  the  side  of  Paris.  On  the  7th  of 
March,  at  the  moment  when,  after  this  vote,  Ger- 
many seemed,  at  last,  disposed  to  make  concessions, 
Mr.  Roosevelt,  for  the  third  time,  recommended  to 
William  II  the  combination  adopted  on  the  15th  of 
February.  After  the  fall  of  the  Rouvier  Cabinet, 
the  American  policy  did  not  vary  one  jot  or  tittle, 
remaining  faithful  at  once  to  its  aim  and  to  France. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED   STATES  295 

When  William  II  sent  his  three  telegrams  (13th, 
15th,  and  17th  of  March),  urging  the  President  to 
exercise  pressure  on  us,  Mr.  Roosevelt  opposed  to 
him  the  most  courteous,  but,  at  the  same  time,  the 
most  resolute  firmness,  exhibiting,  to  the  very  end, 
his  intention  of  executing,  from  the  Moroccan  point 
of  view,  a  work  of  justice  and  good  sense,  and,  from 
the  European  point  of  view,  a  work  of  equilibrium 
and  peace/ 

Is  there  any  need  to  recall  what  comments  were 
passed  upon  the  intervention  of  American  diplo- 
macy? Attempts  were  made  to  explain  it  by  ante- 
rior grievances  against  German  policy.  But  it 
would  seem  that  this  interpretation  cannot  legiti- 
mately be  maintained.  It  is  quite  true,  that,  dur- 
ing the  last  twenty  years,  Germany  has  often  caused 
anxiety  at  Washington.  Refractory  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  she  has  allowed  Americans  to  think,  by 
her  acts  on  several  occasions,  that  she  did  not  intend 
to  be  governed  by  it.  Since  the  dispute  that  arose 
in  connection  with  Samoa  in  1888,  which  it  required 
eleven  years  to  appease,  numerous  incidents  have 
occurred.  In  1898,  the  enigmatic  arrival  of  Ad- 
miral Dietriches  entire  squadron  at  Manila,  on  the 
day  after  Dewey's  victory,  aroused  lasting  distrust 
in  American  political  circles.  Moreover,  it  is  the 
fear  of  Germany  which  has  recently  given  such  an  im- 
petus to  the  construction  of  warships  in  the  United 
States.  The  occupation  of  Kiao-Chow,  the  pur- 
chase of  the  remainder  of  the  Spanish  colonies  in 

^  See  our  work,  The  Conference  of  Algeciras. 


296  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

the  Pacific,  Marshal  Waldersee's  behaviour  during 
the  Chinese  crisis  of  1900,  the  1902  naval  demon- 
stration against  Venezuela,  the  project  attributed 
to  Germany  of  purchasing  the  Danish  Islands  in 
the  West  Indies,  have  alarmed  and  irritated  the 
Americans.  The  restless  activity  of  the  Germans 
in  South  America,  especially  in  Brazil,  the  hypothe- 
sis of  territorial  ambitions,  of  which  immigration 
would  have  been  only  the  preface,  have  caused  appre- 
hensions still  more  precise.  Last  of  all,  between 
the  two  most  modern  ^' World  Firms  "  —  Germany 
and  the  United  States  —  commercial  rivalry  is  in- 
tense and  cannot  be  otherwise.  And  yet,  these 
things  notwithstanding,  it  seems  certain  that,  in 
1906,  the  remembrance  of  the  difficulties  they 
caused  was  to  some  extent  less  vivid,  if  not  entirely 
wiped  out.  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia's  voyage  to 
the  United  States;  the  frequent  exchange  of  cour- 
teous messages  between  William  II  and  Mr.  Roose- 
velt, as,  for  instance,  in  1906,  at  the  time  of  the 
lectures  delivered  by  Professor  Burgess  in  Berlin; 
and,  more  recently,  the  signing  of  a  commercial 
agreement  which  settled  a  long  controversy,  had 
all  contributed  to  a  better  state  of  feeling  between 
the  two  countries.  And  the  Americans,  who  admire 
Germany  on  account  of  her  strength  and  her  me- 
thodic way  of  doing  things,  were  quite  willing  to 
live  on  good  terms  with  her.  Consequently,  the 
approval  of  French  action  during  the  Moroccan 
crisis  was  not  to  be  explained  merely  by  the  exist- 
ence of    a  long-standing  grudge  against  Germany. 


FRANCE  AND   THE  UNITED   STATES  297 

It  had  political  value  and  a  more  general  signifi- 
cation. 

To  the  special  reasons  explained  above,  two  other 
motives  were  to  be  added,  which,  since  then,  have 
continued  to  produce  their  effect.  The  first  was  that 
France,  who  herself  possessed  the  sympathies  of  the 
United  States,  was  thenceforward  the  ally  or  the 
friend  of  the  two  Powers  with  whom  they  have 
the  most  lively  desire  to  maintain  cordial  relations. 
Russia,  who,  three  years  previously,  had  been  an 
object  of  suspicion  to  the  Americans,  was  now 
regarded  by  them  as  a  necessary  counterweight  to 
the  JajDanese  Power.  The  slow,  but  already,  as  it 
would  seem,  normal  evolution  of  the  Russian  Em- 
pire towards  a  regime  of  legality  facilitated  this 
reconciliation,  which  was  determined  by  common 
interest.  To-day,  except  in  Jewish  circles,  there  is 
no  longer  any  hatred  against  Russia.  It  appears 
even  that,  in  Washington  and  Saint  Petersburg, 
equal  regret  is  felt  for  the  neglect  to  profit  by  oppor- 
tunities of  getting  to  know  each  other  better  in  the 
past.  As  regards  England,  she  has  consistently 
sought,  during  the  last  ten  years,  to  gain  the  friend- 
ship of  the  United  States.  The  Venezuelan  dispute 
of  1896  was  the  last  vestige  of  a  century-old  quarrel. 
And  by  then  accepting  the  haughty  interpretation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  opposed  to  him  by  Mr. 
Richard  Olney,  President  Cleveland's  Secretary  of 
State,  Lord  Salisbury  rendered  the  rapprochement 
definitive.  The  war  with  Spain  enabled  Great 
Britain  to  make  it  more  cordial.     The  Hay-Paunce- 


298  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

fote  Treaty,  which  restored  to  the  United  States  their 
liberty  of  action  in  Panama,  and  the  subsequent 
settlement  of  the  Alaskan  frontier  difficulty,  were 
the  outward  and  visible  signs  of  this  improved  state 
of  affairs.  Nor  has  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance, 
which,  indeed,  was  concluded  before  any  difficulties 
arose  between  Japan  and  America,  done  anything 
to  hinder  the  rapprochement.  It  is  most  favourably 
regarded  in  Washington;  and  the  Entente  Cordiale 
has  extended  to  France  its  advantages.  Was  it 
not,  moreover,  Mr.  MacCormick,  the  United  States 
Ambassador  in  Paris,  who,  in  an  official  speech, 
made  in  1905,  said:  ^^I  am  happy  to  notice  the 
development  of  ideas  which,  in  recent  times,  have 
gradually  brought  about  an  amicable  understanding 
between  France  and  the  mother  country  of  Ameri- 
cans. Rapprochements  of  this  kind  render  powerful 
service  to  commercial  and  pacific  interests,  which 
are  those  of  the  world  of  work.  For  my  part,  I 
shall  endeavour  to  encourage  them.'' 

The  second  motive  is  more  general  than  the  first. 
Still  more  than  by  historic  souvenirs,  still  more  than 
by  our  intimacy  with  London  and  Saint  Petersburg, 
our  possession  of  the  United  States'  good-will  is 
favoured  by  the  object  which  our  policy  constantly 
pursues.  Our  aim  is  peace;  our  means  towards  it 
is  the  balance  of  power.  Both  end  and  means 
correspond  equally  to  American  desires.  Being  in 
full  economic  progress,  playing  her  part  in  the  world- 
game,  the  United  States  would  not  be  able  to  regard 
without  apprehension  the  subjection  of  Europe  to 


I 


FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED   STATES  299 

any  single  Power.  They  are  aware  that  William  II, 
when  he  is  not  preaching  a  crusade  against  the 
Yeliov/  Race  or  against  England,  takes  pleasure  in 
denouncing  the  American  peril  to  the  ^^  United 
States  of  Europe,''  which  he  would  like  to  form 
beneath  his  rule.  They  are  ready  to  respect  Ger- 
many's legitimate  interests  whenever  they  meet 
with  them.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  by  reason  and 
by  instinct  they  are  on  the  side  of  France,  when,  in 
defence  of  her  diplomatic  autonomy,  the  latter 
country  undertakes,  as  a  necessary  condition,  the 
defence  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  This  is 
a  moral  guarantee  for  our  policy  as  strong  as  any 
written  engagements.  Is  it  not  for  the  said  policy, 
at  the  same  time,  the  best  of  justifications? 


CHAPTER  VIII 


FRANCE   AND   PEACE 


In  less  than  forty  years,  our  diplomatic  situation 
has  undergone  a  thorough  change.  In  spite  of 
rapidly  succeeding  Ministries,  and  notwithstanding 
the  mistakes  that  have  been  made,  France  has  ac- 
complished the  duty  which  history  marked  out 
for  her  to  perform.  By  means  of  the  Russian  Alli- 
ance, she  has  broken  out  of  the  circle  of  solitude  in 
which  Bismarck  had  confined  her.  By  means  of 
her  understandings  with  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and 
Spain,  she  has  restored  the  balance  of  power  which 
the  German  hegemony  had  destroyed  in  1871.  By 
means  of  the  Russo-Japanese,  Franco-Japanese,  and 
Anglo-Russian  rapprochements ,  she  has  secured  com- 
plementary guarantees  to  her  reconquered  liberty. 
But  being  now  at  the  goal  of  this  evolution,  the 
policy,  dictated  to  her  by  preoccupation  concerning 
her  future,  places  her  more  than  ever  in  opposition 
to  that  suggested  to  Germany  by  this  country's  de- 
votion to  Germany's  past. 

It  is  useless  to  wonder  at  a  conflict  which  every- 
thing rendered  inevitable.  Being  vanquished,  France 
could  do  no  otherwise  than  strive  to  get  back,  if 
not  her  provinces  by  war,  at  least  her  autonomy  and 
her  safety  in  peace.     And  Germany,  being  victori- 

300 


FRANCE  AND   PEACE  301 

ous,  could  do  no  otherwise  than  take  alarm  at  this 
effort.  On  the  one  side,  the  struggle  was  for  equilib- 
rium; on  the  other,  for  supremacy.  Balance  of 
power  was  necessary  to  France;  supremacy  was 
habitual  to  Germany.  France  was  as  fatally  bound 
to  claim  the  one  as  Germany  was  to  endeavour  to 
safeguard  the  other.  The  history  of  Europe  has 
been  working  during  the  last  quarter  of  a  century  at 
this  problem  of  political  psychology  and  seeking  for 
its  solution.  In  the  conflict  itself  there  is  nothing 
of  the  contingent.  It  results  from  the  very  nature 
of  things ;  and  has  its  origin  in  the  Treaty  of  Frank- 
fort, not  in  the  caprices  of  Sovereigns  or  in  the 
passions  of  Peoples. 

In  order  for  the  peril  to  be  removed,  either  France 
would  have  to  sacrifice  her  interests  or  Germany 
would  have  to  reform  her  state  of  mind.  The  first 
hypothesis  is  inadmissible.  On  the  contrary,  the 
second  contains  nothing  that  is  unacceptable.  If, 
instead  of  looking  ever  to  the  past,  the  Germans 
would  live  more  in  the  present,  the  irritation  that 
acts  upon  them  would  thereby  be  appeased.  The 
Germany  of  the  twentieth  century  is  no  longer  the 
dominating  power  in  Europe.  However,  she  holds 
among  its  various  nations  a  rank  that  is  still  emi- 
nent. She  has  admirable  economic  resources.  Her 
vigorous  natality  assures  the  necessary  elements 
of  her  military  organization,  which,  from  above, 
made  up  of  method  and,  from  below,  of  discipline, 
is  unsurpassable  in  solidity.  She  is  allied  with 
Austria  and  also  with  Italy,  both  of  which  Powers 


302  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

are  anxious  to  preserve  the  Alliance.  She  is 
the  pivot  of  the  sole  Triplice  that  exists  in  Europe. 
Germany  is  not  isolated.  Germany  is  not  diminished. 
She  has  the  right  to  be  proud,  in  an  equal  degree,  of 
her  material  strength  and  her  moral  authority. 

She  is  none  the  less  uneasy;  and  is  continually 
showing  signs  of  her  nervousness.  The  Emperor, 
although  he  sometimes  blames  those  that  always 
look  on  the  black  side  of  things  (Schwarzseher) , 
seems  sometimes  also  to  share  in  their  pessimism. 
Even  from  the  Chancellery  words  of  bitterness  are 
heard,  no  doubt  because  during  the  last  fifteen  years 
a  number  of  agreements  —  alliances,  understand- 
ings, friendships  —  have  been  concluded  in  Europe 
without  Germany^s  being  called  upon  to  participate 
in  them.  These  different  groupings,  while  formed 
outside  of  her,  have  not  broken  up  the  one  of  which 
she  is  head.  She  has,  however,  the  impression  that  , 
an  attempt  is  being  made  to  isolate  her.  This  im- 
pression is  erroneous,  yet  it  is  easily  explicable  by 
history.  When  the  habit  has  been  acquired  of 
reigning  without  any  one  to  dispute  the  right,  there 
is  a  tendency  to  find  in  the  divisions  of  others  a 
guarantee  of  the  power  one  exercises.  What  Ger- 
many dreads  is  not  being  reduced  to  solitude,  but 
to  see  her  neighbours  issue  from  theirs.  She  feels 
herself  isolated,  because  they  are  ceasing  to  be  so. 
The  warrant  of  her  peace  is  in  their  remaining  alone. 
^'Ubi  solitudinem  facit  pacem  appellat.'^^ 

*  The  German  Moroccan  policy  in  August  and  September  1908, 
with  regard  to  Muley  Hafid's  recognition,  confirms  the  fact  of  \\e 
existence  in  Berlin  of  a  systematic  opposition  against  France  a"- 
ways  and  everywhere. 


FRANCE  AND   PEACE  303 

Who  is  there,  however,  that  does  not  see  the  im- 
possibility of  her  intervening  in  these  recent  agree- 
ments? In  the  diplomatic  order  of  things,  as  also 
in  the  military,  she  had  managed  to  get  too  far  ahead. 
As  early  as  1882,  she  reared  up  in  the  midst  of 
Europe  the  ^  ^  block '^  of  her  alliances.  Was  it  likely 
that  the  new  groupings  would  themselves  also 
choose  Germany  as  a  pivot;  that  is  to  say,  as  a 
dictator?  Was  it  not  rather  a  necessity,  in  virtue 
of  a  law  of  equilibrium  imposed  in  turn  on  Charles  V, 
Louis  XIV,  and  Napoleon  I,  that  these  groupings 
should  constitute  themselves  outside  of  Germany's 
control?  Against  her?  No.  But  without  her. 
If  what  was  wished  at  Berlin  had  occurred,  Europe 
would  have  no  longer  been  Europe.  And  since 
Europe  did  exist,  it  was  necessary  that  diplomatic 
action  should  load  the  other  scale  of  the  balance  and 
reestablish  the  equilibrium.  Where  Germans  see  a 
deliberate  menace,  there  is  nothing  more  than  the 
action  of  a  law  of  political  physics  guiding  inter- 
national elements  towards  a  position  of  stability. 

If  Germany  would  accept  this  conception  of 
European  equilibrium,  if  she  would  admit  that  a 
river  which  overflows  returns  sooner  or  later  to  its 
bed  and  that  what  it  loses  in  width  it  regains  in 
regularity,  she  would  contribute  the  most  powerful 
guarantee  of  durability  to  the  world's  peace  and  her 
own  puissance.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  is  far  from 
being  the  case.  Germany  has  not  resigned  herself 
to  the  loss  of  her  supremacy.  It  is  true  that,  for 
thirty-seven  years,  she  has  continued  to  be  pacific. 


304  FRANCE  AND   THE  ALLIANCES 

But  since,  during  twenty  of  them,  she  dominated 
Europe  by  means  of  peace,  there  was  no  real  reason 
for  her  to  declare  war.  More  lately,  she  has  allowed 
opportunities  to  go  by  of  doing  so  which  Bismarck 
would  have  seized.  For  this  were  responsible  the 
Emperor  William's  honourable  scruples,  the  fear 
of  risking  a  glory  that  was  already  acquired,  and  the 
new  way  of  thinking  of  people  for  whom  war  is  no 
longer  the  only  trade.  But,  during  this  same  period, 
the  German  peace  has  been  a  nervous,  enervating 
peace,  reluctantly  and  ill-humouredly  accorded,  a 
precarious  peace  that  no  one  is  sure  of,  either  in 
Germany  or  out  of  it.  The  doubts  that  agitate  the 
minds  of  the  Emperor  and  his  Ministers,  that  incline 
them,  one  day,  to  accept  the  inevitable  and,  the  next 
day,  to  try  some  decisive  blow,  have  their  counter- 
effect  on  Europe,  which  suffers  from  the  morbid 
mentality  of  Berlin. 

If  this  state  of  things  persists,  the  risks  of  war  will 
soon  become  greater  than  the  chances  of  peace. 
The  less  Germany  is  disposed  to  resign  herself  to  the 
restored  situation  of  diplomatic  equality,  the  more 
the  other  Powers  will  apply  themselves  to  fortify 
such  equality  and  to  keep  it  free  from  her  attack. 
And  the  more  also,  in  order  to  mate  them,  war  will 
appear  to  her  as  the  only  solution.  Experience 
is  here  decisive.  Each  time  that  Germany  essays 
to  regain  Bismarck's  sceptre,  a  fresh  grouping  of 
Powers  rears  itself  in  her  way.  The  Russo-Japanese 
War,  which  was  the  outcome  of  her  policy  in  Asia, 
renders  her  supreme  in  Europe ;  the  Entente  Cordiale 


FRANCE   AND   PEACE  305 

reestablishes  the  equiUbrium.  Mr.  Delcasse's  fall 
is  a  German  apotheosis ;  the  Conference  of  Algeciras 
reduces  to  a  triumph  of  amour-propre  what  seemed, 
but  lately,  likely  to  be  a  lasting  success.  And,  all 
at  once,  there  is  a  creation  of  agreements  that, 
both  in  Asia  and  in  Europe,  break  the  levers 
by  means  of  which,  a  quarter  of  a  century  before, 
Germany  had  moved  and  manipulated  the  world. 
By  dint  of  such  an  exercise  of  pressure  and  counter- 
pressure,  one  ultimately  drifts  into  war ;  Prince  von 
Buelow  has  said  as  much,  and  he  was  right  to  say  it. 
But  what  should  be  added  is  that  the  pressure,  in  the 
first  instance,  came  from  Germany,  and  that  the 
solution  of  the  difficulty  should  come  from  Berlin, 
since  Berlin  is  responsible. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  France  has  no  offensive  designs. 
Whether  it  be  a  matter  for  congratulation  or  regret, 
she  has  lost  the  vocation  to  attack.  Her  conscience 
forbids  her  to  do  anything  which  resembles  an 
acceptance  of  the  wound  she  bears  in  her  side.  But 
the  sentiment  of  revenge  has  ceased  to  animate  her. 
Having  accustomed  herself  not  to  speak  of  it,  she 
has  at  length  given  up  thinking  of  it.  Nations  that 
wish  to  avenge  themselves  do  not  w^ait  forty  years. 
Between  Shimonasaki  and  Mukden,  ten  years  only 
intervened.  France  has  shown  less  moral  force, 
and  has  not  known  how  to  fix  the  goal  of  her  national 
life  in  the  prompt  reconstitution  of  her  territory. 
She  is  capable  of  making  war ;  but  she  does  not  desire 
it.  She  would  be  a  redoubtable  adversary,  and  no 
one  has  the  right  to  underestimate  her  chances  of 


306  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

success.  But  if  her  mobilization  plans  are  formed 
in  view  of  an  offensive,  her  policy,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  refractory  to  it. 

Her  right,  therefore,  to  require  that  this  policy, 
such  as  it  is,  should  be  admitted,  is  all  the  more 
unattackable.  Instead  of  seeking  for  her  revenge 
on  the  field  of  battle,  she  has  taken  it  in  the  Chancel- 
leries ;  and  this  is  the  very  least  of  what  she  owed  to 
herself.  She  will,  therefore,  yield  nothing  of  what 
she  has  conquered  on  this  ground.  She  was  de- 
termined not  to  remain  the  eternal  vanquished. 
She  was  determined  that  peace,  in  default  of  war, 
should  restore  honour  and  independence  to  her. 
German  threats  have  proved  to  her  the  necessity  of 
being  strong.  She  has  repaired  transient  errors; 
and,  having  limited  her  designs,  she  is  bound  to 
carry  them  out  without  weakness.  Henceforward, 
any  ^^ bluff, '^  like  that  of  1905,  would  produce  no 
effect.  She  will  not  allow  the  edifice  of  her  alliances 
or  her  friendships  to  be  touched.  If,  at  any  time, 
an  attack  should  be  made  on  it,  the  people,  who  have 
pledged  themselves  most  deeply  to  peace,  would, 
as  the  Socialists  themselves  have  declared,  all  of 
them  rise  ready  for  war.^ 

However,  in  the  Europe  of  the  present  day,  a 
Franco-German  dispute  is  not  the  only  thing  that 
might  cause  war.  In  the  world-game  of  nations, 
it  is  no  longer  France,  but  England,  who,  at  present, 
first  faces  Germany.  Commercial  rivalry,  naval 
rivalry,  hostility  of  minds,  an   equally   uncompro- 

*  Speech  of  Mr.  Jaurfes,  June  19,  1908. 


FRANCE  AND  PEACE  307 

mising  attitude,  everything  indicates  that  a  conflict 
is  to  be  feared.  It  is  true  that,  in  such  a  conflict, 
France  ought  to  wish  to  remain  neutral.  She  ought, 
since  she  is  not  England's  ally.  She  ought,  because 
her  geographic  situation,  by  exposing  her  to  the 
enemy's  blows,  bids  her  be  prudent.  She  ought, 
because  her  patience  in  waiting  to  avenge  her  own 
quarrel  forbids  her  to  engage,  except  for  this,  in 
that  of  others.  If  England  should  attack  Germany, 
France  is  not  pledged  to  attack  with  her.  If  Ger- 
many should  attack  England,  France  has  not 
promised  to  back  up  the  British  fleet  by  creating  a 
diversion  in  the  Vosges.  Her  intervention  would 
be  a  contradiction  to  her  past,  and  an  act  of  heed- 
lessness with  regard  to  the  future.  It  would  be  her 
right  and  her  duty  to  preserve  her  neutrality. 
But  would  she  be  able  to  exercise  this  right  ?  Would 
she  be  able  to  fulfil  this  duty  ? 

She  had  formerly  to  encounter  the  hostage  theory. 
This  barbarous  theory  has  since  developed;  and 
now,  somewhat  apologetically,  it  is  taken  up  in 
another  form.  The  German  Army,  we  are  told, 
being  reduced  to  impotence  by  a  naval  war,  would 
not  put  up  with  the  first  defeat.  It  would  insist  on 
fighting,  —  on  fighting  for  the  mere  sake  of  fighting, 
at  any  cost,  against  the  first  persons  to  hand,  against 
the  nearest  neighbour,  in  short  against  France. 
Consequently,  our  pacific  intentions  would  not  be 
sufficient  to  guarantee  us  peace.  We  should  be 
attacked,  not  even  as  hostages,  but  without  reason, 
without  pretext,  simply  in  order  to  find  the  German 


308  FRANCE  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

Army  something  to  do.  In  vain  we  should  have 
renounced  waging  a  war  of  revenge,  and  sacrificed 
our  sympathies  for  our  friends  to  the  higher  claim  of 
our  interests.    War  would  lay  hold  of  us  all  the  same. 

This  hypothesis  dictates  our  duty  to  us.  As 
Clausewitz  remarks,  all  war  must  cease  whenever 
the  conclusion  of  peace  is  less  onerous  than  the  con- 
tinuation of  war.  Turning  this  formula  round,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  only  way  to  avoid  the  outbreak 
of  war  is  to  render  it  more  onerous  to  one's  adver- 
saries than  the  maintenance  of  peace.  If,  in  pres- 
ence of  an  Anglo-German  struggle,  France  and  Rus- 
sia were  to  be  enfeebled  so  as  to  offer  an  easy  prey  to 
the  aggressor,  the  German  Army's  need  of  action 
would  doubtless  be  manifested  at  their  expense,  and 
this  without  much  trouble.  But  if,  on  the  con- 
trary, France  and  Russia  are  both  strong,  and  are 
capable,  each  being  sure  of  the  other,  of  making  any 
one  pay  dear  for  an  attack  on  their  neutrality,  then 
Germany,  however  ardent  for  war,  will  prefer  not  to 
utilize  her  army,  foreseeing  that  she  would  only  fail  in 
the  attempt.  She  will  shrink  from  a  course  of  action 
the  risk  of  which  would  be  greater  than  the  profit. 

The  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  therefore,  on  condi- 
tion it  holds  itself  ready  for  emergencies,  is  the  sole 
guarantee,  if  not  of  the  preservation  of  peace,  at 
least  of  the  circumscription  of  any  war.  It  is  the 
only  foundation  on  which  to  establish  the  league  of 
neutrals  which  will  be,  perhaps,  the  formula  of  the 
near  future.  In  a  period  of  crisis,  the  world's  secur- 
ity will  be  gauged  by  the  power  of  France  and  Russia. 


FRANCE  AND  PEACE  309 

Diplomacy  has  sufficed  to  restore  the  condition  of 
equiUbrium.  It  cannot  pretend  to  be  sufficient  for 
the  avoiding  of  war.  Our  right  to  act  poHtically  de- 
pends on  our  capacity  to  act  mihtarily.  We  can  only 
safeguard  the  freedom  of  our  alliances  and  our  friend- 
ships if  we  are  in  a  position  to  defend  them  on  a  field 
of  battle.  Our  army  would  have  been  the  key  of  our 
future  if  we  had  wished  to  render  peace  impossible. 
It  is  the  key  likewise,  if  we  wish  to  maintain  it. 

There  would  be  a  want  of  frankness  in  not  looking 
these  embarrassing  contingencies  plainly  in  the  face, 
the  more  so  as  the  uncertainty  of  mind  that  prevails 
in  Berlin  respecting  the  best  course  to  be  followed, 
and  the  increasing  irritation  caused  by  this  uncer- 
tainty in  London,  may,  at  any  time,  in  a  few  hours, 
transform  such  contingencies  into  facts.  However, 
nothing  yet  proves  that  the  bad  is  bound  to  change 
into  the  worse.  Through  a  wholesome  fear  of  the 
irreparable,  an  unstable  situation  may  last  for  years. 
Who  indeed  can  say  whether  Germany,  being  satis- 
fied with  what  is  definite  in  her  gains,  will  not  aban- 
don all  idea  of  compromising  them  by  insisting  on 
their  increase,  whether  she  will  not  rather  make  up 
her  mind  to  consolidate  by  a  durable  equilibrium 
what  was  originally  secured  to  her  by  an  ephemeral 
hegemony  ?  Should  she  sincerely  adopt  this  system, 
Germany  might  count  on  our  help  in  preserving  a 
peace  which  would  be  equal  for  all.  And  the  agree- 
ment, by  setting  its  seal  to  our  recovered  status, 
would  become,  among  the  nations  of  Europe,  the 
natural  leaven  of  reasonable  reconciliations. 


INDEX   OF   NAMES 


Abd  el  Aziz,  109, 110, 177, 178. 
Aberdeen,  Lord,  38. 
Aehrenthal,  Baron  von,  259,  260. 
Ahmed  Ben  Mou9a,  109. 
Alexander  II,  Czar,  6,  124,  125,  127, 

128,  129. 
Alexander  III,  Czar,  3,  5,  134,  137, 

147. 
Alexandra,  Czarina,  15,  16. 
Alexeieff,  Admiral,  221. 
Alfonso  XII,  King,  99. 
Alfonso  XIII,  King,  99,  106,  262. 
Almodovar,  Duke  of,  197. 
Andler,  Charles,  132  n. 
Andrassy,  Count,  127,  128,  129. 
Andre,  General,  181. 
Angers,  David  d',  270. 
Appert,  General,  5. 
Aubin,  Eugene,  111. 
Avellan,  Admiral,  15. 

Balfour,  Mr.,  247. 

Bassermann,  Mr.,  207. 

Battenberg,  Princess,  262. 

Baudin,  Pierre,  cited,  180. 

Beaconsfield,  Lord,  42. 

Bebel,  Mr.,  176,  191. 

Benckendorff,  Count,  241. 

Ben  Sedira,  Lieutenant,  118. 

Ben  Sliman,  119,  120. 

Be'rard,  Victor,  cited,  95,  96,  164, 

217. 
Beresford,  Lord  Charles,  215. 
Berezowski,  4. 
Bertin,  Mr.,  233. 
Beust,  Count  von,  134. 
Bezobrazoff,  20. 
Bihourd,  Mr.,  174,  175,  201. 
Bilderling,  General,  224. 
Billot,  JVIr.,  84,  86  n. 
Birilev,  Admiral,  15. 
Bismarck,  Count  Herbert  von,  138. 
Bismarck,  Prince,  2,  4, 6, 7,  8,  46,  47, 

55,  68,  83,  84,  85,  87,  91,  125,  127, 


130-149,  159,  162, 171, 180,  192,  203, 

206, 207,  209, 213,  255,  264,  274,  285, 

300,  304. 
Blanc,  Baron,  84. 
Blowitz,  Mr.  de,  124. 
Boisdeffre,  General  de,  12. 
Bompard,  Mr.,  28. 
Bonchamps,  Mr.  de,  44. 
Bonnal,  General,  153,  156. 
Bonzom,  Lucien,  278. 
Bou  Amama,  115. 
Bourgeois,  Leon,  201. 
Boutmy,  quoted,  285-286. 
Brandt,  Mr.  von,  213. 
Brazza,  Savorgnan  de,  41. 
Broglie,  Due  de,  5,  84. 
Buelow,  Count  von,  14,  50, 156,  160, 

165,  167,  168,  172, 173,  175, 176, 177 ; 

Prince  von,  185,  190-198,  201,  205, 

207,  257,  305. 
Burgess,  Professor,  296. 
Busch,  Maurice,  cited,  132. 

Calchas,  pseudonym,  237-238. 
Cambon,  Jules,  99. 
Cambon,  Paul,  62. 
Canrobert,  General,  152. 
Cantacuzene,  Prince,  136. 
Caprivi,  Count  von,  11,  148,  157. 
Carnot,  President,  15,  86,  152. 
Cassini,  Coimt,  215,  240,  254. 
Castro,  dictator,  283. 
Challemel-Lacour,  40. 
Chamberlain,  Joseph,  41. 
Charles  X,  3. 
Chateaubriand,  3. 
Chatham,  Lord,  36,  52. 
Chaudordy,  Comte  de,  5,  7. 
Cheradame,  Andre,  cited,  214. 
Cherisey,  Comte  de,  171. 
Chiala,  Luigi,  cited,  88. 
Clause witz,  308. 

Combes,  Prime  Minister,  22, 179. 
Constans,  Mr.,  10. 


311 


312 


INDEX  OF   NAMES 


Constantine,  Grand  Duke,  14. 
Coolidge,     Archibald    Gary,    cited, 

268,  283 ;  quoted,  290. 
Corsi,  General,  87. 
Courcel,  Baron  de,  140, 198. 
Crispi,  85,  86,  134, 161. 
Curzon,  Lord,  229,  244,  246,  248,  249, 

250,  252. 

Dane,  Louis,  246. 

Daniloff,  General,  224. 

Darcy,  Jean,  37  n. 

Daudet,  Ernest,  cited,  9,  11. 

Decazes,  Due  de,  6,  125. 

Delcasse;  Mr.,  15,  17,  20,  21,  23,  24, 
25,  44,  59,  62,  65,  68,  89, 90, 102,  118, 
119,  121,  171, 174,  179,  181,  182, 183, 
185,  186,  219,  223,  229,  272,  293, 305. 

Delaisy,  Francis,  cited,  164. 

Denbigh,  Lord,  76. 

Depretis,  de,  92,  130. 

Derby,  Lord,  124. 

Deschanel,  Mr.,  60. 

Dietrich,  Admiral,  295. 

Dragomiroff,  General,  15. 

Dreyfus,  18,  156,  179. 

Driault,  Edouard,  cited,  211. 

Duclerc,  Mr.,43. 

Edward  VII,  King,  57,  60,  61,  67,  62, 
69,  106,  160,  183,  207,  240,  258. 

Fallieres,  Mr.,  67,  273. 

Faure,  Felix,  15,  152. 

Fergusson,  Sir  James,  92. 

Ferry,  Jules,  39,  106,  133,  139,  140, 

Flamingo,  G.  M.,  cited,  89. 

Floquet,  Charles,  5. 

Floureus,  Mr.,  8. 

Forgemol,  General,  84. 

Fournier,  Captain,  119. 

Francis  I,  26. 

Francis  Joseph,  Emperor,  127,  128, 

129,  134. 
Frederick,  Emperor,  162. 
Fregosa,  83. 
Freycinet,  Mr.  de,  10, 12,  15, 140. 

Gaedke,  Colonel,  49. 
Gambetta,  7,  82. 


Genlis,  Madame  de,  61. 
Gervais,  Admiral,  11,  147. 
Giers,  Mr.  de,  8,  15,  136,  154,  247. 
Gontaut-Biron,  Viscount  de,   7  n., 

125. 
Gorst,  Sir  Eldon,  62. 
Gortchakoff,  Prince,  3, 6,  7, 125,  127, 

145,  246. 
Granville,  Lord,  40,  138,  247. 
Grenfell,  Lord,  76. 
Grevy,  President,  5. 
Grey,  Sir  Edward,  41,  241,  250,  251, 

252,  261. 

Habib  Hulla,  Ameer,  246. 
Hafid,  Muley,  111,  .302  n. 
Haldane,  Mr.,  72,  73,  74,  75,  76,77. 
Hanotaux,  Mr.,  42,  154;  cited,  6,  7, 

126. 
Hansen,  Jules,  cited,  12. 
Hardinge,  Sir  Charles,  229,  241. 
Hartmann,  Mr.,  4. 
Hassan,  Muley,  Sultan,  108. 
Hay,  John,  288. 
Henckel  of  Donnersmarck,  Prince, 

183. 
Henry  of  Prussia,  Prince,  214,  296. 
Henry  VII  of  Reuss,  Prince,  128. 
Herbette,  Mr.,  140. 
Hicks-Beach,  Sir  Michael,  44. 
Hill,  Mr.,  65. 
Hilmi  Pacha,  260. 
Hoskier,  Mr.,  9. 
Humbert,  King,  56,  130,  157. 

Ignatieff,  N.  P.,  135. 

Ireland,  Archbishop,  269. 

Isvolski,  Mr.,    15,    27,  231-232,  240, 

252,  260. 
Ito,  Marquis,  19,  219,  233. 

Jaray,  Gabriel  Louis,  59  n. 
Jaures,  Admiral,  4. 
Jaures,  Mr.,  14,  26,  306. 
Jefferson,  Thomas,  269. 
Jones,  Paul,  271. 
Jonnart,  Mr.,  117. 
Jusserand,  Mr.,  270. 

Kalnoky,  Count,  131,  134. 
Kaulbars,  General,  224. 


-^. 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


313 


Ketteler,  Baron  von,  216. 
Kitchener,  Lord,  44. 
Komaroff,  General,  238/ 
Korff,  General,  224. 
Koyander,  Mr.,  213. 
Kropotkine,  Prince,  4. 
Kruger,  President,  47,  55,  206. 
Kuhlmann,  Mr.  von,  171,  175,  177, 

223. 
Kurino,  Baron,  221,  234-235. 
Kuropatkin,    General,    20   n.,    168, 

222,  224. 

Labonlaye,  Mr.  de,  10,  11. 

Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  269. 

Lair,  Maurice,  cited,  48. 

Lambert,  Mr.,  65. 

Lamsdorff,  Count,  15,  197,  203,  221. 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  57,  62,  161,  229, 

252. 
Larras,  Captain,  118. 
Lauriston,  Colonel  de,  36. 
Laval,  Due  de,  38. 
Le  Flo,  General,  6,  125. 
Lemaitre,  Jules,  156. 
Leon  y  Castillo,  Senor  de,  100,  102. 
Leopold,  King,  42. 
Lesourd,  Andre,  278. 
Linevitch,  General,  224. 
Lobanoff,  Prince,  15. 
Loftus,  Lord  Augustus,  246. 
Loubet,  President,  14,  15,  17,  61,  69, 

90,  94,  100,  153,  165,  272. 
Louis,  Philippe,  36. 
Lvof,  General,  224. 
Lyautey,  General,  118. 
Lyons,  Lord,  40. 

Maccio,  Signor,  84. 
MacCormick,  Mr.,  271-272,  298. 
MacMahon,  Marshal,  125,  152. 
Magenta,  Duchess  of,  152. 
Malet,  Sir  Edward,  55. 
Mancini,  130. 

Marchand,  Captain,  44,  56. 
Marselli,  Colonel,  130. 
Martin,  Captain,  118. 
Matter,  Paul,  cited,  136,  142. 
Maximilian,  Emperor,  282. 
Mazarin,  26. 


Mazzini,  83. 
Menebhi,  109. 

Metternich,  Count  Wolff,  190. 
Michael,  Grand  Duke,  135. 
Mille,  Mr.,  104. 
Millerand,  Mr.,  154. 
Minto,  Lord,  246. 
Mizon,  Lieutenant,  41. 
jNIohrenheim,  Baron  de,  12,  15,  136. 
Moltke,  Marshal  von,  130,  147,  181. 
Monaco,  Prince  of,  199. 
Monroe,  President,  281-282. 
Mouson,  Sir  Edmund,  44. 
Montebello,  Marquis  de,  17. 
Monts,  Count  von,  197. 
Morocco,  Sultan  of,  204,  207. 
Motono,  Mr.,  225-226,  230-232. 
Mouravieff,  Count,  15, 155,  219. 
Mouzaffer  ed  Dine,  244. 
Muhlberg,  Mr.  vou,Jl75,  181. 
Miinster,  PrijLic.&^&2,  153. 

Naples,  Prince  of,  85,  89,  157. 
Napoleon  III,  3,  36,  83,  282. 
Neli(*^,  Mr.,  253-254. 
Nicholas  II,  Czar,  158,  258. 
Nicholson,  Sir  Arthur,  240,  250,  252, 

254. 
Noailles,  Marquis  de,  153. 

O'Connor,  General,  118. 
Ojetti,  Ugo,  166. 
Olney,  Richard,  297. 
Orloff,  Prince,  6, 135. 
Ouroussov,  Prince,  27. 

Pelletan,  Camille,  181. 

Perdiccaris,  Mr.,  120. 

Perier,  Jean,  58  n. 

Peter  the  Great,  2. 

Philippe  d'Orleans,  2. 

Pichon,  Mr.,  234. 

Pinon,  Rene,  cited,  19,  83,  213,  261. 

Polignac,  Prince  de,  3,  38. 

Porter,  General,  271,  272. 

Prinetti,  Signor,  90. 

Radolin,  Prince  von,   153,  171,  181, 

186-187. 
Radowitz,  Mr.  von,  6,  196,  197,  199, 

200,  294. 


314 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


Radzivill,  Prince  Anthony,  152. 
Raisuli,  brigand,  120. 
Rennenkarapf ,  General,  224. 
Reuss,  Prince  of,  131. 
Reventlow,  Count,  173, 175,  176. 
Revoil,  Mr.,  115,  196,   199,  200,  201, 

294. 
Ribot,  Mr.,  10,  12,  13,  15. 
Richelieu,  Due  de,  3,  26. 
Richthofen,  Baron  von,  174. 
Ritchie,  Mr.,  44. 
Roberts,  Lord,  75-76,  245. 
Robilant,  Comte  de,  87,  131, 134. 
Rochambeau,  269,  270. 
Rodjestvensky,    Admiral,    23,    222- 

223,  225,  226. 
Rohlfs,  quoted,  93. 
Roosevelt,  President,  51, 198,200, 201, 

223,  273,  286,  288,  293,  294,  295,  296. 
Root,  Elihu,  268,  272,  292. 
Rostand,  Edmond,  16. 
Rouire  cited,  238. 

Rouvier,  Mr.,  182,  185,  186, 187,  201. 
Rudini,  Marquis  di,  92. 

Saint-Hilaire,  Barthelemy,  40. 
St.  John,  Mr.,  39. 
Sakharoff,  General,  224. 
Salisbury,   Lord,  39,  43,  44,  45,  57, 

133,  297. 
Samsonoff,  General,  224. 
Sassoon,  Sir  Edward,  59. 
Schamyl,  Iman,  238. 
Schiemann,  Theodore,  256. 
Schoen,  Mr.  von,  197. 
Schouvaloff,  Count,  126,  149. 
Segonzac,  Marquis  de,  96. 
Sermoneta,  Duke  of,  93. 
Shaw,  Secretary,  287. 
Silvela,  Senor,  98. 
Simon,  Jules,  151,  152. 
Sinclair,  Louis,  59. 
Skobeleff,  135. 
Sorel,  Albert,  36. 
Soult,  Marshal,  36. 
Staal,  Mr.  de,  136. 
Stackelberg,  General,  222. 
Stockton,  Admiral,  271. 
Struwe,  Mr.  de,  137. 


Stumm,  Mr.  von,  198. 
Suyematsu,  Baron,  233-234. 

Taft,  William  H.,  289. 

Taillandier,     Saint-Rene,    24,    119, 

171,  175,  178. 
Talleyrand,  206. 
Tardieu,  Andre,  cited,  24,  67,  104, 

196,  254,  286,  295. 
Tattenbach,  Count  von,  197, 199. 
Thiers,  3,  84,  255. 
Toll,  Mr.  de,  137. 
Touchard,  Admiral,  28. 
Treitchske,  quoted,  51. 
Tschirschky,  Mr.  von,  201. 

Urquhart,  Mr.,  quoted,  37. 

Vandal,  Albert,  cited,  2. 
Varley,  Mr.,  120. 
Victor  Emmanuel,  83, 130. 
Victoria,  Queen,  36. 
Villanueva,  Serior,  100. 
Vladimir,  Grand  Duke,  15. 

Waddington,  W.  H.,  39. 
Waldeck-Rousseau,  Mr.,  179. 
Waldersee,  Count,  51,  56,  156,  216, 

296. 
Wallace,    Sir     Donald    Mackenzie, 

240,  254. 
Washington,  George,  266-267. 
Weisgerber,  Dr.  F.,  109  n. 
Wellington,  Duke  of,  38. 
White,  Henry,  273,  291,  292,  294. 
Wichnegradski,  Mr.,  9. 
William  I,  Emperor,  99, 127, 130, 134, 

135,  151,  163, 168. 
William  II,  Emperor,  24,  25,  47,  49, 

55,  56,  67,  146, 147, 151-168, 175, 176, 

177,  184,  185, 195,  198,  200,  203, 205, 

207,  214,  216,  223,  256,  293-296,  299, 

304. 
Wimpffen,  General  de,  115. 
Witte,  Count,  16,  18,  32,  34,  198,  200, 

Yacoub,  Sultan,  238. 
Younghusband,  Colonel,  244,  249. 

Zarubaieff,  General,  224. 


14  DAY  USE 

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